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In	  1974,	  the	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  Act	  replaced	  traditional	  
antipoverty	  programs	  with	  block	  grants,	  decentralizing	  decisions	  about	  federal	  
funding,	  ostensibly	  to	  give	  more	  control	  to	  local	  administrators.	  Despite	  the	  
pretense	  of	  providing	  greater	  flexibility,	  the	  focus	  of	  block	  grants	  on	  developing	  the	  
city’s	  physical	  environment	  circumscribed	  the	  options	  of	  local	  planners	  hoping	  to	  
pursue	  comprehensive	  community	  development.	  Community	  Underdevelopment	  
traces	  the	  struggle	  of	  government	  officials	  in	  New	  Orleans	  to	  fulfill	  the	  dual	  aims	  of	  
alleviating	  poverty	  and	  spurring	  economic	  growth	  in	  a	  time	  of	  fiscal	  crisis.	  Armed	  
with	  new	  social	  science	  techniques,	  planners	  believed	  that	  with	  accurate	  data	  
collection	  and	  systematic	  planning,	  they	  could	  achieve	  these	  ends	  simultaneously.	  
However,	  coping	  with	  an	  increasingly	  regressive	  tax	  regime	  and	  an	  anemic	  economy,	  
they	  soon	  discarded	  this	  vision.	  	  	  
Instead,	  block	  grants	  were	  used	  as	  stopgap	  measures	  in	  low-­‐income	  
communities	  while	  the	  city	  pursued	  economic	  development	  strategies	  that	  
administrators	  acknowledged	  would	  do	  little	  to	  improve	  conditions	  in	  those	  
neighborhoods.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade,	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  could	  
achieve	  what	  the	  public	  sector	  could	  not	  led	  the	  city	  to	  shift	  federal	  funds	  away	  from	  
antipoverty	  measures	  and	  toward	  boosting	  private-­‐sector	  involvement.	  Low-­‐income	  
communities	  in	  New	  Orleans	  struggled	  to	  resist	  this	  movement,	  but	  their	  efforts	  to	  
do	  so	  went	  unsupported	  by	  local	  officials	  who	  feared	  that	  supporting	  resource	  
redistribution	  would	  jeopardize	  relationships	  with	  private	  developers.	  
Consequently,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s,	  local	  urban	  development	  strategies	  had	  
largely	  abandoned	  antipoverty	  aims.	  	  Rather	  than	  read	  this	  period	  solely	  as	  the	  
precursor	  to	  President	  Ronald	  Reagan’s	  unprecedented	  cuts	  to	  urban	  aid,	  
Community	  Underdevelopment	  explores	  a	  steady	  shift	  in	  policy	  and	  ideology	  that	  
created	  a	  political	  climate	  conducive	  to	  such	  dramatic	  reductions.	  Moreover,	  my	  
focus	  on	  this	  period	  reveals	  that	  the	  movement	  to	  undercut	  antipoverty	  programs	  
did	  not	  originate	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Revolution.	  Instead,	  it	  was	  from	  its	  
inception	  a	  bipartisan	  assault.
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   1	  
INTRODUCTION	  
New	  Orleans	  and	  the	  Long	  Urban	  Crisis	  
“I	  think	  it	  is	  the	  most	  unreal	  outpost	  in	  American	  civilization;	  people	  living	  right	  at	  the	  
edge	  of	  catastrophe.”	  –	  Bill	  Kuhns1	  
	  
If	  you	  have	  visited	  New	  Orleans	  in	  July,	  you	  are	  aware	  of	  standing	  on	  the	  
most	  precarious	  of	  marshland.	  	  The	  air	  hangs	  heavy	  just	  above	  the	  street	  and	  seems	  
to	  breathe	  with	  you	  as	  you	  walk.	  	  In	  hurricane	  season,	  the	  weight	  of	  that	  air	  can	  be	  
the	  deadliest	  of	  natural	  disasters,	  throwing	  shotgun	  houses	  off	  their	  pilings	  and	  
bringing	  water	  almost	  15	  feet	  high.	  New	  Orleans	  has	  always	  been	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  
environmental	  catastrophe.	  	  However,	  a	  fragile	  ecosystem	  did	  not	  cause	  the	  uneven	  
development	  unmasked	  by	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  	  The	  city’s	  deep-­‐seated	  structural	  
inequalities	  were	  man-­‐made.2	  	  They	  were,	  in	  fact,	  the	  result	  of	  decades	  of	  policy	  
making	  at	  both	  the	  federal	  and	  local	  levels.	  	  These	  decisions	  reshaped	  (and	  
preserved,	  in	  many	  ways)	  the	  city’s	  socioeconomic	  landscape	  by	  shifting	  policy	  aims	  
away	  from	  alleviating	  poverty.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s,	  new	  federal	  programs	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Bill	  Kuhns,	  The	  People’s	  Directory;	  New	  Orleans,	  La:	  Fall	  1973.	  Reprinted	  in	  G.	  Lee	  
Caston	  and	  Rose	  Drill,	  "Input	  New	  Orleans,"	  Career	  Education	  Department,	  Spectrum	  High	  
School	  (New	  Orleans,	  1975).	  
	  
2	  At	  the	  time	  of	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  almost	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  city	  lived	  at	  or	  below	  the	  
federal	  poverty	  line;	  New	  Orleans	  maintained	  some	  of	  the	  grossest	  wealth	  inequities	  in	  the	  
country.	  There	  is	  a	  proliferation	  of	  good	  studies	  on	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐	  Katrina	  New	  Orleans.	  For	  
statistics	  on	  the	  storm	  and	  its	  aftermath,	  see	  Amy	  Liu,	  Matt	  Fellowes,	  and	  Mia	  Mabanta,	  
Special	  Edition	  of	  the	  Katrina	  Index:	  A	  One-­‐Year	  Review	  of	  Key	  Indicators	  of	  Recovery	  in	  Post-­‐
Storm	  New	  Orleans,	  Brookings	  Institute,	  2006,	  
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2011/8/29%20new%20orle
ans%20index/20060822_katrina.pdf	  (accessed	  December	  22,	  2013).	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focused	  on	  rebuilding	  the	  city’s	  tax	  base	  through	  private-­‐sector	  investments.3	  This	  
study	  traces	  this	  shift	  and	  its	  inevitable	  consequences	  for	  much	  of	  the	  city’s	  
population.	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  ask	  the	  simple	  question:	  How	  did	  New	  Orleans	  get	  here?	  
	  
I.	  
In	  August	  1974,	  the	  93rd	  Congress	  passed	  the	  Housing	  and	  Community	  
Development	  Act.	  The	  law	  would	  dramatically	  alter	  the	  relationship	  between	  cities	  
and	  the	  federal	  government	  by	  transferring	  oversight	  of	  urban	  aid	  from	  Congress	  to	  
mayors	  and	  opening	  federal	  housing	  and	  community	  development	  funds	  to	  citywide	  
use.	  Simultaneously,	  the	  Nixon	  White	  House	  began	  dismantling	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  
War	  on	  Poverty	  programs,	  which	  began	  less	  than	  10	  years	  prior.4	  Community	  
Development	  Block	  Grants	  (CDBGs)	  formed	  the	  centerpiece	  of	  the	  new	  legislation.	  
While	  CDBGs	  have	  never	  been	  the	  largest	  share	  of	  federal	  aid	  going	  into	  cities,	  they	  
are,	  however,	  indicative	  of	  the	  broad	  transformations	  in	  a	  cluster	  of	  federal	  urban	  
policies—including	  block	  grants	  in	  law	  enforcement,	  manpower	  and	  social	  
services—that	  disempowered	  black	  and	  low-­‐income	  constituencies	  by	  severing	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Or	  as	  historian	  Emily	  Lieb	  has	  described	  a	  similar	  process	  in	  Baltimore	  as,	  	  “it	  
shifted	  from	  a	  concern	  for	  the	  people	  who	  actually	  lived	  in	  Baltimore	  to	  a	  concern	  for	  the	  
people	  whom	  city	  officials	  wished	  would	  live	  there.”	  See	  Emily	  Lieb,	  Row	  House	  City:	  
Unbuilding	  Residential	  Baltimore,	  1940-­‐1980.	  (PhD	  Diss.,	  Columbia	  University,	  2010).	  	  
	  
4	  In	  his	  1964	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  Address,	  President	  Lyndon	  B.	  Johnson	  announced	  
that	  “this	  administration	  here	  and	  now	  declares	  a	  war	  on	  poverty”	  and	  asked	  Congress	  to	  
pass	  legislation	  that	  would	  enable	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  programs	  targeting	  urban	  poverty.	  In	  
August	  1964,	  Congress	  passed	  the	  Economic	  Opportunity	  Act	  of	  1964,	  which	  established	  the	  
Office	  of	  Economic	  Opportunity	  and	  authorized	  the	  creation	  of	  community	  action	  agencies.	  
See	  Lyndon	  B.	  Johnson,	  “State	  of	  the	  Union	  Address,”	  Delivered	  before	  Congress,	  January	  8,	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links	  between	  national	  policy	  and	  particular	  urban	  inequalities.	  The	  transition	  to	  
block	  grants	  as	  the	  popular	  form	  of	  federal	  urban	  aid	  detached	  federal	  outlays	  from	  
national	  urban	  directives,	  undermined	  newly	  established	  channels	  between	  low-­‐
income	  organizations	  and	  their	  congressional	  representatives,	  severed	  aid	  from	  the	  
oversight	  of	  community-­‐led	  initiatives,	  and	  reorganized	  community	  participation	  
through	  local	  choice.	  In	  place	  of	  these	  considerations,	  new	  aid	  and	  the	  ideology	  that	  
emerged	  alongside	  downplayed	  the	  effect	  of	  national	  structural	  economic	  change	  on	  
cities	  wrought	  by	  the	  confluence	  of	  deindustrialization,	  white	  flight,	  inadequate	  
investment	  in	  education,	  and	  institutionalized	  impediments	  to	  access	  for	  low-­‐
income	  communities.	  Instead,	  the	  ideology	  behind	  new	  urban	  aid	  blamed	  the	  failure	  
of	  federal	  programs	  to	  impact	  poverty	  populations	  on	  the	  inefficiencies	  of	  national	  
policy	  and	  reliance	  on	  public	  sector	  solutions.	  
Thus,	  CDBGs,	  which	  restricted	  utilization	  to	  hardware-­‐specific	  programs	  
(material	  development),	  reflected	  a	  transformation	  in	  ideology	  that	  prevailed	  
throughout	  the	  1970s	  that	  public	  efforts	  to	  confront	  the	  urban	  crisis	  had	  been	  a	  
failure.	  	  Alternatively,	  the	  discourse	  offered,	  in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  growing	  needs	  
of	  the	  nation’s	  cities,	  the	  private	  sector	  needed	  to	  take	  on	  a	  new	  role	  in	  the	  process	  
of	  urban	  revitalization.	  The	  idea	  that	  the	  marketplace	  could	  facilitate	  what	  the	  
government	  had	  not	  masked	  the	  vastly	  unequal	  access	  to	  employment	  and	  
resources	  of	  low-­‐income	  city	  dwellers.	  It	  also	  obscured	  the	  way	  that	  this	  ideology	  
and	  subsequent	  programs	  coalesced	  to	  steer	  the	  conversation	  about	  urban	  life	  away	  
from	  addressing	  poverty	  altogether.	  The	  consequences	  of	  this	  policy	  shift	  altered	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both	  the	  constituencies	  receiving	  federal	  funding	  and	  the	  capacity	  of	  city	  
governments	  to	  address	  urban	  inequality.	  
This	  dissertation	  explores	  the	  implications	  of	  federal	  action	  in	  a	  case	  study	  of	  
the	  use	  of	  Community	  Development	  Block	  Grants	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  I	  chose	  New	  
Orleans	  for	  two	  reasons.	  The	  first	  was	  a	  desire	  to	  situate	  the	  well-­‐known	  aftermath	  
of	  Katrina	  in	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  the	  responses	  of	  cities	  to	  urban	  inequality	  are	  
shaped	  by	  federal	  urban	  policy	  and	  priorities.	  	  Federal	  disinvestment	  in	  New	  
Orleans	  began	  nearly	  forty	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  storm.	  Second,	  the	  New	  Orleans	  story	  
illuminates	  a	  transition	  that	  is	  exemplary	  of	  1970s	  urban	  development.	  A	  liberal,	  
pro-­‐growth	  mayor	  was	  voted	  in	  on	  a	  platform	  that	  included	  a	  commitment	  to	  civil	  
rights	  and	  antipoverty	  reform.	  When	  national	  economic	  transformation	  undermined	  
the	  capacity	  of	  local	  administrators	  to	  expand	  these	  commitments	  in	  meaningful	  
ways,	  city	  leaders	  supported	  reorganizing	  federal	  aid	  around	  principles	  that	  
narrowed	  the	  potential	  for	  purposeful	  redistribution.	  The	  story	  of	  how	  local	  officials	  
and	  planners,	  with	  great	  optimism,	  sought	  to	  remake	  the	  city	  reveals	  what	  
happened	  as	  the	  nation	  retreated	  from	  a	  war	  on	  poverty.	  	  	  
	  
II.	  
Despite	  being	  one	  of	  the	  nation’s	  50	  largest	  cities,	  New	  Orleans	  developed	  in	  
ways	  that	  bore	  little	  resemblance	  to	  other	  American	  urban	  spaces.	  In	  1970,	  New	  
Orleans	  had	  only	  just	  begun	  to	  share	  in	  the	  largesse	  of	  federal	  urban	  aid.	  As	  a	  result	  
of	  a	  Louisiana	  ban	  on	  urban	  renewal	  from	  1954	  through	  1968,	  construction	  was	  
dormant	  in	  New	  Orleans	  while	  cities	  across	  the	  nation	  remade	  their	  skylines	  with	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the	  assistance	  of	  federal	  programs.5	  In	  addition,	  there	  was	  a	  lack	  of	  business-­‐led	  
coalitions	  between	  real	  estate	  interests	  and	  local	  governing	  officials	  that	  promoted	  
economic	  growth	  in	  such	  cities	  as	  San	  Francisco,	  New	  Haven,	  and	  Boston.	  Instead,	  in	  
the	  era	  of	  nationwide	  downtown	  growth,	  New	  Orleans	  experienced	  utter	  economic	  
stagnation.	  
The	  absence	  of	  federal	  urban	  renewal	  programs	  preserved	  an	  almost	  
aristocratic	  culture	  in	  the	  city	  reliant	  on	  segregation	  and	  the	  supremacy	  of	  an	  elite	  
social	  class.	  Old	  families	  with	  old	  money	  controlled	  not	  just	  the	  social	  aristocracy,	  
embodied	  in	  Mardi	  Gras	  krewes	  and	  such	  elite	  civic	  societies	  as	  the	  Boston	  and	  
Pickwick	  clubs,	  but	  also	  banks	  and	  a	  series	  of	  semi-­‐independent	  boards	  and	  
agencies	  that	  ensnared	  local	  government	  in	  bargaining	  with	  the	  elite’s	  collective	  
demands.6	  The	  boards	  and	  agencies,	  relics	  of	  the	  post-­‐Reconstruction	  era,	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  only	  such	  ban	  in	  the	  country,	  the	  law	  operated	  until	  a	  successful	  lobby	  
stemming	  from	  a	  coalition	  between	  New	  Orleans	  businesses	  and	  civil	  rights	  activists	  was	  
able	  to	  have	  it	  overturned	  in	  1968.	  	  
	  
6	  In	  just	  one	  of	  these	  agencies,	  the	  Dock	  Board,	  more	  than	  75	  percent	  of	  its	  
membership	  was	  drawn	  from	  the	  Boston	  and	  Pickwick	  clubs.	  	  The	  supremacy	  of	  the	  Dock	  
Board	  in	  city	  politics	  was	  twofold:	  first,	  the	  largest	  source	  of	  city	  revenue	  and	  jobs	  
throughout	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  came	  from	  the	  shipping	  and	  port	  
industries	  of	  New	  Orleans.	  Second,	  the	  Dock’s	  Board	  of	  Commissioners	  was	  linked,	  through	  
the	  operation	  of	  steamship	  companies	  and	  warehouses,	  to	  the	  monetization	  of	  the	  port	  
industry.	  While	  many	  of	  these	  elite	  had,	  by	  the	  1970s,	  diversified	  their	  interests	  in	  stocks	  
and	  banking,	  none	  usurped	  the	  power	  of	  the	  committee.	  The	  concentration	  of	  their	  interests	  
allowed	  the	  business	  elite	  in	  New	  Orleans	  to	  form	  coalitions	  around	  these	  extra-­‐
governmental	  boards	  and	  commissions,	  thus	  exercising	  power	  without	  election	  over	  all	  the	  
city’s	  essential	  functions.	  For	  example,	  leading	  members	  of	  the	  Sewerage	  and	  Water	  Board	  
also	  held	  board	  positions	  or	  elected	  appointments	  in	  the	  city’s	  top	  banks:	  Morgan	  Shaw	  was	  
the	  vice	  president	  of	  the	  Sixth	  Federal	  Reserve	  and	  Robert	  Walmsley	  maintained	  a	  board	  
position	  at	  the	  National	  Bank	  of	  Commerce.	  Perhaps	  most	  illustrative	  of	  the	  incestuous	  
nature	  of	  banking,	  political	  power,	  and	  social	  aristocracy	  was	  Eads	  Poitevent.	  From	  an	  old	  
New	  Orleans	  family,	  Poitevent	  was	  the	  head	  of	  the	  New	  Orleans	  International	  City	  Bank,	  
chair	  of	  the	  Dock	  Board,	  and	  the	  1974	  Rex	  King	  of	  Mardi	  Gras.	  	  The	  tight-­‐knit	  nature	  of	  these	  
communities	  helped	  maintain	  power	  despite	  lack	  of	  official	  control	  of	  the	  city.	  As	  historian	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designed,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  rising	  working-­‐class	  machines,	  to	  control	  city	  politics	  
without	  electorate	  approval.7	  Removing	  important	  city	  functions	  (city	  debt,	  city	  
planning,	  control	  of	  the	  docks,	  sewerage,	  and	  water)	  from	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  
mayor’s	  office,	  the	  boards	  and	  commissions	  entrenched	  the	  city’s	  most	  important	  
decisions	  within	  an	  increasingly	  autonomous	  elite,	  thus	  allowing	  members	  to	  
determine	  the	  city’s	  economic	  options	  while	  avoiding	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  elected	  office.	  	  
By	  1966,	  the	  boards	  and	  commissions	  controlled,	  with	  little	  oversight,	  nearly	  
two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  city’s	  budget,	  some	  $70	  million	  that	  year.8	  The	  control	  of	  resources	  
exercised	  by	  the	  diverse	  boards	  and	  agencies	  ensured	  that	  zoning,	  land	  use,	  and	  
long-­‐term	  planning	  remained	  subject	  to	  the	  needs,	  desires,	  and	  political	  preferences	  
of	  the	  elite.	  By	  shaping	  zoning	  restrictions	  along	  with	  the	  construction	  of	  roads	  and	  
housing	  and	  transportation	  routes,	  these	  committees	  also	  guaranteed	  the	  physical	  
intractability	  of	  segregation.9	  Their	  actions	  were	  not	  just	  guided	  by	  the	  looming	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Arnold	  Hirsch	  once	  wrote,	  “In	  no	  other	  American	  city	  does	  birth,	  as	  opposed	  to	  
achievement,	  count	  for	  so	  much.”	  See	  Arnold	  R.	  Hirsch,	  "New	  Orleans:	  Sunbelt	  in	  the	  
Swamp,"	  in	  Sunbelt	  Cities:	  Politics	  and	  Growth	  Since	  World	  War	  II	  (Austin:	  University	  of	  
Texas	  Press,	  1983),	  118.	  For	  a	  history	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Dock	  Board	  in	  particular,	  see	  
Brian	  L.	  Azcona,	  "The	  Razing	  Tide	  of	  the	  Port	  of	  New	  Orleans:	  Power,	  Ideology,	  Economic	  
Growth	  and	  the	  Destruction	  of	  Community,"	  Social	  Thought	  and	  Research	  27	  (2006),	  69-­‐
101.	  
	  
7	  New	  Orleans	  has	  often	  been	  described	  as	  a	  “banana	  republic,”	  operating	  more	  like	  
a	  colonial	  outpost	  than	  an	  American	  city.	  See	  T.	  Harry	  Williams,	  "The	  Gentleman	  from	  
Louisiana:	  Demagogue	  or	  Democrat,"	  Journal	  of	  Southern	  History	  26,	  no.	  1	  (1960),	  3-­‐21.	  
	  
8	  Robert	  John	  Montgomery	  Matteson,	  Community	  Development	  Comments	  2,	  no.	  3	  
(June	  1978),	  1.	  Matteson	  Associates,	  Dimensions	  and	  Solutions	  of	  New	  Orleans'	  Financial	  
Dilemma:	  Report	  of	  a	  Reconnaissance	  Study,	  (New	  Orleans:	  Bureau	  of	  Governmental	  
Research,	  1966).	  	  
	  
9	  Despite	  federal	  mandates	  to	  desegregate	  public	  and	  private	  accommodations,	  the	  
New	  Orleans	  elite	  firmly	  resisted.	  The	  New	  Orleans	  Audubon	  Gulf	  Course	  denied	  entry	  to	  
black	  patrons	  until	  1983,	  while	  the	  New	  Orleans	  Athletic	  Club	  continued	  to	  enforce	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threat	  of	  civil	  rights	  agitation;	  the	  elite	  also	  sought	  to	  prevent	  unfettered	  economic	  
growth.	  New	  businesses	  (and	  new	  powerful	  players)	  would	  threaten	  the	  gilded	  
society	  that	  controlled	  the	  city's	  economy;	  consequently,	  the	  elite	  did	  not	  simply	  
mediate	  development,	  they	  actively	  discouraged	  it.	  The	  elite	  circles	  resisted	  both	  
state-­‐	  and	  privately-­‐sponsored	  growth	  so	  adamantly	  that	  sociologist	  Charles	  Chai	  of	  
Tulane	  University	  concluded,	  "These	  social	  kinds	  simply	  want	  stagnation."10	  	  He	  was	  
not	  alone	  in	  that	  categorization.	  Writers	  for	  Figaro,	  the	  city’s	  alternative	  weekly,	  
wrote	  that	  the	  city’s	  social	  elite	  was	  best	  characterized	  by	  “its	  lack	  of	  activity.	  Its	  
refusal	  to	  play	  a	  leadership	  role….”	  Thus,	  the	  elite's	  real	  power	  “appear[ed]	  to	  be	  a	  
veto	  power.”11	  
Nevertheless,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1960s,	  despite	  the	  divergent	  path	  of	  
economic	  development	  (or	  lack	  thereof),	  New	  Orleans	  more	  prominently	  resembled	  
cities	  in	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  than	  it	  did	  neighboring	  Sunbelt	  cities	  prospering	  from	  the	  
growth	  of	  cheaper	  markets.	  Fiscally	  strained,	  the	  city	  was	  burdened	  by	  unusually	  
restrictive	  tax	  codes,	  an	  economy	  based	  on	  tourism	  and	  a	  rapidly	  shrinking	  port	  
industry—the	  result	  of	  the	  board’s	  failure	  to	  invest	  in	  modernization—and	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
segregation	  well	  into	  the	  1990s.	  In	  1992,	  all-­‐white	  Mardi	  Gras	  krewes	  decided	  not	  to	  parade	  
rather	  than	  be	  forced	  to	  integrate	  their	  ranks.	  See	  Kent	  B.	  Germany,	  New	  Orleans	  After	  the	  
Promises:	  Poverty,	  Citizenship,	  and	  the	  Search	  for	  the	  Great	  Society	  (Atlanta:	  University	  of	  
Georgia	  Press,	  2007).	  	  
	  
10	  Chai	  argued	  that	  mayoral	  interests	  no	  longer	  ran	  the	  city;	  rather,	  a	  
conglomeration	  of	  elite	  interests	  dictated	  the	  planning	  directions	  and	  boundaries	  of	  
government.	  Quoted	  in	  Marlene	  Keller	  and	  Michael	  Peter	  Smith,	  "'Managed	  Growth'	  and	  the	  
Politics	  of	  Uneven	  Development	  in	  New	  Orleans,"	  in	  Restructuring	  the	  City:	  The	  Political	  
Economy	  of	  Urban	  Redevelopment,	  ed.	  Susan	  Fainstein	  and	  Norman	  Fainstein,	  126-­‐166	  (New	  
York:	  Longman,	  1986),	  131.	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increasingly	  poor	  population.	  While	  the	  integration	  of	  schools	  that	  began	  in	  1960	  
did	  not	  ensure	  the	  end	  of	  segregation,	  it	  did	  guarantee	  the	  continued	  flight	  of	  the	  
white	  middle	  class	  from	  the	  city.12	  Between	  1960	  and	  1970,	  16	  percent	  of	  the	  city’s	  
white	  population	  left	  the	  municipality.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  ban	  on	  urban	  renewal,	  federal	  
funds	  had	  nevertheless	  dramatically	  reshaped	  the	  city’s	  landscape.	  Those	  fleeing	  
were	  aided	  by	  increased	  state	  and	  federal	  subsidies	  for	  highway	  and	  road	  
construction	  uniting	  suburb	  and	  city	  as	  well	  as	  federal	  housing	  subsidies	  for	  white,	  
working-­‐class	  homeownership.13	  	  
Federal	  funding	  affected	  the	  population	  that	  remained	  in	  New	  Orleans	  as	  
well.	  	  The	  city’s	  residential	  geography	  was	  redrawn	  with	  federal	  public	  housing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Fears	  concerning	  integration	  were	  not	  strictly	  residential.	  By	  1960,	  there	  was	  a	  
powerful	  local	  civil	  rights	  struggle	  emerging.	  First	  around	  schools,	  and	  then	  around	  political	  
and	  economic	  rights,	  the	  calls	  for	  integration	  by	  grassroots	  leadership	  could	  not	  be	  ignored.	  	  
The	  integration	  of	  downtown	  businesses	  and	  tourist	  accommodations	  took	  on	  particular	  
significance	  by	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  1960s.	  In	  1963,	  a	  coalition	  of	  grassroots	  activists,	  including	  
Oretha	  Castle	  Haley	  and	  Revered	  A.L.	  Davis,	  organized	  the	  Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Consumers’	  
League	  to	  boycott	  downtown	  businesses	  that	  refused	  to	  integrate	  hiring	  and	  customer	  
practices.	  Through	  a	  series	  of	  sit-­‐ins,	  strikes,	  and	  boycotts,	  the	  coalition	  forced	  city	  
governing	  officials	  and	  business	  owners	  to	  consider	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  city’s	  economy	  
of	  not	  integrating.	  	  It	  was	  not	  until	  1970,	  however,	  that	  the	  city	  passed	  a	  mandate	  
integrating	  public	  accommodations.	  Integration	  of	  public	  spaces	  and	  public	  schools	  had	  a	  
profound	  effect.	  By	  1975,	  80	  percent	  of	  the	  students	  at	  the	  city’s	  public	  schools	  were	  black.	  	  
For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  local	  civil	  rights	  struggles	  in	  New	  Orleans,	  see	  Kim	  Lacy	  Rogers,	  
Righteous	  Lives:	  Narratives	  of	  the	  New	  Orleans	  Civil	  Rights	  Movement	  (New	  York:	  New	  York	  
University	  Press,	  1995)	  and	  	  Adam	  Fairclough,	  Race	  &	  Democracy:	  The	  Civil	  Rights	  Struggle	  
in	  Louisiana,	  1915-­‐1972	  (Atlanta,	  Georgia:	  University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  1999).	  For	  more	  on	  
schooling	  in	  New	  Orleans,	  see	  Donald	  E.	  DeVore	  and	  Joseph	  Logsdon,	  Crescent	  City	  Schools:	  
Public	  Education	  in	  New	  Orleans,	  1841-­‐1991	  (Lafayette:	  University	  of	  Louisiana	  Press,	  1991).	  
	  
13	  Marlene	  Keller	  and	  Michael	  Peter	  Smith,	  "'Managed	  Growth'	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  
Uneven	  Development	  in	  New	  Orleans,"	  in	  Restructuring	  the	  City:	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  
Urban	  Redevelopment,	  ed.	  Susan	  Fainstein	  and	  Norman	  Fainstein,	  128	  (New	  York:	  Longman,	  
1986).	  For	  more	  on	  these	  trends,	  see	  Kenneth	  T.	  Jackson,	  Crabgrass	  Frontier:	  The	  
Suburbanization	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1985);	  and	  
Thomas	  J.	  Sugrue,	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Urban	  Crisis:	  Race	  and	  Inequality	  in	  Postwar	  Detroit	  
(Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2005).	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funds	  in	  line	  with	  a	  policy	  of	  total	  segregation.14	  The	  first	  city	  to	  receive	  aid	  through	  
the	  Wagner	  Act	  of	  1935,	  New	  Orleans	  used	  $30	  million	  in	  federal	  funds	  to	  build	  six	  
public	  housing	  projects.15	  The	  same	  highways	  that	  allowed	  white	  working	  and	  
middle-­‐class	  residents	  to	  leave	  cut	  across	  stable	  black	  neighborhoods,	  dividing	  
public	  housing	  from	  better-­‐off	  black	  communities.	  This	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  
destabilizing	  black	  neighborhoods	  and	  isolating	  poverty.16	  	  	  
	  Businesses	  also	  abandoned	  the	  city.	  From	  1960	  to	  1970,	  every	  sector	  of	  the	  
New	  Orleans	  economy	  declined	  except	  for	  the	  service	  industry,	  which	  grew	  by	  20	  
percent.17	  By	  1970,	  city	  officials	  estimated	  that	  nearly	  20	  percent	  of	  the	  population	  
lived	  below	  the	  poverty	  line,	  with	  nearly	  40	  percent	  classified	  as	  low-­‐income.	  Jobs	  
were	  scarce,	  particularly	  for	  unskilled,	  poorly	  educated,	  low-­‐income	  residents.	  New	  
Orleans’s	  unemployment	  rate	  increased	  in	  both	  real	  numbers	  and	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Many	  Southern	  cities	  did	  not	  have	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  distinct	  patterns	  of	  
segregation	  enforced	  in	  the	  North	  until	  federal	  funding	  allowed	  for	  new	  technological	  
advances,	  roads,	  and	  housing	  to	  develop	  that	  were	  organized	  to	  enforce	  a	  residential	  Jim	  
Crow	  order.	  See	  Daphne	  Spain,	  "Race	  relations	  and	  residential	  segregation	  in	  New	  Orleans:	  
Two	  centuries	  of	  paradox,"	  Annals	  of	  the	  American	  Academy	  of	  Political	  and	  Social	  Science,	  
1979,	  82-­‐96.	  	  
	  
15	  The	  two	  white	  housing	  projects	  were	  in	  downtown	  New	  Orleans,	  while	  the	  four	  
projects	  built	  for	  black	  families	  were	  constructed	  on	  the	  city’s	  peripheries.	  As	  the	  city’s	  poor	  
population	  grew,	  instead	  of	  locating	  new	  public	  housing	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  the	  city,	  the	  
Housing	  Authority	  of	  New	  Orleans	  rebuked	  the	  scatter	  request	  of	  HUD	  by	  nearly	  doubling	  
the	  size	  of	  existing	  projects,	  locating	  new	  units	  alongside	  old	  ones.	  	  For	  a	  full	  discussion	  of	  
the	  history	  of	  public	  housing	  in	  New	  Orleans,	  see	  Margaret	  Gonzalez-­‐Perez,	  "A	  House	  
Divided:	  Public	  Housing	  Policy	  in	  New	  Orleans,"	  Louisiana	  History	  44,	  no.	  4	  (2003),	  455.	  
	  
16	  Highway	  I-­‐10,	  a	  direct	  line	  from	  the	  suburbs	  of	  Jefferson	  Parish	  and	  St.	  Bernard’s	  
parish	  to	  the	  Central	  Business	  District,	  removed	  hundreds	  of	  stable,	  black	  working-­‐class	  
families	  in	  the	  Tremé	  area,	  severing	  it	  from	  more	  middle-­‐class	  areas	  of	  the	  city,	  but	  also	  
isolating	  the	  Iberville	  and	  St.	  Bernard	  projects	  from	  the	  resources	  of	  that	  once	  viable	  
community.	  The	  road	  was	  completed	  in	  1968.	  
	  
17	  Anthony	  J.	  Mumphrey	  and	  Pamela	  H.	  Moomau,	  "New	  Orleans:	  An	  Island	  in	  the	  
Sunbelt,"	  Public	  Administration	  Quarterly	  8,	  no.	  1	  (1984),	  94.	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the	  labor	  force	  every	  year	  after	  1966.18	  More	  than	  23	  percent	  of	  New	  Orleans	  
residents	  were	  making	  less	  than	  $3,000	  a	  year	  while	  the	  median	  income	  was	  less	  
than	  $8,000.19	  As	  unemployment	  rose,	  the	  city’s	  poor	  areas	  also	  grew	  more	  isolated.	  	  
By	  1970,	  low-­‐income	  areas	  of	  the	  city	  were	  nearly	  90	  percent	  black	  and	  contained	  
nearly	  82	  percent	  of	  the	  city’s	  unemployed.	  Those	  poverty	  areas	  garnered	  only	  4	  
percent	  of	  the	  city’s	  gross	  income	  while	  the	  top	  one-­‐fifth	  of	  income	  earners	  in	  New	  
Orleans	  received	  nearly	  45	  percent.20	  Segregation,	  both	  physical	  and	  economic,	  
defined	  the	  city.	  	  	  
An	  evaluation	  in	  1966	  of	  the	  city’s	  impending	  fiscal	  crisis	  exposed	  real	  
barriers	  to	  creating	  positive	  economic	  change.	  The	  report,	  written	  by	  Matteson	  
Associates,	  an	  independent	  planning	  firm,	  identified	  the	  greatest	  source	  of	  fiscal	  
instability	  as	  the	  punitive	  relationship	  of	  the	  state	  Legislature	  to	  the	  city’s	  governing	  
capacity.	  Dating	  back	  to	  the	  Huey	  Long	  era,	  policies	  of	  punishing	  New	  Orleans	  by	  
removing	  its	  ability	  to	  generate	  revenue	  had	  all	  but	  crushed	  the	  city’s	  ability	  to	  
support	  its	  own	  services.	  21	  A	  restriction	  on	  the	  use	  of	  sales	  taxes	  was	  coupled	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  James	  Bobo,	  "Housing	  in	  New	  Orleans,"	  in	  Presented	  to	  the	  Task	  Force	  on	  Assisted	  
Housing,	  Subcommittee	  on	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  U.S.	  
House	  of	  Representatives	  Committee	  on	  Banking,	  Finance	  and	  Urban	  Affairs,	  February	  10,	  
1978).	  
	  
19	  Emmett	  S.	  Moten,	  "Analysis	  of	  Bobo’s	  Report	  on	  New	  Orleans	  Economy:	  Pro	  Bono	  
Publico,	  June	  1975,”	  Box	  7,	  Folder	  Bobo	  Report,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  
Central	  Files	  1973-­‐1979,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  
Louisiana.	  	  
	  
20	  James	  R.	  Bobo,	  The	  New	  Orleans	  Economy:	  Pro	  Bono	  Publico?,	  Working	  Paper	  (New	  
Orleans:	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  1975),	  26.	  
	  
21	  The	  exemption,	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  reign	  of	  Huey	  Long,	  created	  a	  system	  through	  
which	  nearly	  80	  percent	  of	  Louisiana	  citizens	  paid	  no	  property	  taxes	  at	  all.	  Despite	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  Great	  Depression	  and	  the	  growing	  need	  of	  both	  state	  and	  local	  governments,	  the	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an	  exorbitant	  homestead	  exemption	  ($50,000	  on	  all	  homes)	  that	  severely	  limited	  
the	  use	  of	  property	  taxes	  to	  generate	  municipal	  revenue.	  While	  nationwide,	  cities	  
raised	  more	  than	  80	  percent	  of	  their	  revenue	  from	  property	  taxes,	  the	  percentage	  of	  
New	  Orleans	  revenue	  funded	  through	  property	  taxation	  declined	  each	  year.22	  The	  
property	  tax,	  constrained	  by	  the	  Legislature,	  was	  inflexible	  and	  immovable.	  As	  a	  
result,	  millage	  rates	  remained	  stagnant,	  assessments	  were	  conducted	  by	  political	  
operatives	  who	  had	  little	  reason	  to	  create	  an	  equalized	  and	  fair	  system,	  and	  
homestead	  laws	  created	  a	  bevy	  of	  exemptions	  that	  both	  local	  officials	  and	  their	  
constituents	  used	  for	  patronage.23	  The	  inability	  to	  garner	  revenue	  through	  property	  
taxation	  left	  the	  city	  with	  a	  tax	  program	  that	  was	  “uneven	  and	  basically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
homestead	  exemption	  remained	  sanctimoniously	  as	  the	  Holy	  Grail	  within	  Louisiana	  tax	  
policy.	  Firmly	  entrenched	  in	  the	  state’s	  political	  framework,	  homestead	  exemptions	  
furthered	  the	  inequities	  of	  assessments	  as	  tax	  assessors	  would	  lower	  assessment	  ratios	  to	  
ensure	  full	  coverage	  for	  people.	  There	  were	  numerous	  cases	  of	  assessors	  being	  paid	  off	  to	  
value	  property	  just	  under	  the	  exemption	  level.	  This	  kind	  of	  manipulation	  meant	  that	  
parishes	  with	  low	  assessment	  rates	  were	  given	  a	  larger	  percentage	  of	  the	  homestead	  relief	  
fund	  from	  the	  state	  than	  those	  with	  higher	  percentages	  of	  need,	  like	  Orleans.	  See	  Richard	  M.	  
Hynes,	  Anup	  Malani	  and	  Eric	  A.	  Posner,	  "The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Property	  Exemption	  
Laws,"	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Economics	  (2004),	  47.	  
	  
22	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Tax	  Setup	  Bars	  Progress—Davis,”	  December	  15,	  1966,	  4.	  
	  
23	  If	  tax	  assessment	  was	  an	  avenue	  to	  larger	  political	  success,	  it	  was	  also	  a	  coveted	  
and	  powerful	  position;	  for	  the	  right	  price,	  improvements	  could	  be	  overlooked,	  home	  
additions	  could	  go	  unseen.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  the	  politicization	  of	  property	  taxes	  in	  the	  state	  
of	  Louisiana	  led	  to	  major	  discrepancies	  in	  the	  local	  taxation,	  not	  just	  between	  parishes	  but	  
within	  them	  as	  well.	  By	  1971,	  there	  were	  cases	  of	  neighboring	  houses	  being	  assessed	  at	  
such	  disparate	  rates,	  there	  was	  no	  way	  to	  validate	  who	  was	  paying	  taxes	  and	  who	  was	  not.	  	  
In	  one	  instance,	  a	  house	  with	  the	  market	  value	  of	  $30,000	  was	  assessed	  at	  $21,000	  while	  
another	  house	  in	  the	  parish	  valued	  at	  $32,000	  was	  assessed	  at	  a	  mere	  $3,000.	  Thus,	  
suburban	  parishes	  could	  profit	  and	  expand	  services	  with	  no	  expense	  coming	  from	  their	  
property	  owners.	  While	  Jefferson	  Parish	  received	  some	  $250	  for	  each	  homestead	  exemption	  
through	  a	  state	  property	  relief	  fund	  formula,	  New	  Orleans	  was	  given	  just	  $72	  for	  each	  
comparable	  exemption.	  New	  Orleans	  remained	  a	  loser	  in	  the	  arena	  of	  property	  taxes	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regressive.”24	  It	  also	  left	  city	  services	  in	  an	  extremely	  precarious	  bind	  and	  would	  
impact	  social	  service	  delivery,	  sanitation,	  and	  most	  troubling,	  public	  school	  
operations.25	  
By	  the	  late	  1960s,	  state	  tax	  legislation	  and	  the	  anti-­‐growth	  mentality	  of	  the	  
elite	  had	  placed	  city	  politics	  in	  a	  fiscal	  vise.26	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  city’s	  need	  for	  
revenue	  outpaced	  that	  of	  surrounding	  parishes,	  thus	  demanding	  new	  levies	  to	  keep	  
pace	  with	  rising	  municipal	  costs.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  ordering	  new	  levies	  would	  
jeopardize	  the	  tax	  base	  by	  encouraging	  flight.27	  Without	  new	  sources	  of	  funding,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Matteson	  Report,	  iii.	  	  
	  
25	  Following	  the	  integration	  of	  the	  New	  Orleans	  public	  school	  system	  in	  1960,	  the	  
number	  of	  white	  children	  enrolled	  in	  public	  schools	  dropped	  dramatically.	  By	  1974,	  the	  
city’s	  school	  system	  was	  predominantly	  black.	  With	  rising	  inflation	  and	  decreased	  
enrollment	  of	  white	  children,	  the	  city’s	  school	  superintendent	  said	  that	  with	  the	  shift	  in	  
demographics,	  it	  was	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  a	  school	  tax	  increase	  would	  ever	  pass.	  See	  Figaro,	  
"School	  Tax	  Hike	  Soundly	  Defeated,"	  October	  30,	  1974,	  4.	  
	  
26	  The	  city’s	  protracted	  struggle	  with	  the	  state	  over	  revenue	  authority	  came	  to	  a	  
head	  with	  the	  new	  governor	  of	  Louisiana,	  Earl	  Long.	  After	  then	  mayor	  DeLesseps	  Morrison	  
supported	  another	  candidate	  for	  governor,	  Long	  furiously	  began	  exacting	  revenge	  on	  the	  
city’s	  ability	  to	  function.	  In	  the	  spring	  of	  1948,	  he	  launched	  a	  campaign	  of	  nearly	  200	  
legislative	  bills	  aimed	  at	  curbing	  the	  power	  of	  the	  state’s	  largest	  and	  most	  profitable	  city.	  	  
The	  new	  laws	  reduced	  the	  city’s	  share	  of	  the	  state	  sales	  tax	  (despite	  contributing	  nearly	  25	  
percent),	  reduced	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  municipal	  sales	  tax,	  placed	  new	  restrictions	  on	  the	  
city’s	  ability	  to	  utilize	  bonds,	  and	  shifted	  the	  supervision	  of	  key	  city	  functions	  (including	  
utilities)	  to	  the	  state	  Legislature.	  In	  the	  early	  1950s,	  to	  spite	  New	  Orleans,	  Long	  refused	  to	  
support	  programs	  that	  would	  have	  attracted	  new	  industry	  to	  the	  state	  and	  city.	  For	  a	  
detailed	  account	  of	  the	  relationship	  of	  Earl	  Long	  to	  the	  city	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  see	  Michael	  L.	  
Kurtz,	  "Earl	  Long's	  Political	  Relations	  with	  the	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans:	  1948-­‐1960,"	  Louisiana	  
History	  10,	  no.	  3	  (1969),	  241-­‐254.	  
	  
27	  Their	  fiscal	  plight	  was	  further	  restricted	  by	  the	  state.	  The	  state	  Legislature,	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  deep	  infighting	  between	  the	  political	  machine	  of	  New	  Orleans	  and	  the	  Long	  
administration,	  had	  implemented	  measures	  to	  restrict	  the	  city’s	  fiscal	  power.	  	  State	  
legislation	  restricted	  the	  city	  government	  from	  enacting	  new	  tax	  measures	  without	  
statewide	  referendum.	  	  As	  surrounding	  suburban	  communities	  gained	  voting	  strength	  and	  
benefitted	  from	  preserving	  the	  city’s	  regressive	  tax	  structure,	  this	  restriction	  all	  but	  
guaranteed	  that	  local	  governing	  officials	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  pass	  progressive	  taxation.	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Matteson	  group	  estimated	  that	  the	  city,	  also	  required	  to	  achieve	  a	  balanced	  budget,	  
would	  be	  faced	  with	  a	  $45	  million	  deficit	  by	  1975.28	  The	  result	  was	  that	  by	  1970,	  
New	  Orleans	  resembled	  the	  rapidly	  deindustrialized	  city	  centers	  of	  the	  Northeast	  
with	  deeply	  concentrated	  poverty,	  declining	  economic	  possibilities,	  and	  a	  fiscally	  
unstable	  city	  government.	  
It	  was	  this	  fiscal	  crisis	  alongside	  civil	  rights	  action	  that	  opened	  the	  city	  to	  
War	  on	  Poverty	  programs.	  By	  1966,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  the	  city’s	  history,	  massive	  
federal	  outlays	  were	  directed	  to	  impoverished,	  majority-­‐black	  neighborhoods.	  In	  
1969	  alone,	  antipoverty	  programs	  produced	  more	  than	  $11.2	  million	  in	  funding	  for	  
use	  in	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods.29	  By	  1973,	  the	  Model	  Cities	  program,	  operating	  
in	  three	  of	  the	  city’s	  poorest	  neighborhoods,	  generated	  nearly	  $20	  million	  in	  federal	  
funds	  and	  employed	  staff	  in	  some	  50	  different	  antipoverty	  projects.30	  Circumventing	  
both	  state	  and	  local	  governments,	  War	  on	  Poverty	  funds	  also	  reordered	  the	  city’s	  
local	  power	  structure	  in	  important	  ways.	  
The	  direct	  funding	  to	  low-­‐income	  leadership	  created	  an	  alternative	  
bureaucratic	  framework	  for	  service	  delivery	  and	  development	  in	  long-­‐marginalized	  
city	  neighborhoods.	  Black	  political	  organizations	  emerging	  out	  of	  the	  struggle	  for	  
civil	  rights	  legislation	  withheld	  support	  for	  the	  campaign	  for	  urban	  renewal	  until	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  The	  need	  to	  balance	  the	  budget	  is	  something	  that	  distinguishes	  local	  and	  state	  
governments	  from	  the	  federal	  government.	  Matteson	  Associates,	  Dimensions	  and	  Solutions	  
of	  New	  Orleans'	  Financial	  Dilemma:	  Report	  of	  a	  Reconnaissance	  Study,	  (New	  Orleans:	  Bureau	  
of	  Governmental	  Research,	  1966),	  vi.	  
	  
29	  Kent	  B.	  Germany,	  New	  Orleans	  After	  the	  Promises:	  Poverty,	  Citizenship,	  and	  the	  
Search	  for	  the	  Great	  Society	  (Atlanta:	  University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  2007),	  102.	  
	  
30	  Kent	  B.	  Germany,	  New	  Orleans	  After	  the	  Promises:	  Poverty,	  Citizenship,	  and	  the	  
Search	  for	  the	  Great	  Society	  (Atlanta:	  University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  2007),	  181.	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city	  leadership	  guaranteed	  citizen	  participation	  at	  every	  level	  of	  the	  planning	  and	  
implementation	  process.31	  While	  federal	  programs	  were	  broadly	  designed	  through	  
conventional	  mechanisms	  aimed	  at	  inclusion	  rather	  than	  redistribution,	  the	  
circumvention	  of	  traditional	  leadership	  allowed	  community	  leaders	  and	  residents	  to	  
make	  demands	  on	  city,	  state,	  and	  federal	  governments	  for	  resources,	  access,	  and	  
enfranchisement.	  Thus,	  programs	  built	  around	  activities	  that	  offered	  little	  by	  way	  of	  
low-­‐income	  inclusion	  within	  the	  city’s	  political	  economy	  fared	  better	  than	  those—
like	  job	  training	  and	  employment	  ventures—that	  confronted	  economic	  
inequalities.32	  	  
Yet,	  the	  most	  successful	  and	  certainly	  the	  most	  enduring	  channel	  opened	  by	  
the	  War	  on	  Poverty	  funding	  provided	  the	  entrée	  necessary	  for	  black	  leadership	  to	  
gain	  access	  to	  the	  political	  sphere.	  By	  1970,	  black	  community	  leaders	  dominated	  the	  
ranks	  (and	  leadership	  positions)	  of	  various	  community	  action	  and	  antipoverty	  
operations	  affiliated	  with	  the	  city.	  In	  1969,	  Sherman	  Copelin,	  a	  25-­‐year-­‐old	  Dillard	  
University	  graduate	  and	  founder	  of	  the	  Southern	  Organization	  for	  Unified	  
Leadership	  (SOUL),	  the	  Ninth	  Ward’s	  political	  machine,	  was	  appointed	  assistant	  
director	  of	  the	  Model	  Cities	  program	  by	  outgoing	  mayor	  Victor	  Schiro;	  later	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Germany,	  New	  Orleans	  After	  the	  Promises:	  Poverty,	  Citizenship,	  and	  the	  Search	  for	  
the	  Great	  Society,	  191.	  	  
	  
32	  Employment	  programs	  suffered	  almost	  immediately	  despite	  millions	  of	  dollars	  in	  
federal	  investment.	  The	  federal	  Comprehensive	  Employment	  Program	  (CEP)	  generated	  
some	  $11	  million	  between	  1967	  and	  1970,	  but	  within	  just	  a	  few	  short	  years,	  the	  program’s	  
limitations	  were	  made	  evident.	  Staff	  had	  failed	  to	  place	  over	  half	  of	  the	  trained	  participants,	  
downtown	  businesses	  continued	  to	  refuse	  to	  hire	  black	  workers,	  and	  educational	  
attainment	  remained	  detached	  from	  job	  creation.	  See	  Germany,	  New	  Orleans	  After	  the	  
Promises:	  Poverty,	  Citizenship,	  and	  the	  Search	  for	  the	  Great	  Society,	  164.	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year,	  King	  S.	  Wells,	  a	  business	  graduate	  of	  Xavier	  University,	  and	  Sidney	  J.	  
Barthelemy,	  a	  Community	  Organization	  for	  Urban	  Politics	  (COUP)	  constituent	  and	  
lawyer,	  were	  appointed	  as	  deputy	  director	  of	  the	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  
(urban	  renewal)	  and	  director	  of	  the	  City	  Welfare	  Office	  respectively.33	  By	  the	  early	  
1970s,	  black	  community	  residents	  held	  more	  than	  92	  percent	  of	  the	  positions	  
created	  through	  Model	  Cities.34	  In	  the	  span	  of	  Moon	  Landrieu’s	  mayoral	  tenure,	  the	  
number	  of	  city	  government	  positions	  held	  by	  black	  residents	  doubled.35	  In	  a	  city	  
that	  upheld	  segregation	  with	  the	  flagrant	  intensity	  of	  Bull	  Connor	  or	  George	  Wallace,	  
the	  presence	  of	  black	  leadership	  in	  city	  government	  was	  beyond	  symbolic.	  36	  It	  
signaled	  an	  effort	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  local	  government	  to	  make	  inclusion	  its	  
governing	  model.37	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  these	  new	  black	  political	  organizations	  and	  their	  
influence	  on	  city	  politics,	  see	  Kent	  B.	  Germany,	  New	  Orleans	  After	  the	  Promises:	  Poverty,	  
Citizenship,	  and	  the	  Search	  for	  the	  Great	  Society	  (Atlanta:	  University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  2007).	  
	  
34	  Kent	  B.	  Germany,	  New	  Orleans	  After	  the	  Promises:	  Poverty,	  Citizenship,	  and	  the	  
Search	  for	  the	  Great	  Society	  (Atlanta:	  University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  2007),	  267.	  	  
	  
35	  Germany,	  New	  Orleans	  After	  the	  Promises:	  Poverty,	  Citizenship,	  and	  the	  Search	  for	  
the	  Great	  Society,	  267.	  	  
	  
36	  Many	  new	  histories	  that	  stress	  the	  grassroots	  use	  of	  these	  programs	  argue	  that	  
while	  the	  structure	  of	  antipoverty	  programs	  channeled	  participation	  in	  ways	  that	  became	  
fraught	  with	  limitations,	  the	  people	  involved	  used	  the	  programs	  to	  empower	  their	  own	  
visions	  of	  an	  equitable	  society.	  Facilitated	  through	  configurations	  established	  by	  Great	  
Society	  programming,	  poor	  people	  insisted	  they	  must	  be	  included	  in	  envisioning	  their	  
relationship	  as	  citizens	  to	  government	  services.	  See	  Robert	  O.	  Self,	  American	  Babylon:	  Race	  
and	  the	  Struggle	  for	  Postwar	  Oakland	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2005);	  Rhonda	  
Y.	  Williams,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Public	  Housing:	  Black	  Women's	  Struggles	  Against	  Urban	  Inequality	  
(New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005).	  Premilla	  Nadasen,	  Welfare	  Warriors:	  The	  
Welfare	  Rights	  Movement	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2005);	  Kent	  B.	  
Germany,	  New	  Orleans	  After	  the	  Promises:	  Poverty,	  Citizenship,	  and	  the	  Search	  for	  the	  Great	  
Society	  (Atlanta:	  University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  2007).	  
	  
37	  As	  many	  scholars	  have	  pointed	  out,	  this	  new	  bureaucratic	  access	  was	  a	  double-­‐
edged	  sword.	  The	  newfound	  power	  often	  mitigated	  the	  potential	  for	  grassroots	  activism.	  In	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But	  black	  leadership	  was	  not	  the	  only	  constituency	  that	  profited	  from	  the	  
War	  on	  Poverty	  funding.	  The	  proliferation	  of	  pro-­‐growth,	  civic	  minded,	  pro-­‐
integration	  groups,	  including	  the	  New	  Orleans	  Coalition,	  a	  majority-­‐white	  lobby	  
group;	  the	  Metropolitan	  Action	  Committee	  (MAC),	  a	  "good	  government"	  business	  
collective;	  and	  the	  Urban	  Land	  Institute,	  a	  private	  research	  enterprise,	  framed	  a	  new	  
vision	  of	  New	  Orleans.	  It	  focused	  on	  integrating	  the	  city’s	  black	  middle	  class	  into	  the	  
bureaucracy,	  the	  support	  of	  social	  welfare,	  and	  a	  vision	  for	  economic	  development	  
that	  would	  bring	  the	  city	  into	  a	  new	  golden	  era	  of	  shared	  prosperity.	  While	  most	  
civic	  leaders	  claimed	  a	  commitment	  to	  antipoverty	  efforts	  and	  racial	  integration	  
alongside	  their	  beliefs	  about	  economic	  development,	  the	  participation	  of	  business	  
leaders	  in	  these	  efforts	  was	  also	  driven	  by	  fear	  of	  unrest	  and	  dissent.	  Most	  
downtown	  businessmen	  had	  certainly	  not	  taken	  a	  leadership	  role	  in	  civil	  rights	  
struggles	  nor	  had	  they	  participated	  in	  initial	  efforts	  to	  bring	  antipoverty	  programs	  
to	  New	  Orleans.	  	  	  
However,	  by	  1970,	  a	  majority	  of	  downtown	  business	  leaders	  believed	  that	  
segregation,	  at	  least	  of	  tourism	  attractions,	  and	  the	  organized	  boycotts	  and	  sit-­‐ins	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
leadership	  roles,	  black	  activists	  were	  now	  aligned	  with	  the	  local	  government,	  though	  their	  
increased	  influence	  was	  limited	  to	  only	  programs	  affecting	  low-­‐income	  communities.	  In	  
New	  Orleans,	  the	  paradigm	  is	  perhaps	  more	  complicated	  by	  the	  particular	  neighborhood	  
patronage	  politics	  that	  drive	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  how	  local	  government	  works	  in	  the	  city.	  	  
While	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  acts	  and	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty	  provided	  room	  for	  new	  black	  leadership,	  
this	  leadership	  was	  often	  firmly	  rooted	  in	  specific	  areas	  of	  the	  city	  and	  that	  area’s	  particular	  
socioeconomic,	  racial,	  and	  political	  conditions.	  Thus,	  two	  of	  those	  organizations—SOUL	  and	  
COUP—represented	  two	  very	  different	  constituencies.	  SOUL,	  serving	  the	  low-­‐income	  Lower	  
Ninth	  Ward,	  tended	  to	  have	  a	  more	  action-­‐first	  approach	  to	  political	  interventions	  while	  
COUP,	  representing	  the	  more	  affluent	  Creole	  Seventh	  Ward,	  tended	  to	  be	  more	  centrist	  in	  its	  
approach	  to	  urban	  political	  intervention.	  Thus,	  funding	  and	  leadership	  positions,	  divided	  as	  
they	  were	  between	  these	  groups,	  rarely	  united	  War	  on	  Poverty	  organizations	  around	  the	  
city	  under	  a	  banner	  of	  common	  issues.	  See	  Kent	  B.	  Germany,	  New	  Orleans	  After	  the	  Promises:	  
Poverty,	  Citizenship,	  and	  the	  Search	  for	  the	  Great	  Society	  (Atlanta:	  University	  of	  Georgia	  
Press,	  2007),	  268.	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downtown	  establishments	  were	  bad	  for	  business.	  Urban	  uprisings	  in	  Detroit	  and	  
Newark,	  which	  left	  millions	  of	  dollars	  of	  property	  damaged	  (and	  thousands	  dead	  or	  
injured),	  presented	  a	  real	  threat	  to	  the	  city’s	  business	  community.	  Antipoverty	  
activity	  could	  be	  an	  antidote.	  As	  one	  businessman	  remarked,	  the	  political	  and	  
economic	  disenfranchisement	  of	  black	  New	  Orleanians	  was	  “not	  only	  an	  economic	  
loss	  and	  burden,	  but	  also	  a	  physical	  danger	  to	  our	  society.”38	  The	  pro-­‐growth	  city	  
leaders	  viewed	  inclusion	  as	  a	  mechanism	  by	  which	  to	  prevent	  the	  violence	  and	  
expansion	  of	  the	  marketplace	  as	  a	  means	  to	  fulfill	  the	  promises	  of	  integration.	  	  	  
The	  War	  on	  Poverty	  programs	  also	  created	  the	  mechanism	  for	  this	  platform	  
without	  local	  leadership	  having	  to	  subsidize	  the	  promises	  of	  inclusion	  and	  
amelioration	  of	  the	  city’s	  poverty	  neighborhoods.	  In	  fact,	  the	  promise	  of	  urban	  
renewal	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  boon	  for	  real	  estate	  developers	  and	  pro-­‐growth	  forces	  
who	  had	  been	  stymied	  by	  the	  anti-­‐growth	  attitude	  of	  the	  elite	  in	  previous	  years.	  The	  
board	  of	  the	  city’s	  urban	  renewal	  arm,	  the	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency,	  
comprised	  a	  broad	  array	  of	  bankers,	  real	  estate	  developers,	  and	  businessmen.	  The	  
motivation	  of	  the	  board	  was,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  self-­‐interest,	  stemming	  from	  the	  reality	  
that	  many	  of	  the	  members	  would	  benefit	  from	  construction	  contracts.39	  While	  urban	  
renewal	  was	  designed	  to	  provide	  the	  tools	  for	  black	  leadership	  to	  reinvest	  in	  the	  
physical	  infrastructure	  of	  the	  city’s	  most	  impoverished	  communities,	  it	  most	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Over	  the	  following	  12	  months,	  some	  325	  cities	  erupted	  into	  violence.	  Quoted	  in	  
Kent	  B.	  Germany,	  New	  Orleans	  After	  the	  Promises:	  Poverty,	  Citizenship,	  and	  the	  Search	  for	  the	  
Great	  Society	  (Atlanta:	  University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  2007),	  107.	  
	  
39	  Kent	  B.	  Germany,	  New	  Orleans	  After	  the	  Promises:	  Poverty,	  Citizenship,	  and	  the	  
Search	  for	  the	  Great	  Society	  (Atlanta:	  University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  2007),189.	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certainly	  represented	  new	  money	  for	  real	  estate	  as	  well:	  bulldozers,	  bonded	  
contractors,	  architectural	  firms,	  lumber	  companies,	  etc.,	  would	  all	  benefit	  from	  the	  
influx	  of	  federal	  antipoverty	  dollars.	  Circumventing	  the	  city’s	  traditional	  elite,	  this	  
coalition	  of	  civil	  rights	  leaders,	  civic-­‐minded	  liberals,	  and	  proponents	  of	  growth	  
united	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  bringing	  new	  funding	  and	  prosperity	  to	  New	  Orleans:	  
Growth	  was	  now,	  at	  least	  rhetorically,	  inextricable	  from	  racial	  and	  economic	  
progress.	  
The	  power	  of	  these	  disparate	  interests	  culminated	  in	  the	  election	  of	  Mayor	  
Moon	  Landrieu	  in	  1970.40	  Landrieu	  was	  the	  first	  mayor	  to	  be	  voted	  in	  on	  a	  platform	  
that	  promised	  an	  integrated	  City	  Hall.41	  He	  quickly	  brought	  the	  newly	  emerging	  
second	  bureaucracy	  into	  the	  fold	  of	  City	  Hall,	  hoping	  to	  use	  it	  to	  reshape	  power	  
alliances	  in	  the	  city.	  Reorganization	  opened	  the	  city	  to	  new	  channels	  of	  economic	  
growth.	  Programs	  such	  as	  urban	  renewal,	  housing	  rehabilitation,	  low-­‐income	  
housing	  development,	  and	  Model	  Cities	  created	  an	  infrastructure	  through	  which	  
private	  developers,	  contractors,	  and	  agencies	  like	  the	  Community	  Improvement	  
Agency,	  which	  now	  possessed	  the	  capability	  for	  large-­‐scale	  development,	  could	  
engage	  in	  the	  revitalization	  of	  the	  city.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Born	  Maurice	  Landrieu,	  he	  changed	  his	  name	  to	  Moon,	  a	  childhood	  nickname,	  to	  
be	  more	  recognizable	  to	  voters.	  	  	  
	  
41	  In	  a	  favorite	  anecdote	  from	  those	  who	  worked	  with	  him,	  Landrieu	  and	  his	  
opponent,	  Jimmy	  Fitzmorris,	  were	  asked	  if	  they	  would	  employ	  qualified	  black	  candidates	  in	  
positions	  in	  their	  cabinet.	  While	  Fitzmorris	  danced	  around	  the	  issue,	  attempting	  not	  to	  
offend	  the	  city’s	  elite	  segregationists,	  Moon	  just	  stated,	  “YES!”	  Landrieu	  entered	  City	  Hall	  
with	  a	  progressive	  record	  on	  integration	  issues.	  	  As	  a	  state	  legislator,	  he	  had	  been	  the	  sole	  
member	  to	  vote	  against	  segregation	  measures	  designed	  to	  stymie	  school	  integration.	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The	  leadership	  of	  these	  groups,	  while	  asserting	  its	  commitment	  to	  
antipoverty	  ends	  and	  often	  managing	  the	  agency	  boards	  that	  oversaw	  War	  on	  
Poverty-­‐funded	  programs,	  quickly	  moved	  to	  support	  and	  expand	  the	  city	  
government’s	  steadfast	  commitment	  to	  the	  tourism	  industry.42	  While	  War	  on	  
Poverty	  programs	  provided	  an	  important	  service	  to	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods,	  the	  
pro-­‐growth	  coalition	  felt	  that	  economic	  development,	  through	  the	  tourism	  and	  
conventions	  industries,	  was	  needed	  to	  attract	  a	  middle	  class	  back	  to	  the	  city	  center.	  
With	  the	  New	  Orleans	  Superdome	  close	  to	  completion	  and	  construction	  under	  way	  
of	  the	  Shell	  Square	  (local	  headquarters	  for	  Shell	  Oil	  and	  part	  of	  an	  attempt	  by	  city	  
officials	  to	  lure	  oil	  companies	  to	  locate	  corporate	  offices	  in	  the	  city),	  the	  pro-­‐growth	  
coalition	  proposed	  an	  array	  of	  development	  projects,	  including	  riverfront	  hotels,	  
convention	  centers,	  plazas,	  and	  parks	  to	  local	  government	  leaders.43	  Thus,	  the	  new	  
government	  sought	  to	  transform	  the	  city	  by	  simultaneously	  expanding	  the	  economy	  
and	  rebuilding	  low-­‐income	  communities,	  though	  importantly,	  these	  projects	  were	  
not	  necessarily	  linked.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  The	  Metropolitan	  Action	  Committee	  (MAC),	  which	  pushed	  for	  War	  on	  Poverty	  
funds,	  also	  began	  to	  lobby	  the	  mayor	  for	  new	  investments	  in	  the	  tourism	  industry	  as	  soon	  as	  
he	  was	  elected.	  See	  New	  Orleans	  Tourist	  and	  Convention	  City:	  Report	  of	  the	  Metropolitan	  
Action	  Committee,	  May	  27,	  1970,	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  Mayor	  and	  City	  Council	  Correspondence;	  
Human	  Relations	  Committee	  Collection,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  
Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
43	  The	  Superdome,	  a	  covered	  arena	  built	  right	  outside	  the	  Central	  Business	  District,	  
was	  the	  brainchild	  of	  sports	  aficionado	  David	  Dixon	  and	  Governor	  John	  McKeithen.	  	  
Financed	  through	  state	  bonds,	  the	  project’s	  backers	  promised	  that	  the	  arena	  would	  
generate	  whole	  new	  industries	  in	  the	  city.	  See	  Laurence	  Eustis	  to	  Moon	  Landrieu,	  June	  12,	  
1970,	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  Mayor	  and	  City	  Council	  Correspondence	  Human	  Relations	  Committee	  
Collection,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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In	  this	  way,	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty	  operated	  in	  New	  Orleans	  because	  its	  vast	  
programmatic	  design	  allowed	  disparate	  leadership	  to	  lay	  claim	  to	  goals	  that	  were	  
often	  contradictory,	  even	  as	  they	  were	  held	  without	  mutual	  exclusion.	  Urban	  
renewal	  provided	  the	  funds	  for	  targeted	  redevelopment	  of	  neighborhoods	  lacking	  
basic	  lighting,	  drainage	  and	  housing;	  it	  also	  provided	  contracts	  for	  the	  growth	  of	  
speculative	  real	  estate	  interests.	  The	  emergence	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty	  bureaucracy	  
provided	  channels	  for	  black	  political	  power	  to	  operate—yet	  only	  in	  positions	  that	  
did	  little	  to	  challenge	  the	  board	  and	  commission	  structure	  that	  controlled	  the	  
majority	  of	  the	  city’s	  budget	  (although	  this	  was	  less	  true	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade).	  
The	  growth	  of	  the	  economy	  sought	  by	  this	  new	  coalition	  operated	  within	  its	  own	  
contradictions:	  While	  neither	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty	  nor	  the	  tourism	  industry	  sought	  to	  
provide	  real	  economic	  gains	  to	  low-­‐income	  people	  of	  color,	  the	  promotion	  of	  tourist	  
development	  as	  central	  to	  integration	  compelled	  white	  leadership	  to	  remake	  the	  
city	  in	  an	  image	  of	  racial	  tolerance.44	  Thus,	  by	  1970,	  while	  it	  was	  impossible	  to	  say	  
that	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty	  and	  parallel	  civil	  rights	  legislation	  had	  not	  dramatically	  
reordered	  the	  city,	  it	  was	  not	  antipoverty	  efforts	  that	  benefited	  from	  these	  shifts	  in	  
the	  coming	  decade.	  	  	  
At	  precisely	  the	  moment	  this	  liberal	  city	  government	  coalesced,	  its	  ability	  to	  
enact	  a	  program	  of	  redistributive	  measures,	  enabled	  by	  War	  on	  Poverty	  funds,	  was	  
curtailed	  by	  the	  retrenchment	  of	  support	  and	  funding	  for	  low-­‐income	  federal	  aid.	  By	  
1972,	  President	  Richard	  Nixon	  had	  launched	  his	  campaign	  to	  discredit	  and	  eliminate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Of	  course,	  the	  myth	  of	  racial	  tolerance	  was	  just	  a	  myth.	  Police	  brutality,	  oppressive	  
residential	  segregation	  measures,	  and	  racism	  articulated	  by	  high-­‐ranking	  city	  officials	  went	  
hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  a	  rhetoric	  of	  racial	  inclusion.	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funding	  for	  War	  on	  Poverty	  programs.	  The	  city,	  facing	  a	  dire	  fiscal	  crisis,	  balanced	  
on	  the	  precipice	  between	  two	  goals:	  to	  create	  a	  more	  just	  city,	  socially	  and	  
economically,	  and	  to	  regenerate	  a	  fleeing	  tax	  base	  with	  new	  industry	  and	  centers	  for	  
middle-­‐class	  (largely	  white)	  consumption.	  As	  the	  long-­‐term	  commitment	  to	  ending	  
poverty	  in	  urban	  areas	  waned	  both	  ideologically	  and	  financially,	  it	  seemed	  that	  
these	  goals	  were	  incompatible.	  If	  the	  New	  Deal	  marked	  the	  opening	  of	  public	  sector	  
aid	  to	  urban	  constituencies,	  this	  period	  of	  New	  Orleans	  history,	  1974-­‐1980,	  marks	  a	  
reversal	  of	  that	  covenant—a	  definitive	  turn	  away	  from	  the	  concern	  of	  federal	  
government	  with	  protecting	  the	  social	  welfare	  of	  its	  citizenry.	  	  
	  
III.	  
This	  study	  focuses	  on	  two	  interrelated	  questions.	  The	  first	  question	  asks:	  
How	  does	  city	  leadership	  balance	  social,	  political,	  and	  economic	  priorities	  within	  a	  
restrictive	  set	  of	  intergovernmental	  and	  historical	  constraints?	  Literature	  of	  the	  
1970s	  and	  early	  1980s	  on	  the	  question	  focused	  on	  how	  political	  and	  economic	  
constraints	  as	  well	  as	  the	  way	  that	  social	  imperatives,	  such	  as	  segregation	  or	  welfare	  
expenditures,	  complicate	  how	  local	  leadership	  constructs	  urban	  policy	  initiatives.	  
The	  political	  economy	  of	  cities	  is	  constrained,	  Paul	  E.	  Peterson	  argues,	  by	  the	  need	  
to	  preserve	  a	  tax	  base	  and	  remain	  economically	  viable	  amid	  growing	  competition	  
between	  urban	  centers.45	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  this	  economic	  imperative,	  cities	  are	  
hesitant	  to	  pursue	  redistributive	  goals	  without	  intergovernmental	  participation	  for	  
fear	  it	  will	  mobilize	  the	  flight	  of	  the	  middle	  and	  upper	  classes.	  The	  incongruity	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Paul	  E.	  Peterson,	  City	  Limits	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1981),	  4.	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engendered	  from	  a	  growing	  poor	  population	  and	  economic	  growth	  aimed	  at	  middle-­‐
class	  constituencies	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  narrow	  capacity	  of	  cities	  to	  generate	  revenue,	  
Peterson	  and	  others	  have	  argued.	  The	  majority	  of	  American	  cities,	  overwhelmingly	  
reliant	  on	  the	  property	  tax,	  must	  keep	  levy	  ratios	  low	  to	  compete	  with	  peripheral	  
suburbs	  that	  enjoy	  greater	  power	  to	  enhance	  middle-­‐class	  benefits.46	  New	  Orleans,	  
whose	  municipal	  tax	  revenue	  was	  derived	  largely	  from	  sales	  taxes,	  nevertheless	  
suffered	  from	  the	  same	  concerns	  over	  tax	  hikes.	  	  Cities,	  then,	  are	  largely	  confined	  to	  
the	  pursuit	  of	  growth	  that	  aims	  to	  attract	  and	  retain	  capital,	  often	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
low-­‐income	  populations.47	  	  
Other	  scholarship	  has	  reinforced	  the	  idea	  that	  cities	  protect	  revenue	  over	  
people.	  As	  government	  officials	  see	  it,	  a	  better	  city,	  Fainstein	  and	  Fainstein	  assert,	  
“is	  a	  more	  middle-­‐class	  city,	  even	  when	  the	  majority	  of	  citizens	  are	  working	  class	  
and	  poor	  people.”48	  Viewing	  cities	  as	  unwilling	  to	  risk	  their	  relationship	  with	  
private-­‐sector	  investment,	  Fainstein	  and	  Fainstein	  argue	  that	  cities	  will	  encourage	  
political	  participation	  only	  in	  venues	  that	  do	  not	  risk	  private-­‐sector	  stability,	  i.e.,	  city	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  For	  comparison,	  in	  2012,	  property	  taxes	  made	  up	  36.7	  percent	  of	  the	  New	  York	  
City	  budget.	  In	  2010,	  more	  than	  60	  percent	  of	  the	  City	  of	  Boston’s	  recurring	  revenue	  came	  




47	  While	  Peterson’s	  City	  Limits	  shaped	  the	  argument	  that	  economic	  imperatives	  
drive	  city	  politics,	  numerous	  other	  scholars	  have	  added	  to	  this	  field	  of	  study.	  See	  Stanley	  
Elkin,	  City	  and	  Regime	  in	  the	  American	  Republic	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  
1987);	  Peter	  Eisenger,	  "City	  Politics	  in	  an	  Era	  of	  Federal	  Devolution,"	  Urban	  Affairs	  Review	  
33	  (1998),	  308-­‐325;	  John	  R.	  Logan	  and	  Harvey	  L.	  Molotch,	  Urban	  Fortunes:	  The	  Political	  
Economy	  of	  Place	  (Los	  Angeles:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1988).	  	  
	  
48	  Susan	  S.	  Fainstein	  and	  Norman	  Fainstein,	  "Regime	  Strategies,	  Communal	  
Resistance	  and	  Economic	  Forces,"	  in	  Restructuring	  the	  City:	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Urban	  
Redevelopment	  ,	  ed.	  Susan	  S.	  Fainstein	  and	  Norman	  Fainstein,	  (London:	  Longman,	  1986),	  
251.	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council	  elections	  but	  not	  zoning	  decisions.	  This	  makes	  responsible	  reinvestment	  in	  
low-­‐income	  areas,	  such	  as	  the	  funding	  of	  public	  schools	  and	  flexible	  job	  creation,	  
unlikely	  without	  federal	  or	  state	  coercion.	  In	  New	  Orleans,	  the	  feudalistic	  social	  
order	  counteracted	  this	  kind	  of	  economic	  prioritization,	  but	  the	  late	  1960s	  fiscal	  
crisis	  facilitated	  a	  growth	  coalition	  to	  develop	  in	  earnest	  throughout	  the	  1970s.	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  clear-­‐cut	  pattern	  that	  Peterson	  imagines,	  where	  cities	  will	  
pursue	  developmental	  (economic)	  over	  redistributive	  (social	  and	  economic	  
services)	  policy	  options,	  does	  little	  to	  explain	  how	  federal	  policies	  interact	  within	  
the	  complex	  socioeconomic,	  let	  alone	  political,	  terrain	  in	  which	  local	  policy	  decisions	  
are	  often	  made.	  Peterson	  assumes	  that	  most	  development,	  because	  it	  is	  inevitably	  
best	  for	  the	  city,	  happens	  with	  overwhelming	  consensus.	  Yet	  he	  also	  informs	  us	  that	  
these	  choices	  are	  often	  decided	  outside	  of	  public	  debate.	  Peterson’s	  thesis	  does	  not	  
explain	  why	  certain	  choices—such	  as	  the	  decision	  to	  pursue	  a	  tourism-­‐driven	  
economic	  strategy,	  which	  may	  be	  inappropriate	  for	  the	  labor	  force—are	  pursued	  
over	  other	  economic	  strategies	  that	  may	  reap	  more	  widespread	  benefits	  for	  the	  
larger	  populace.	  	  	  
The	  answer	  is	  to	  root	  policy	  in	  a	  particular	  local	  history	  of	  this	  moment	  in	  
time.	  Cities	  respond	  not	  only	  to	  economic	  imperatives,	  but	  also	  to	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  
need	  to	  reinforce	  segregation,	  the	  desire	  to	  bring	  back	  a	  specifically	  white	  middle	  
class,	  industry	  assumptions	  about	  geographical	  differences,	  and	  the	  preferences	  of	  
dominant	  business	  leaders.	  Growth	  in	  New	  Orleans	  took	  the	  form	  that	  it	  did	  because	  
tourism	  was	  the	  industry	  least	  likely	  to	  challenge	  the	  deeply	  entrenched	  racial	  and	  
social	  stratification	  of	  the	  city,	  because	  the	  city	  struggled	  to	  get	  manufacturers	  to	  
	  
	   24	  
locate	  to	  a	  city	  that	  was	  poor	  and	  black,	  and	  because	  the	  reliance	  on	  sales	  tax	  
revenue	  made	  tourism	  more	  attractive.	  Thus,	  while	  “economic	  conditions	  gave	  these	  
entrepreneurs	  a	  chance	  to	  act,”	  they	  did	  not	  shape	  the	  particular	  way	  they	  acted.49	  
Both	  courses	  of	  action—one	  that	  pursues	  economic	  growth	  and	  the	  other	  
that	  attempts	  to	  address	  the	  needs	  of	  low-­‐income	  city	  dwellers—are	  informed	  by	  
much	  more	  complex	  social	  and	  political	  processes,	  according	  to	  urban	  regime	  
theorists.50	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  address	  the	  practical	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  narrative	  of	  
economic	  determinists,	  urban	  regime	  theory	  proposes	  that	  the	  choices	  made	  by	  
local	  governing	  bodies	  are	  established	  by	  specific	  arrangements	  between	  public	  
officials	  and	  private-­‐sector	  leadership.	  These	  arrangements	  are	  not	  always	  stable	  
nor	  do	  they	  appear	  the	  same	  in	  different	  places	  and	  times.	  While	  Clarence	  Stone	  and	  
other	  scholars	  of	  regime	  theory	  agree	  that	  political	  power	  is	  ultimately	  rooted	  
within	  economic	  relations,	  the	  particular	  policy	  directives	  that	  emerge	  from	  those	  
imperatives	  are	  contingent	  on	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  public-­‐private	  agents	  in	  the	  
city.	  Thus,	  Stone	  believes	  that	  while	  economic	  restructuring,	  such	  as	  the	  
deindustrialization	  of	  Rust	  Belt	  cities,	  encourages	  cities	  to	  undertake	  development	  
activity,	  economic	  conditions	  alone	  do	  not	  reorganize	  city	  centers	  as	  corporate	  hubs.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  John	  H.	  Mollenkopf,	  The	  Contested	  City	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  
1983),	  95.	  	  
	  
50	  See	  Clarence	  N.	  Stone,	  Regime	  Politics:	  Governing	  Atlanta,	  1946-­‐1988	  (Lawrence:	  
University	  Press	  of	  Kansas,	  1989);	  Clarence	  N.	  Stone	  and	  Heywood	  T.	  Sanders,	  The	  Politics	  of	  
Urban	  Development	  (Lawrence:	  University	  of	  Kansas	  Press,	  1987);	  Mickey	  Lauria,	  ed.,	  
Reconstructing	  Urban	  Regime	  Theory:	  Regulating	  Urban	  Politics	  in	  a	  Global	  Economy,	  ed.	  
Mickey	  Lauria	  (Thousand	  Oaks:	  Sage	  Publications,	  1997);	  Stanley	  Elkin,	  City	  and	  Regime	  in	  
the	  American	  Republic	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1987);	  and	  Adolph	  Reed	  Jr.,	  
"The	  black	  urban	  regime:	  Structural	  origins	  and	  constraints.,"	  in	  Power,	  community	  and	  the	  
city:	  Comparative	  urban	  and	  community	  research,	  ed.	  Michael	  Peter	  Smith,	  21-­‐41	  (New	  
Brunswick:	  Transaction	  Publishers,	  1988).	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Rather,	  coalitions	  develop	  within	  specific	  contexts	  to	  pursue	  policy	  measures	  that	  
emerge	  out	  of	  and	  reflect	  the	  preferences	  of	  those	  who	  make	  up	  the	  “regime.”51	  In	  
New	  Orleans,	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  growth	  regime,	  devised	  in	  concert	  with	  real	  estate	  
interests,	  worked	  around	  the	  refusal	  of	  local	  banking	  institutions	  to	  fund	  
development	  by	  appealing	  to	  those	  with	  external	  funding:	  namely	  speculative	  
developers.52	  The	  mayor-­‐driven	  coalition	  mobilized	  newly	  organized	  urban	  renewal	  
agencies	  to	  support	  the	  development	  process.	  This	  mobilization	  facilitated	  
developers	  in	  re-­‐organizing	  the	  land	  using	  established	  and	  widely	  accepted,	  though	  
wholly	  unequal,	  city	  economic	  practices.	  Yet	  once	  again,	  the	  model	  works	  only	  when	  
cities	  fit	  the	  typology.	  If	  cities	  do	  not,	  which	  often	  is	  the	  case	  when	  you	  look	  at	  cities	  
over	  time,	  we	  once	  again	  must	  reconsider	  how	  local	  administrators	  act	  to	  determine	  
priorities.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Clarence	  N.	  Stone,	  "Urban	  Regimes	  and	  the	  Capacity	  to	  Govern,	  A	  Political	  
Economy	  Approach,"	  Journal	  of	  Urban	  Affairs	  15,	  no.	  1	  (1993),	  13.	  In	  his	  seminal	  book	  on	  
Atlanta,	  Stone	  maps	  four	  different	  types	  of	  regimes	  that	  he	  believes	  operate	  in	  cities.	  The	  
first	  is	  a	  caretaker	  regime.	  Mainly	  concerned	  with	  protecting	  the	  status	  quo,	  the	  caretaker	  
regime	  provides	  basic	  city	  services	  and	  maintains	  low	  tax	  rates.	  When	  regime	  theory	  has	  
been	  utilized	  to	  discuss	  New	  Orleans	  prior	  to	  1970,	  the	  city	  has	  been	  classified	  as	  
“caretaker.”	  The	  second	  type	  of	  regime	  is	  a	  developmental	  regime.	  Often	  insulated	  from	  
public	  opinion,	  the	  development	  regime	  links	  private	  funds	  with	  public	  action;	  thus,	  
business	  has	  a	  large	  say	  in	  the	  way	  economic	  and	  political	  development	  of	  the	  city	  occurs.	  	  
The	  final	  two	  regime	  types	  are	  far	  rarer	  in	  American	  urban	  development.	  The	  third	  is	  a	  
progressive	  regime	  that	  attempts	  to	  balance	  economic	  imperatives	  with	  social	  ones,	  
focusing	  on	  low-­‐income	  housing,	  historic	  preservation,	  and	  strict	  environmental	  
protections.	  Finally,	  and	  most	  rarely	  occurring,	  is	  a	  low-­‐income	  opportunity	  expansion	  
regime	  that	  focuses	  on	  widening	  employment,	  education,	  and	  housing	  opportunities	  for	  
low-­‐income	  populations.	  	  
	  
52	  Even	  the	  city’s	  Superdome	  was	  financed	  through	  outside	  funding	  after	  the	  city’s	  
Whitney	  Bank	  refused	  to	  bankroll	  construction.	  See	  Marlene	  Keller	  and	  Michael	  Peter	  Smith,	  
"'Managed	  Growth'	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Uneven	  Development	  in	  New	  Orleans,"	  in	  
Restructuring	  the	  City:	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Urban	  Redevelopment,	  ed.	  Susan	  Fainstein	  
and	  Norman	  Fainstein,	  (New	  York:	  Longman,	  1986)	  126-­‐166.	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Ultimately,	  choices	  are	  determined	  not	  just	  by	  the	  composition	  of	  public-­‐
private	  partnerships	  and	  their	  economic	  preferences,	  but	  also	  by	  a	  range	  of	  external	  
factors.	  In	  New	  Orleans,	  the	  makeup	  of	  this	  governing	  regime	  in	  the	  1970s	  was,	  in	  
important	  ways,	  shaped	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  second	  guiding	  question	  of	  this	  
study:	  How	  are	  city	  priorities	  shaped	  by	  the	  changing	  priorities	  of	  federal	  aid?	  	  
Federal	  urban	  policy	  shapes	  the	  capacity	  of	  cities	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  their	  
populace.	  While	  Peterson	  suggests	  that	  only	  the	  federal	  government	  is	  capable	  of	  
facilitating	  redistributive	  measures,	  federal	  policy	  has	  rarely	  operated	  toward	  this	  
objective.	  In	  fact,	  for	  much	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  federal	  policies	  have	  worked	  to	  
further	  exacerbate	  the	  inequality	  found	  in	  cities.	  	  
Kenneth	  T.	  Jackson	  and	  Thomas	  J.	  Sugrue	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  federal	  
government,	  while	  providing	  urban	  aid,	  has	  also	  enacted	  policy	  measures	  that	  have	  
systematically	  weakened	  the	  viability	  of	  cities	  and	  limited	  the	  opportunities	  of	  their	  
populace.53	  Jackson’s	  Crabgrass	  Frontier:	  The	  Suburbanization	  of	  the	  United	  States	  
provides	  analysis	  of	  how	  discriminatory	  housing	  policies	  enacted	  at	  the	  federal	  level	  
shaped	  the	  racial	  and	  spatial	  divides	  between	  city	  and	  suburb;	  Sugrue	  and	  Arnold	  
Hirsch,	  among	  others,	  contribute	  more	  detailed	  accounts	  of	  how	  these	  federal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  There	  has	  been	  extensive	  work	  done	  on	  the	  making	  of	  the	  suburbs	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  
era	  and	  its	  devastating	  effect	  on	  city	  economies	  and	  social	  structures.	  See	  Kenneth	  T.	  
Jackson,	  Crabgrass	  Frontier:	  The	  Suburbanization	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  1985).	  Arnold	  R.	  Hirsch,	  Making	  the	  Second	  Ghetto:	  Race	  and	  Housing	  in	  
Chicago	  1940-­‐1960	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1998);	  Robert	  O.	  Self,	  American	  
Babylon:	  Race	  and	  the	  Struggle	  for	  Postwar	  Oakland	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  
2005);	  Thomas	  J.	  Sugrue,	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Urban	  Crisis:	  Race	  and	  Inequality	  in	  Postwar	  
Detroit	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2005);	  Jason	  Hackworth,	  The	  Neoliberal	  City:	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policies	  have	  interacted	  with	  local	  structures	  of	  racism	  to	  sustain	  inequality	  in	  both	  
housing	  and	  access	  to	  resources.54	  	  
Through	  localized	  case	  studies	  of	  Chicago	  and	  Detroit,	  respectively,	  Hirsch	  
and	  Sugrue	  locate	  the	  genesis	  of	  the	  late	  1960s	  “urban	  crisis”	  in	  federally	  facilitated	  
municipal	  policies	  that	  used	  urban	  renewal	  funds	  to	  reinforce	  racial	  segregation,	  
encourage	  white	  flight,	  produce	  the	  deindustrialization	  of	  urban	  cores,	  and	  promote	  
unequal	  access	  to	  homeownership,	  education,	  and	  other	  resources.	  As	  these	  policies	  
directed	  the	  formation	  of	  communities	  and	  the	  allocation	  of	  resources,	  they	  shaped	  
the	  nature	  of	  inner-­‐city	  poverty	  and	  isolation	  following	  deindustrialization.	  In	  these	  
accounts,	  the	  way	  that	  local	  actors	  initiated	  federal	  programs	  reinforced	  the	  
structural	  and	  institutional	  inequalities	  between	  a	  mobile	  white	  middle	  class	  and	  a	  
black	  low-­‐income	  population	  confined	  to	  diminishing	  city	  centers.	  Even	  federal	  
programs	  with	  the	  rhetorical	  goal	  of	  redistribution	  are	  not	  always	  implemented	  
accordingly	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  local	  actors.	  If	  we	  return	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  
the	  ambivalence	  often	  found	  in	  federal	  directives	  gave	  the	  New	  Orleans	  governing	  
coalition,	  made	  up	  of	  public	  officials	  and	  private	  investors,	  unfettered	  latitude	  with	  
which	  to	  pursue	  developmental	  interests	  through	  antipoverty	  work.	  	  
Yet	  even	  when	  local	  governments	  use	  federal	  funding	  to	  address	  inequities,	  
directives	  that	  target	  the	  structural	  nature	  of	  inequality	  have	  not	  always	  
accompanied	  the	  aid.	  This	  last	  point	  has	  largely	  been	  the	  framework	  for	  a	  critique	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  See	  Arnold	  Hirsch,	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  Second	  Ghetto:	  Race	  and	  Housing	  in	  Chicago	  
1940-­‐1960,	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1998)	  and	  Thomas	  Sugrue,	  The	  Origins	  of	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the	  federal	  government’s	  War	  on	  Poverty	  programs.	  Arguing	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  
War	  on	  Poverty	  programs	  were	  incapable	  of	  addressing	  poverty	  in	  any	  substantive	  
way,	  Frances	  Fox	  Piven	  and	  Richard	  Cloward	  have	  contended	  that	  programs	  were	  
ultimately	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  redistributive,	  but	  rather	  to	  provide	  just	  enough	  
concessions	  to	  temper	  the	  protests	  in	  low-­‐income	  communities.55	  Rather	  than	  
create	  clear	  mechanisms	  for	  incorporating	  low-­‐income	  residents	  into	  the	  official	  
decision-­‐making	  apparatus	  of	  city	  government,	  new	  institutional	  arrangements	  
provided	  access,	  but	  even	  that	  was	  always	  unequal.56	  The	  role	  of	  federal	  aid	  then	  is	  
to	  assuage	  racial	  and	  class	  conflicts,	  providing	  stopgaps	  along	  the	  way	  for	  these	  
tensions.57	  	  	  
Nevertheless,	  it	  would	  be	  remiss	  to	  read	  the	  impact	  of	  federal	  urban	  policy,	  
and	  in	  particular	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty,	  on	  local	  decision-­‐making	  as	  a	  sham.	  Political	  
power	  derived	  from	  participation	  in	  antipoverty	  programs	  was	  indeed	  limited	  by	  
the	  lack	  of	  structural	  analysis	  attached	  to	  program	  design.	  Yet	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  
creation	  of	  a	  “second	  bureaucracy”	  in	  cities	  like	  New	  Orleans	  cannot	  be	  overstated,	  
even	  as	  it	  had	  unintended	  consequences.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  this	  new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  See	  Frances	  Fox	  Piven	  and	  Richard	  Cloward,	  Regulating	  the	  Poor:	  The	  Functions	  of	  
Public	  Welfare	  (New	  York:	  Vintage,	  1983).	  
	  
56	  Arnold	  R.	  Hirsch,	  "New	  Orleans:	  Sunbelt	  in	  the	  Swamp,"	  in	  Sunbelt	  Cities:	  Politics	  
and	  Growth	  Since	  World	  War	  II	  (Austin:	  University	  of	  Texas	  Press,	  1983).	  
	  
57	  One	  mechanism	  for	  this	  is	  through	  the	  division	  of	  city	  bureaucracies	  following	  the	  
War	  on	  Poverty.	  Federal	  programs	  created	  a	  division	  between	  traditional	  local	  political	  
institutions	  that	  determined	  development	  policies	  and	  a	  “shadow”	  bureaucracy	  tasked	  with	  
overseeing	  service	  delivery	  within	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods.	  The	  effects	  of	  that	  division	  
on	  the	  capacity	  of	  cities	  to	  create	  sound	  low-­‐income	  policy	  are	  profound.	  See	  Kathe	  
Newman	  and	  Robert	  W.	  Lake,	  "Democracy,	  Bureaucracy	  and	  Difference	  in	  U.S.	  Community	  
Development	  Politics,"	  Progress	  in	  Human	  Geography	  30,	  no.	  44	  (2006),	  48.	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coalition,	  leaders	  of	  the	  second	  bureaucracy	  used	  the	  tenets	  of	  the	  Great	  Society	  to	  
determine	  the	  city's	  needs	  based	  on	  poverty,	  segregation,	  and	  other	  measures,	  and	  
then	  developed	  programs	  based	  on	  these	  needs.	  Thus,	  these	  new	  programs	  became	  
laboratories	  for	  social	  and	  political	  change.58	  In	  New	  Orleans,	  the	  introduction	  of	  
War	  on	  Poverty	  programs	  would	  forever	  change	  the	  city’s	  political	  arrangements	  
and	  capacities,	  integrating	  city	  government	  and	  building	  an	  alternative,	  liberal	  
apparatus	  that	  would	  attempt	  to	  address	  the	  needs	  of	  low-­‐income	  residents.	  
This	  dissertation	  is	  largely	  a	  study	  of	  the	  eight	  years	  between	  the	  demise	  of	  
the	  War	  on	  Poverty	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  Reaganomics.	  It	  argues	  that	  the	  1970s	  were	  a	  
time	  in	  which	  the	  socioeconomic	  terrain	  of	  American	  cities	  was	  dramatically	  
transformed.	  Deindustrialization	  of	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  began	  to	  re-­‐organize	  economic	  
power	  in	  the	  Sun	  Belt	  Southwest,	  and	  thus	  transferred	  economic	  production	  from	  
industrial	  manufacturing	  to	  high-­‐tech	  industries	  and	  corporate	  centers.	  	  Across	  the	  
nation,	  the	  ability	  to	  confront	  the	  changing	  urban	  landscape	  was	  diminished	  by	  
periods	  of	  recession,	  most	  dramatically	  between	  1969-­‐1970	  and	  1972-­‐1975;	  the	  
exponential	  growth	  of	  inflation;	  a	  reduction	  in	  real	  wages;	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  an	  
ideology	  that	  the	  market	  should	  be	  the	  force	  driving	  city	  revitalization.	  
Conservatives	  and	  liberals	  alike	  embraced	  the	  idea	  that	  cities	  would	  be	  remade	  
through	  private	  rather	  than	  public	  investment.	  And	  yet,	  the	  1970s	  was	  the	  first	  
decade	  since	  the	  Great	  Depression	  in	  which	  the	  American	  people	  grew	  poorer.59	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  John	  H.	  Mollenkopf,	  The	  Contested	  City	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  
1983),	  86.	  	  
	  
59	  Judith	  Stein,	  Pivotal	  Decade:	  How	  the	  United	  States	  Traded	  Factories	  for	  Finance	  in	  
the	  Seventies	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  ii.	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cities	  across	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  divide	  in	  wealth	  grew	  steadily	  as	  poverty	  became	  
more	  desperate.	  	  
This	  short	  period	  radically	  altered	  the	  federal	  and	  local	  response	  to	  issues	  of	  
poverty,	  inequality,	  and	  fiscal	  instability	  in	  cities.	  	  The	  distribution	  of	  federal	  urban	  
aid	  of	  the	  1970s	  constrained	  action	  in	  ways	  that	  turned	  local	  attention	  from	  issues	  
of	  redistributive	  equality	  toward	  preserving	  the	  fiscal	  health	  of	  urban	  areas,	  even	  at	  
the	  cost	  of	  rising	  inequality.	  	  	  
	  
IV.	  
This	  dissertation	  explores	  the	  relationship	  between	  shifting	  federal	  urban	  
policy	  and	  local	  decision-­‐making.	  Chapter	  One	  examines	  the	  federal	  policy-­‐making	  
context	  during	  the	  years	  that	  War	  on	  Poverty	  programs	  were	  being	  dismantled.	  	  
Critics	  found	  the	  overwhelming	  size	  of	  the	  antipoverty	  bureaucracy	  at	  fault	  for	  
growing	  recessionary	  periods	  of	  1969-­‐1970	  and	  1972-­‐1975.60	  Cities,	  they	  argued,	  
were	  completely	  overwhelmed	  by	  the	  inefficiencies	  and	  programmatic	  nightmares	  
that	  antipoverty	  programs	  had	  created.	  While	  the	  more	  obvious	  culprits	  for	  
recession	  were	  inflation,	  white	  flight	  from	  municipal	  centers,	  the	  increasing	  
deindustrialization	  of	  Rust	  Belt	  cities,	  a	  reorganization	  of	  the	  economy	  around	  
finance	  and	  the	  move	  of	  capital	  to	  undeveloped	  Sun	  Belt	  cities	  and	  overseas,	  the	  War	  
on	  Poverty	  and	  its	  attention	  to	  low-­‐income	  people	  of	  color	  became	  a	  palatable	  target	  
in	  the	  midst	  of	  cultural	  upheaval,	  riots,	  and	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	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  Jamie	  Peck,	  "Liberating	  the	  City:	  Between	  New	  York	  and	  New	  Orleans,"	  Urban	  
Geography	  27,	  no.	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  (2006),	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While	  Nixon	  and	  his	  administration	  waged	  battle	  on	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty,	  they	  
argued	  that	  a	  new	  federalism	  would	  bring	  the	  people	  and	  the	  polity	  back	  together,	  
mobilizing	  better	  mechanisms	  to	  aid	  troubled	  cities.	  A	  resurgent	  reliance	  on	  private-­‐
sector	  investment	  and	  local	  autonomy	  could	  do	  what	  the	  federal	  government	  could	  
not:	  save	  cities	  and	  effectively	  end	  inequality.	  Despite	  uneasiness	  in	  the	  compromise	  
forged	  between	  Democratic	  mayors	  and	  the	  Republican	  administration,	  the	  notion	  
that	  private-­‐sector	  involvement	  should	  be	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  city	  revitalization	  
efforts	  received	  solidly	  bipartisan	  support.61	  The	  resultant	  community	  development	  
legislation	  maintained	  and,	  in	  fact,	  reinforced	  a	  separation	  between	  redistributive	  
social	  service	  policies	  and	  economic	  development	  while	  facilitating	  the	  federal	  
government’s	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  role	  of	  social	  equity	  policeman.62	  Although	  
policy	  expert	  Richard	  P.	  Nathan	  has	  characterized	  Nixon’s	  attempt	  at	  federalism	  as	  
the	  “plot	  that	  failed,”	  the	  president’s	  inability	  to	  discard	  federal	  oversight	  
completely	  does	  not	  diminish	  the	  ways	  that	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Housing	  and	  
Community	  Development	  Act	  of	  1974	  irrevocably	  transformed	  the	  relationship	  
between	  federal	  and	  local	  governments.63	  	  
Cutbacks	  and	  aid	  reorganization	  rationalized	  new	  theories	  that	  understood	  
neighborhoods	  at	  the	  beginning	  stages	  of	  decline	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  city	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Peter	  Eisenger,	  "City	  Politics	  in	  an	  Era	  of	  Federal	  Devolution,"	  Urban	  Affairs	  
Review	  33	  (1998),	  317.	  
	  
62	  Susan	  S.	  Fainstein	  and	  Ann	  Markusen,	  "The	  Urban	  Policy	  Challenge:	  Integrating	  
Across	  Social	  and	  Economic	  Development	  Policy,"	  North	  Carolina	  Law	  Review	  71	  (1992-­‐
1993),	  1475.	  
	  
63	  Richard	  P.	  Nathan,	  The	  plot	  that	  failed:	  Nixon	  and	  the	  administrative	  presidency	  
(New	  York:	  Wiley,	  1975).	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Planners	  began	  to	  conceptualize	  lower-­‐income	  neighborhoods	  in	  stable	  condition	  as	  
both	  an	  asset	  in	  retaining	  a	  middle	  class	  and	  as	  an	  intervention	  site	  to	  slow	  the	  rapid	  
decline	  of	  the	  city	  itself.	  Chapter	  Two	  details	  some	  of	  these	  intervention	  efforts	  in	  
New	  Orleans	  neighborhoods.	  Harnessing	  a	  theoretical	  approach	  developed	  by	  
Anthony	  Downs,	  a	  consultant	  for	  the	  federal	  Department	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  
Development	  (HUD),	  political	  proponents	  of	  using	  block	  grants	  to	  revitalize	  the	  tax	  
base	  argued	  that	  amid	  shrinking	  federal	  funds,	  cities	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  invest	  in	  
neighborhoods	  that	  could	  actually	  be	  saved.64	  John	  T.	  Metzger,	  Nancy	  Kleniewski,	  
and	  Peter	  Marcuse,	  among	  others,	  have	  argued	  that	  theories	  defining	  
neighborhoods	  on	  a	  spectrum	  of	  intervention	  drove	  city	  officials	  to	  practice	  “triage”	  
planning,	  investing	  federal	  aid	  in	  neighborhoods	  that	  did	  not	  suffer	  from	  the	  same	  
extreme	  dilapidation	  or	  poverty	  as	  those	  formerly	  targeted	  by	  Model	  Cities.65	  While	  
many	  planners	  believed	  this	  approach	  to	  be	  problematic,	  they	  nonetheless	  agreed	  
that	  it	  was	  important	  to	  preserving	  the	  city’s	  fiscal	  base	  and	  might	  even	  inevitably	  
lift	  up	  nearby	  poverty	  neighborhoods.	  However,	  the	  utilization	  of	  funding	  in	  non-­‐
poverty	  neighborhoods	  would	  have	  other	  consequences	  as	  well,	  stretching	  the	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  Nancy	  Kleniewski,	  "Triage	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  Urban	  Planning:	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  Study	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International	  Journal	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65To	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  debate	  around	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  planning”	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  John	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  policy,"	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  Policy	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  (2000),	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objectives	  of	  block	  grants	  in	  ways	  that	  allowed	  other	  interests	  to	  lay	  claim	  to	  the	  
funds.	  
Chapter	  Three	  situates	  how	  these	  shifts	  in	  federal	  aid	  and	  ideology	  affected	  
the	  implementation	  of	  the	  CDBG	  program	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  By	  investigating	  the	  
formation	  of	  a	  city	  planning	  and	  analysis	  unit	  charged	  with	  organizing	  block	  grant	  
delivery,	  this	  chapter	  explores	  the	  assumptions	  and	  limitations	  of	  the	  planning	  
techniques	  and	  the	  planners	  themselves	  as	  they	  deployed	  federal	  community	  
development	  funds.	  Utilizing	  an	  array	  of	  "in	  vogue"	  data-­‐gathering	  techniques,	  the	  
team	  of	  liberal	  professionals	  constituting	  the	  new	  bureaucracy	  set	  out	  to	  
reconfigure	  the	  city’s	  aid	  delivery	  system.	  Believing	  firmly	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  new	  
approaches	  would	  bring	  planning	  closer	  to	  the	  people	  they	  sought	  to	  aid,	  planners	  
were	  optimistic	  about	  the	  potential	  of	  locally	  controlled	  funding.	  	  Planning	  around	  
solutions	  for	  blight	  (a	  physical	  characteristic),	  and	  not	  poverty	  (a	  structural	  
characteristic),	  the	  analysis	  team	  found	  few	  ways	  to	  utilize	  the	  new	  scientific	  
approach	  that	  could	  re-­‐invent	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods.	  	  	  
Stymied	  by	  legislative	  constraints	  that	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  conceive	  of	  
community	  development	  through	  structural	  interventions,	  and	  by	  the	  city’s	  growth	  
agenda,	  the	  city	  retreated	  from	  this	  optimism.	  The	  programs	  emerging	  from	  
community	  development	  planning	  efforts	  reflected	  little	  of	  the	  analysis	  in	  which	  the	  
planners	  had	  engaged.	  Instead,	  programs	  closely	  mirrored	  those	  initiated	  in	  other	  
cities,	  with	  focused	  efforts	  on	  physical	  development	  and	  housing	  rehabilitation.	  	  	  
These	  programs,	  with	  their	  concentration	  on	  homeownership,	  were	  rooted	  within	  a	  
certain	  kind	  of	  low-­‐income	  assistance	  conditioned	  by	  the	  emerging	  growth	  
	  
	   34	  
liberalism	  defined	  in	  New	  Orleans	  by	  a	  push	  for	  privatization.	  As	  their	  limitations	  
were	  made	  clear,	  planning	  efforts	  bifurcated	  between	  poverty	  neighborhoods	  and	  
growth	  areas.66	  
	  Chapter	  Four	  examines	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  extension	  of	  federal	  urban	  aid	  
to	  less	  needy	  neighborhoods	  provided	  an	  ideological	  mechanism	  for	  downtown	  
developers	  to	  also	  lobby	  for	  block	  grants.	  They	  often	  did	  this	  with	  the	  support	  of	  
local	  government.	  In	  New	  Orleans,	  city	  officials	  not	  only	  facilitated	  the	  emergence	  of	  
a	  development	  coalition,	  but	  they	  also	  created	  semi-­‐autonomous	  institutions	  that	  
allowed	  downtown	  developers	  a	  privileged	  position	  in	  shaping	  the	  city’s	  economic	  
development	  strategy.	  Removing	  economic	  choices	  from	  the	  public	  domain,	  the	  
leadership	  of	  this	  coalition	  made	  distinctions	  between	  community	  development	  
(rebuilding	  the	  area’s	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods),	  and	  economic	  development,	  
(revitalizing	  the	  middle-­‐class	  tax	  base).	  While	  some	  argued	  that	  these	  two	  objectives	  
could	  be	  linked,	  New	  Orleans	  pursued	  diametrically	  opposed	  strategies	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  There	  is	  a	  rich	  and	  compelling	  literature	  chronicling	  the	  local	  experience	  with	  
block	  grants.	  Much	  of	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  field	  of	  study,	  which	  is	  mostly	  situated	  within	  social	  
sciences,	  revolves	  around	  questions	  of	  “who	  benefited”	  from	  the	  new	  federal	  directives.	  	  
These	  local	  studies	  have,	  with	  little	  variation,	  demonstrated	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  new	  
legislation	  was	  successful	  in	  diverting	  the	  concentrated	  focus	  of	  city	  officials	  in	  low-­‐income	  
neighborhoods.	  Rather,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  growing	  fiscal	  crisis	  faced	  in	  many	  post-­‐industrial	  
cities,	  city	  officials	  used	  the	  new	  flexibility	  to	  disperse	  funds	  widely	  and	  for	  an	  array	  of	  non-­‐
antipoverty	  programs.	  In	  fact,	  many	  of	  these	  studies	  found	  that	  even	  when	  city	  leadership	  
was	  progressive,	  the	  development	  priority	  of	  the	  legislation	  undermined	  attempts	  at	  
providing	  redistributive	  services	  to	  these	  areas	  and	  instead	  encouraged	  cities	  to	  use	  funds	  
to	  attract	  private-­‐sector	  investment.	  See	  Richard	  P.	  Nathan,	  Paul	  R.	  Dommel,	  Sarah	  F.	  
Liebschutz	  and	  Milton	  D.	  Morris,	  "Monitoring	  the	  Block	  Grant	  Program	  for	  Community	  
Development,"	  Political	  Science	  Quarterly	  92,	  no.	  2	  (1977),	  228;	  Dennis	  Keating	  and	  Richard	  
LeGates,	  "Who	  Should	  Benefit	  from	  the	  CDBG	  Program?,"	  Urban	  Lawyer	  10,	  no.	  4	  (1978),	  
710;	  Sarah	  F.	  Liebschutz,	  "Neighborhood	  Conservation:	  Political	  Choices	  under	  the	  
Community	  Development	  Program,"	  Publius	  13,	  no.	  2	  (1983),	  23-­‐37;	  Richard	  P	  Nathan	  and	  
Paul	  R	  Dommel,	  "Federal-­‐Local	  Relations	  Under	  Block	  Grants,"	  Political	  Science	  Quarterly	  
93,	  no.	  3	  (1979),	  421-­‐442.	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community	  and	  economic	  development	  that	  exacerbated	  the	  city’s	  ability	  to	  develop	  
redistributive	  policy	  measures.	  By	  the	  mid	  1970s,	  new	  federal	  aid	  was	  easily	  
directed	  into	  private-­‐sector	  demands	  for	  public	  subsidization.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  shifting	  
discourse	  and	  the	  overwhelming	  need	  of	  cities	  to	  reestablish	  tax	  bases,	  the	  federal	  
government	  dramatically	  multiplied	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  private-­‐sector	  investors	  
could	  reap	  the	  benefits	  of	  urban	  aid.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s,	  downtown	  developers	  
became	  major	  beneficiaries	  of	  federal	  urban	  aid	  as	  downtown	  construction	  
“divert(ed)	  concern	  and	  even	  resources	  from	  the	  broader	  problems	  that	  beset	  the	  
region.”67	  	  	  
Thus,	  federal	  funding,	  particularly	  in	  its	  block	  grant	  form,	  operated	  with	  dual	  
purpose	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  The	  prioritization	  of	  private-­‐sector	  involvement	  
underlying	  the	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  Act	  (1974)	  underscored	  an	  
ideological	  position	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  low-­‐income	  people	  of	  color	  were	  
intrinsically	  tied	  to	  the	  city’s	  physical	  development.	  This	  position	  was	  reinforced	  by	  
the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  New	  Orleans	  government,	  which	  linked	  economic	  stagnation	  with	  
segregation	  and	  inequality.	  In	  this	  context,	  federal	  aid	  operated	  to	  provide	  benefits	  
to	  working	  and	  poor	  people	  that	  the	  type	  of	  downtown	  development,	  based	  as	  it	  
was	  in	  low-­‐wage,	  service-­‐sector	  industries,	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  support.	  Thus,	  
federal	  aid	  allowed	  a	  liberal	  government	  to	  pursue	  a	  narrow	  economic	  development	  
strategy	  despite	  the	  asymmetry	  of	  job	  creation	  and	  city	  demographics.	  Ultimately,	  
the	  distribution	  of	  block	  grants	  on	  a	  neighborhood	  basis	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  create	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  David	  Harvey,	  "From	  Managerialism	  to	  Entrepreneurialism:	  The	  Transformation	  
in	  Urban	  Governance	  in	  Late	  Capitalism,"	  Geografiska	  Annaler	  71,	  no.	  1	  (1989),	  8.	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collective	  goals,	  and	  sometimes	  collective	  protest,	  that	  could	  have	  given	  low-­‐income	  
residents	  more	  of	  a	  stake	  and	  say	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  economic	  development.	  	  	  
Legislation	  that	  promised	  to	  give	  local	  powerbrokers	  the	  opportunity	  to	  
design	  better	  programs	  was	  a	  conduit	  to	  a	  larger	  retreat	  of	  federal	  policy	  away	  from	  
redistributive	  urban	  aid.68	  Thus,	  community	  development	  operated	  as	  a	  mirage	  of	  
possibility	  within	  broader	  shifts	  in	  the	  national	  political	  economy—	  
deindustrialization,	  the	  decline	  of	  real	  wages,	  and	  the	  weakening	  of	  unions—that	  
only	  exacerbated	  the	  crisis	  facing	  cities.	  In	  an	  era	  of	  shrinking	  funds	  and	  growing	  
fiscal	  instability,	  calls	  for	  redistribution	  at	  a	  local	  government	  level	  were	  scaled	  back	  
in	  favor	  of	  less	  politically	  controversial	  growth	  schemes.69	  Yet,	  instead	  of	  economic	  
growth	  “trickling	  down,”	  poverty	  and	  joblessness	  only	  increased	  in	  the	  Crescent	  City.	  	  
This	  dissertation	  ends	  in	  what	  could	  be	  called	  a	  new	  moment	  that	  was	  
defined	  by	  cutbacks,	  Reaganomics,	  deregulation,	  and	  the	  political	  pushback	  against	  
redistributive	  urban	  policies.	  Yet	  it	  was	  in	  the	  previous	  decade,	  which	  began	  amid	  a	  
War	  on	  Poverty	  and	  ended	  with	  the	  collapse	  of	  most	  urban	  federal	  funding,	  that	  the	  
ideology	  and	  bureaucracy	  of	  a	  government-­‐supported	  social	  welfare	  platform	  was	  
dismantled.	  The	  programs	  that	  developed	  in	  this	  era—ones	  that	  promoted	  
development,	  privatization,	  and	  less	  community	  involvement—reorganized	  city	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  John	  Mollenkopf,	  "Neighborhood	  Political	  Development	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Urban	  
Growth:	  Boston	  and	  San	  Francisco	  1958-­‐1978,"	  International	  Journal	  of	  Urban	  and	  Regional	  
Studies	  5,	  no.	  1	  (1981),	  16.	  
	  
69	  For	  broad	  overviews	  of	  these	  political	  and	  economic	  trends	  throughout	  the	  1970s,	  
see	  Judith	  Stein,	  Pivotal	  Decade:	  How	  the	  United	  States	  Traded	  Factories	  for	  Finance	  in	  the	  
Seventies	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2010);	  and	  	  Bruce	  Schulman,	  The	  Seventies:	  
The	  Great	  Shift	  In	  American	  Culture,	  Society,	  and	  Politics	  (Boston,	  MA:	  De	  Capo	  Press,	  2002).	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Cities,	  in	  isolation,	  are	  limited	  in	  what	  they	  can	  accomplish.70	  In	  New	  Orleans,	  
a	  liberal	  government	  with	  an	  expressed	  commitment	  to	  redistributive	  measures	  
encountered	  new	  federal	  legislation	  with	  excitement	  and	  optimism.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  decade,	  however,	  Community	  Development	  Block	  Grants	  provided	  only	  
piecemeal	  alleviation	  of	  poverty	  conditions	  in	  the	  city.	  The	  limitations	  of	  
intergovernmental	  relations	  and	  aid,	  both	  state	  and	  federal,	  left	  city	  leaders	  feeling	  
that	  their	  ability	  to	  transform	  the	  city	  had	  been	  crippled.	  For	  cities	  like	  New	  Orleans,	  
where	  residents	  were	  desperately	  poor,	  the	  shifting	  national	  economy,	  which	  re-­‐
imagined	  cities	  as	  centers	  for	  high-­‐tech	  industries	  and	  corporate	  headquarters,	  had	  
largely	  excluded	  their	  populace.	  The	  city’s	  tax	  base,	  which	  failed	  to	  support	  even	  
minimal	  tax	  increases	  for	  expanded	  social	  services	  and	  schooling	  throughout	  the	  
1970s	  and	  1980s,	  continued	  to	  dwindle.	  State	  regulations	  on	  equitable	  tax	  measures	  
deterred	  a	  balance	  in	  developmental	  and	  redistributive	  programs.	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  
economic	  stagnation	  and	  growing	  fiscal	  instability,	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  local	  leadership	  
to	  act	  autonomously	  was	  diminished	  by	  its	  desire	  to	  attract	  and	  respond	  to	  the	  
needs	  of	  the	  private	  sector.	  	  The	  challenges	  to	  truly	  redistributive	  urban	  programs,	  a	  
fact	  that	  the	  Community	  Development	  Block	  Grant	  program	  embodied	  symbolically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Paul	  E.	  Peterson,	  City	  Limits	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	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through	  its	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  physical	  development	  of	  the	  broad	  city	  landscape,	  all	  
but	  eliminated	  any	  possibility	  of	  progressive	  urban	  change.	  	  
Yet	  the	  specific	  approach	  taken	  in	  New	  Orleans,	  which	  consisted	  of	  
promoting	  tourism	  and	  convention	  centers,	  was	  a	  choice	  made	  within	  a	  larger	  
framework	  of	  determinants,	  including	  the	  hesitation	  of	  the	  city’s	  social	  elite	  to	  
promote	  a	  diverse	  economy	  and	  the	  salience	  of	  real	  estate	  as	  a	  means	  to	  circumvent	  
that	  elite.	  While	  local	  leadership	  throughout	  the	  1970s	  supported	  integration,	  
administrators	  found	  goals	  of	  economic	  inclusion—and	  attendant	  goals	  of	  quality	  
housing—less	  achievable.	  At	  many	  times,	  it	  seemed	  as	  if	  this	  was	  not	  the	  goal	  in	  the	  
first	  place.	  Thus,	  where	  community	  groups	  attempted	  alternative	  program	  
development	  in	  New	  Orleans	  that	  linked	  housing,	  education,	  and	  employment	  
opportunities,	  those	  programs	  were	  unable	  to	  get	  off	  the	  ground	  without	  the	  full	  
support	  of	  governing	  officials.	  With	  the	  city	  unwilling	  to	  force	  redistributive	  
measures—in	  the	  form	  of	  training	  programs,	  educational	  kickbacks	  or	  community	  
employment	  programs—from	  local	  business	  developers,	  even	  as	  it	  provided	  
developers	  with	  financial	  and	  spatial	  incentives,	  New	  Orleans	  failed	  to	  provide	  for	  
its	  low-­‐income	  population	  in	  ways	  that	  other	  cities	  have.	  	  	  
The	  fallible	  nature	  of	  the	  separation	  between	  community	  and	  economic	  
activity	  remained	  hidden	  by	  federal	  urban	  aid	  and	  the	  talented	  grantsmenship	  of	  
Mayors	  Moon	  Landrieu	  and	  Dutch	  Morial,	  both	  of	  whom	  contributed	  to	  increased	  
federal	  funding	  outlays	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  local	  budget	  in	  every	  year	  between	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1970	  and	  1979.71	  By	  1982,	  however,	  as	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  began	  to	  
decimate	  federal	  urban	  aid	  programs,	  the	  city’s	  funding	  had	  been	  reduced	  by	  nearly	  
two-­‐thirds	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  pursuing	  separate	  strategies	  for	  middle-­‐class	  
retention	  and	  low-­‐income	  neighborhood	  development	  were	  unraveling.	  	  	  	  	  	  
This	  dissertation	  demonstrates	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  federal	  policies	  
circumscribe	  and	  redirect	  the	  options	  that	  local	  political	  agents	  can	  utilize	  to	  
respond	  to	  urban	  inequality.	  In	  1974,	  a	  path	  toward	  privatization	  turned	  attention	  
away	  from	  structural	  inequity;	  in	  2005,	  Americans	  finally,	  although	  only	  
momentarily,	  noticed	  the	  consequences.	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  Whelan,	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CHAPTER	  ONE	  
	  
From	  Maximum	  Feasible	  Participation	  to	  Maximum	  Feasible	  Priority:	  
	  Dismantling	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty	  
	  
	  
From	  1970	  to	  1974,	  the	  battle	  to	  pass	  the	  Community	  Development	  Block	  
Grant	  (CDBG)	  program	  coincided	  with	  an	  effort	  to	  dismantle	  categorical	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  
programming	  that	  defined	  nearly	  35	  years	  of	  federal	  assistance	  to	  cities.	  In	  
removing	  the	  link	  between	  funding	  and	  national	  policy	  objectives,	  the	  enactment	  of	  
the	  CDBG	  program	  dramatically	  reshaped	  the	  way	  city	  governments	  conceptualized,	  
planned	  for,	  and	  implemented	  urban	  revitalization	  programs	  in	  low-­‐income	  
communities.	  The	  emergence	  of	  block	  grants	  paralleled	  a	  rise	  in	  a	  bipartisan	  
discourse	  that	  highlighted	  the	  failure	  of	  community-­‐centered	  antipoverty	  measures.	  
Linking	  that	  failure	  to	  the	  management	  of	  programs	  and	  the	  futility	  of	  fighting	  
isolated	  poverty	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  larger	  urban	  crisis,	  block	  grants	  emphasized	  the	  
need	  for	  centralized,	  efficient	  local	  planning	  efforts	  to	  drive	  citywide	  revitalization.	  
Measures	  to	  involve	  low-­‐income	  communities	  had	  failed,	  so	  the	  argument	  went,	  and	  
thus,	  local	  governing	  experts	  must	  be	  the	  frontline	  for	  new	  efforts.	  	  	  
While	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning	  ignored	  both	  the	  structural	  impediments	  to	  
community	  action	  (and	  its	  successes)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  central	  role	  that	  local	  officials	  
played	  in	  maintaining	  unequal	  access	  to	  resources	  in	  cities,	  it	  was	  nevertheless	  
salient	  to	  a	  broad	  array	  of	  constituencies.	  As	  a	  result,	  in	  the	  decade	  after	  federal	  
officials	  had	  sidestepped	  local	  governance	  to	  provide	  rights	  to	  low-­‐income	  people	  of	  
color,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  now	  claimed	  that	  it	  was	  mayors	  who	  could	  best	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operate	  community	  development	  programs.	  The	  CDBG	  program	  appeared	  to	  offer	  
the	  flexibility	  and	  autonomy	  that	  mayors	  had	  asked	  for;	  yet,	  as	  mayors	  contended	  
with	  shifts	  in	  national	  economic	  trends,	  deindustrialization,	  and	  inflation,	  the	  new	  
program’s	  focus	  on	  physical	  development	  and	  private-­‐sector	  reinvestment	  was,	  in	  
fact,	  quite	  restrictive.	  The	  goal	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  inclusion,	  which	  had	  once	  
been	  central	  to	  demands	  for	  antipoverty	  aid,	  was	  displaced	  by	  those	  of	  fiscal	  health,	  
management,	  and	  an	  ideology	  espousing	  that	  market	  growth	  could	  fix	  what	  poverty	  
programs	  could	  not.	  In	  the	  end,	  Community	  Development	  Block	  Grants	  left	  local	  
governing	  officials	  with	  far	  fewer	  options	  to	  pursue	  redistributive	  action.	  	  	  
This	  chapter	  offers	  a	  case	  study	  of	  the	  national	  legislative	  process	  through	  
which	  antipoverty	  efforts	  were	  dismantled	  and	  block	  grants	  were	  negotiated.	  It	  
examines	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  federal	  aid	  to	  states	  in	  three	  stages:	  
categorical	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid,	  revenue	  sharing,	  and	  block	  grants.	  Until	  the	  1970s,	  
Congress	  distributed	  antipoverty	  aid	  through	  categorical	  grants	  that	  were	  awarded	  
either	  on	  a	  formula	  or	  project	  basis.	  In	  the	  early	  1970s,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  
enacted	  a	  general	  revenue-­‐sharing	  scheme	  distributing	  funds	  for	  broad	  use	  under	  
mayoral	  discretion.	  Attempting	  to	  eliminate	  a	  majority	  of	  categorical	  antipoverty	  aid,	  
Nixon	  then	  proposed	  a	  “special”	  revenue-­‐sharing	  package	  that	  would	  give	  mayors	  
control	  over	  an	  array	  of	  community	  development	  activities	  without	  federal	  
oversight.	  Ultimately,	  a	  compromise	  was	  approved,	  resulting	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  
federal	  funds	  through	  block	  grants	  with	  limited	  federal	  oversight.	  The	  resultant	  
Community	  Development	  Block	  Grants	  focused	  on	  the	  physical	  development	  of	  the	  
city	  itself,	  rather	  than	  targeted	  antipoverty	  work.	  This	  approach	  would	  affect	  both	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the	  scope	  of	  programs	  that	  cities	  developed	  and	  the	  way	  they	  conceptualized	  their	  
goals	  in	  relation	  to	  low-­‐income	  communities.	  Such	  a	  change	  altered	  the	  means	  
through	  which	  cities	  could	  address	  poverty,	  a	  change	  that	  continues	  to	  impact	  
antipoverty	  efforts	  40	  years	  later.	  By	  understanding	  how	  the	  legislation	  was	  
manipulated	  to	  shift	  conversations	  away	  from	  poverty,	  we	  then	  have	  a	  better	  
framework	  for	  understanding	  how	  committed	  local	  officials	  attempted	  to	  balance	  
priorities	  between	  development	  and	  redistribution.	  	  
	  
A	  War	  on	  the	  'War	  on	  Poverty'	  
By	  1969,	  two	  presidential	  task	  force	  commissions	  released	  reports	  
suggesting	  that	  the	  federal	  role	  in	  antipoverty	  efforts	  should	  be	  circumscribed.	  The	  
findings	  claimed	  that	  antipoverty	  efforts	  established	  through	  the	  Office	  of	  Economic	  
Opportunity	  (OEO)	  were	  “irrational”	  and	  “wasteful.”	  Deploying	  an	  argument	  that	  
antipoverty	  activists	  themselves	  were	  making,	  one	  of	  the	  task	  forces	  claimed	  that	  
despite	  the	  400-­‐plus	  categorical	  grants	  for	  urban	  aid,	  the	  narrow	  scope	  of	  each	  grant	  
did	  not	  empower	  antipoverty	  agencies	  to	  conduct	  comprehensive	  approaches	  to	  
issues	  of	  urban	  inequity.	  “On	  the	  whole,”	  the	  Future	  of	  Model	  Cities	  task	  force's	  
report	  observed,	  “the	  tendency	  of	  the	  federal	  subsidies	  has	  been	  to	  redistribute	  
income	  from	  the	  less	  well-­‐off	  to	  the	  more	  well-­‐off	  and	  to	  encourage	  the	  latter	  to	  
move	  out	  of	  the	  central	  city.”	  1	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Edward	  C.	  Banfield,	  “Re-­‐draft	  of	  Task	  Force	  Report,”	  November	  24,	  1969,	  Box	  42,	  
Folder	  Councils	  and	  Committees:	  Future	  of	  Model	  Cities	  Program	  Subcommittee	  1-­‐4-­‐
3,White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Staff	  Member	  and	  Office	  Files,	  Daniel	  Patrick	  Moynihan;	  
Richard	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	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The	  task	  force,	  led	  by	  Harvard	  political	  scientist	  Edward	  Banfield,	  a	  vocal	  
opponent	  of	  federal	  antipoverty	  measures,	  argued	  that	  this	  redistribution	  had	  little	  
to	  do	  with	  insufficient	  federal	  directives	  and	  the	  steering	  of	  funds	  toward	  white,	  
middle-­‐class	  suburbs.	  According	  to	  the	  task	  force,	  the	  cause	  was	  quite	  the	  opposite:	  
An	  ever-­‐expanding	  federal	  bureaucracy	  with	  no	  real	  understanding	  of	  urban	  issues	  
had	  driven	  efforts	  to	  achieve	  stable	  cities	  into	  the	  ground.	  The	  present	  system,	  the	  
task	  force	  wrote,	  encouraged	  both	  cities	  and	  local	  antipoverty	  agencies	  to	  “use	  
resources	  wastefully”	  and	  to	  “provide	  cover	  for	  bureaucrats	  whose	  natural	  
inclination	  is	  to	  make	  simple	  matters	  complicated.”2	  Local	  officials,	  who	  by	  the	  task	  
force’s	  reporting	  were	  attempting	  to	  confront	  issues	  of	  urban	  poverty,	  were	  instead	  
forced	  to	  use	  urban	  aid	  in	  ways	  that	  gave	  little	  priority	  to	  their	  most	  pressing	  
demands.	  	  
Even	  programs	  that	  could	  have	  a	  real	  impact,	  such	  as	  Model	  Cities,	  were	  in	  
danger	  of	  just	  “gilding	  the	  ghetto.”3	  Invoking	  imagery	  then	  dominant	  in	  mainstream	  
rhetoric	  that	  stereotyped	  poor	  people	  as	  welfare	  queens	  and	  antipoverty	  robber	  
barons,	  Banfield's	  task	  force	  claimed	  that	  antipoverty	  programs	  did	  more	  to	  allow	  
small	  fiefdoms	  to	  amass	  both	  power	  and	  resources	  than	  they	  did	  to	  empower	  self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Report;	  “Re-­‐draft	  of	  Task	  Force	  Report,”	  November	  24,	  1969,	  Box	  42,	  Councils	  and	  
Committees,	  Future	  of	  Model	  Cities	  Program	  Subcommittee,	  1-­‐4-­‐3;	  White	  House	  Central	  
Files,	  Staff	  Member	  and	  Office	  Files,	  Daniel	  Patrick	  Moynihan;	  Richard	  Nixon	  Presidential	  
Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	  
	  
3	  Report;	  “Re-­‐draft	  of	  Task	  Force	  Report,”	  November	  24,	  1969,	  Box	  42,	  Councils	  and	  
Committees,	  Future	  of	  Model	  Cities	  Program	  Subcommittee,	  1-­‐4-­‐3;	  White	  House	  Central	  
Files,	  Staff	  Member	  and	  Office	  Files,	  Daniel	  Patrick	  Moynihan;	  Richard	  Nixon	  Presidential	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sufficient	  low-­‐income	  citizens.	  Refuting	  antipoverty	  activists'	  claims	  that	  targeted	  
relief	  efforts	  were	  necessary,	  a	  second	  task	  force	  found	  evidence	  indicating	  that	  
concentrated	  antipoverty	  efforts	  were	  woefully	  inadequate.	  Areas	  of	  cities	  
designated	  for	  the	  Model	  Cities	  program,	  the	  Urban	  Affairs	  Advisory	  task	  force	  
members	  outlined,	  rarely	  contained	  more	  than	  10	  percent	  of	  a	  city’s	  renewable	  
neighborhoods	  and	  less	  than	  1	  percent	  of	  possible	  urban	  renewal	  territory	  
nationwide.	  	  Not	  only	  were	  programs	  limited	  by	  their	  approach,	  they	  were	  actually	  
impeding	  more	  fruitful	  revitalization	  of	  entire	  cities.4	  By	  allowing	  local	  officials	  to	  
conduct	  “uncoordinated	  and	  unguided	  urban	  development,”	  antipoverty	  efforts	  had	  
been	  responsible	  for	  exacerbating	  “the	  crisis	  of	  the	  city.”5	  Instead,	  the	  reports	  
offered	  that	  the	  OEO	  should	  be	  merged	  with	  Department	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  
Development	  (HUD)	  programs	  and	  a	  form	  of	  locally	  controlled	  revenue	  sharing	  
should	  be	  adopted	  to	  begin	  to	  counteract	  local	  deficiencies,	  federal	  bureaucracy,	  and	  
the	  myopia	  of	  earlier	  programs.6	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  National	  Governor’s	  Committee,	  “Urban	  Affairs	  Advisory	  Task	  Force,	  Report	  on	  
Community	  Development,	  March	  26,	  1969.”	  Princeton,	  N.J.,	  Box	  2,	  White	  House	  Central	  
Files,	  Subject	  Files,	  Meetings	  and	  Conferences,	  Richard	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  
Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	  	  
	  
5	  National	  Governor’s	  Committee,	  “Urban	  Affairs	  Advisory	  Task	  Force,	  Report	  on	  
Community	  Development,	  March	  26,	  1969.”	  Princeton,	  N.J.,	  Box	  2,	  White	  House	  Central	  
Files,	  Subject	  Files,	  Meetings	  and	  Conferences,	  Richard	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  
Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	  
	  
6	  The	  critique	  mirrored	  that	  of	  the	  Nixon	  administration,	  which	  was	  beginning	  to	  
form	  strategies	  aimed	  at	  dismantling	  antipoverty	  aid.	  While	  many	  celebrated	  the	  efforts	  
conducted	  in	  cities	  under	  War	  on	  Poverty	  programs,	  there	  was	  also	  growing	  resentment	  
among	  various	  constituencies	  about	  the	  focus	  on	  antipoverty	  programs.	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  anti-­‐
Vietnam	  protests,	  student	  boycotts,	  the	  recession	  and	  urban	  inflation,	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  
“wastefulness”	  had	  a	  particular	  appeal.	  For	  suburban	  interests,	  organized	  around	  an	  
ideology	  of	  individualism	  and	  fearing	  federal	  imposition	  on	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  
structure	  of	  their	  communities,	  the	  critique	  reiterated	  their	  claims	  that	  tax	  money	  was	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'New	  Federalism'	  
The	  findings	  emboldened	  the	  policy	  position	  of	  President	  Richard	  Nixon	  and	  
later	  that	  year	  the	  president	  had	  developed	  a	  program	  that	  would	  redirect	  urban	  aid	  
and	  attendant	  policy	  measures	  away	  from	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  the	  states.	  
Calling	  his	  plan	  “New	  Federalism,”	  Nixon	  proposed	  a	  program	  of	  revenue	  sharing	  
providing	  unprecedented	  relief	  to	  suffering	  cities	  and	  towns.7	  The	  president	  
outlined	  how	  the	  act,	  by	  supplying	  local	  leadership	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  deploy	  funds	  
as	  was	  needed,	  could	  stabilize	  tax	  bases,	  avoid	  new	  levies,	  and	  begin	  to	  address	  vast	  
urban	  inequities.	  The	  blanket	  approach	  of	  the	  federal	  War	  on	  Poverty,	  the	  president	  
argued,	  had	  failed	  to	  develop	  responsiveness	  to	  the	  divergent	  needs	  of	  cities	  and	  
states.	  This	  was	  a	  deficiency	  that	  was	  at	  once	  costly	  and	  detrimental	  to	  city	  fiscal	  
health.	  By	  offering	  local	  autonomy,	  the	  president	  maintained,	  revenue	  
sharing	  ”corrected”	  those	  inadequacies.	  	  	  
However,	  the	  president's	  revenue-­‐sharing	  program	  went	  far	  beyond	  offering	  
new	  funds	  to	  struggling	  big	  cities.	  Most	  significantly,	  it	  systematically	  undermined	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
being	  used	  to	  subsidize	  inefficient	  and	  lazy	  city	  residents.	  This	  critique	  developed	  in	  
strength	  from	  new	  theories	  that	  claimed	  poverty	  was	  pathological.	  It	  was	  a	  theory	  that	  was	  
accepted	  not	  just	  by	  conservatives,	  but	  by	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  liberal	  social	  scientists	  as	  
well.	  Thus,	  those	  who	  believed	  they	  were	  subsidizing	  ghetto	  living	  were	  hardly	  the	  only	  
interests	  anxious	  to	  do	  away	  with	  categorical	  aid.	  For	  Democratic	  mayors	  of	  once-­‐thriving	  
city	  centers,	  the	  control	  and	  flexibility	  of	  local	  autonomy	  over	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  was	  particularly	  
appealing.	  See	  Robert	  B.	  Semple	  Jr.,	  “Nixon	  Considering	  Agency	  Shake-­‐up,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  
January	  11,	  1971.	  	  
	  
7	  Richard	  Nixon,	  "Address	  to	  the	  Nation	  on	  Domestic	  Programs.,"	  August	  8,	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antipoverty	  programs.	  How	  that	  occurred	  is	  made	  clearer	  by	  examining	  the	  impetus	  
for	  Nixon's	  revenue-­‐sharing	  proposals	  and	  the	  congressional	  actions	  that	  occurred	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  consequential	  shifts	  in	  federal	  urban	  aid.	  
Nixon	  contended	  that	  the	  inefficiencies	  found	  at	  the	  level	  of	  local	  
implementation	  as	  a	  result	  of	  categorical	  aid	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  bureaucracies	  
that	  oversaw	  the	  program	  grants	  as	  well.	  Decentralizing	  federal	  aid	  implementation	  
and	  redirecting	  it	  to	  local	  governing	  officials	  would	  render	  inconsequential	  the	  
federal	  bureaucratic	  structures	  that	  had	  been	  established	  for	  direction	  and	  
oversight.	  Thus,	  revenue	  sharing	  would	  present	  cities	  with	  new	  powers	  to	  make	  
choices	  about	  where	  and	  how	  to	  spend	  funds,	  and	  in	  the	  course	  of	  decentralizing	  
autonomy,	  would	  end	  federal	  oversight.	  To	  avoid	  duplicity	  and	  eliminate	  useless	  
procedures,	  Nixon	  announced,	  the	  OEO,	  host	  to	  most	  War	  on	  Poverty	  programs,	  
would	  be	  transformed	  into	  a	  centralized	  research	  and	  development	  agency	  that	  
could	  offer	  new	  insight	  on	  federal	  urban	  policy.8	  	  
The	  proposal	  elicited	  immediate	  protest	  from	  antipoverty	  activists	  and	  their	  
congressional	  allies.	  While	  members	  of	  Congress	  had	  begun	  questioning	  the	  efficacy	  
of	  antipoverty	  programs,	  the	  proposition	  of	  ending	  them	  entirely	  in	  favor	  of	  
unrestricted	  funding	  was	  unacceptable	  to	  many	  legislators.	  The	  concerns	  were	  
innumerable	  and	  ranged	  from	  questions	  about	  guiding	  directives	  to	  fear	  that	  the	  
president	  might	  be	  using	  new	  funding	  as	  a	  means	  of	  eroding	  support	  for	  older,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Press	  Release,	  “Statement	  by	  the	  President	  on	  the	  Office	  of	  Economic	  Opportunity,”	  
Box	  1,	  Folder	  2;	  Folder	  Group	  6-­‐7,	  OEO,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Subject	  Files,	  Office	  of	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categorical	  programs.	  Without	  congressional	  oversight,	  any	  revenue-­‐sharing	  
scheme	  would	  radically	  alter	  which	  constituencies	  received	  funding,	  opponents	  
argued.9	  There	  could	  be	  no	  accountability	  of	  state	  and	  local	  officials	  to	  national	  
urban	  policy	  directives,	  both	  redistributive	  and	  developmental,	  if	  local	  officials	  were	  
allowed	  to	  dictate	  the	  spending	  of	  funds	  as	  they	  chose.10	  While	  protecting	  urban	  
constituencies	  was	  important,	  members	  of	  Congress	  worried	  that	  to	  allow	  local	  and	  
state	  officials	  to	  exercise	  discretion	  with	  impunity	  set	  a	  precedent	  to	  revoke	  other	  
congressional	  directives.	  Local	  autonomy	  was	  only	  a	  guise,	  critics	  argued,	  to	  begin	  
dismantling	  a	  much	  wider	  array	  of	  Democratic	  measures	  to	  equalize	  urban	  life.	  For	  
those	  opposing	  revenue	  sharing,	  there	  was	  little	  doubt	  that	  the	  proposal	  signaled	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty.	  	  	  	  
Aware	  that	  concern	  over	  other	  antipoverty	  programs	  could	  derail	  support	  
for	  the	  revenue-­‐sharing	  venture,	  the	  administration’s	  leadership	  was	  careful	  to	  keep	  
talk	  of	  ending	  categorical	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  out	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  and,	  in	  many	  cases,	  
adamantly	  denied	  that	  intention	  at	  all.	  Those	  fears,	  further	  fueled	  by	  Daniel	  Patrick	  
Moynihan’s	  critique	  of	  community	  action,	  Maximum	  Feasible	  Misunderstanding,	  
could	  extinguish	  the	  administration’s	  opportunity	  to	  reform	  urban	  aid	  directives.11	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  James	  M.	  Naughton,	  “Nixon	  Aide	  Hopeful	  on	  Congress	  Ties,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  
January	  16,	  1971.	  
	  
10	  	  New	  York	  Times,	  “Mills	  Criticizes	  Revenue	  Sharing,”	  October	  20,	  1970,	  51.	  
	  
11	  A	  staff	  assistant	  to	  President	  Nixon,	  Christopher	  DeMuth,	  informed	  Moynihan	  that	  
among	  community	  activists,	  he	  was	  not	  held	  in	  high	  regard.	  DeMuth	  wrote,	  “The	  attitude	  
towards	  you	  was	  generally	  quite	  suspicious.	  Most	  of	  the	  professionals	  felt	  that	  you	  don’t	  
think	  poor	  people	  should	  be	  involved	  [with	  politics],	  that	  you	  have	  overreacted	  to	  the	  
problems	  created	  by	  a	  few	  CAAs	  and	  that	  you	  would	  probably	  like	  to	  kill	  CAP	  entirely.”	  See	  
Christopher	  DeMuth,	  Memorandum	  on	  Antipoverty	  conference,	  12	  January	  1969,	  Box	  34,	  
Folder	  Council	  on	  Urban	  Affairs,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Staff	  Member	  and	  Office	  Files,	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Moynihan,	  working	  as	  counselor	  of	  Urban	  Affairs,	  warned	  John	  Ehrlichman,	  Nixon’s	  
top	  aide,	  and	  H.R.	  Haldeman,	  the	  White	  House	  chief	  of	  staff,	  that	  as	  the	  
administration	  moved	  forward,	  it	  would	  be	  of	  great	  importance	  to	  assuage	  the	  
nation’s	  elected	  officials	  of	  their	  fears	  that	  antipoverty	  programs	  would	  be	  struck	  
down.12	  Revenue	  sharing	  would	  not	  get	  municipal	  approval	  if	  mayors	  thought	  they	  
would	  be	  losing	  significant	  shares	  of	  funding	  elsewhere.	  	  	  
Instead,	  administration	  officials	  believed	  that	  efforts	  should	  focus	  on	  issues	  
that	  would	  cultivate	  political	  approval	  for	  broad-­‐based	  reform.	  Revenue	  sharing	  
would	  need	  to	  “be	  sold	  to	  the	  people,”	  domestic	  aide	  Kenneth	  Cole	  determined.13	  
Drawing	  connections	  between	  antipoverty	  efforts	  and	  the	  stumbling	  economy,	  the	  
administration	  sought	  to	  blame	  the	  growth	  of	  federal	  bureaucracy	  for	  recent	  fiscal	  
instability.	  In	  addition,	  the	  administration	  relied	  on	  social	  issues—namely	  
integration—to	  leverage	  support	  for	  revenue	  sharing.	  This	  particular	  fear	  was	  
already	  coming	  to	  a	  head	  because	  HUD	  Secretary	  George	  Romney,	  former	  governor	  
of	  Michigan,	  pursued	  integration	  measures	  as	  a	  key	  component	  of	  his	  
administration	  of	  the	  urban	  development	  office.	  Romney,	  despite	  support	  for	  
overhauling	  the	  antipoverty	  programs,	  nevertheless	  believed	  that	  segregated	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Daniel	  Patrick	  Moynihan,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  
California.	  	  
	  
12Daniel	  Patrick	  Moynihan,	  Confidential	  Memo	  for	  John	  Ehrlichman	  and	  H.	  R.	  
Haldeman,	  Box	  21,	  Folder	  24	  July,	  1970,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Staff	  Material	  and	  Office	  
Files,	  John	  D.	  Ehrlichman,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	  	  
	  
13	  Memo,	  Ken	  Cole	  to	  President	  Nixon,	  December	  18,	  1970,	  Box	  29,	  Folder	  Revenue	  
Sharing	  1970-­‐1971	  (II)	  {1	  of	  3],	  White	  House	  Special	  Files,	  Staff	  Member	  and	  Office	  Files,	  
John	  D.	  Ehrlichman,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  
California.	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suburbs	  were	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  developing	  crisis	  of	  central	  cities.	  Thus,	  under	  
his	  leadership,	  HUD	  began	  an	  aggressive	  mission	  to	  desegregate	  suburbs	  and	  force	  
low-­‐income	  housing	  into	  previously	  homogenous	  areas.	  By	  withholding	  funds	  from	  
cities	  and	  parishes	  that	  refused	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  integration	  agenda,	  Romney	  
had	  not	  only	  ruffled	  feathers	  throughout	  the	  nation’s	  suburbs,	  but	  made	  enemies	  
with	  the	  president	  as	  well.	  Despite	  efforts	  to	  silence	  him,	  the	  administration	  was	  
distressed	  as	  Romney	  continued	  to	  give	  speeches	  calling	  suburbanites	  “white	  
majority	  escapists”	  and	  “self-­‐serving.”14	  	  	  
In	  general,	  HUD	  programs,	  whose	  mandate	  centered	  on	  “hardware”-­‐specific	  
aid	  (a	  term	  used	  to	  describe	  physical,	  rather	  than,	  social	  development	  programs),	  
were	  widely	  accepted	  by	  urban	  mayors	  and,	  on	  a	  fundamental	  level,	  the	  
administration.	  However,	  under	  Romney’s	  leadership,	  they	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  
administration’s	  support	  base.15	  The	  autonomy	  granted	  through	  revenue	  sharing	  
offered	  local	  administrators	  a	  way	  to	  correct	  this	  dilemma.	  Careful	  not	  to	  mention	  
race	  specifically,	  Nixon	  drew	  distinctions	  between	  hard-­‐working	  suburbanites	  and	  
those	  suffering	  from	  urban	  pathologies.	  Urban	  aid	  programs	  threatened	  white	  
suburbia’s	  freedom	  of	  choice	  and	  this,	  Nixon	  argued,	  was	  reason	  to	  oppose	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Memo,	  Dana	  Mead	  to	  Kenneth	  Cole,	  April	  18,	  1972;	  Box	  3,	  Folder	  3/1/72-­‐
4/31/72,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Subject	  Files,	  Federal	  Government-­‐	  Organizations	  
Department	  of	  HUD,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  
California.	  	  
	  
15	  Memo,	  John	  Ehrlichman	  to	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon,	  Box	  21,	  Folder	  October	  21,	  1970,	  
White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Staff	  Material	  and	  Office	  Files,	  John	  Ehrlichman,	  Nixon	  
Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	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continuation	  of	  antipoverty	  measures.16	  Revenue	  sharing	  would	  remove	  funding	  
most	  closely	  connected	  to	  urban	  black	  communities—housing	  grants,	  in	  
particular—from	  federal	  civil	  rights	  legislation.17	  While	  the	  administration	  was	  
concerned	  with	  being	  perceived	  as	  “anti-­‐black,”	  officials	  believed	  that	  they	  could	  
skirt	  the	  issue	  by	  designing	  references	  to	  civil	  rights	  without	  developing	  specific	  
mechanisms	  to	  enforce	  antidiscrimination	  claims	  on	  revenue	  sharing.18	  Exploiting	  
the	  instability	  created	  by	  rising	  inflation,	  urban	  unrest,	  and	  economic	  upheaval,	  
Nixon	  exclaimed:	  “A	  majority	  of	  Americans	  no	  longer	  support	  the	  continued	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Richard	  Cook,	  the	  president’s	  liaison	  for	  Congressional	  Relations	  and	  Legislative	  
Affairs,	  relayed	  this	  position	  to	  Ohio	  Representative	  Samuel	  L.	  Devine	  as	  it	  related	  to	  
economic	  and	  residential	  integration.	  He	  promised	  that	  the	  administration	  would	  not	  
impose	  any	  form	  of	  integration	  on	  existing	  local	  communities.	  See	  memorandum	  from	  
Richard	  Cook	  to	  Samuel	  L.	  Devine,	  January	  8,	  1972.	  	  Box	  24,	  Folder	  EX	  FA	  5	  Housing	  
1/1/72-­‐7/31/72,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Subject	  Files,	  Federal	  Aid	  (Housing),	  Richard	  
M.	  Nixon	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	  
	  
17	  Memo,	  John	  Ehrlichman	  to	  President	  Nixon,	  December	  31,	  1970;	  Box	  25,	  Folder	  
Revenue	  Sharing	  1970-­‐1971	  [6	  of	  6].	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Staff	  Member	  and	  Office	  
Files,	  John	  Ehrlichman,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  
California.	  
	  
18	  As	  revenue	  sharing	  moved	  forward,	  the	  administration	  fought	  against	  any	  formal	  
compliance	  measures,	  even	  those	  suggested	  by	  the	  Attorney	  General.	  Instead,	  they	  pushed	  
for	  much	  more	  ambiguous	  language	  with	  only	  passing	  reference	  to	  conformity	  to	  civil	  rights	  
legislation.	  See	  Memo,	  Leonard	  Carment	  to	  Caspar	  W.	  Weinberger,	  January	  28,	  1971,	  Box	  
29,	  Folder	  Revenue	  Sharing	  1970-­‐1971	  [II]	  [2	  of	  3],	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Staff	  Member	  
and	  Office	  Files,	  John	  Ehrlichman,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  
Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	  For	  administration	  discussing	  the	  perception	  of	  revenue	  sharing	  as	  
“anti-­‐black,”	  see	  Memo,	  John	  Ehrlichman	  to	  President	  Nixon,	  December	  31,	  1970;	  Box	  25,	  
Folder	  Revenue	  Sharing	  1970-­‐1971	  [6	  of	  6].	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Staff	  Member	  and	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extension	  of	  federal	  services.	  The	  momentum	  for	  federal	  expansion	  has	  passed	  its	  
peak;	  a	  process	  of	  deceleration	  has	  set	  in.”19	  	  
Members	  of	  the	  Cabinet	  came	  to	  the	  same	  conclusions.	  Top	  officials	  at	  the	  
Office	  of	  Budget	  and	  Management	  publicly	  favored	  a	  “bold	  approach”	  that	  
eliminated	  funding	  for	  categorical	  aid	  to	  the	  “maximum	  extent	  possible.”20	  Citing	  
cities'	  reliance	  on	  federal	  programs,	  Romney	  said,	  “Government	  has	  become	  too	  
occupied	  with	  sponsoring	  programs—rather	  than	  igniting	  and	  reshaping	  policies	  
that	  will	  encourage	  maximum	  private	  action.”	  It	  was	  high	  time	  that	  private	  citizens	  
and	  companies	  remake	  cities	  in	  their	  own	  vision.21	  
	  
Expanding	  Revenue	  Sharing	  
	  Capitalizing	  on	  that	  support,	  Nixon	  decided	  to	  dramatically	  expand	  his	  
proposal	  on	  revenue	  sharing.	  On	  January	  22,	  1971,	  Nixon	  delivered	  a	  State	  of	  the	  
Union	  address	  that	  proposed	  investing	  $16	  billion	  in	  revenue-­‐sharing	  funds	  for	  
cities,	  much	  of	  which	  would	  go	  directly	  to	  municipal	  leadership.	  Unlike	  his	  1970	  
revenue-­‐sharing	  proposal,	  this	  plan	  would	  consolidate	  hundreds	  of	  categorical	  
grants	  into	  six	  programs	  defined	  by	  broad	  categorical	  headings:	  urban	  development,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon,	  “Special	  Message	  to	  the	  Congress	  on	  Sharing	  Federal	  Revenues	  
With	  the	  States.”	  (speech,	  Washington,	  D.C.,	  August,	  13,	  1969),	  American	  Presidency	  Project,	  
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2200#ixzz1qQzZvwoQ	  	  
	  
20	  Memo,	  George	  Shultz	  to	  President	  Nixon,	  December	  18,	  1970,	  Box	  29,	  Folder	  
Revenue	  Sharing	  1970-­‐1971	  (II)	  (1	  of	  3),	  Staff	  Member	  and	  Office	  Files,	  John	  Ehrlichman,	  
Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	  
	  
21	  George	  Romney,	  “Address	  to	  the	  National	  League	  of	  Cities,	  1969,”	  San	  Diego,	  
California,	  Box	  19,	  Folder	  Cabinet	  (George	  Romney),	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Staff	  
Member	  and	  Office	  Files,	  Daniel	  Patrick	  Moynihan,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  
Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	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rural	  development,	  education,	  transportation,	  job	  training,	  and	  law	  enforcement.	  
The	  plan	  called	  for	  reorganizing	  “antipoverty”	  aid	  delivery	  under	  a	  single	  
community	  development	  agency	  that	  would	  simply	  manage	  allocation	  and	  aid	  cities	  
in	  qualifying	  for	  aid.	  More	  significantly,	  unlike	  the	  president’s	  earlier	  revenue-­‐
sharing	  scheme,	  this	  “special”	  revenue-­‐sharing	  program	  would	  replace	  HUD-­‐
directed	  antipoverty	  programs.	  	  
While	  revenue	  sharing	  was	  certainly	  not	  uncontroversial,	  the	  elimination	  of	  
supervising	  bureaucracies	  was	  far	  more	  threatening	  to	  established	  congressional	  
leadership.	  This	  made	  the	  passage	  of	  such	  legislation	  dubious.	  The	  Republican	  Nixon	  
administration	  was	  not	  delusional	  about	  this;	  rather	  it	  saw	  the	  sweeping	  mandate	  
for	  the	  reorganization	  of	  federal	  aid	  and	  governing	  bureaucracies	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
strategy	  to	  draw	  support	  away	  from	  Democratic	  leadership	  and	  reframe	  the	  
ideological	  entry	  point	  for	  discussing	  urban	  policy	  and	  aid.	  For	  political	  purposes,	  it	  
was	  best	  to	  “fight”	  for	  “a	  big,	  bold”	  agenda	  than	  something	  that	  could	  not	  be	  
construed	  as	  ideologically	  different	  than	  the	  urban	  legislation	  of	  prior	  
administrations.	  22	  
	  By	  linking	  new,	  unrestricted	  funds	  with	  the	  elimination	  of	  Democratic-­‐
controlled	  federal	  bureaucracies,	  the	  administration	  hoped	  to	  drive	  a	  wedge	  
between	  congressional	  Democrats	  wanting	  to	  retain	  oversight,	  and	  urban	  mayors	  
and	  fiscally	  strained	  governors	  blindly	  seeking	  access	  to	  new	  funds.	  From	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Caspar	  W.	  Weinberger	  to	  President	  Nixon,	  December	  17,	  1970,	  Box	  29,	  Folder	  
Revenue	  Sharing	  1970-­‐1971	  [II]	  [1	  of	  3],	  White	  House	  Special	  Files,	  Staff	  Member	  and	  Office	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administration's	  standpoint,	  mayors,	  who	  were	  direct	  recipients	  of	  urban	  aid,	  could	  
advocate	  for	  the	  funding	  redistribution	  in	  ways	  that	  states,	  which	  were	  tied	  to	  other	  
interests	  (namely	  suburban	  constituencies),	  could	  not.	  Both	  Nixon	  and	  his	  
administration	  realized	  that	  to	  garner	  support	  for	  any	  proposal	  that	  would	  diminish	  
the	  power	  of	  a	  Democratic	  Congress,	  they	  needed	  to	  lobby	  a	  unified	  constituency	  
with	  unified	  needs	  separate	  from	  the	  needs	  of	  special-­‐interest	  groups	  protected	  
through	  categorical	  aid.23	  Addressing	  Congress,	  Nixon	  slyly	  remarked	  that:	  	  	  
The	  time	  has	  come	  for	  a	  new	  partnership	  between	  the	  Federal	  Government	  
and	  the	  States	  and	  localities—a	  partnership	  in	  which	  we	  entrust	  the	  States	  
and	  localities	  with	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  the	  Nation's	  responsibilities,	  and	  in	  
which	  we	  share	  our	  Federal	  revenues	  with	  them	  so	  that	  they	  can	  meet	  those	  
responsibilities.24	  	  
	  
Nixon	  argued	  that	  the	  programmatic	  constraints	  attached	  to	  categorical	  grants	  
benefited	  only	  a	  minority	  of	  communities	  across	  the	  nation	  while	  his	  program	  
would	  support	  the	  expansion	  of	  funding	  into	  previously	  neglected	  cities.	  The	  
president	  reminded	  legislators	  that	  by	  creating	  more	  localized	  centers	  of	  
government	  authority,	  revenue-­‐sharing	  schemes	  offered	  new	  opportunities	  to	  
respond	  directly	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  urban	  residents.	  The	  inundation	  of	  federal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Caspar	  W.	  Weinberger,	  the	  Deputy	  Director	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  
Budget,	  told	  the	  president	  that	  a	  strategy	  that	  could	  phase	  out	  categorical	  aid	  without	  an	  
immediate	  drop	  in	  overall	  outlays	  could	  help	  marshal	  the	  support	  of	  “mayors	  against	  the	  
special	  interests	  on	  a	  program-­‐by-­‐program	  basis	  rather	  than	  taking	  on	  these	  special	  
interests	  as	  a	  group.”	  See	  Caspar	  W.	  Weinberger	  to	  President	  Nixon,	  December	  17,	  1970,	  
Box	  29,	  Folder	  Revenue	  Sharing	  1970-­‐1971	  [II]	  [1	  of	  3],	  White	  House	  Special	  Files,	  Staff	  
Member	  and	  Office	  Files,	  John	  D.	  Ehrlichman,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  
Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	  
	  
24	  Richard	  Nixon,	  Annual	  Message	  to	  Congress	  on	  the	  State	  of	  the	  Union,	  January	  22,	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bureaucratic	  measures	  had	  left	  city	  governments	  with	  few	  tools	  to	  tailor	  their	  
programs	  to	  their	  particular	  needs;	  as	  cities	  across	  the	  nation	  reeled	  from	  growing	  
deficits,	  the	  president	  blamed	  the	  “Washington	  bureaucrat”	  for	  imposing	  
restrictions	  that	  left	  city	  governing	  officials	  impotent.25	  In	  Nixon’s	  revisionist	  history	  
of	  the	  urban	  crisis,	  it	  was	  the	  result	  of	  an	  overloaded	  federal	  bureaucracy,	  not	  
structural	  economic	  changes	  (many	  wrought	  through	  federal	  subsidies	  for	  middle-­‐
class	  flight)	  that	  left	  cities	  fiscally	  unstable.	  	  	  
Testing	  the	  waters	  of	  public	  opinion,	  the	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget	  
(OMB)	  announced	  plans	  to	  reduce	  the	  Office	  of	  Economic	  Opportunity's	  budget	  by	  
an	  unprecedented	  10	  percent.26	  The	  reductions,	  OMB	  President	  George	  Shultz	  
explained,	  would	  be	  accompanied	  by	  efforts	  to	  integrate	  Community	  Action	  
Agencies	  (CAA)	  into	  a	  broad	  spectrum	  of	  federal,	  state,	  and	  local	  institutions,	  thus	  
ending	  their	  autonomy	  and	  central	  focus.27	  In	  a	  parallel	  effort,	  the	  administration	  
began	  to	  dismantle	  the	  Model	  Cities	  program,	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  antipoverty	  
program	  operated	  by	  HUD.	  The	  OMB	  implemented	  a	  unilateral	  freeze,	  effective	  
December	  31,	  1971,	  on	  all	  Model	  Cities	  program	  funding	  while	  stalling	  the	  release	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Richard	  Nixon,	  Annual	  Message	  to	  Congress	  on	  the	  State	  of	  the	  Union,	  January	  22,	  
1971.	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project.	  
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3110.	  
	  
26	  Jack	  Rosenthal,	  “Poverty	  Agency	  Resists	  22%	  Cut,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  January	  6,	  
1971,	  41.	  
	  
27	  Memo,	  Edwin	  Harper	  to	  John	  Ehrlichman,	  January	  11,	  1971;	  Box	  28,	  Folder	  
Revenue	  Sharing	  1970-­‐1971	  [4	  of	  6],	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Staff	  Member	  and	  Office	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nearly	  $200	  million	  of	  urban	  renewal	  aid.28	  Despite	  the	  rhetoric	  that	  re-­‐evaluating	  
and	  reorganizing	  older	  categorical	  aid	  was	  a	  means	  to	  enhance	  antipoverty	  efforts,	  
administration	  officials	  acknowledged	  privately	  that	  this	  action	  was	  part	  of	  an	  
attempt	  to	  “reverse	  the	  trend	  of	  30	  years	  of	  government	  in	  six	  months.”29	  
Although	  many	  of	  the	  mayors,	  including	  New	  Orleans	  Mayor	  Moon	  Landrieu,	  
continued	  to	  speak	  positively	  about	  the	  need	  for	  revenue	  sharing,	  they	  signed	  a	  
petition	  that	  opposed	  the	  cuts	  and	  challenged	  the	  administration’s	  decision	  to	  
disrupt	  vitally	  important	  antipoverty	  programs.	  30	  The	  president	  received	  an	  
outpouring	  of	  unmatched	  anger	  from	  senators,	  state	  legislators,	  and	  city	  councilors.	  
Congressman	  John	  V.	  Tunney	  (D-­‐CA)	  chastised	  the	  president	  for	  using	  revenue	  
sharing	  as	  a	  Trojan	  horse	  to	  remove	  categorical	  grants.	  “It	  would	  be	  a	  disaster	  in	  our	  
major	  cities,”	  Tunney	  wrote,	  “if	  the	  Model	  Cities	  program	  were	  to	  flounder	  because	  
of	  disinterest	  or	  active	  subterfuge	  on	  the	  part	  of	  those	  who	  administer	  the	  program	  
here	  in	  Washington.	  Unquestionably,	  Model	  Cities	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  few	  federal	  
efforts	  to	  genuinely	  raise	  expectations	  in	  neglected	  neighborhoods	  of	  some	  of	  our	  
larger	  cities.”31	  Tunney	  maintained	  that	  downgrading	  or	  diverting	  funds	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  New	  York	  Times,	  “Model	  Cities	  Fund	  Freeze	  Dropped	  by	  White	  House.”	  February	  
21,	  1971,	  20;	  see	  also	  Don	  Lewis,	  “Mayor	  Declares	  Support	  for	  Revenue	  Sharing,”	  Times-­‐	  
Picayune,	  January	  28,	  1971,	  1.	  
	  
29	  Memo,	  Ken	  Cole	  to	  President	  Nixon,	  December	  18,	  1970,	  Box	  29,	  Folder	  Revenue	  
Sharing	  1970-­‐1971	  (II)	  {1	  of	  3],	  White	  House	  Special	  Files,	  Staff	  Member	  and	  Office	  Files,	  
John	  D.	  Ehrlichman,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  
California.	  	  	  
	  	  
30	  New	  York	  Times,	  “Model	  Cities	  Fund	  Freeze	  Dropped	  by	  White	  House,”	  February	  
21,	  1971,	  20.	  	  	  
	  
31John	  Tunney	  to	  President	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon,	  February	  4,	  1971,	  Box	  7,	  Folder	  EX	  GF	  
24	  Model	  Cities	  Administration,	  1/1/71-­‐5/9/72,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Subject	  Files,	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antipoverty	  programs	  would	  only	  exacerbate	  the	  urban	  economic	  crisis.	  Revenue	  
sharing,	  he	  said,	  should	  “not	  be	  a	  smokescreen	  to	  cut	  back	  assistance	  now	  going	  to	  
local	  governments.”32	  	  
The	  unilateral	  outrage,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  mayors’	  lobby,	  was	  successful	  in	  forcing	  
the	  administration	  to	  soften	  its	  assault.	  On	  February	  10,	  1971,	  administration	  
officials	  announced	  their	  decision	  to	  halt	  the	  impending	  freeze	  on	  Model	  Cities	  
funding,	  though	  continuing	  to	  support	  the	  impoundment	  on	  urban	  renewal	  aid.33	  
Despite	  the	  retreat,	  the	  president	  continued	  to	  openly	  attack	  the	  viability	  of	  
categorical	  grants.	  Yet	  his	  critique	  subtly	  shifted	  focus	  from	  bureaucratic	  
inefficiency	  to	  the	  primary	  need	  for	  mayoral	  control.	  Over	  and	  over	  again,	  the	  
president	  coupled	  program	  failure	  with	  the	  circumvention	  of	  local	  authorities	  in	  a	  
thinly	  veiled	  attempt	  to	  develop	  renewed	  support	  from	  big-­‐city	  mayors.	  By	  the	  end	  
of	  February	  1971,	  Nixon	  once	  again	  argued	  for	  a	  broader	  form	  of	  special	  revenue	  
sharing	  that	  would	  strengthen	  state	  and	  local	  government	  flexibility	  and	  enable	  
autonomy	  in	  program	  decision-­‐making.	  He	  maintained	  that	  by	  making	  city	  
governments	  engage	  in	  activities	  that	  were	  not	  necessarily	  a	  priority	  in	  order	  to	  
gain	  access	  to	  grant	  money,	  categorical	  grants	  distorted	  the	  nature	  and	  outcomes	  of	  
local	  decision-­‐making.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  categorical	  grants	  were	  not	  just	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Folder	  Group	  24,	  Department	  of	  HUD,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  
Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	  	  	  
	  
32	  John	  Tunney	  to	  President	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon,	  February	  4,	  1971,	  Box	  7,	  Folder	  EX	  GF	  
24	  Model	  Cities	  Administration,	  1/1/71-­‐5/9/72,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Subject	  Files,	  
Folder	  Group	  24,	  Department	  of	  HUD,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  
Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	  	  	  
	  
33New	  York	  Times,	  “Sparkman	  scores	  Nixon	  on	  funds,”	  March	  4,	  1971,1.	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unnecessary,	  but	  actually	  exacerbated	  the	  complex	  political	  and	  economic	  issues	  
facing	  cities.	  As	  Nixon	  told	  Congress,	  the	  aid	  “tended	  to	  perpetuate	  and	  deepen	  
community	  fragmentation”	  rather	  than	  facilitate	  unity.34	  	  	  
Using	  the	  same	  language	  that	  mayors	  had	  employed	  as	  evidence	  of	  the	  need	  
to	  keep	  categorical	  grants,	  the	  president	  continued:	  	  
We	  see	  all	  around	  us	  signs	  of	  the	  past	  failure	  in	  the	  federal	  urban	  
development	  	  effort—an	  inadequate	  supply	  of	  housing	  and	  community	  
facilities,	  large	  sections	  of	  our	  cities	  becoming	  wastelands	  of	  decaying	  and	  
vacant	  buildings,	  homes	  for	  none	  but	  derelicts,	  addicts	  and	  criminals,	  acre	  
upon	  acre	  of	  valuable	  urban	  renewal	  land	  lying	  vacant	  and	  fallow,	  and	  
millions	  of	  Americans	  living	  in	  substandard	  housing.35	  	  
	  
Cities	  were	  suffering,	  the	  president	  appealed,	  and	  targeting	  neighborhoods	  that	  
were	  incapable	  of	  contributing	  to	  revitalizing	  their	  urban	  environment	  would	  only	  
exacerbate	  larger,	  citywide	  deficiencies.	  Thus,	  city	  leaders,	  with	  the	  right	  access	  to	  
resources	  and	  with	  comprehensive	  localized	  conceptions	  of	  planning,	  should	  be	  at	  
the	  forefront	  of	  these	  efforts.	  	  	  
On	  March	  5,	  1971,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  formally	  asked	  Congress	  to	  
consolidate	  several	  major	  HUD	  programs	  into	  a	  single	  $2	  billion	  grant	  program.36	  	  
Under	  the	  Community	  Development	  Act	  of	  1971,	  cities	  could	  use	  money	  for	  a	  wide	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Draft,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon.	  “Speech	  to	  the	  House,”	  February	  27,	  1971,	  Washington	  D.	  
C.	  Box	  1,	  Folder	  March	  1971,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Subject	  Files,	  Folder	  Group	  24,	  
Department	  of	  HUD,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  
California.	  	  
	  
35	  Draft,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon.	  “Speech	  to	  the	  House,”	  February	  27,	  1971,	  Washington	  D.	  
C.	  Folder	  March	  1971,	  Box	  1,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Subject	  Files,	  Folder	  Group	  24,	  
Department	  of	  HUD,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  
California.	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array	  of	  development	  purposes,	  including	  urban	  renewal,	  clearing	  blight,	  building	  
streets,	  code	  enforcement,	  public	  works,	  and	  housing	  relocation.	  The	  emphasis	  on	  
growing	  the	  urban	  environment	  would	  eradicate	  narrow	  approaches	  to	  city	  
problems.37	  As	  the	  central	  tenet	  of	  the	  president’s	  return	  to	  federalism,	  the	  act	  
offered	  little	  restriction	  as	  to	  how	  states	  and	  cities	  used	  new	  funds	  as	  long	  as	  their	  
activities	  fell	  under	  the	  ambiguously	  defined	  umbrella	  of	  community	  development.	  
While	  presenting	  revenue	  sharing	  as	  a	  means	  to	  provide	  local	  communities	  with	  the	  
resources	  and	  capacity	  to	  lead	  with	  policy-­‐making	  decisions,	  Nixon	  downplayed	  the	  
effect	  it	  would	  have	  on	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  programs,	  continuing	  to	  suggest	  that	  programs	  
that	  city	  leadership	  found	  utility	  in	  would	  continue.	  	  	  
	  
Formulating	  Block	  Grant	  Policy	  
The	  strategy	  of	  using	  the	  promise	  of	  new	  unrestricted	  funds	  as	  a	  means	  to	  
diminish	  support	  for	  older	  programs	  worked	  to	  divide	  Democrats	  on	  the	  future	  of	  
urban	  aid.	  Mayors	  responded	  with	  cautious	  optimism,	  but	  congressional	  Democrats	  
assailed	  the	  proposal	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  pull	  support	  away	  from	  federally	  imposed	  
oversight	  measures.	  In	  its	  proposed	  form,	  the	  act	  had	  neither	  a	  planning	  application	  
nor	  an	  impact	  evaluation;	  a	  municipality	  was	  simply	  responsible	  for	  outlining	  goals	  
and	  objectives,	  broadly	  covering	  intended	  use.38	  The	  lack	  of	  studied	  review	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon.	  “Special	  Message	  to	  Congress	  Proposing	  a	  General	  Revenue	  
Sharing	  Program,”	  February	  5,	  1971.	  Washington,	  D.C.	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  
Woolley,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project.	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3289.	  
	  
38	  	  Robert	  Fishman,	  "Title	  I	  of	  the	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  Act	  of	  1974,	  
New	  Federal	  and	  Local	  Dynamics	  in	  Community	  Development,"	  Urban	  Lawyer	  7,	  no.	  2	  
(1975),	  192.	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community	  development	  plans	  struck	  many	  in	  Congress	  as	  egregiously	  
irresponsible.	  While	  plenty	  had	  gone	  wrong	  within	  the	  categorical	  program,	  it	  was	  
congressional	  oversight	  that	  allowed	  lawmakers	  to	  see	  where	  objectives	  and	  
outcomes	  were	  no	  longer	  congruous.	  
	  	  It	  seemed	  dually	  implausible	  that	  local	  leadership,	  unwilling	  to	  enforce	  civil	  
rights	  legislation	  without	  federal	  intervention,	  would	  promote	  low-­‐income	  
community	  development	  autonomous	  of	  congressional	  directives.	  Commenting	  on	  
the	  proposal,	  former	  director	  of	  the	  Congress	  of	  Racial	  Equality	  (CORE)	  James	  
Farmer	  lamented,	  “In	  the	  course	  of	  my	  activities—getting	  my	  head	  broken	  and	  
spending	  time	  in	  jail,	  I	  would	  have	  been	  loath	  to	  let	  George	  Wallace	  make	  the	  
decisions.	  Mr.	  Wallace	  might	  decide	  the	  kind	  of	  urban	  renewal	  he	  wants	  is	  the	  kind	  
that	  could	  move	  50	  percent	  of	  the	  blacks	  outside	  a	  city	  just	  as	  they	  are	  about	  to	  elect	  
a	  mayor.”39	  Throughout	  the	  South,	  national	  civil	  rights	  legislation	  continued	  to	  be	  
overturned	  by	  state	  and	  local	  legislatures	  well	  into	  the	  1970s;	  for	  rights	  activists,	  
revenue	  sharing	  was	  the	  newest	  way	  for	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  pass	  the	  buck	  on	  
providing	  the	  necessary	  support	  to	  marginalized	  communities	  on	  controversial	  
issues	  like	  housing	  integration	  and	  economic	  opportunities—issues	  that	  truly	  
affected	  the	  battle	  against	  poverty.	  Ending	  citizen	  participation	  and	  eliminating	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Referring	  to	  the	  “Segregation	  Now,	  Segregation	  Forever”	  Governor	  of	  Alabama.	  
Farmer	  had	  recently	  resigned	  his	  post	  as	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Health,	  
Welfare	  and	  Education	  (HEW)	  due	  to	  a	  frustration	  with	  the	  Nixon	  administration.	  New	  York	  
Times,	  “James	  Farmer	  sees	  Peril	  in	  Tax	  Sharing,”	  March	  5,	  1971,	  29.	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targeting	  efforts	  would	  undoubtedly	  weaken	  the	  influence	  of	  these	  communities	  on	  
the	  local	  budgets	  of	  their	  cities,	  critics	  continued	  to	  argue.40	  	  	  
There	  were	  similar	  concerns	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  local	  and	  state	  
leaders	  to	  promote	  low-­‐income	  interests	  in	  a	  spectrum	  of	  other	  constituencies	  with	  
far	  more	  power	  and	  pull.	  Returning	  power	  to	  local	  authorities	  would	  certainly	  not	  
be	  returning	  power	  to	  low-­‐income	  residents,	  those	  at	  the	  Center	  for	  Community	  
Change	  argued.	  This	  reality	  was	  not	  necessarily	  the	  fault	  of	  local	  officials,	  the	  
organization	  reported,	  but	  merely	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  city	  government.	  The	  
reliance	  of	  local	  governments	  on	  an	  imbalanced	  local	  tax	  structure	  made	  urban	  
mayors	  particularly	  susceptible	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  powerful	  wealthy	  constituencies.	  
Without	  federal	  intervention,	  their	  ability	  to	  balance	  the	  needs	  of	  these	  wealthy	  elite	  
with	  those	  of	  the	  needy	  would	  be	  reduced	  to	  nothing.41	  	  	  
There	  were	  other	  issues	  concerning	  the	  act.	  Envisioned	  as	  a	  physical	  
development	  program,	  the	  act	  would	  eliminate	  the	  emphasis	  on	  uniting	  social	  
services	  with	  neighborhood	  development	  that	  was	  intended	  by	  programs	  like	  Model	  
Cities.	  Cities,	  forced	  to	  use	  local	  revenue	  to	  fund	  social	  services,	  would	  have	  to	  make	  
difficult	  decisions	  about	  what	  could	  and	  could	  not	  be	  funded.	  If	  the	  plan	  came	  to	  
replace	  categorical	  aid,	  the	  proposition	  posed	  a	  quandary	  for	  big-­‐city	  mayors	  about	  
where	  to	  direct	  resources.	  Yet	  despite	  such	  limitations,	  unrestricted	  aid	  remained	  
an	  attractive	  remittance	  for	  city	  leaders.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  	  James	  L.	  Judson,	  "Federalism	  and	  Model	  Cities	  Experiment,"	  Publius	  2,	  no.	  1	  
(1972),	  93.	  
	  
41	  John	  Herbers,	  “Revenue	  Sharing	  Foes:	  Critics	  of	  the	  Nixon	  plan	  say	  oppressed	  
must	  look	  to	  Washington	  for	  support,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  February	  1,	  1971,	  24.	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Increasing	  pressure	  from	  local	  officials	  pushed	  the	  US	  House	  of	  
Representatives	  Ways	  and	  Means	  Committee	  to	  open	  congressional	  hearings	  on	  the	  
potential	  benefits	  and	  problems	  of	  revenue	  sharing.	  Invariably,	  proponents	  of	  
revenue	  sharing	  were	  most	  often	  mayors	  of	  economically	  distressed,	  racially	  
polarized	  big	  cities.	  Those	  testifying	  spoke	  to	  the	  increasing	  challenges	  of	  meeting	  
the	  needs	  of	  urban	  residents;	  diminishing	  industry,	  abandoned	  substandard	  housing,	  
and	  faltering	  public	  school	  systems	  encapsulated	  the	  predicament	  of	  cities	  
irrespective	  of	  geography.	  The	  flight	  of	  the	  middle	  class	  had	  shrunk	  the	  tax	  base	  
while	  demanding	  more	  from	  those	  who	  continued	  to	  reside	  in	  city	  centers.42	  Urban	  
mayors	  explained	  to	  their	  representatives	  that	  to	  raise	  taxes	  to	  contend	  with	  the	  
needs	  of	  isolated	  low-­‐income	  residents	  would	  only	  encourage	  further	  flight	  of	  those	  
who	  had	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  capital	  to	  leave.	  “No	  matter	  how	  badly	  we	  need	  
the	  money,”	  Mayor	  Landrieu	  explained	  to	  legislators,	  “it	  would	  be	  economically	  
impossible,	  not	  politically	  possible,	  economically	  impossible	  to	  raise	  the	  sales	  tax	  
another	  1	  percent	  because,”	  with	  white	  flight,	  “we	  would	  lose	  rather	  than	  gain	  from	  
the	  addition	  of	  another	  cent.”43	  A	  diminishing	  middle	  class	  could	  do	  nothing	  to	  aid	  in	  
stabilizing	  impoverished	  cities.	  	  	  
Other	  mayors	  described	  how	  revenue	  sharing	  would	  help	  balance	  the	  
growing	  inequities	  that	  they	  were	  responsible	  for	  addressing.	  Cities	  had	  “become	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Testimony	  of	  Moon	  Landrieu.	  House	  Ways	  and	  Means	  Committee,	  General	  
Revenue	  Sharing:	  Hearings	  before	  the	  House	  Ways	  and	  Means	  Committee,	  92nd	  Cong.,	  1st	  sess.,	  
June	  11,	  1971,	  648.	  
	  
43	  Testimony	  of	  Moon	  Landrieu,	  House	  Ways	  and	  Means	  Committee,	  General	  
Revenue	  Sharing:	  Hearings	  before	  the	  House	  Ways	  and	  Means	  Committee,	  92nd	  Cong.,	  1st	  sess.,	  
June	  11,	  1971,648.	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the	  guardians	  of	  the	  country’s	  unwanted	  stepchildren”	  and	  mayors	  had	  been	  asked	  
to	  “solve	  the	  problems	  of	  poverty”	  while	  contending	  with	  a	  shrinking	  tax	  base	  and	  
increasing	  demands	  on	  social	  and	  public	  services.44	  Revenue	  sharing	  was	  potentially	  
a	  way	  to	  meet	  those	  needs,	  but	  also	  the	  needs	  of	  other	  residents	  who	  would	  
otherwise	  join	  the	  flight	  to	  suburbia.	  Without	  devoting	  funds	  to	  renew	  the	  physical	  
structure	  of	  the	  city	  in	  areas	  of	  economic	  growth	  rather	  than	  in	  low-­‐income	  
neighborhoods,	  these	  problems	  would	  only	  continue	  to	  grow,	  the	  mayors	  argued.	  
Only	  a	  revenue-­‐sharing	  scheme	  would	  allow	  that	  kind	  of	  flexible	  impact.45	  
The	  pressure	  from	  mayors	  led	  the	  Senate	  to	  develop	  a	  response	  to	  the	  
administration’s	  platform,	  albeit	  one	  with	  greater	  congressional	  oversight	  and	  
provisional	  measures	  to	  protect	  the	  antipoverty	  aim	  of	  urban	  funding.	  The	  emergent	  
Development	  Assistance	  Act	  of	  1971	  (S.	  2333)	  consolidated	  five	  of	  seven	  programs	  
that	  the	  administration	  proposed	  combining—urban	  renewal,	  open	  space,	  
community	  facilities,	  public	  works,	  and	  public	  facilities—yet	  moved	  away	  from	  
strict	  revenue	  sharing	  to	  a	  block	  grant	  approach	  retaining	  congressional	  oversight.46	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Testimony	  of	  Mayor	  John	  Lindsay,	  House	  Ways	  and	  Means	  Committee,	  General	  
Revenue	  Sharing:	  Hearings	  before	  the	  House	  Ways	  and	  Means	  Committee,	  92nd	  Cong.,	  1st	  sess.,	  
June	  11,	  1971,	  637.	  
	  
45	  Testimony	  of	  Mayor	  Moon	  Landrieu,	  House	  Ways	  and	  Means	  Committee,	  General	  
Revenue	  Sharing:	  Hears	  before	  the	  House	  Ways	  and	  Means	  Committee,	  92nd	  Cong.,	  1st	  sess.,	  
June	  11,	  1971,	  648.	  
	  
46	  Though	  often	  used	  interchangeably,	  “revenue	  sharing”	  and	  “block	  grants”	  connote	  
very	  different	  proposals.	  Revenue	  sharing	  was	  considered	  "no	  strings	  attached"	  funding.	  
Within	  that	  framework,	  general	  revenue	  sharing	  could	  be	  used	  for	  any	  purpose	  deemed	  
necessary	  by	  local	  officials	  to	  revitalize	  the	  city	  while	  special	  revenue	  sharing	  consolidated	  
specific	  categorical	  grants	  and,	  as	  long	  as	  funds	  were	  used	  to	  fulfill	  the	  activities	  included	  
within	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  grant,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  congressional	  oversight,	  no	  
application	  process,	  and	  no	  evaluation.	  Cities	  would	  have	  complete	  autonomy.	  Block	  grants	  
presupposed	  a	  process	  through	  which	  Congress	  would	  define	  specific	  policy	  priorities	  (i.e.,	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On	  one	  hand,	  the	  Senate’s	  act	  maintained	  the	  importance	  of	  nationwide	  policy	  goals,	  
while	  on	  the	  other,	  it	  conceded	  to	  more	  flexibility	  and	  less	  direct	  evaluation	  on	  the	  
part	  of	  congressional	  leadership.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  proposal	  ascribed	  to	  the	  
administration’s	  goal	  of	  opening	  the	  aid	  to	  citywide	  use,	  but	  developed	  preferential	  
provisions	  for	  low-­‐income	  communities	  to	  retain	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  aid,	  including	  a	  
requirement	  that	  80	  percent	  of	  all	  aid	  go	  to	  low-­‐	  or	  moderate-­‐income	  
neighborhoods.	  In	  another	  attempt	  to	  compromise,	  the	  act	  required	  cities	  to	  adhere	  
to	  an	  application	  process,	  but	  loosened	  the	  process	  through	  which	  city	  plans	  would	  
be	  approved.	  	  	  
The	  House	  of	  Representatives	  developed	  a	  bill	  as	  well.	  Its	  version	  called	  for	  
less	  oversight	  than	  the	  Senate,	  but	  incorporated	  a	  central	  innovation	  tying	  housing	  
production	  to	  aid	  through	  the	  requirement	  of	  a	  housing	  assistance	  plan.	  Without	  
producing	  a	  strategy	  for	  upgrading	  low-­‐	  and	  moderate-­‐income	  housing	  options	  
within	  a	  community,	  cities	  would	  not	  be	  eligible	  for	  aid	  through	  the	  new	  block	  
grant.47	  Fearing	  that	  without	  geographical	  restrictions,	  the	  funds	  would	  not	  go	  to	  
impoverished	  areas,	  the	  House	  committee	  saw	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  housing	  plan	  as	  
twofold:	  first,	  it	  would	  eliminate	  the	  eligibility	  of	  cities	  that	  refused	  to	  build	  low-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
alleviating	  blight	  conditions)	  that	  activities	  should	  work	  toward	  fulfilling.	  Under	  block	  
grants,	  this	  oversight	  was	  controlled	  by	  an	  application,	  review,	  and	  evaluation—thus	  
holding	  cities	  to	  certain	  federally	  defined	  measures.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  early	  1970s,	  
President	  Nixon	  proposed	  special	  revenue-­‐sharing	  programs	  in	  four	  fields:	  community	  
development,	  law	  enforcement,	  manpower	  and	  training,	  and	  health.	  They	  would	  all	  
eventually	  pass	  as	  block	  grants.	  	  
	  
47	  Norman	  Beckman,	  "Toward	  Development	  of	  National	  Urban	  Growth	  Policy,	  A	  
Legislative	  Review,"	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Institute	  of	  Planners	  38,	  no.	  4	  (1972),	  232.	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income	  housing	  and,	  more	  broadly,	  it	  would	  ensure	  that	  cities	  receiving	  funds	  would	  
have	  to	  address	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  poor	  in	  tangible,	  readily	  evaluated	  ways.48	  	  	  
Attempts	  to	  reconcile	  the	  different	  versions	  of	  a	  revenue-­‐sharing	  proposal	  
stalled	  in	  Congress.	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  stalemate,	  Nixon	  sidestepped	  the	  need	  for	  
legislative	  approval	  by	  launching	  Planned	  Variations,	  a	  pilot	  program	  established	  in	  
20	  cities	  with	  preexisting	  Model	  Cities	  operations	  in	  which	  mayors	  would	  be	  given	  
broad	  autonomy	  in	  planning	  and	  decision-­‐making.	  The	  mayors	  would	  not	  only	  
control	  and	  approve	  projects	  at	  their	  discretion,	  but	  could	  utilize	  funding	  at	  a	  
citywide	  level.49	  As	  a	  small-­‐scale	  version	  of	  revenue	  sharing,	  the	  program	  operated	  
to	  generate	  widespread	  support	  from	  mayors	  while	  undermining	  the	  opinions	  of	  
Congress.	  On	  another	  level,	  the	  program	  led	  to	  questions	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  
Congress	  to	  protect	  federally	  directed	  antipoverty	  efforts.	  	  	  
That	  uncertainty	  was	  heightened	  by	  rumors	  that	  the	  federally	  sponsored	  
Community	  Action	  Program	  (CAP)	  was	  quietly	  being	  dismantled	  while	  attention	  
was	  focused	  elsewhere.	  Those	  rumors	  seemed	  to	  be	  confirmed	  when	  on	  August	  25,	  
1971,	  nearly	  900	  Community	  Action	  Agencies	  (CAA)	  across	  the	  nation	  received	  
word	  from	  OEO	  director	  Frank	  Carlucci	  warning	  them	  to	  consider	  the	  prospect	  of	  
decentralization	  as	  a	  finite	  trend	  that	  would	  eventually	  end	  their	  operations.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Shortly	  after	  the	  Senate	  released	  its	  bill,	  the	  Housing	  Banking	  and	  Currency	  
Committee	  produced	  a	  similar	  Community	  Development	  bill	  that	  differed	  in	  few	  ways	  
except	  that	  it	  had	  a	  controversial	  provision	  providing	  for	  a	  percentage	  of	  funds	  going	  into	  
social	  service	  programs	  and	  excluded	  the	  Model	  Cities	  program	  from	  its	  consolidation.	  The	  
administration	  was	  adamantly	  against	  any	  forced	  provision	  of	  social	  services,	  arguing	  that	  
not	  all	  cities	  needed	  them.	  	  	  
	  
49	  	  See	  James	  L.	  Judson,	  "Federalism	  and	  Model	  Cities	  Experiement,"	  Publius	  2,	  no.	  1	  
(1972	  ),	  69-­‐94.	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Encouraging	  existing	  agencies	  and	  antipoverty	  activists	  to	  form	  alliances	  with	  local	  
government	  entities,	  the	  director	  explained	  that	  if	  revenue	  sharing	  passed,	  the	  OEO	  
would	  exist	  only	  if	  these	  city	  executives	  deemed	  the	  organization	  vital	  to	  furthering	  
community	  development.50	  Far	  from	  providing	  comfort,	  the	  impending	  demise	  of	  
the	  OEO	  continued	  to	  threaten	  mayoral	  support	  for	  the	  administration.	  
A	  presidential	  exploratory	  committee	  released	  findings	  that	  December	  
supporting	  the	  administration’s	  position	  on	  the	  Office	  of	  Economic	  Opportunity.	  
Reversing	  its	  previous	  report	  that	  found	  the	  OEO	  essential	  to	  the	  management	  and	  
oversight	  of	  antipoverty	  efforts,	  the	  committee	  now	  informed	  Congress	  that	  the	  OEO,	  
as	  a	  managing	  bureaucracy,	  was	  no	  longer	  of	  use.	  Its	  report	  stressed	  that	  the	  
president’s	  proposal	  to	  transform	  the	  OEO	  into	  a	  research	  and	  development	  arm	  of	  
the	  executive	  branch	  was	  consistent	  with	  its	  findings	  and,	  in	  fact,	  that	  revenue	  
sharing	  might	  prove	  capable	  of	  making	  any	  programs	  worth	  continuing	  entirely	  up	  
to	  local	  discretion.51	  In	  mid-­‐July	  1971,	  with	  no	  signs	  of	  the	  stalemate	  ending,	  federal	  
funding	  had	  still	  not	  been	  released	  to	  cities	  for	  urban	  renewal.	  	  	  
	   By	  early	  1972,	  the	  president	  expanded	  his	  use	  of	  impoundments	  to	  drive	  
local	  officials	  to	  accept	  revenue	  sharing.	  While	  nearly	  $11	  billion	  of	  HUD	  funds	  
remained	  frozen,	  the	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget	  declared	  that	  it	  would	  also	  
withhold	  close	  to	  $75	  million	  for	  public	  housing	  operating	  expenses.	  Claiming	  it	  was	  
reviewing	  the	  eligibility	  of	  recipients,	  the	  OMB	  denied	  allegations	  that	  suppressing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50As	  most	  mayors	  opposed	  CAP,	  this	  was	  highly	  unlikely.	  	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  “The	  
Once-­‐Powerful	  Poverty	  Agency	  Has	  Lost	  Strength,”	  September	  15,	  1971,	  58.	  
	  
51	  National	  Advisory	  Council	  on	  Economic	  Opportunity,	  Fourth	  Annual	  Report,	  
(Washington:	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1971).	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funds	  was	  part	  of	  a	  scare	  tactic	  to	  bully	  mayors	  into	  siding	  with	  the	  president.52	  
Edward	  Brooke,	  a	  Republican	  senator	  from	  Massachusetts	  and	  the	  architect	  behind	  
the	  controversial	  Brooke	  Amendment,	  implored	  Nixon	  to	  reconsider	  withholding	  
funds.53	  With	  every	  impoundment	  on	  existing	  funds,	  whether	  in	  housing	  or	  renewal	  
or	  health	  services,	  cities	  became	  more	  and	  more	  crippled	  in	  every	  way,	  the	  senator	  
warned.	  Cities	  would	  begin	  to	  openly	  violate	  federal	  law,	  Brooke	  argued,	  because	  
amid	  rising	  inflation,	  public	  housing	  tenant	  rents	  remained	  too	  low	  to	  fund	  the	  
repairs	  that	  many	  of	  the	  projects	  needed.	  Consequently,	  they	  would	  either	  charge	  
more	  or	  file	  for	  bankruptcy.54	  Each	  additional	  impoundment	  further	  hollowed	  out	  
the	  capacity	  of	  local	  officials	  to	  launch	  a	  response	  to	  the	  urban	  crisis.	  Yet	  the	  
president	  and	  his	  men	  did	  not	  budge.	  	  
The	  president’s	  tactics	  produced	  a	  victory,	  although	  a	  tempered	  one,	  for	  the	  
administration.	  On	  October	  22,	  1972,	  following	  a	  series	  of	  congressional	  
compromises,	  the	  State	  and	  Local	  Fiscal	  Assistance	  Act,	  the	  product	  of	  Nixon’s	  lobby	  
for	  revenue	  sharing,	  was	  signed	  into	  law	  as	  a	  modified	  and	  experimental	  version	  of	  
the	  original	  proposal.	  The	  program	  authorized	  $30.2	  billion	  over	  five	  years	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Mayors	  ask	  Legislators	  to	  Remember	  Urban	  Ills,”	  September	  7,	  
1972,	  27.	  
	  
53	  As	  part	  of	  the	  Fair	  Housing	  Act,	  the	  Brooke	  Amendment	  limited	  the	  amount	  that	  
persons	  in	  federally	  assisted	  housing	  would	  need	  to	  contribute	  to	  25	  percent	  of	  their	  
income.	  	  
	  
54	  Memo,	  Edward	  Brooke	  to	  the	  President,	  July	  5,	  1972;	  Box	  24,	  Folder	  EX	  FA	  
HOUSING	  1/1/72-­‐	  7/31/72	  ,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Subject	  Files,	  Federal	  Aid,	  Nixon	  
Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	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general	  revenue	  sharing	  funds	  directed	  to	  both	  state	  and	  local	  governments.55	  The	  
law	  provided	  the	  general	  revenue-­‐sharing	  funds	  the	  president	  had	  originally	  called	  
for,	  while	  debates	  over	  specialized	  revenue	  sharing	  continued.	  Distributed	  directly	  
to	  cities,	  with	  a	  small	  percentage	  going	  to	  state	  governments,	  the	  legislation	  outlined	  
broad	  programmatic	  categories	  within	  which	  funding	  should	  be	  used.	  Beyond	  these	  
capacious	  programs,	  policy	  guidelines	  were	  virtually	  nonexistent	  and	  abstract	  at	  
best.	  Cities	  would	  be	  able	  to	  design	  programs	  and	  use	  funds	  in	  any	  way	  they	  saw	  fit.	  
While	  many	  remained	  confused	  as	  to	  what	  place	  such	  legislation	  would	  have	  in	  
cities,	  mayors	  were	  thrilled.	  It	  signaled	  a	  clear	  new	  direction	  for	  federal	  policy.	  	  
	  
An	  Unprecedented	  Moratorium	  
By	  the	  close	  of	  the	  year,	  that	  new	  direction	  clearly	  undercut	  the	  other	  needs	  
voiced	  by	  mayors	  and	  community	  activists.	  On	  January	  8,	  1973,	  Romney,	  resigning	  
from	  his	  post	  as	  HUD	  secretary,	  announced	  an	  unprecedented	  moratorium	  on	  
various	  programs	  for	  urban	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  at	  the	  annual	  convention	  of	  the	  National	  
Association	  of	  Home	  Builders.	  The	  freeze,	  Romney	  outlined,	  would	  apply	  to	  all	  new	  
commitments	  for	  subsidized	  housing	  programs,	  water	  and	  sewerage	  grants,	  public	  
facilities	  loans,	  urban	  open-­‐space	  programs,	  urban	  renewal,	  and	  Model	  Cities.56	  His	  
support	  for	  desegregation	  did	  not	  equate	  with	  support	  for	  categorical	  grants	  and	  
Romney	  reserved	  parting	  shots	  to	  rail	  against	  the	  buildup	  of	  Great	  Society	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  	  Department	  of	  the	  Treasury,	  What	  is	  Revenue	  Sharing,	  (Washington:	  Government	  
Printing	  Office,	  1973),	  1.	  
	  
56	  Frank	  Schneider,	  “Halt	  to	  Many	  Programs	  Causes	  Romney	  Delight.”	  Times-­‐	  
Picayune,	  January	  9,	  1973,19.	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programming.	  He	  said,	  “By	  1970,	  it	  became	  crystal	  clear	  that	  the	  patchwork,	  year-­‐
by-­‐year	  piecemeal	  addition	  of	  programs	  over	  a	  period	  of	  more	  than	  three	  decades	  
has	  created	  a	  statutory	  and	  administrative	  monstrosity.	  […]	  It	  was	  clear	  that	  literally	  
billions	  and	  billions	  of	  dollars	  of	  hard-­‐earned	  taxpayer	  money	  were	  being	  wasted,	  
particularly	  in	  our	  inner	  cities.”57	  He	  admonished	  the	  overall	  War	  on	  Poverty	  as	  a	  
pathetic	  exercise	  in	  bureaucratic	  inefficiency	  and	  railed	  against	  the	  way	  programs	  
had	  allowed	  cities	  to	  develop	  a	  lazy	  reliance	  on	  federal	  government	  aid.	  The	  
moratorium,	  Romney	  noted,	  would	  remain	  active	  until	  Congress	  was	  able	  to	  pass	  a	  
special	  revenue-­‐sharing	  block	  grant	  to	  unite	  the	  disparate	  programs	  under	  one	  
design.	  The	  outgoing	  secretary’s	  comments	  were	  the	  clearest	  indication	  that	  the	  
administration	  would	  delay	  any	  new	  grants	  and	  prevent	  cities	  from	  moving	  forward	  
on	  programming	  until	  revenue-­‐sharing	  legislation	  was	  passed.	  
Amid	  the	  administration's	  effort	  to	  pass	  an	  updated,	  but	  uncompromising,	  
version	  of	  special	  revenue	  sharing	  for	  community	  development,	  the	  impoundments	  
appeared	  deliberate	  to	  local	  leaders.	  Nixon’s	  domestic	  policy	  aide,	  Kenneth	  Cole,	  
took	  center	  stage	  in	  deflecting	  the	  protests	  of	  congressmen	  angrily	  attempting	  to	  
defend	  their	  political	  constituencies	  and	  the	  livelihood	  of	  community	  action	  
networks	  against	  the	  full-­‐blown	  assault	  of	  the	  administration.	  Responding	  to	  cries	  of	  
impropriety	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  administration	  for	  ignoring	  congressional	  directives,	  
Cole	  assured	  critics	  that	  the	  suspension	  of	  programs	  was	  not	  about	  an	  unwillingness	  
to	  support	  struggling	  cities,	  but	  merely	  a	  moment	  to	  evaluate	  the	  effectiveness	  of	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programs	  not	  only	  for	  poor	  people,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  taxpayers	  who	  supported	  
them.58	  Program	  efficacy	  was	  essential	  to	  creating	  a	  system	  of	  benefits	  that	  did	  not	  
waste	  taxpayer	  funds	  on	  programs	  that	  did	  not	  work.	  The	  reality,	  Cole	  told	  Senator	  
John	  J.	  Sparkman	  (D-­‐AL),	  was	  that	  War	  on	  Poverty	  programs	  were	  not	  working	  at	  all	  
and	  may,	  in	  fact,	  have	  never	  worked.	  “This	  is	  the	  cruelest	  aspect	  of	  the	  present	  
system—it	  does	  not	  serve	  the	  intended	  beneficiaries:	  the	  poor,”	  Cole	  elaborated.	  
“Instead	  in	  many	  cases,	  the	  programs	  have	  created	  false	  expectations,	  more	  financial	  
hardship	  and	  disappointment.”59	  This	  last	  point	  was	  central	  to	  the	  argument	  being	  
made	  in	  front	  of	  Congress	  for	  ending	  current	  antipoverty	  efforts.	  The	  programs	  
themselves	  created	  government	  waste	  and	  inefficiency	  as	  well	  as	  aggravated	  urban	  
hardships.	  Attempting	  to	  capitalize	  on	  widespread	  anxiety	  about	  rising	  inflation	  and	  
depleting	  employment	  opportunities,	  antipoverty	  efforts	  were	  spun	  as	  central	  to	  
what	  was	  eating	  away	  at	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  average	  taxpayer	  to	  support	  a	  family.	  The	  
suspension	  was	  a	  way	  to	  “assure	  the	  taxpayer”	  that	  they	  were	  getting	  all	  they	  could	  
out	  of	  their	  dollars.	  New	  programs	  would	  develop	  in	  ways	  “consistent	  with	  
Republican	  and	  American	  philosophy	  centered	  on	  rugged	  individualism.”60	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Memo,	  Bob	  Packwood	  to	  President	  Richard	  Nixon,	  January	  10,	  1973,	  Box	  25,	  
Folder	  EX	  FA5	  Housing	  1/1/73-­‐1/16/73,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Subject	  Files,	  Federal	  
Aid,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	  	  
	  
59	  Memo,	  Kenneth	  R.	  Cole	  to	  Senator	  John	  J.	  Sparkman,	  January	  15,	  1973,	  Box	  25,	  
Folder	  EX	  FA5	  Housing	  1/1/73-­‐1/16/73,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Subject	  Files,	  Federal	  
Aid,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	  	  
	  
60	  Memo,	  Michael	  P.	  Balzano	  Jr.	  to	  President	  Nixon,	  February	  9,	  1973.	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  
1,	  FG	  Federal	  Government-­‐	  Organization	  FG	  607	  Office	  of	  Economic	  Opportunity	  White	  
House	  Central	  Files,	  Subject	  Files,	  Office	  of	  Economic	  Opportunity,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  
Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	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It	  was	  an	  argument	  that	  resonated	  with	  many	  Americans.	  As	  the	  Nixon	  
administration	  continued	  its	  assault,	  this	  rhetoric	  gained	  traction	  in	  gathering	  public	  
support	  for	  dismantling	  the	  OEO	  along	  with	  implementing	  other	  urban	  aid	  freezes.	  
Letters	  to	  White	  House	  staff	  poured	  in	  complaining	  that	  the	  poor	  were	  being	  given	  
benefits	  that	  the	  “working,	  taxpaying	  middle	  class	  cannot	  afford”	  and	  claiming	  that	  
community	  action	  would	  eventually	  be	  the	  “destruction	  of	  our	  society.”61	  Citing	  
these	  responses,	  the	  administration	  reiterated	  that	  further	  support	  of	  unwieldy	  
programs	  would	  not	  only	  continue	  to	  divide	  the	  nation,	  but	  could	  lead	  to	  
catastrophe.	  The	  presumed	  prosperity	  of	  the	  nation	  prior	  to	  antipoverty	  efforts	  
began	  aided	  the	  administration	  in	  tying	  the	  programs	  to	  financial	  crisis	  and	  
inflation.62	  Now,	  the	  administration	  offered,	  there	  were	  “too	  many	  leaks	  in	  the	  
federal	  pipeline.”	  Suspending	  programs	  and	  ending	  support	  for	  categorical	  grant-­‐in-­‐
aid	  signaled	  a	  new	  beginning.	  It	  was	  time	  to	  “plug	  them	  up.”63	  
Amid	  outrage,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  continued	  to	  transfer	  programs	  with	  
controversial	  political	  significance	  to	  other	  departments	  while	  eliminating	  other	  
programs	  altogether.	  Nixon	  warned	  Congress	  that	  any	  attempt	  to	  restore	  funds	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Memo,	  California	  Residents	  to	  President	  Nixon,	  October	  21,	  1970.	  Box	  3,	  Folder	  
White	  House	  Subject	  Files,	  FG	  Federal	  Government-­‐	  Organization	  FG	  607	  Office	  of	  Economic	  
Opportunity,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	  
	  
62	  This	  has	  been	  disputed	  by	  the	  work	  of	  Thomas	  Sugrue	  and	  Arnold	  Hirsch,	  among	  
others.	  Locating	  the	  beginnings	  of	  the	  urban	  crisis	  in	  the	  1950s,	  these	  scholars	  have	  
demonstrated	  how	  deindustrialization	  and	  federally	  subsidized	  white	  flight	  isolated	  low-­‐
income	  people	  of	  color	  from	  the	  era	  of	  prosperity.	  	  	  
	  
63	  Draft	  of	  the	  Address	  by	  the	  President	  on	  the	  Community	  Development	  Section	  of	  
the	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  Message,	  March	  4,	  1973;	  Box	  10,	  Folder	  1;	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  
Staff	  Members	  and	  Office	  Files,	  Michael	  Raoul-­‐Duval,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  
and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	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would	  be	  vetoed	  immediately.64	  By	  mid-­‐1973,	  nearly	  50	  antipoverty	  programs	  
would	  be	  transferred	  to	  new	  institutional	  homes.	  By	  locating	  programs	  in	  disparate	  
organizations,	  the	  administration	  hoped	  that	  protests	  would	  be	  diluted	  to	  single-­‐
issue	  advocacy	  that	  would	  reduce	  agency-­‐wide	  support.	  The	  point,	  OEO	  director	  
Carlucci	  noted,	  would	  be	  to	  strip	  OEO	  of	  its	  parts,	  thus	  leaving	  no	  need	  for	  Congress	  
to	  approve	  its	  termination.	  Carlucci	  and	  Ehrlichman	  began	  to	  develop	  a	  strategy	  to	  
expedite	  this	  erosion:	  The	  president	  would	  not	  request	  new	  funds	  for	  any	  of	  the	  
remaining	  programs	  while	  leadership	  at	  the	  OEO	  would	  continue	  to	  eliminate	  and	  
transfer	  programs.	  As	  programs	  were	  eliminated,	  the	  OEO’s	  staff	  would	  be	  reduced	  
from	  more	  than	  2,000	  employees	  to	  merely	  800	  over	  16	  months.	  Indeed,	  nearly	  200	  
federal	  OEO	  employees	  had	  been	  laid	  off	  or	  transferred	  to	  other	  agencies	  in	  the	  six	  
months	  prior	  to	  the	  moratorium.	  If	  the	  plan	  were	  managed	  correctly,	  the	  officials	  
hoped,	  the	  Office	  of	  Economic	  Opportunity	  would	  cease	  to	  exist	  July	  1,	  1973.65	  	  	  
	  
Dismantling	  the	  'War	  on	  Poverty'	  	  
Just	  days	  after	  the	  sudden	  death	  on	  January	  22,	  1973,	  of	  former	  president	  
Lyndon	  B.	  Johnson,	  architect	  of	  the	  Great	  Society,	  new	  OMB	  Chief	  Roy	  Ash	  confirmed	  
the	  fate	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty’s	  central	  agency	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  agency	  would	  be	  
dismantled	  with	  or	  without	  public	  support,	  Ash	  reported.	  In	  tandem	  with	  the	  HUD	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64Committee	  on	  Government	  Operations.	  Subcommittee	  on	  Intergovernmental	  
Relations,	  A	  New	  Federalism:	  Hearings	  before	  the	  Senate	  Subcommittee	  on	  Intergovernmental	  
Relations.	  93rd	  Cong.,	  1st	  sess.,	  February	  23,	  1973.	  	  
	  
65	  	  Memo,	  Frank	  Carlucci	  to	  John	  Ehrlichman,	  “Disposition	  of	  OEO	  and	  its	  Programs	  
as	  shown	  in	  the	  1974	  President's	  Budget,”	  January	  17,	  1973	  Confidential,	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  
1/1/73-­‐4/30/73,	  Group	  6-­‐7,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Office	  of	  Economic	  Opportunity,	  
Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	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moratorium,	  the	  administration	  planned	  to	  suspend	  all	  community	  development	  
antipoverty	  aid	  by	  June	  30,	  1973.	  Communities	  had	  less	  than	  five	  months	  to	  finish	  
programs	  and	  develop	  self-­‐sufficient	  means	  of	  funding	  additional	  services	  that	  once	  
had	  been	  delivered	  through	  the	  OEO.	  In	  a	  flurry	  of	  activity,	  recently	  appointed	  OEO	  
Director	  Phillip	  Sanchez	  resigned	  and	  Howard	  Phillips,	  a	  Massachusetts	  Republican	  
and	  former	  special	  assistant	  to	  OEO's	  now-­‐former	  director	  Carlucci,	  was	  sworn	  in	  as	  
acting	  director.	  	  
	   Despite	  being	  sworn	  in	  without	  congressional	  approval,	  Phillips,	  ambitious	  
and	  adamantly	  against	  the	  OEO,	  launched	  into	  action,	  announcing	  that	  all	  federal	  aid	  
to	  Community	  Action	  Agencies	  would	  be	  terminated	  immediately;	  some	  900	  CAAs,	  
with	  federal	  funding	  of	  $384	  million,	  would	  no	  longer	  receive	  the	  funds.	  	  
Suppressing	  a	  study	  of	  community	  action’s	  successful	  impact	  on	  low-­‐income	  
communities,	  Phillips	  publicly	  lambasted	  the	  OEO’s	  involvement	  in	  antipoverty	  
work.66	  Casting	  Community	  Action	  Agencies	  as	  divisive	  and	  dangerous,	  he	  argued	  
that	  the	  condition	  of	  cities	  lay	  firmly	  in	  the	  defective	  conceptualization	  of	  
antipoverty	  work.	  “Boycotts	  and	  demonstrations	  and	  riots	  and	  so	  forth	  and	  so	  on	  
may	  be	  legal,”	  he	  critiqued,	  “but	  they	  should	  not	  be	  subsidized	  by	  the	  federal	  
government.	  They	  tend	  to	  erode	  the	  kind	  of	  normal	  majoritarian	  democratic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66Washington	  Post,	  “Lou	  Cannon	  OEO	  Chief	  Savors	  Shutdown.”	  February	  4,	  1973,	  A1.	  
See	  also	  the	  appendices	  of	  the	  hearings	  on	  the	  OEO	  to	  read	  the	  study.	  Study	  shows	  that	  in	  
many	  ways	  the	  Community	  Action	  Agencies	  were	  providing	  a	  buffer	  to	  cities,	  employing	  the	  
poor	  in	  great	  amounts,	  folding	  residents	  into	  civic	  duty,	  etc.	  	  See	  Senate	  Subcommittee	  on	  
Equal	  Opportunity	  Committee	  on	  Education	  and	  Labor	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Education	  and	  
Labor.	  Proposed	  Elimination	  of	  OEO	  and	  Related	  Legislation:	  Appendices	  in	  the	  Hearings,	  93rd	  
Cong.,	  1st	  sess.,	  February	  7,	  8,	  27,	  1973.	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safeguards	  that	  are	  incident	  to	  the	  electoral	  process."67	  Quietly,	  the	  administration	  
began	  collecting	  information	  on	  Community	  Action	  Agencies	  that	  had	  misused	  funds	  
or	  deployed	  aid	  to	  conduct	  activities	  that	  could	  be	  spun	  as	  illegal.	  As	  “bonifide	  [sic]	  
examples	  of	  the	  warts	  on	  OEO,”	  these	  cases	  could	  legitimize	  the	  administration's	  
plan	  to	  terminate	  funds,	  Deputy	  Director	  of	  Communications	  Ken	  W.	  Clawson	  
suggested.68	  
	   In	  order	  to	  isolate	  power	  from	  antipoverty	  networks,	  Phillips	  eliminated	  the	  
authority	  of	  regional	  OEO	  offices	  to	  authorize	  grants;	  transfer,	  hire	  or	  fire	  staff;	  and	  
communicate	  with	  local	  CAAs.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  budget	  message,	  he	  informed	  the	  
regional	  directors	  that	  any	  grants	  that	  exceeded	  the	  June	  30th	  funding	  cutoff	  would	  
be	  eliminated	  by	  his	  executive	  order.69	  	  	  
The	  strategy	  forged	  by	  Phillips	  and	  Carlucci	  would	  isolate	  the	  three	  most	  
controversial	  programs	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  create	  debate	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  
programs,	  and	  therefore	  the	  agency,	  should	  continue	  to	  exist.	  As	  press	  secretary	  
Patrick	  Buchanan	  relayed,	  the	  strategy	  allowed	  the	  OEO’s	  demise	  to	  appear	  in	  line	  
with	  the	  administration’s	  larger	  ideological	  mission	  of	  streamlining	  and	  efficiency.	  
Buchanan	  noted	  to	  Cole	  that	  the	  political	  strategy	  was	  “both	  governmentally	  sound,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  Washington	  Post,	  “Lou	  Cannon	  OEO	  Chief	  Savors	  Shutdown.”	  February	  4,	  1973,	  A1	  
	  
68	  Memo,	  Ken	  Clawson	  to	  Ronald	  Ziegler,	  February	  23,	  1973,	  Box	  19,	  Folder	  Cabinet	  
Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development—George	  W.	  Romney	  [1	  of	  3],	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  
Staff	  Member	  Office	  Files,	  Daniel	  Patrick	  Moynihan,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  
and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	  	  
	  
69	  Subcommittee	  on	  Equal	  Opportunity	  on	  Education	  and	  Labor.	  Committee	  on	  
Education	  and	  Labor.	  Proposed	  Elimination	  of	  OEO	  and	  Related	  Legislation:	  Appendices	  in	  the	  
Hearings,	  93rd	  Cong.,	  1st	  sess.,	  February	  7,8,	  27,	  1973.	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from	  our	  philosophical	  standpoint,	  and	  politically	  attractive	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  
publicly	  putting	  the	  sword	  to	  the	  poverty	  agencies.”70	  Thus,	  they	  would	  present	  
Congress	  with	  a	  “virtual	  fait	  accompli”	  before	  there	  could	  be	  a	  substantial	  
objection.71	  	  
In	  many	  ways,	  it	  was	  a	  strategy	  that	  the	  administration	  believed	  it	  could	  use	  
to	  attract	  widespread	  support	  for	  revenue	  sharing.	  In	  fact,	  the	  administration	  had	  
been	  quite	  successful	  at	  convincing	  citizens	  that	  antipoverty	  programs	  in	  their	  
current	  form	  had	  been	  central	  to	  the	  top-­‐heavy	  buildup	  of	  government	  bureaucracy.	  
Yet	  the	  press	  secretary	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  administration's	  actions.	  
To	  dismantle	  the	  OEO,	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  urban	  aid	  freezes	  and	  the	  protracted	  struggle	  
for	  revenue	  sharing,	  would	  surely	  end	  any	  federal	  commitment	  to	  the	  War	  on	  
Poverty.	  Acknowledging	  that	  reality,	  Buchanan	  ended	  his	  memo	  approving	  the	  
Phillips	  strategy,	  saying,	  “What	  think	  you;	  or	  is	  it	  an	  impeachable	  offense	  to	  
contemplate	  sins	  of	  this	  magnitude?72	  	  
	  
	  Better	  Communities	  Act	  
	   Although	  public	  officials	  were	  astounded,	  Nixon	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  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Memo,	  Patrick	  Buchanan	  to	  Ken	  Cole,	  May	  13,	  1974,”	  OEO	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  5-­‐1-­‐73	  to	  
5/31/74,	  Folder	  Group	  6-­‐7,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Subject	  Files,	  Office	  of	  Economic	  
Opportunity,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	  
	  
71	  Memo,	  Frank	  Carlucci	  to	  John	  Ehrlichman,	  “Disposition	  of	  OEO	  and	  its	  Programs	  
as	  shown	  in	  the	  1974	  Presidents	  Budget,”	  January	  17,	  1973	  Confidential,	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  
1/1/73-­‐4/30/73,	  Group	  6-­‐7,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Office	  of	  Economic	  Opportunity,	  
Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	  	  
	  
72	  Memo,	  Patrick	  Buchanan	  to	  Ken	  Cole,	  May	  13,	  1974,”	  OEO	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  5-­‐1-­‐73	  to	  
5/31/74,	  Folder	  Group	  6-­‐7,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  Subject	  Files,	  Office	  of	  Economic	  
Opportunity,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	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consolidation	  of	  urban	  funding	  through	  a	  flexible	  block	  grant	  structure	  with	  
minimal	  oversight	  that	  he	  called	  the	  Better	  Communities	  Act.73	  Counter	  to	  the	  
anxieties	  expressed	  by	  local	  officials	  about	  the	  future	  of	  their	  cities	  without	  
categorical	  aid,	  Nixon	  claimed	  the	  urban	  crisis	  was	  no	  more.	  Cities	  were	  “no	  longer	  
on	  the	  verge	  of	  financial	  catastrophe.	  The	  ship	  of	  state	  is	  back	  on	  an	  even	  keel	  and	  
we	  can	  put	  behind	  us	  the	  fear	  of	  capsizing.”74	  Under	  that	  delusion,	  new	  special	  
revenue	  sharing	  would	  consolidate	  urban	  aid	  programs,	  shift	  funding	  directly	  to	  
municipal	  governments,	  and	  allow	  for	  minimal	  review.	  “The	  time	  has	  come,”	  he	  
wrote	  to	  his	  constituency,	  “to	  reject	  the	  patronizing	  notion	  that	  Federal	  planners,	  
peering	  over	  the	  point	  of	  a	  pencil	  in	  Washington,	  can	  guide	  your	  lives	  better	  than	  
you	  can.”75	  	  	  
Big-­‐city	  mayors	  and	  governors	  were	  outraged	  by	  what	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  ploy	  to	  
consolidate	  funding	  while	  stripping	  down	  the	  overall	  resources	  for	  local	  
governments	  to	  assist	  urban	  crises.	  The	  National	  Committee	  Against	  Discrimination	  
in	  Housing	  released	  a	  press	  statement	  alleging	  that	  the	  president	  was	  using	  
“executive	  coercion”	  to	  force	  the	  hand	  of	  Congress.	  By	  eliminating	  programs,	  “the	  
administration	  forces	  the	  acceptance	  of	  revenue	  sharing”	  without	  formulating	  any	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  “White	  House	  Press	  Release,”	  March	  4,	  1973.	  Washington,	  D.C.	  	  
Box	  35,	  Folder	  EX	  FA	  7	  Revenue	  Sharing	  3/1/1973-­‐3/31/1973,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  
Subject	  Files,	  Federal	  Aid	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  
California.	  	  
	  
74	  The	  Mayor,	  March	  15,	  1973,	  1.	  In	  possession	  of	  the	  author.	  
	  
75	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  “White	  House	  Press	  Release,”	  March	  4,	  1973.	  Washington,	  D.C.	  	  
Box	  35,	  Folder	  EX	  FA	  7	  Revenue	  Sharing	  3/1/1973-­‐3/31/1973,	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	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form	  of	  accountability	  to	  national	  antipoverty	  goals.76	  The	  most	  egregious	  element	  
of	  the	  bill	  was	  that	  the	  revenue-­‐sharing	  plan	  extended	  funding	  to	  cities	  with	  no	  prior	  
experience	  with	  antipoverty	  aid.	  Nixon	  used	  the	  expansion	  as	  a	  tactic	  to	  draw	  
greater	  support;	  but,	  for	  urban	  mayors,	  it	  was	  a	  means	  to	  further	  dilute	  the	  targeted	  
nature	  of	  categorical	  urban	  aid	  funding.	  With	  confusion	  growing	  about	  the	  fate	  of	  
other	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  programs	  and	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  Economic	  
Opportunity,	  local	  leaders	  expressed	  a	  growing	  resentment	  in	  the	  way	  the	  
administration	  was	  deciding	  their	  fates.	  	  	  
The	  urban	  crisis	  had	  not	  passed	  and,	  in	  fact,	  it	  was	  worsening	  with	  further	  
cutbacks.	  With	  cities	  reporting	  potential	  deficits,	  the	  National	  Governors’	  
Conference	  raised	  concerns	  about	  the	  capabilities	  of	  special	  revenue	  sharing	  to	  
sustain	  social	  service	  provisions	  historically	  provided	  by	  categorical	  aid.	  The	  War	  on	  
Poverty	  had	  provided	  “hardware”	  and	  “software”	  programs,	  they	  argued.	  If	  funding	  
were	  spread	  more	  disparately	  throughout	  urban	  and	  suburban	  communities,	  
already	  strained	  local	  governments	  would	  likely	  not	  be	  able	  to	  retain	  software	  
programs.	  As	  one	  governor	  commented,	  “The	  more	  questions	  we	  have	  asked	  about	  
special	  revenue	  sharing,	  the	  more	  uncertain	  we	  have	  become	  about	  answers.”77	  
Mayors	  continued	  to	  express	  that	  any	  form	  of	  special	  revenue	  sharing	  could	  
not	  substitute	  for	  the	  vital	  programs	  operating	  through	  categorical	  aid.	  In	  hearings	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  “National	  Committee	  Against	  Discrimination	  in	  Housing	  Press	  Release	  on	  the	  
Administration's	  Housing	  Moratorium	  and	  Budget	  Message,”	  Box	  25,	  Folder	  EX	  FA	  5	  
Housing	  3/1/1973-­‐3/31/1973;	  White	  House	  Central	  Files,	  White	  House	  Subject	  Files,	  
Federal	  Aid,	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon	  Presidential	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Yorba	  Linda,	  California.	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before	  Maine	  Democratic	  Senator	  Edmund	  Muskie’s	  Intergovernmental	  Relations	  
Subcommittee,	  mayors	  testified	  to	  a	  feeling	  of	  betrayal	  by	  the	  Nixon	  administration;	  
they	  felt	  duped	  into	  believing	  that	  revenue	  sharing	  would	  allow	  cities	  to	  eliminate	  
blight	  by	  freeing	  them	  to	  target	  other	  issues	  contributing	  to	  poverty.78	  Instead,	  they	  
watched	  as	  funding	  for	  basic	  services	  was	  being	  stripped	  away.	  New	  Orleans's	  
Landrieu,	  representing	  the	  Legislative	  Action	  branch	  of	  the	  US	  Conference	  of	  Mayors,	  
testified	  that	  though	  there	  was	  general	  support	  for	  grant	  consolidation	  and	  the	  
trend	  toward	  block	  grants,	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  proposed	  FY	  1974	  budget	  
was	  bringing	  central	  cities	  to	  their	  knees	  with	  “crippling	  cutbacks	  and	  reductions.”79	  	  
Despite	  the	  allegations	  against	  the	  executive	  branch,	  congressional	  
appropriations	  for	  FY	  1974	  were	  immobilized	  by	  the	  OMB’s	  continued	  support	  of	  
the	  president’s	  freezes.	  Even	  a	  judicial	  decision	  that	  found	  the	  president’s	  
dismemberment	  of	  the	  OEO	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  need	  for	  congressional	  approval	  
meant	  little	  if	  the	  president	  did	  not	  release	  the	  impounded	  funds	  for	  antipoverty	  
programs.80	  On	  July	  12,	  1973,	  Nixon	  announced	  that	  all	  but	  three	  OEO	  programs	  
would	  be	  transferred	  within	  the	  following	  month	  to	  other	  governmental	  agencies.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  After	  initially	  opposing	  general	  revenue	  sharing,	  Muskie	  was	  an	  important	  
figurehead	  in	  getting	  the	  Senate	  and	  House	  to	  reconcile	  differences	  on	  their	  committee’s	  
proposals	  for	  fiscal	  assistance	  and	  pass	  through	  the	  State	  and	  Local	  Fiscal	  Assistance	  Act	  
just	  six	  months	  earlier.	  See	  Committee	  on	  Government	  Operations.	  Subcommittee	  on	  
Intergovernmental	  Relations,	  A	  New	  Federalism:	  Hearings	  Before	  the	  Senate	  Subcommittee	  
on	  Intergovernmental	  Relations.	  93rd	  Cong.,	  1st	  sess.,	  February	  23,	  1973.	  	  	  
	  
79	  Testimony	  of	  Moon	  Landrieu.	  Committee	  on	  Government	  Operations.	  
Subcommittee	  on	  Intergovernmental	  Relations,	  A	  New	  Federalism:	  Hearings	  Before	  the	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The	  remaining	  programs—community	  action,	  economic	  development,	  and	  legal	  
services—would	  stay	  intact	  under	  the	  OEO.	  While	  the	  administration	  avoided	  
violating	  the	  judge’s	  order	  to	  leave	  the	  OEO	  intact,	  it	  nonetheless	  was	  able	  to	  
weaken	  the	  agency	  by	  leaving	  untouched	  only	  the	  programs	  most	  loathed	  by	  local	  
government	  bureaucracies.	  	  	  
In	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  OEO	  crisis,	  some	  mayors	  continued	  to	  object	  to	  the	  Better	  
Communities	  Act.	  If	  revenue	  sharing	  would	  be	  coupled	  with	  cuts,	  the	  program	  
would	  not	  aid	  the	  recovery	  of	  American	  cities.	  Despite	  supporting	  the	  streamlined	  
application	  process	  and	  local	  autonomy,	  mayors	  from	  economically	  divided	  cities	  
like	  Detroit,	  New	  York	  City,	  and	  New	  Orleans	  took	  issue	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  national	  
policy	  directives.	  Urban	  officials	  expressed	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  city	  politics,	  where	  
local	  revenue	  was	  determined	  by	  keeping	  middle-­‐class	  residents	  and	  middle-­‐class	  
jobs,	  made	  it	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  ever-­‐growing,	  low-­‐income	  
populations	  without	  specifically	  targeted	  objectives.81	  Discouraged	  by	  the	  situation,	  
Raleigh,	  N.C.,	  Mayor	  Robert	  Bradshaw	  commented,	  “There	  wouldn't	  have	  been	  a	  
need	  for	  federal	  programs	  in	  the	  first	  place	  if	  local	  government	  hadn't	  abdicated	  its	  
responsibilities	  in	  these	  areas.	  What	  we	  need	  now	  are	  national	  priorities	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  Leaders	  in	  New	  Orleans	  were	  equally	  concerned	  about	  the	  impact	  
decentralization	  would	  have	  on	  issues	  of	  civil	  rights	  and	  fair	  housing	  that	  had	  only	  become	  a	  
priority	  in	  cities	  due	  to	  the	  imposition	  of	  the	  federal	  government.	  	  The	  city’s	  Washington,	  
D.C.-­‐based	  lobbyist,	  Dick	  Cherry,	  cautioned	  Moon	  Landrieu	  to	  consider	  the	  side	  effects	  of	  
promoting	  programs	  like	  general	  revenue	  sharing	  that	  were	  not	  accompanied	  by	  strict	  
national	  directives.	  Writing	  to	  the	  mayor,	  he	  questioned	  the	  nation’s	  progress	  around	  issues	  
of	  civil	  rights,	  health	  care,	  and	  housing.	  	  “Have	  we	  advanced	  so	  far	  that	  we	  don’t	  still	  need	  
national	  goals,	  objectives,	  standards,	  guidelines?	  Nixon	  doesn’t	  want	  to	  build	  a	  nation.	  He	  
wants	  to	  subsidize	  parochialism.”	  See	  Memo,	  Dick	  Cherry	  to	  Mayor	  Moon	  Landrieu,	  
February	  2,	  1975;	  Box	  65,	  Folder	  Revenue	  Sharing	  1974-­‐1975;	  Moon	  Landrieu	  Papers,	  
Loyola	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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national	  leadership,	  not	  a	  fight	  on	  the	  local	  level	  about	  where	  the	  money	  is	  to	  go.”82	  
The	  concern	  showed	  the	  complexity	  of	  interests	  facing	  state	  and	  local	  politicians	  in	  
municipalities	  where	  the	  most	  powerful	  political	  players	  were	  not	  poor	  or	  black,	  
and	  fulfilling	  their	  interests	  would	  mean	  diverting	  funds	  from	  antipoverty	  projects	  
unless	  there	  were	  federal	  regulations.83	  
What	  heightened	  the	  anxiety	  of	  community	  activists	  (while	  not	  necessarily	  
mayors)	  in	  particular	  was	  the	  absence	  of	  stipulated	  community	  participation.	  The	  
Better	  Communities	  Act	  firmly	  consolidated	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  mayors	  at	  a	  local	  
level,	  but	  mayors	  had	  never	  been	  active	  proponents	  of	  community	  action	  networks.	  
Though	  local	  administrators	  had	  generally	  not	  circumvented	  the	  agencies,	  fearing	  
the	  backlash	  from	  community	  activists,	  they	  had	  not	  advocated	  their	  continuation	  
either.	  The	  Better	  Communities	  Act	  removed	  the	  requirement	  for	  community	  
participation,	  leaving	  it	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  individual	  mayors	  to	  determine	  the	  
process	  of	  funds	  allocation.	  Without	  citizen	  participation,	  accountability	  to	  low-­‐
income	  populations	  diminished	  only	  further.	  
These	  concerns	  seemed	  justified	  by	  reports	  outlining	  how	  cities	  were	  
beginning	  to	  spend	  general	  revenue-­‐sharing	  funds.	  While	  calls	  for	  revenue	  sharing	  
stemmed	  from	  the	  discussion	  of	  overhauling	  antipoverty	  aid,	  only	  a	  meager	  portion	  
of	  general	  revenue-­‐sharing	  funds	  were	  used	  for	  low-­‐income	  community	  
development.	  Instead,	  cities	  across	  the	  country	  had	  utilized	  the	  funds	  to	  prevent	  tax	  
hikes	  or	  to	  provide	  wage	  increases	  to	  city	  workers.	  Of	  more	  concern,	  the	  funds	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  Shifts	  in	  Federal	  Aid	  Alarm	  'New	  South,'	  March	  19,	  1973,1.	  
	  
83	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Mayors	  Object	  to	  Revenue	  Bill,”	  June	  21,	  1973,	  5.	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also	  being	  used	  for	  purposes	  far	  less	  beneficial	  to	  the	  greater	  urban	  community.	  
Without	  clauses	  for	  participation,	  local	  governing	  officials	  were	  substituting	  
revenue-­‐sharing	  funds	  for	  projects,	  typically	  funded	  through	  bond	  issues,	  that	  they	  
were	  uncertain	  would	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  general	  public.84	  Though	  federal	  revenue-­‐
sharing	  funds	  were	  supposed	  to	  be	  used	  for	  purposes	  that	  could	  fulfill	  basic	  
antidiscrimination	  legislation,	  the	  practice	  of	  substituting	  revenue-­‐sharing	  funds	  
with	  local	  revenue	  to	  allow	  flexible	  use	  was	  common	  and	  allowed	  city	  officials	  to	  
“bypass	  civil	  rights	  requirements.”85	  While	  community	  action	  leaders	  and	  activists	  
frequently	  expressed	  hope	  that	  funds	  would	  become	  a	  way	  of	  supplementing	  
desperately	  needed	  social	  services,	  funding	  was	  most	  often	  used	  on	  brick-­‐and-­‐
mortar	  projects.	  There	  was	  no	  guarantee	  that	  special	  revenue	  sharing	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
block	  grants	  would	  be	  employed	  any	  differently.	  	  
Yet	  stalled	  efforts	  to	  pass	  any	  bill	  shifted	  the	  allegiances	  of	  local	  
administrators.	  	  Local	  elected	  officials,	  who	  earlier	  that	  year	  had	  vowed	  to	  not	  
support	  any	  program	  that	  would	  diminish	  specific	  antipoverty	  efforts,	  now	  claimed	  
that	  revenue	  sharing	  would	  return	  the	  power	  necessary	  to	  revitalize	  cities	  to	  the	  
hands	  of	  those	  who	  could	  most	  effectively	  design	  programs	  to	  directly	  respond	  to	  
the	  needs	  of	  urban	  residents:	  the	  mayors	  themselves.	  Those	  same	  mayors	  who	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  Carol	  M.	  Rose,	  Citizen	  participation	  in	  revenue	  sharing:	  a	  report	  from	  the	  South,	  
Southern	  Regional	  Council	  (Southern	  Governmental	  Monitoring	  Project,	  1975),	  3.	  
 
85	  For	  example,	  city	  officials	  would	  use	  local	  revenue	  allocated	  to	  nondiscriminatory	  
uses	  like	  sanitation	  and	  replace	  it	  with	  general	  revenue-­‐sharing	  money.	  That	  would	  create	  a	  
surplus	  of	  local	  revenue,	  which	  officials	  would	  then	  allocate	  to	  clearly	  discriminatory	  city	  
departments,	  such	  as	  policing	  units.	  Carol	  M.	  Rose,	  Citizen	  participation	  in	  revenue	  sharing:	  a	  
report	  from	  the	  South,	  Southern	  Regional	  Council	  (Southern	  Governmental	  Monitoring	  
Project,	  1975),	  12.	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asked	  for	  federal	  policy	  priorities	  now	  told	  their	  peers	  that	  the	  assumption	  that	  local	  
leadership	  would	  not	  enforce	  the	  priorities	  of	  low-­‐income	  residents	  was	  misguided.	  	  
War	  on	  Poverty	  programs	  were	  just	  too	  uneven	  to	  keep;	  it	  was	  time	  they	  stood	  
behind	  the	  president’s	  proposal,	  one	  mayor	  noted.86	  	  	  
New	  Orleans	  Mayor	  Landrieu,	  as	  newly	  elected	  chair	  of	  the	  US	  Conference	  of	  
Mayors,	  was	  among	  those	  who	  decided	  to	  now	  stand	  against	  antipoverty	  programs.	  
Blaming	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty	  on	  its	  attempts	  to	  circumvent	  local	  
administrators,	  Landrieu	  slammed	  the	  work	  of	  antipoverty	  agencies.	  Nixon,	  the	  
mayor	  said,	  recognized	  the	  “disorder	  and	  confusion	  which	  had	  developed.”	  It	  was	  
“not	  only	  government	  officials	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  but	  many	  people	  around	  the	  
country	  who	  were	  supposed	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  categorical	  system,	  [who]	  were	  
dissatisfied	  because	  the	  system	  could	  not	  produce	  what	  it	  promised.”	  Landrieu	  
extolled	  Nixon’s	  New	  Federalism	  as	  an	  innovative	  response	  to	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty’s	  
“failure.”	  The	  mayor	  urged	  cities	  to	  prepare,	  warning	  them	  that	  failing	  to	  implement	  
the	  pending	  legislation	  adequately	  could	  doom	  them	  to	  see	  the	  return	  of	  an	  
overbearing	  federal	  bureaucracy.87	  	  	  
Though	  the	  reversal	  in	  opinion	  seemed	  dramatic,	  it	  is	  better	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  
strategic	  decision.	  The	  Better	  Communities	  Act	  dissolved	  the	  ability	  for	  mayors	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Moon	  Landrieu,	  “Cities	  and	  the	  New	  Federalism,”	  at	  the	  Michigan	  Municipal	  
League	  Annual	  Convention,	  September	  4,	  1973.	  Box	  123,	  Folder	  Cities	  and	  the	  New	  
Federalism;	  Moon	  Landrieu	  Mayoral	  Papers,	  Loyola	  University	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  
Louisiana.	  	  
	  
87	  Moon	  Landrieu,	  “Cities	  and	  the	  New	  Federalism,”	  at	  the	  Michigan	  Municipal	  
League	  Annual	  Convention,	  September	  4,	  1973.	  Box	  123,	  Folder	  Cities	  and	  the	  New	  
Federalism;	  Moon	  Landrieu	  Mayoral	  Papers,	  Loyola	  University	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  
Louisiana.	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support	  antipoverty	  agencies,	  ending	  formal	  ties	  between	  antipoverty	  organizations	  
and	  local	  governing	  officials.	  With	  the	  capacity	  of	  city	  governments	  to	  pursue	  
antipoverty	  efforts	  already	  inhibited	  by	  the	  freeze	  and	  city	  leaders	  believing	  that	  
some	  version	  of	  the	  president’s	  plan	  was	  inevitable,	  they	  attempted	  to	  avoid	  a	  
protracted	  battle	  by	  pledging	  their	  support.	  A	  need	  for	  immediate	  funds	  thus	  
outweighed	  concerns	  about	  the	  act’s	  viability	  for	  replacing	  antipoverty	  programs.	  In	  
cities	  with	  diminishing	  prosperity,	  the	  ability	  to	  control	  funding	  decisions	  citywide	  
also	  offered	  new	  potential	  in	  how	  to	  entice	  city	  growth	  and	  middle-­‐class	  
communities.	  As	  professionals,	  they	  could	  use	  the	  block	  grant	  funding	  to	  manage	  
and	  coordinate	  programs	  in	  a	  way	  that	  could	  benefit	  not	  just	  low-­‐income	  areas	  but	  
the	  city	  itself.	  	  
	  
Block	  Grants	  Take	  Hold	  
Even	  as	  Congress	  appropriated	  money	  for	  the	  continuance	  of	  categorical	  
grants,	  it	  was	  hard	  to	  envision	  that	  some	  form	  of	  block	  grants	  would	  not	  be	  
passed.88	  With	  the	  administration	  continuing	  to	  frame	  antipoverty	  efforts	  as	  the	  
gross	  misuse	  of	  funds	  for	  a	  minority	  of	  residents,	  support	  for	  the	  programs	  
continued	  to	  wane	  even	  among	  congressional	  Democrats.	  By	  September	  1973,	  the	  
majority	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  expressed	  approval	  for	  using	  an	  enhanced	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  On	  July	  1,	  1973,	  the	  Senate	  passed	  a	  budget	  appropriations	  bill	  for	  FY	  1974	  
totaling	  more	  than	  $19.1	  billion.	  While	  the	  bill	  retained	  more	  than	  a	  $500	  million	  that	  the	  
administration’s	  budget	  had	  proposed	  cutting,	  its	  total	  appropriations	  were	  $1.75	  billion	  
less	  than	  the	  total	  funds	  for	  1973.	  The	  budget	  contained	  $611	  million	  for	  community	  
development	  and	  strict	  anti-­‐impoundment	  legislation	  aimed	  at	  deflating	  the	  power	  of	  
Nixon’s	  executive	  branch.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  amusing	  part	  of	  the	  anti-­‐impoundment	  
legislation	  targeted	  the	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget.	  It	  stated	  that	  if	  the	  OMB	  were	  to	  
withhold	  funds	  appropriated	  by	  Congress,	  its	  air	  conditioning	  would	  be	  shut	  off	  indefinitely.	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version	  of	  block	  grants,	  if	  not	  outright	  revenue	  sharing.89	  In	  light	  of	  the	  successful	  
impoundments,	  freezes,	  and	  the	  all-­‐but-­‐symbolic	  dismantling	  of	  the	  OEO,	  the	  about-­‐
face	  of	  Congress	  was	  an	  effort	  to	  stay	  one	  step	  ahead	  of	  the	  Nixon	  administration.	  
Local	  governing	  constituencies,	  frustrated	  with	  congressional	  representatives	  for	  
not	  moving	  faster	  to	  pass	  some	  form	  of	  aid	  that	  could	  alleviate	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  
moratorium	  and	  other	  freezes,	  favored	  revenue	  sharing.	  Thus,	  the	  House	  moved	  
toward	  approving	  a	  block	  grant	  structure	  that	  would	  retain	  oversight	  but	  enact	  the	  
local	  control	  that	  mayors	  sought.	  In	  essence,	  the	  House	  viewed	  block	  grants	  as	  a	  
means	  of	  compromising	  between	  revenue	  sharing	  (a	  program	  without	  restrictions)	  
and	  categorical	  aid	  (programs	  over	  which	  Congress	  had	  authority.)	  The	  battle	  was	  
no	  longer	  a	  struggle	  between	  preserving	  antipoverty	  efforts	  and	  introducing	  new	  
forms	  of	  revenue	  sharing;	  the	  administration’s	  tactics	  had	  determined	  that	  War	  on	  
Poverty	  aid	  would	  be	  dismantled.	  The	  battle	  now	  was	  for	  control	  of	  what	  would	  
constitute	  urban	  revenue-­‐sharing	  programs.90	  	  	  
Still,	  not	  everyone	  accepted	  the	  belief	  that	  revenue	  sharing	  was	  inherently	  a	  
better	  means	  of	  aiding	  cities.	  By	  late	  1973,	  HUD	  in-­‐house	  reports	  detailed	  the	  failure	  
of	  the	  Planned	  Variations	  experiment	  in	  the	  20	  cities	  across	  the	  country.	  Although	  
the	  Planned	  Variations	  program	  was	  designed	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  special	  revenue	  
sharing	  would	  enable	  cities	  to	  develop	  strategic	  planning	  aims	  around	  their	  specific	  
priorities,	  the	  results	  of	  a	  study	  examining	  the	  program's	  effectiveness	  indicated	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  See	  House	  Subcommittee	  on	  Intergovernmental	  Relations	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  
Government	  Operations,	  Hearings	  on	  Revenue	  Sharing,	  92nd	  Cong.,	  2nd	  sess.,	  June	  12,	  1974.	  
	  
90	  See	  Advisory	  Commission	  on	  Intergovernmental	  Relations,	  Block	  Grants:	  A	  
comparative	  analysis,	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1977).	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opposite.	  In	  the	  two	  years	  the	  program	  had	  been	  active,	  not	  a	  single	  city	  within	  the	  
survey	  had	  developed	  a	  comprehensive	  planning	  agenda	  or	  a	  plan	  for	  distribution	  of	  
grant	  funds.	  Local	  officials	  were	  unable	  to	  develop	  strategic	  alliances	  with	  urban	  
renewal	  agencies	  or	  community	  demonstration	  councils	  to	  coordinate	  planning	  and	  
development	  efforts.	  Few	  of	  the	  cities	  had	  used	  funds	  for	  any	  sort	  of	  strategic	  effort	  
at	  all.	  Citing	  a	  HUD	  study	  conducted	  the	  year	  before	  that	  raised	  similar	  reservations,	  
Henry	  Eschwege,	  director	  of	  the	  Government	  Accountability	  Office,	  questioned	  
whether	  cities	  were	  truly	  ready	  for	  the	  responsibility	  embedded	  within	  the	  
proposed	  Better	  Communities	  Act.	  Even	  with	  more	  control,	  cities	  did	  not	  develop	  
the	  capacity,	  or	  the	  expertise,	  to	  set	  long-­‐term	  planning	  directives,	  Eschwege	  
relayed.	  If	  cities	  that	  had	  coordinated	  Model	  Cities	  funding	  could	  not	  create	  citywide	  
strategies	  for	  urban	  aid	  distribution,	  there	  were	  doubts	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  cities	  
new	  to	  the	  program	  to	  do	  the	  same.91	  	  	  
	   The	  planning	  subcommittee	  of	  HUD’s	  Advisory	  Council	  was	  skeptical	  as	  well.	  	  
In	  a	  report	  released	  later	  that	  fall,	  the	  council	  questioned	  the	  administration’s	  goals	  
for	  special	  revenue	  sharing.	  The	  act,	  the	  subcommittee	  wrote,	  failed	  to	  adequately	  
develop	  a	  statement	  on	  national	  urban	  policy	  objectives	  for	  the	  program,	  instead	  
offering	  only	  citywide	  redevelopment	  as	  a	  possible	  solution	  to	  urban	  blight	  and	  
poverty.	  Since	  the	  1930s,	  cities	  had	  functioned	  with	  federal	  oversight.	  Now,	  the	  
subcommittee	  wrote,	  cities	  would	  be	  required	  to	  develop	  and	  evaluate	  their	  own	  
priorities	  and	  policy	  initiatives	  without	  the	  experience	  and	  support	  of	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Memo,	  U.S.	  General	  Accounting	  Office	  Director	  Henry	  Eschwege	  to	  the	  Honorable	  
Secretary	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development,	  August	  22,	  1973.	  Accessed	  from	  
www.gao.gov.	  February	  10,	  2013.	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relationship.	  If	  “there	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  national	  goal	  of	  eliminating	  or	  ameliorating	  
the	  conditions	  of	  poverty	  and	  urban	  blight,”	  the	  subcommittee	  suggested,	  then	  the	  
legislation	  should	  clearly	  restate	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  Fair	  Housing	  Act	  of	  1968	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  purpose	  behind	  Model	  Cities	  so	  that	  “they	  are	  evident	  in	  the	  Community	  
Development	  revenue-­‐sharing	  legislation.”92	  Without	  such	  a	  stipulation,	  cities	  were	  
being	  asked	  to	  take	  on	  new	  responsibilities	  with	  less	  direction.	  	  	  
	   As	  the	  federal	  moratorium	  on	  urban	  aid	  reached	  its	  one-­‐year	  mark,	  the	  
president	  once	  again	  called	  on	  Congress	  to	  approve	  a	  new	  system	  for	  federal	  aid	  
delivery.93	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  Watergate	  allegations,	  the	  stakes	  for	  revenue	  sharing	  took	  
on	  new	  political	  expediency.	  The	  Senate	  attempted	  to	  find	  ways	  of	  overcoming	  the	  
impasse.	  In	  February	  1974,	  the	  Senate	  Banking,	  Housing,	  and	  Urban	  Affairs	  
committee	  introduced	  an	  omnibus	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  Act,	  a	  
piece	  of	  comprehensive	  legislation	  aimed	  at	  consolidating	  urban	  development	  
programs	  into	  a	  single	  block	  grant	  while	  providing	  precise	  national	  objectives	  for	  
fund	  delivery	  and	  use.	  Although	  the	  proposed	  legislation	  capitulated	  on	  grant	  
structure,	  the	  committee	  remained	  steadfast	  to	  conditions	  of	  oversight	  in	  both	  the	  
application	  process	  and	  a	  rigorous	  review.	  	  
	   The	  committee	  attempted	  to	  maintain	  a	  focused	  antipoverty	  directive	  as	  well,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  Subcommittee	  on	  the	  Planning	  Process	  and	  Urban	  Development	  of	  the	  Advisory	  
Committee	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development,	  Revenue	  Sharing	  and	  the	  
Planning	  Process:	  Shifting	  the	  Locus	  of	  Responsibility	  for	  Domestic	  Problem	  Solving,	  
(Washington,	  D.	  C.:	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1974),	  76.	  
	  
93	  This	  ban	  was	  partially	  lifted	  to	  provide	  revenue	  for	  the	  least	  controversial	  of	  
housing	  programs	  under	  Section	  235	  and	  Section	  236.	  These	  programs	  provided	  subsidies	  
for	  low-­‐income	  home	  ownership.	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despite	  the	  brick-­‐and-­‐mortar	  scope	  of	  the	  programs.	  With	  alleviating	  poverty	  
conditions	  central	  to	  its	  objectives,	  the	  bill	  mandated	  that	  funds	  be	  used	  in	  ways	  that	  
combated	  blight	  and	  alleviated	  conditions	  in	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods.	  The	  bill	  
required	  that	  funds	  be	  spent	  through	  activities	  that	  “directly	  and	  significantly”	  
benefited	  the	  lives	  of	  low-­‐	  and	  moderate-­‐income	  city	  dwellers.	  Eighty	  percent	  of	  the	  
funds	  would	  be	  awarded	  on	  a	  discretionary	  basis	  with	  preference	  going	  to	  cities	  that	  
participated	  previously	  in	  federal	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  programs.	  The	  Senate	  committee	  
emphasized	  that	  this	  prescription	  was	  the	  only	  way	  to	  ensure	  that	  CDBGs,	  no	  longer	  
geographically	  bounded	  like	  Model	  Cities	  programs	  or	  Community	  Action	  Agencies,	  
would	  be	  used	  in	  ways	  that	  differed	  from	  the	  massively	  diffuse,	  non-­‐targeted	  
structure	  of	  general	  revenue	  sharing.94	  	  	  
	   Despite	  such	  protective	  measures,	  the	  bill	  discouraged	  cities	  from	  linking	  
physical	  development	  programs	  with	  social	  service	  provisions.	  Following	  the	  
administration	  bill’s	  lead,	  the	  proposal	  capped	  the	  utilization	  of	  funds	  for	  social	  
services	  at	  20	  percent	  of	  a	  city’s	  outlay.	  Although	  the	  Senate	  justified	  the	  bill's	  
exclusion	  of	  social	  provisions	  by	  pointing	  to	  the	  myriad	  of	  other	  grants	  available	  for	  
such	  use,	  the	  segregation	  of	  physical	  and	  social	  services	  defied	  earlier	  
comprehensive	  approaches	  to	  antipoverty	  efforts.	  	  Thus,	  playground	  construction,	  
housing	  rehabilitation,	  and	  tree	  planting	  were	  divorced	  from	  health	  care,	  tenant	  
rights	  training,	  and	  citizen	  participation	  networks.	  Such	  separations,	  made	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  See	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  “$9	  billion	  housing	  plan	  proposed	  in	  Senate	  bill,”	  
February	  23,	  1974,5;	  Paul	  Delaney,	  “Major	  Housing	  Bill	  to	  Aid	  Poor	  Approved	  by	  Senate	  
Committee,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  February	  11,	  1974,	  38.	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ostensibly	  for	  political	  expediency,	  inevitably	  changed	  the	  focus	  of	  federal	  aid.	  On	  
March	  11,	  1974,	  the	  bill	  passed	  the	  Senate.	  
	   The	  bill’s	  success	  alarmed	  leaders	  in	  the	  Nixon	  camp	  who	  saw	  the	  Senate	  
version	  as	  far	  more	  radical	  than	  the	  House's	  earlier	  version.	  Hampered	  by	  growing	  
rumors	  of	  an	  impeachment	  trial,	  the	  Senate	  bill	  threatened	  to	  dismantle	  the	  legacy	  
of	  New	  Federalism.95	  Cole,	  Nixon's	  domestic	  policy	  aide,	  noted	  that	  there	  were	  
serious	  concerns	  with	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Senate	  bill,	  particularly	  its	  oversight	  
measures.96	  He	  recommended	  that	  the	  administration	  take	  measures	  to	  find	  a	  
compromise	  with	  the	  House,	  whose	  members	  were	  in	  the	  process	  of	  revising	  their	  
version	  of	  community	  block	  grant	  legislation.97	  With	  the	  leadership	  of	  Secretary	  
James	  T.	  Lynn,	  who	  had	  recently	  been	  given	  a	  more	  active	  role	  in	  negotiations	  with	  
the	  onslaught	  of	  impeachment	  probes,	  the	  possibilities	  of	  finding	  an	  accord	  seemed	  
plausible.	  Lynn	  had	  already	  publicly	  extolled	  the	  House	  bill	  while	  chastising	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  The	  House	  Judiciary	  Committee	  had	  begun	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  president’s	  
involvement	  in	  the	  Watergate	  scandal.	  It	  was	  made	  clear	  that	  if	  an	  impeachment	  trial	  
started,	  any	  pending	  legislation	  suggested	  by	  the	  administration	  would	  be	  put	  on	  hold	  until	  
after	  judgment.	  This	  warning	  jeopardized	  any	  potential	  community	  development	  
legislation.	  This	  was	  a	  fate	  that	  both	  the	  president,	  in	  trying	  to	  preserve	  his	  legacy,	  and	  
Congress,	  trying	  to	  avoid	  a	  potential	  disaster	  of	  having	  no	  appropriated	  community	  
development	  funds,	  wanted	  to	  avoid.	  
	  
96	  Kenneth	  Cole,	  who	  had	  worked	  for	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  since	  1969,	  replaced	  
John	  Ehrlichman,	  as	  top	  domestic	  aide,	  after	  Ehrlichman	  resigned	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  
Watergate	  scandal	  (and	  was	  later	  convicted	  of	  conspiracy,	  obstruction	  of	  justice	  and	  
perjury).	  
	  
97	  Memo,	  Kenneth	  Cole	  to	  the	  President,	  March	  29	  1974;	  Box	  4,	  Folder	  EX	  FG	  24,	  
3/1/74-­‐	  4/30/74,	  Folder	  Group	  24,	  Legislative	  Housing;	  White	  House	  Central	  Files;	  Subject	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Senate	  for	  refusing	  to	  compromise	  in	  light	  of	  the	  dire	  situation	  facing	  cities.98	  The	  
compromise	  effort,	  led	  by	  Democratic	  US	  Representative	  Thomas	  Ashley	  of	  Ohio,	  
pushed	  for	  the	  separation	  of	  any	  housing	  subsidies	  from	  the	  final	  community	  
development	  legislation.	  Where	  to	  build	  low-­‐income	  housing	  would	  be	  controversial	  
at	  the	  local	  level,	  sparking	  new	  battles	  about	  integration;	  money	  to	  fund	  physical	  
development	  citywide	  would	  not	  be.	  Thus,	  separating	  them	  would	  expedite	  the	  total	  
legislative	  package.	  Ultimately,	  this	  effort	  at	  compromise	  was	  successful.	  
	  
A	  New	  Law,	  A	  New	  President	  
	   Two	  days	  after	  the	  agreement	  was	  announced,	  President	  Nixon	  resigned	  to	  
avoid	  the	  almost	  certain	  fate	  of	  impeachment.	  On	  August	  22,	  1974,	  the	  newly	  
appointed	  President	  Gerald	  Ford	  signed	  the	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  
Act	  of	  1974	  into	  legislation.	  Ford	  impressed	  upon	  Congress	  that	  under	  his	  
leadership,	  the	  quest	  for	  decentralization	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  New	  Federalism	  would	  
continue.	  As	  the	  first	  commitment	  of	  that	  federalism,	  the	  legislation	  would	  “help	  to	  
return	  power	  from	  the	  banks	  of	  the	  Potomac	  to	  people	  in	  their	  own	  communities.”99	  	  	  
	   Title	  I	  of	  the	  law	  authorized	  $8.6	  billion	  for	  community	  development,	  
combining	  all	  seven	  programs	  originally	  proposed	  by	  the	  administration	  into	  a	  
single	  block	  grant.	  	  Eligibility	  for	  aid	  would	  be	  determined	  through	  a	  formula	  that	  
gave	  equal	  weight	  to	  population	  and	  overcrowding	  but	  doubled	  the	  funding	  merit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  Edmond	  LeBreton,	  "More	  Major	  Legislation	  Not	  Congress	  Plan,"	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  
May	  5,	  1974,	  19.	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for	  poverty.	  Communities	  that	  had	  participated	  in	  prior	  antipoverty	  programs	  
would	  be	  given	  entitlement	  grants,	  but	  new	  communities	  could	  be	  eligible	  for	  
discretionary	  funding	  as	  well.100	  Each	  city	  or	  town	  applying	  for	  funding	  would	  be	  
responsible	  for	  providing	  a	  housing	  assistance	  plan	  outlining	  intentions	  to	  build	  or	  
rehabilitate	  low-­‐	  and	  moderate-­‐income	  housing.	  As	  funding	  could	  now	  be	  used	  
across	  entire	  cities	  in	  neighborhoods	  that	  were	  “blighted,”	  the	  housing	  assistance	  
plan	  remained	  one	  of	  the	  few	  assertions	  that	  maintained	  the	  grant’s	  focus	  on	  issues	  
specific	  to	  low-­‐	  and	  moderate-­‐	  income	  populations.	  	  
	   In	  the	  end,	  Congress	  compromised	  on	  every	  mechanism	  proposed	  to	  ensure	  
that	  the	  funds	  went	  to	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods.	  In	  fact,	  the	  law	  made	  little	  
mention	  of	  poverty	  at	  all,	  outside	  of	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  funding	  formula.	  Most	  
tellingly,	  the	  Senate’s	  requisite	  that	  80	  percent	  of	  funding	  be	  directed	  into	  targeted	  
low-­‐	  or	  moderate-­‐income	  neighborhood	  projects	  was	  removed	  and	  replaced	  with	  a	  
congressional	  recommendation	  with	  broader	  and	  less	  precise	  language.	  The	  new	  
wording	  recommended	  that	  communities	  use	  funding	  in	  ways	  that	  offered	  
“maximum	  feasible	  priority	  to	  activities	  that	  benefit	  low-­‐	  or	  moderate-­‐income	  
families	  or	  aid	  in	  the	  prevention	  of	  slums	  and	  blight.”101	  The	  “or”	  conjunction	  left	  
vague	  any	  stipulation	  of	  how	  much	  of	  the	  funding	  went	  into	  low-­‐	  versus	  moderate-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  Those	  receiving	  funding	  from	  entitlements	  would	  also	  fall	  under	  a	  hold-­‐harmless	  
provision	  that	  guaranteed	  funding	  at	  the	  prior	  Model	  Cities	  level.	  However,	  this	  expansion	  
of	  eligibility	  also	  diminished	  the	  overall	  funding	  levels	  for	  former	  antipoverty	  cities	  and	  
further	  altered	  the	  nature	  of	  federal	  urban	  aid.	  Now,	  communities	  without	  the	  desperately	  
poor	  populations	  of	  cities	  like	  Detroit,	  Newark,	  and	  New	  Orleans	  would	  benefit	  from	  an	  
influx	  of	  new	  federal	  aid	  as	  well.	  
	  
101	  93rd	  United	  States	  Congress.	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  Act	  of	  1974.	  
(Washington,	  D.C.:	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1974),	  119.	  Emphasis	  added.	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income	  neighborhoods.	  Separating	  goals	  of	  programs	  in	  low-­‐	  or	  moderate-­‐income	  
communities	  from	  those	  of	  preventing	  blight	  had	  similarly	  ambiguous	  implications.	  
That	  ambiguity	  in	  the	  language	  meant	  that	  cities	  could	  use	  funds	  for	  activities	  
outside	  of	  target	  areas	  if	  the	  activities	  met	  “other	  community	  development	  needs	  
having	  a	  particular	  urgency.”102	  	  	  
	   The	  lack	  of	  clarity	  in	  the	  law's	  language	  applied	  to	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  
blight	  as	  well.	  The	  term,	  though	  central	  to	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  law	  itself,	  remained	  
undefined.	  Additionally,	  the	  law	  provided	  funding	  for	  cities	  to	  attack	  pre-­‐existing	  
blight,	  but	  a	  clause	  that	  extended	  the	  utility	  of	  the	  act	  to	  the	  	  "prevention"	  of	  blight	  
meant	  that	  community	  development	  activities	  could	  apply	  to	  neighborhoods	  at	  risk	  
of	  being	  in	  distress	  as	  well.	  Who	  was	  to	  determine	  what	  prevention	  would	  mean	  and	  
which	  neighborhoods	  would	  qualify?	  How	  would	  cities	  begin	  to	  determine	  the	  onset	  
of	  blight?	  While	  historic	  preservation	  and	  housing	  conservation	  were	  considered	  
eligible	  activities,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  monitoring	  of	  where	  these	  activities	  took	  place	  
and	  how	  they	  were	  to	  benefit	  low-­‐	  and	  moderate-­‐income	  people.	  By	  not	  providing	  
concrete	  answers	  for	  some	  of	  these	  questions,	  the	  law	  offered	  little	  clarity	  on	  what	  
would	  NOT	  be	  considered	  eligible	  activities.	  	  	  
	   Finally,	  the	  block	  grant	  promoted	  programs	  that	  would	  attract	  and	  retain	  
private-­‐sector	  investment.	  With	  US	  cities	  embracing	  the	  now-­‐salient	  ideology	  that	  
their	  problems	  could	  be	  fixed	  if	  grant	  funds	  were	  used	  to	  attract	  private-­‐sector	  
investment,	  the	  grant	  offered	  new	  incentives	  to	  adopt	  activities	  that	  would	  directly	  
engage	  this	  concept.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  United	  States	  Government,	  Summary	  of	  the	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  
Act	  of	  1974,	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Dept.	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development,	  1974),	  4.	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   Yet,	  CDBGs	  retained	  far	  fewer	  review	  and	  oversight	  mechanisms	  than	  
congressional	  leaders	  had	  initially	  demanded.	  Cities	  would	  be	  asked	  to	  submit	  a	  
community	  development	  plan	  for	  review	  by	  HUD,	  but	  the	  bill	  was	  structured	  to	  
provide	  oversight	  and	  intervention	  only	  when	  there	  was	  a	  visible	  problem.	  Rather	  
than	  actively	  determining	  compliance	  to	  national	  objectives,	  HUD	  would	  grant	  
automatic	  approval	  to	  applications	  with	  housing	  plans	  unless	  there	  was	  something	  
within	  them	  that	  was	  grossly	  inappropriate.	  Cities	  would	  submit	  a	  year-­‐end	  
assessment	  for	  review,	  but	  without	  a	  full-­‐scale	  compliance	  system,	  the	  requirement	  
was	  solely	  an	  exercise.	  Congress	  had	  bargained	  away	  not	  just	  its	  authority	  to	  
determine	  national	  urban	  policy	  goals,	  but	  also	  any	  renewed	  effort	  to	  combat	  
poverty	  in	  cities	  head-­‐on.	  	  
	   By	  1974,	  the	  Office	  of	  Economic	  Opportunity	  had	  been	  diminished	  to	  a	  
skeletal	  agency	  with	  few	  active	  antipoverty	  programs.	  Despite	  its	  continued	  
existence,	  the	  agency’s	  power	  to	  define	  and	  support	  specific	  antipoverty	  programs	  
was	  no	  more.	  With	  a	  powerless	  OEO,	  Community	  Development	  Block	  Grants	  became	  
the	  largest	  federal	  program	  for	  urban	  development.	  	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
	   Community	  Development	  Block	  Grants	  irrevocably	  altered	  the	  relationship	  of	  
federal	  urban	  policy	  to	  low-­‐income	  city	  residents.	  The	  war	  waged	  on	  the	  War	  on	  
Poverty	  focused	  on	  inefficiencies,	  expanding	  federal	  bureaucracies,	  lack	  of	  
autonomy	  in	  decision-­‐making,	  the	  narrowness	  of	  national	  urban	  priorities,	  and	  the	  
impenetrable	  culture	  of	  poverty.	  Undoubtedly,	  there	  were	  inadequacies	  within	  the	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War	  on	  Poverty	  programs,	  particularly	  in	  management,	  but	  the	  above	  reasons	  were	  
not	  the	  cause	  of	  their	  failure.	  Rather,	  these	  programs	  failed	  because	  of	  the	  calculated	  
tactics	  of	  government	  officials	  who	  hoped	  to	  shift	  the	  conversation	  away	  from	  
concentrated	  antipoverty	  efforts.	  The	  link	  between	  antipoverty	  programs	  and	  the	  
subsequent	  community	  development	  focus	  was	  the	  exclusion	  of	  discourse	  on	  
meaningful	  redistribution	  of	  access	  to	  employment,	  education,	  and	  housing.	  Yet	  
antipoverty	  activists,	  in	  a	  position	  of	  control	  in	  many	  War	  on	  Poverty	  agencies	  and	  
community	  action	  networks,	  were	  able	  to	  force	  these	  conversations	  to	  take	  place.	  In	  
public	  housing	  training,	  tenant	  strikes,	  and	  Head	  Start	  programs,	  dedicated	  
leadership	  made	  conversations	  about	  social,	  economic,	  and	  political	  inclusion	  the	  
preeminent	  issue	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty.103	  	  	  
	   Ultimately,	  CDBGs	  narrowed	  the	  space	  for	  debates	  over	  redistribution—both	  
economic	  and	  political—to	  take	  place.	  The	  lack	  of	  clear	  community	  participation	  
constructs	  increased	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  how	  community	  development,	  within	  the	  
rigid	  confines	  of	  private-­‐sector-­‐led	  physical	  development,	  would	  eradicate	  the	  many	  
issues	  facing	  low-­‐income	  communities.	  In	  that	  way,	  with	  no	  formal	  mandates	  for	  
community	  interaction,	  the	  grant	  structure	  relegated	  low-­‐income	  residents	  to	  a	  
position	  of	  receivership.	  More	  broadly,	  the	  act	  altered	  the	  way	  that	  cities	  and	  their	  
low-­‐income	  activist	  constituencies	  could	  pursue	  antipoverty	  ends	  altogether.	  While	  
local	  officials	  applauded	  the	  legislation	  and	  its	  promise	  of	  more	  autonomy	  and	  more	  
flexible	  use,	  they	  would	  soon	  find	  that	  in	  many	  ways	  what	  they	  were	  offered	  was	  far	  
more	  limited	  than	  what	  they	  gave	  up.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  Certainly,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty	  that	  Lyndon	  B.	  Johnson	  had	  imagined,	  
but	  it	  was	  the	  kind	  of	  program	  enacted	  by	  grassroots	  activists.	  	  	  
	  
	   93	  
	   Community	  Development	  Block	  Grants,	  while	  allowing	  local	  officials	  to	  
choose	  which	  programs	  to	  fund,	  also	  meant	  that	  national	  government	  would	  no	  
longer	  step	  in	  to	  provide	  measures	  for	  equitable	  redistribution.	  Without	  federal	  
mandates	  or	  more	  comprehensive	  funding	  requirements,	  cities	  were	  asked	  to	  both	  
confront	  their	  diminishing	  revenue	  capacities	  while	  developing	  programs	  in	  low-­‐
income	  communities	  within	  the	  limitations	  of	  new	  grants.	  CDBGs	  left	  little	  room	  for	  
municipal	  governing	  officials	  to	  pursue	  these	  differing	  objectives	  in	  tandem.	  Block	  
grants,	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  private-­‐sector-­‐sponsored	  physical	  development	  
projects,	  encouraged	  a	  different	  intervention	  in	  low-­‐income	  communities	  from	  that	  
of	  antipoverty	  policies—instead	  of	  building	  community	  networks,	  programs	  now	  
concentrated	  on	  building	  up	  cities	  with	  new	  streets,	  playgrounds,	  houses,	  etc.	  	  
	   Block	  grants,	  supported	  by	  new	  social	  science	  research,	  classified	  poverty	  as	  
something	  that	  development	  could	  fix.	  For	  municipal	  leaders	  with	  fewer	  tools	  to	  
combat	  the	  limitations	  of	  block	  grant	  programs,	  this	  focus	  provided	  a	  significant	  
political	  argument	  for	  shifting	  the	  way	  they	  directed	  city-­‐led	  efforts	  in	  low-­‐income	  
neighborhoods.	  As	  city	  revenues	  fell,	  the	  possibility	  of	  using	  local	  funds	  to	  
supplement	  physical	  development	  with	  programs	  aimed	  at	  socioeconomic	  inclusion	  
diminished.	  Without	  explicit	  focus	  on	  poverty,	  the	  emergent	  rhetoric	  of	  citywide	  
revitalization	  offered	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  growing	  gaps	  in	  resources	  that	  went	  far	  
beyond	  what	  the	  program	  could	  provide.	  The	  brick-­‐and-­‐mortar	  programs	  supported	  
through	  CDBGs	  were,	  in	  and	  of	  themselves,	  worthy	  projects	  to	  pursue	  in	  low-­‐income	  
neighborhoods.	  The	  problem	  was	  that	  the	  block	  grants	  promoted	  a	  system	  that	  
could	  not	  address	  the	  incongruity	  of	  such	  development	  with	  the	  shrinking	  economic,	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social,	  and	  educational	  opportunities	  for	  low-­‐income	  residents	  in	  cities.	  	  	  
	   Calling	  for	  the	  federal	  aid	  to	  work	  in	  tandem	  with	  private	  development,	  the	  
act	  tied	  the	  fate	  of	  cities	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  local	  officials	  to	  leverage	  private-­‐sector	  
involvement.104	  Providing	  one	  of	  few	  guiding	  principles,	  private-­‐sector	  interests	  
demanded	  that	  physical	  development	  take	  priority	  and	  conform	  to	  their	  means.	  
Generally,	  these	  interests	  diverged	  from	  those	  of	  low-­‐income	  communities,	  which	  
hoped	  that	  even	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  program,	  job	  creation	  and	  human	  
development	  would	  continue	  to	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  government	  officials.	  In	  most	  cases,	  
it	  was	  not.	  While	  many	  urban	  administrations	  understood	  the	  vast	  limitations	  of	  the	  
grants	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  municipal	  political	  economies,	  including	  the	  ways	  
that	  physical	  development	  would	  not	  abate	  the	  growing	  isolation	  of	  low-­‐income	  city	  
residents	  from	  economic	  and	  social	  opportunities,	  they	  nevertheless	  sought	  action	  
that	  would	  reinvigorate	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  retain	  local	  revenue.	  City	  leaders,	  
however,	  remained	  optimistic	  that	  the	  act	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  deploy	  new	  
strategies	  for	  city	  revitalization.	  The	  lingering	  question	  now	  was:	  Who	  would	  
benefit	  from	  the	  new	  law?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  93rd	  United	  States	  Congress.	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  Act	  of	  1974.	  
Washington,	  D.C.:	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1974,9.	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CHAPTER	  TWO	  
Prioritizing	  the	  Private:	  
	  Low-­‐income	  Housing,	  Urban	  Triage,	  and	  Gentrification	  
	  
“Cutback	  planning	  will	  sometimes	  force	  planners	  into	  triage	  decisions,	  thinking	  about	  
who	  or	  what	  must	  be	  sacrificed	  so	  that	  other	  populations	  and	  functions	  of	  the	  city	  may	  





The	  ratification	  of	  Community	  Development	  Block	  Grants	  popularized	  an	  
urban	  revitalization	  strategy	  that	  suggested	  cities	  assume	  a	  method	  of	  pragmatic	  
planning	  following	  the	  loss	  of	  targeted	  antipoverty	  aid.	  New	  federal	  aid	  alone	  could	  
no	  longer	  buttress	  urban	  areas	  from	  the	  effects	  of	  white	  and	  capital	  flight,	  advocates	  
argued.	  Funding	  would	  never	  again	  be	  adequate	  to	  focus	  energy	  on	  the	  pathologies	  
of	  poverty	  and,	  thus,	  city	  leaders	  should	  direct	  the	  more	  flexible	  aid	  into	  
neighborhoods	  on	  the	  periphery	  of	  blight—areas	  where	  “treatment”	  would	  have	  
visible	  influence,	  attracting	  both	  middle-­‐class	  residents	  and	  private-­‐sector	  
investment	  back	  to	  the	  city.	  While	  some	  advocates	  hoped	  that	  treatment	  of	  this	  kind	  
would	  have	  a	  “ripple	  effect”—penetrating	  even	  the	  most	  impoverished	  of	  
neighborhoods—advocates	  offered	  little	  prescription	  of	  how	  that	  could	  occur.2	  	  
While	  cities	  across	  the	  country	  exercised	  this	  strategy	  with	  varying	  degrees,	  in	  New	  
Orleans	  it	  was	  most	  readily	  deployed	  through	  neighborhood	  housing	  initiatives.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Herbert	  J.	  Gans,	  "Planning	  for	  Declining	  and	  Poor	  Cities,"	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  
Institute	  of	  Planners	  41,	  no.	  5	  (1975),	  307.	  
	  
2	  Section	  7:	  Conclusions	  about	  Central	  City	  Area,	  New	  Orleans	  Office	  of	  the	  Mayor	  
Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Central	  Files	  1973-­‐1979,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	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By	  the	  early	  1970s,	  prior	  to	  the	  authorization	  of	  block	  grant	  funding,	  the	  city	  
began	  diverting	  resources	  into	  areas	  with	  significant	  homeownership	  and	  moderate	  
incomes	  to	  attract	  private	  investment	  and	  to	  deflect	  flight.	  While	  planners	  hoped	  
that	  their	  efforts	  could	  protect	  the	  neighborhood’s	  lower-­‐income	  families	  and	  root	  
surrounding	  areas	  with	  the	  same	  security,	  as	  the	  projects	  progressed,	  that	  seemed	  
more	  and	  more	  unlikely.	  Ultimately,	  city	  leadership	  sacrificed	  the	  goal	  of	  integrated	  
and	  fair	  community	  development	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  private-­‐sector	  
investment.	  	  	  
As	  this	  neighborhood	  revitalization	  strategy	  was	  predicated	  on	  these	  
interests,	  poverty	  neighborhoods	  did	  not	  receive	  the	  same	  treatment.	  Rather	  than	  
promote	  stability,	  this	  revitalization	  strategy	  disrupted	  poverty	  neighborhoods	  
through	  the	  same	  appeals	  to	  private-­‐sector	  involvement.	  Thus,	  without	  direct	  
antipoverty	  aid,	  the	  projects	  pursued	  by	  local	  officials	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  
circumscribing	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  they	  could	  advocate	  for	  decent	  and	  equitable	  
low-­‐income	  housing.	  	  	  
	  
Theorizing	  Public	  Improvement:	  Alternative	  Visions	  of	  Community	  Development	  and	  
the	  Downs	  Effect	  
	  
In	  late	  January	  1973,	  a	  City	  Planning	  Commission	  strategy	  review	  team	  
presented	  a	  community	  development	  proposal	  to	  the	  City	  Council.	  The	  team	  
underscored	  the	  unlikelihood	  that	  aid	  for	  antipoverty	  work	  would	  be	  renewed.	  To	  
continue	  to	  work	  in	  areas	  of	  rapid	  decline	  was,	  therefore,	  shortsighted.	  	  
Underscoring	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Nixon	  administration,	  the	  team	  stressed	  that	  
reliance	  on	  the	  national	  government	  to	  deliver	  the	  aid	  necessary	  to	  begin	  rebuilding	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the	  city	  through	  its	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods	  would	  lead	  to	  failure.	  Instead,	  they	  
proposed	  launching	  a	  pilot	  program	  that	  would	  begin	  correcting	  defects	  in	  
neighborhoods	  at	  the	  “beginning	  stages	  of	  decline.”3	  Rather	  than	  allow	  these	  areas,	  
vulnerable	  to	  the	  socioeconomic	  shifts	  around	  them,	  to	  become	  blighted,	  the	  team	  
argued	  that	  with	  strategic	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  and	  an	  influx	  of	  funding,	  
these	  areas	  could	  be	  reconfigured	  as	  assets	  within	  a	  broader	  urban	  revitalization.	  
Proposing	  to	  use	  limited	  public	  funding	  to	  attract	  private	  investment,	  the	  team	  
explained	  that	  the	  project	  would	  work	  within	  neighborhoods	  in	  which	  “the	  
treatment	  will	  have	  the	  greatest	  effect.”4	  Planners	  assured	  the	  council	  that	  effects	  
would	  trickle	  down	  into	  more	  dilapidated	  areas.5	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3Report,	  Staff	  Proposal	  for	  Demonstration	  Project,	  June	  6th,	  1972,	  “An	  Environmental	  
Approach	  to	  Housing.”	  City	  Planning	  Commission,	  Personal	  Archives	  of	  Tom	  Taylor,	  in	  
possession	  of	  the	  author.	  
	  
4	  Tom	  Taylor.	  Proposal	  for	  the	  Public	  Improvement	  Project.	  1973,	  Unprocessed	  
personal	  collection	  of	  Tom	  Taylor,	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  author.	  New	  York,	  NY.	  	  
	  
5	  In	  early	  1972,	  the	  Texas-­‐based	  real	  estate	  firm	  of	  Carter	  and	  Burgess	  Inc.	  released	  
the	  results	  of	  a	  city-­‐commissioned	  study	  to	  the	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  board	  and	  
the	  City	  Council	  that	  painted	  a	  discouraging	  portrait	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  efforts	  in	  the	  three	  
New	  Orleans	  Model	  Cities	  neighborhoods—Central	  City,	  Desire-­‐Florida,	  and	  the	  Lower	  
Ninth	  Ward—to	  improve	  low-­‐income	  housing.	  The	  degree	  of	  decay	  was	  astounding,	  the	  
firm	  reported.	  More	  than	  half	  of	  the	  residential	  structures	  in	  the	  Central	  City	  area	  were	  
substandard.	  The	  area,	  encompassing	  some	  60	  acres	  just	  west	  of	  the	  Central	  Business	  
District,	  was	  more	  than	  98	  percent	  black	  and	  an	  average	  of	  104	  people	  lived	  on	  each	  acre	  of	  
land.	  Houses	  were	  literally	  falling	  down	  as	  shoddily	  constructed	  roofs	  caved	  into	  the	  thin	  
sheetrock	  separating	  overcrowded	  apartments.	  Even	  so,	  the	  extreme	  overcrowding	  of	  
Central	  City	  did	  not	  compare	  to	  that	  of	  the	  Desire-­‐Florida	  area,	  the	  planners	  continued.	  In	  
Desire,	  a	  neighborhood	  with	  the	  highest	  concentration	  of	  public	  housing	  in	  all	  of	  New	  
Orleans,	  nearly	  23,000	  people	  resided	  in	  an	  area	  of	  less	  than	  1.3	  square	  miles.	  More	  than	  
half	  of	  Desire	  residents	  lived	  in	  dilapidated	  public	  housing	  projects.	  The	  firm	  suggested	  that	  
the	  problems	  in	  the	  three	  Model	  Cities	  neighborhoods	  were	  insurmountable	  without	  an	  
extreme	  influx	  of	  funding.	  Carter	  and	  Burgess	  estimated	  that	  it	  would	  take	  more	  than	  $180	  
million	  of	  dedicated	  funding	  as	  well	  as	  15	  years	  of	  professional	  planning	  and	  groundwork	  to	  
address	  the	  multitude	  of	  issues	  facing	  the	  three	  impoverished	  areas.	  See	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  
"Two	  Blight	  Areas	  Need	  180	  Million,	  15	  years,"	  September	  29,	  1972,	  8.	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The	  strategy	  review	  team	  had	  identified	  neighborhoods	  that	  could	  
realistically	  respond	  to	  treatment:	  areas	  that	  had	  high	  homeownership	  compared	  to	  
median	  income,	  relative	  community	  cohesion,	  and	  retained	  houses	  that,	  despite	  
being	  rundown,	  were	  architecturally	  sound	  (if	  not	  historic).	  A	  measure	  of	  stability	  
was	  essential.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  strategy	  review	  team	  suggested	  that	  to	  include	  
neighboring	  public	  housing	  projects	  in	  the	  pilot	  would	  defeat	  the	  possibility	  of	  
fostering	  change	  on	  the	  very	  limited	  budget.	  In	  fact,	  the	  planners	  suggested	  that	  in	  
order	  to	  strengthen	  the	  security	  of	  these	  declining	  areas	  and	  promote	  investment	  
interest,	  it	  would	  be	  important	  to	  remove	  public	  housing	  of	  any	  sort	  from	  the	  areas	  
altogether.6	  Pilot	  neighborhoods	  could	  be	  models	  for	  the	  future	  of	  revitalization,	  but	  
only	  with	  the	  right	  conditions.	  	  
The	  philosophy	  that	  urban	  decline	  could	  only	  be	  alleviated	  through	  
renovating	  areas	  in	  mild	  distress	  had	  become	  popular	  in	  planning	  rhetoric	  by	  the	  
early	  1970s.	  While	  similar	  arguments	  predated	  this	  era—the	  1954	  Housing	  Act	  
included	  provisions	  for	  “conservation	  and	  rehabilitation”	  of	  areas	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
decline—the	  uniform	  acceptance	  of	  the	  utility	  in	  this	  approach	  coalesced	  in	  
response	  to	  the	  attacks	  on	  antipoverty	  aid.7	  Amid	  increasing	  anxiety	  over	  recession,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  One	  of	  the	  neighborhoods	  chosen	  for	  the	  initial	  project,	  Irish	  Channel,	  had	  rejected	  
the	  demolition	  of	  substandard	  housing	  in	  the	  area	  to	  make	  room	  for	  200	  scattered	  site	  
public	  housing	  units	  in	  1969.	  Residents	  were	  adamant	  that	  such	  a	  project	  would	  destroy	  the	  
framework	  for	  their	  neighborhood	  and	  utilized	  the	  power	  of	  close	  ties	  to	  political	  officials.	  	  
Attending	  a	  meeting	  of	  local	  community	  leaders,	  Louisiana	  State	  Senator	  Fritz	  Windhorst	  
reaffirmed	  the	  idea	  that	  “this	  is	  not	  the	  area	  for	  such	  a	  project.”	  See	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  
“Comiskey	  Lauds	  Firm	  Stand,”	  August	  3,	  1969,	  21.	  
	  
7	  Colin	  Gordon,	  “Blighting	  the	  Way:	  Urban	  Renewal,	  Economic	  Development	  and	  the	  
Elusive	  Definition	  of	  Blight.”	  Fordham	  University	  Law	  Journal.	  31	  (2003),	  328.	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aid	  reductions,	  and	  what	  local	  administrators	  believed	  was	  an	  assertion	  by	  the	  
federal	  government	  that	  no	  funding	  would	  be	  permanent,	  mayors	  felt	  compelled	  to	  
pursue	  strategies	  that	  would	  maximize	  benefit	  and	  minimize	  cost.	  	  
The	  blueprint	  for	  this	  approach	  was	  associated	  with	  the	  Chicago-­‐based	  Real	  
Estate	  Development	  Corporation	  (RERC),	  a	  research	  and	  planning	  firm	  directed	  by	  
Anthony	  Downs.8	  Responding	  to	  the	  vast	  structural	  and	  economic	  ruptures	  in	  cities,	  
Downs’s	  theory	  of	  urban	  renewal	  derived	  from	  an	  understanding	  that	  cities,	  like	  the	  
people	  that	  lived	  within	  them,	  had	  a	  natural	  life	  cycle.	  While	  it	  was	  not	  inevitable	  
that	  neighborhoods	  would	  "die,"	  Downs	  asserted	  that	  without	  planned	  intervention	  
at	  early	  moments	  in	  the	  process	  of	  decline,	  those	  areas	  would	  fall	  into	  a	  state	  of	  
inevitable	  dilapidation	  and	  blight.	  	  
Classifying	  neighborhoods	  on	  a	  scale	  ranging	  from	  “Healthy”	  to	  
“Abandonment,”	  with	  various	  stages	  of	  decline	  in	  between,	  Downs	  prescribed	  a	  
series	  of	  neighborhood-­‐specific	  policy	  measures	  capable	  of	  utilizing	  limited	  
resources	  for	  broad	  revitalization.	  The	  RERC	  model	  described	  healthy	  
neighborhoods	  as	  communities	  of	  mainly	  white,	  middle-­‐upper-­‐class	  homeowners	  
who	  took	  pride	  in	  their	  homes	  and	  held	  the	  city	  accountable	  for	  providing	  quality	  
social	  services.9	  On	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  were	  “Accelerating	  Decline”	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  RERC	  director	  Anthony	  Downs	  was	  a	  prominent	  economist	  and	  real	  estate	  expert.	  
After	  being	  appointed	  to	  President	  Johnson’s	  National	  Commission	  on	  Urban	  Problems	  in	  
1967,	  he	  became	  an	  influential	  voice	  in	  social	  policy	  as	  well,	  developing	  urban	  policy	  
platforms	  for	  both	  the	  Johnson	  and	  Nixon	  administrations.	  Indeed,	  HUD	  frequently	  used	  the	  
RERC	  to	  write	  position	  papers	  and	  policy	  directives	  for	  its	  programs.	  	  
	  
9	  See	  scale	  on	  page	  102.	  Derived	  from	  Real	  Estate	  Research	  Corporation,	  The	  
Dynamics	  of	  Neighborhood	  Change,	  Prepared	  for	  the	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Development	  and	  
Research	  of	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Affairs	  (Washington:	  Government	  
	  
	   100	  
“Abandoned”	  neighborhoods.10	  These	  communities	  were	  classified	  as	  majority	  
minority,	  often	  with	  large	  numbers	  of	  female-­‐headed	  households	  and	  high	  
unemployment	  rates	  among	  men.	  When	  neighborhoods	  reached	  these	  final	  stages,	  
crime	  and	  vandalism	  rose,	  while	  property	  values	  fell,	  banks	  divested,	  and	  lending	  
institutions	  denied	  mortgages	  and	  refinancing.11	  As	  posited	  by	  the	  RERC,	  these	  
cycles	  could	  be	  reversed	  at	  critical	  moments	  or,	  if	  a	  lack	  of	  funding	  prohibited	  such	  
intervention,	  neighborhoods	  could	  be	  abandoned,	  upon	  which	  clearance	  could	  lead	  








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Printing	  Office,	  1975),	  23.	  
	  
10	  In	  Opening	  up	  the	  Suburbs:	  An	  Urban	  Strategy	  for	  America,	  Downs	  argues	  that	  
providing	  means	  by	  which	  low-­‐income	  urban	  residents	  could	  gain	  proximity	  (although	  not	  
advocating	  for	  fully	  mixed-­‐income	  communities)	  to	  their	  suburban	  counterparts,	  thus	  
allowing	  them	  access	  to	  better	  schools,	  jobs,	  and	  resources,	  would	  provide	  new	  channels	  for	  
resident	  mobility.	  Nevertheless,	  he	  refuses	  to	  advocate	  for	  fully	  integrated	  communities,	  
instead	  offering	  that	  these	  communities	  could	  remain	  stable	  only	  if	  the	  threshold	  of	  poor,	  
black	  residents	  was	  set	  at	  25	  percent.	  Thus,	  even	  as	  he	  promotes	  integration,	  he	  maintains	  a	  
model	  where	  black,	  poor	  residents	  are	  incapable	  of	  creating	  stable	  neighborhoods.	  See	  
Anthony	  Downs,	  Opening	  up	  the	  Suburbs:	  An	  Urban	  Strategy	  for	  America	  (New	  Haven,	  CT:	  
Yale	  University	  Press,	  1975).	  
	  
11	  Real	  Estate	  Research	  Corporation,	  Recommendations	  for	  Community	  Development	  
Planning,	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1974),	  II-­‐14.	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HEALTHY	   Homogenous	  (usually	  white),	  owner-­‐occupied,	  socially	  cohesive,	  
efficient	  public	  services,	  private	  services,	  high	  levels	  of	  investment,	  
stable	  economy.	  
INCIPIENT	  DECLINE	   Experiencing	  residential	  flight,	  aging	  housing	  stock	  and	  residents,	  
reluctance	  of	  banks	  to	  loan,	  declining	  business	  patronage.	  
CLEARLY	  
DECLINING	  
Moderate-­‐	  and	  low-­‐income	  residents,	  welfare	  population,	  racially	  




Low-­‐income	  residents	  of	  color,	  welfare	  population,	  absentee	  
landlords,	  rising	  crime	  rates,	  overcrowding,	  substandard	  housing,	  
lack	  of	  sanitation,	  poor	  public	  schools,	  concentrated	  poverty.	  
ABANDONED	   Poverty	  population,	  buildings	  dilapidated	  or	  abandoned,	  crime	  is	  
high,	  city	  services	  are	  minimal,	  presence	  of	  public	  housing.	  	  
	  
Source:	  Real	  Estate	  Research	  Corporation,	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Neighborhood	  Change,	  
Prepared	  for	  the	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Development	  and	  Research	  of	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  
Housing	  and	  Urban	  Affairs	  (Washington:	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1975).	  
	  
	  
At	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  model	  was	  the	  use	  of	  "triage	  planning."	  The	  idea	  was	  
derived	  from	  the	  practice	  by	  World	  War	  II	  Army	  medics	  of	  making	  split-­‐second	  
decisions	  about	  which	  patients	  they	  could	  save	  and	  which,	  despite	  attention,	  would	  
die.12	  RERC	  and	  other	  advocates	  of	  “triage	  planning”	  argued	  that	  dwindling	  federal	  
funds	  necessitated	  an	  aggressive	  refocusing	  of	  priorities.13	  In	  turn,	  with	  the	  
philosophy	  behind	  new	  federal	  aid	  shifting	  to	  support	  primarily	  "brick	  and	  mortar"	  
community	  development,	  the	  RERC’s	  model	  of	  neighborhood	  reinvestment	  sought	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Nancy	  Kleniewski,	  "Triage	  and	  Urban	  Planning:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  Philadelphia,"	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Urban	  and	  Regional	  Research	  10,	  no.	  4	  (1986),	  564.	  See	  also	  Real	  
Estate	  Research	  Corporation,	  Recommendations	  for	  Community	  Development	  Planning,	  
(Washington,	  D.C.:	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1974).	  
	  
13	  Kleniewski,	  "Triage	  and	  Urban	  Planning:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  Philadelphia,"	  563.	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to	  target	  urban	  areas	  where	  renewal	  of	  this	  sort	  would	  have	  rewarding	  effects,	  most	  
tangibly,	  gentrification.14	  Downs	  asserted	  that	  city	  revitalization	  depended	  not	  on	  
the	  overwhelming	  task	  of	  fixing	  the	  whole	  city,	  as	  many	  understood	  the	  goal	  of	  
revenue	  sharing	  to	  be,	  but	  in	  distinguishing	  salvageable	  urban	  zones	  and	  tailoring	  
comprehensive	  treatment	  to	  their	  renewal.	  The	  “imperfect	  understanding”	  of	  
neighborhood	  development	  with	  which	  local	  officials	  had	  attempted	  to	  combat	  
poverty	  had	  created	  programs	  that	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  find	  in	  cities	  those	  areas	  that	  
could	  be	  saved.15	  	  	  
Despite	  the	  complex	  processes	  that	  RERC	  ascribed	  to	  neighborhood	  
deterioration,	  the	  model	  used	  surface	  causality	  to	  chart	  the	  path	  toward	  
abandonment.	  RERC	  noted	  that	  neighborhoods	  could	  change	  as	  a	  result	  of	  social	  or	  
economic	  shifts—though	  this	  was	  largely	  measured	  by	  visible	  impact—but	  said	  
little	  about	  how	  new	  economic	  development	  efforts	  could	  be	  established	  to	  address	  
the	  socioeconomic	  needs	  of	  residents	  who	  remained.	  Downs’s	  staff	  acknowledged	  
how	  fears	  of	  integration	  drove	  white	  flight	  and	  the	  parallel	  abandonment	  of	  middle-­‐
class	  urban	  neighborhoods,	  but	  structured	  planning	  responses	  around	  efforts	  to	  
encourage	  their	  return.	  The	  model	  was	  entirely	  silent	  on	  addressing	  the	  structural	  
impediments	  to	  such	  renovation	  in	  lower-­‐income	  areas.	  To	  take	  the	  RERC	  scale	  at	  
its	  “word,”	  cities	  like	  New	  Orleans,	  with	  a	  growing	  black	  majority,	  could	  never	  again	  
become	  healthy	  on	  their	  own.	  The	  natural	  response	  then	  was	  to	  identify	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Ibid.	  
	  
15	  Real	  Estate	  Research	  Corporation,	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Neighborhood	  Change,	  
Prepared	  for	  the	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Development	  and	  Research	  of	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  
Housing	  and	  Urban	  Affairs	  (Washington:	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1975),	  1.	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neighborhoods	  ripe	  for	  uplift	  that	  could	  attract	  middle-­‐class,	  white	  residents	  back	  to	  
the	  city.	  Thus,	  a	  healthy	  neighborhood	  was	  synonymous	  with	  a	  white	  neighborhood.	  	  	  
While	  the	  "life	  cycle"	  theory	  received	  much	  public	  opposition,	  Downs’s	  
outlook	  permeated	  both	  federal	  and	  local	  policy	  decisions	  around	  poverty	  
planning.16	  Most	  cities	  did	  not	  actively	  call	  their	  planning	  triage,	  but	  the	  distinctions	  
made	  between	  planning	  strategies	  for	  poverty	  neighborhoods	  and	  those	  designed	  
for	  more	  moderate-­‐income	  neighborhoods	  carried	  with	  them	  the	  language	  and	  
action	  of	  this	  theory.	  While	  the	  theory	  suggested	  that	  work	  within	  former	  
antipoverty	  neighborhoods	  was	  no	  longer	  viable	  due	  to	  cuts	  in	  federal	  aid,	  the	  
political	  feasibility	  of	  actually	  discontinuing	  those	  efforts	  was	  unlikely,	  and	  often	  
unwanted,	  for	  political	  leadership.17	  However,	  efforts	  through	  New	  Orleans’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  By	  1974,	  RERC	  wrote	  a	  series	  of	  reports	  commissioned	  by	  HUD	  to	  explore	  
implementation	  strategies	  for	  the	  impending	  policy	  shift	  facilitated	  by	  block	  grant	  funding.	  	  
The	  report	  emphasized	  the	  need	  for	  flexible	  funding:	  Funding	  should	  be	  able	  to	  be	  used	  by	  
the	  city	  for	  the	  priorities	  it	  determined;	  there	  should	  not	  be	  a	  fixed	  percentage	  used	  in	  
specific	  poverty	  neighborhoods;	  and	  funds,	  instead,	  should	  be	  used	  citywide.	  Downs	  
asserted	  that	  stopping	  poverty	  also	  meant	  creating	  incentives	  to	  stay	  for	  those	  who	  could	  
leave,	  thus	  stimulating	  downtown	  business	  districts	  or	  less-­‐in-­‐need	  neighborhoods.	  	  
Emphasizing	  that	  historic	  preservation	  was	  an	  important	  part	  of	  a	  city’s	  framework,	  RERC	  
defined	  a	  much	  broader	  purpose	  for	  the	  block	  grants.	  Despite	  opposition,	  the	  final	  act	  
lacked	  stipulations	  of	  where	  the	  money	  should	  be	  spent,	  reinforcing	  the	  centrality	  of	  triage	  
planning	  within	  future	  block	  grant	  planning.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  impact,	  see	  John	  T.	  
Metzger’s	  “Planned	  Abandonment:	  The	  Neighborhood	  Cycle	  Theory	  and	  National	  Urban	  
Policy,”	  Housing	  Policy	  Debate,	  11	  (1),	  2000;	  and	  a	  specific	  case	  study	  of	  how	  Rochester,	  
N.Y.,	  employed	  RERC	  triage	  methods,	  see	  Sarah	  F.	  Liebschutz,	  “Neighborhood	  Conservation:	  
Political	  Choices	  under	  the	  Community	  Development	  Program,”	  Publius	  13.2	  (1983)	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  23-­‐37.	  
	  
17	  More	  recently,	  debates	  have	  centered	  on	  whether	  the	  promotion	  of	  such	  a	  theory	  
is	  the	  reason	  behind	  the	  demise	  of	  urban	  stability	  or	  its	  offshoot.	  A	  whole	  issue	  of	  the	  
journal	  Housing	  Policy	  Debate	  revolved	  around	  the	  discussion	  of	  this	  issue.	  While	  the	  main	  
commenter,	  John	  T.	  Metzger,	  argues	  that	  triage	  planning	  became	  central	  to	  the	  way	  that	  
cities	  grappled	  with	  urban	  poverty—often	  just	  ignoring	  it	  entirely—other	  social	  scientists	  
oppose	  that	  theory.	  Opposition	  has	  seen	  “life	  cycle”	  theory	  as	  only	  one	  mechanism	  in	  a	  
larger	  set	  of	  planning	  assumptions	  that	  include	  institutionalized	  racism,	  the	  need	  to	  
promote	  economic	  growth,	  already	  existent	  trends	  toward	  suburbia,	  etc.	  While	  I	  certainly	  
	  
	   104	  
improvement	  model	  did	  conform	  to	  the	  model	  of	  "modified	  triage"	  proposed	  by	  
RERC	  and	  its	  success	  affirmed	  the	  belief	  that	  only	  projects	  capable	  of	  visible	  results	  
and	  middle-­‐class	  appeal	  would	  attract	  the	  private	  investment	  necessary	  to	  revitalize	  
cities.18	  	  	  
	  
Public	  Improvement	  is	  NOT	  Urban	  Renewal	  
The	  proposed	  Public	  Improvement	  Projects	  (PIPs)	  represented	  an	  early	  
attempt	  by	  the	  New	  Orleans	  city	  government	  to	  restructure	  local	  community	  
development	  efforts	  around	  planning	  strategies	  of	  triage.	  As	  the	  program's	  
innovator,	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  planner	  Tom	  Taylor	  envisioned	  the	  
projects.	  The	  goal	  of	  the	  pilot	  program	  was	  fairly	  modest,	  including	  broad	  
neighborhood	  cleanup	  that	  he	  believed	  could	  attract	  private-­‐sector	  investment.	  In	  
comparison	  to	  the	  millions	  of	  dollars	  expended	  in	  poverty	  neighborhoods	  through	  
previous	  antipoverty	  programs,	  the	  projects'	  $250,000	  budget	  was	  a	  pittance.	  
However,	  the	  limited	  funding	  was	  deceiving	  in	  that	  the	  PIPs	  required	  a	  substantial	  
influx	  of	  city	  resources	  in	  addition	  to	  financial	  contributions.	  
Acknowledging	  that	  service	  delivery	  in	  neighborhoods	  experiencing	  decline	  
was	  inadequate,	  the	  strategy	  review	  team	  for	  the	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  
determined	  that	  it	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  lack	  of	  quality	  housing	  that	  encouraged	  flight;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
do	  not	  believe	  that	  RERC’s	  model	  singlehandedly	  charted	  the	  way	  cities	  pursued	  renewal	  
efforts,	  through	  my	  research	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  local	  officials	  in	  New	  Orleans	  and	  elsewhere	  
were	  not	  only	  aware	  of	  this	  approach,	  but	  welcomed	  it	  as	  a	  means	  to	  combat	  urban	  
deterioration.	  To	  read	  the	  whole	  of	  this	  debate,	  see	  Housing	  Policy	  Debate	  11,	  no.	  1	  (2000).	  
	  
18	  Peter	  Marcuse,	  Peter	  Medoff,	  and	  Andrea	  Pereira,	  "Triage	  as	  Urban	  Policy,"	  Social	  
Policy	  12,	  no.	  3	  (1982),	  34.	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rather,	  residents	  in	  declining	  areas	  perceived	  an	  overall	  atmosphere—litter	  on	  
sidewalks,	  potholes,	  a	  lack	  of	  trees—that	  led	  those	  with	  options	  to	  depart.	  The	  
review	  team	  emphasized	  that	  the	  program's	  success	  was	  contingent	  on	  the	  
provision	  that	  city	  departments	  would	  provide	  services	  beyond	  the	  status	  quo.	  
Though	  the	  program	  had	  yet	  to	  be	  approved,	  the	  department	  chairs	  of	  the	  Sewerage	  
and	  Water	  Board,	  the	  Sanitation	  Department,	  and	  the	  Police	  Department	  
enthusiastically	  agreed	  to	  do	  just	  that.	  Appropriating	  the	  language	  of	  the	  RERC,	  the	  
proposal	  sought	  to	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  “arresting	  this	  pattern	  before	  the	  area	  becomes	  
so	  deteriorated	  that	  extensive	  renewal	  is	  required.”19	  	  	  
The	  strategy	  review	  team	  proposed	  two	  neighborhoods	  suffering	  from	  what	  
it	  determined	  to	  be	  mild	  decline.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  Irish	  Channel,	  a	  historically	  white	  
neighborhood	  that	  derived	  its	  name	  from	  the	  Irish	  immigrants	  who	  settled	  there	  
more	  than	  100	  years	  before.	  The	  relatively	  cohesive	  community	  was	  traditionally	  
working	  class;	  its	  residents	  had	  been	  single-­‐family	  homeowners	  of	  small	  shotgun-­‐
style	  houses	  and	  cottages.	  Yet,	  between	  1960	  and	  1970,	  the	  area	  had	  lost	  15	  percent	  
of	  its	  population	  and	  14	  percent	  of	  its	  homeownership	  while	  rental	  vacancies	  had	  
nearly	  doubled.	  Racial	  demographics	  were	  also	  changing.	  In	  the	  ten	  years	  prior,	  the	  
percentage	  of	  black	  residents	  had	  risen	  by	  50	  percent.20	  Despite	  what	  planners	  saw	  
as	  clear	  signs	  of	  the	  area’s	  distress,	  the	  neighborhood’s	  median	  family	  income	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Report,	  “Reasons	  for	  Selection	  of	  the	  Public	  Improvement	  Project	  Area,	  prepared	  
by	  the	  City	  Planning	  Commission”;	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  CG-­‐CIA	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency,	  
Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Central	  Files	  1973-­‐1979,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  
New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  	  
	  
20	  The	  area	  remained	  over	  70	  percent	  white.	  See	  Real	  Estate	  Research	  Corporation,	  
Neighborhood	  Preservation:	  A	  Catalogue	  of	  Local	  Programs,	  US	  Department	  of	  Housing	  and	  
Urban	  Development	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Office	  of	  Policy	  and	  Research,	  1975),	  107.	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$6,300	  was	  higher	  than	  in	  all	  poverty	  areas,	  where	  income	  averaged	  $4,500.21	  Irish	  
Channel,	  bounded	  on	  one	  side	  by	  the	  St.	  Thomas	  Projects	  and	  on	  the	  other	  by	  the	  
affluent	  Garden	  District,	  was	  a	  deteriorating	  buffer	  zone	  between	  poverty	  and	  
opulence.	  With	  strong	  community	  organizations	  already	  in	  place,	  the	  neighborhood	  
provided	  a	  perfect	  pilot	  study	  for	  the	  public	  improvement	  model	  of	  revitalization.22	  
Fig.	  2:2	  Map	  of	  Irish	  Channel	  	  
	  
Source:	  Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Community	  Data	  Center,	  2002.	  
www.gnocdc.org	  
	  
The	  second	  neighborhood	  was	  the	  Broadmoor	  section	  of	  Uptown,	  and	  the	  
home	  of	  Mayor	  Landrieu.	  Broadmoor	  consisted	  of	  three	  very	  distinct	  communities:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Memo,	  Francis	  Keevers	  to	  Richard	  Kernion,	  “Interim	  Report	  on	  the	  Public	  
Improvement	  Programs	  I	  and	  II”;	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  CG-­‐CDI-­‐REH	  Housing	  Rehabilitation,	  Office	  
of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Central	  Files	  1973-­‐1979,	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans	  Archives,	  New	  
Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
22	  The	  neighborhood	  was,	  not	  coincidentally,	  also	  home	  to	  the	  project’s	  head	  
planner,	  Tom	  Taylor.	  The	  project	  carried	  with	  it	  the	  planner’s	  ideas	  of	  planning	  for	  the	  
people,	  communalism,	  and	  cooperation.	  From	  the	  project’s	  design,	  the	  planning	  team	  had	  
already	  linked	  shifting	  demographics	  with	  the	  process	  of	  deterioration.	  In	  operating	  from	  
that	  preconception,	  instead	  of	  one	  that	  sought	  to	  link	  housing	  with	  the	  larger	  political	  
economy,	  the	  planner’s	  vision	  often	  excluded	  the	  lowest-­‐income	  residents	  of	  the	  area	  from	  
the	  “fix.”	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middle-­‐class	  white	  homeowners,	  black	  homeowners,	  and	  a	  single	  census	  tract	  of	  
extremely	  poor	  black	  residents.	  The	  area	  experienced	  dramatic	  demographic	  shifts	  
from	  1960	  to	  1970	  due	  in	  part	  to	  a	  blockbusting	  campaign	  by	  real	  estate	  agents.23	  	  
While	  the	  overall	  population	  remained	  consistent,	  the	  number	  of	  black	  residents	  
increased	  more	  than	  55	  percent,	  revealing	  a	  significant	  out-­‐migration	  of	  white	  
residents.	  As	  fewer	  residents	  owned	  their	  own	  homes	  and	  fewer	  property	  owners	  
lived	  in	  the	  area,	  Broadmoor	  experienced	  a	  quick	  deterioration	  in	  the	  area’s	  housing	  
conditions.	  Broadmoor,	  in	  spite	  of	  its	  shifting	  demographics,	  maintained	  a	  strong	  
civic	  presence	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  1930s.24	  By	  the	  1970s,	  the	  Broadmoor	  
Improvement	  Association	  was	  formally	  incorporated	  and	  vocal	  leadership	  sought	  to	  







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  The	  area	  sued	  US	  Realty	  for	  illegal	  redlining	  under	  the	  1968	  Fair	  Housing	  Act.	  The	  
suit	  represented	  one	  of	  the	  first	  successful	  attempts	  in	  the	  South	  to	  petition	  the	  state	  to	  
uphold	  fair	  housing.	  See	  “Keeping	  the	  Best	  of	  Broadmoor,”	  Figaro,	  October	  1,	  1979,	  2.	  See	  
also	  Site	  Selection	  Committee	  Progress	  Report,	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  Neighborhood	  Housing	  Services,	  
Human	  Relations	  Committee;	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  
Louisiana.	  
	  
24	  Site	  Selection	  Committee	  Progress	  Report,	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  Neighborhood	  Housing	  








Fig.	  2-­‐3:	  Map	  of	  Broadmoor	  
	  
Source:	  Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Community	  Data	  Center,	  
www.gnocdc.org	  
	  
The	  PIP	  proposal	  was	  not,	  however,	  universally	  applauded.	  The	  
improvement	  agency's	  director,	  Francis	  P.	  Keevers,25	  questioned	  the	  morality	  of	  
working	  within	  low-­‐priority	  zones	  of	  the	  city	  when	  areas	  with	  serious	  dilapidation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Francis	  P.	  Keevers	  was	  not	  a	  New	  Orleans	  native,	  unlike	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  new	  
administration.	  Born	  in	  Chicago,	  Keevers	  graduated	  from	  Georgetown	  University,	  and	  
moved	  into	  a	  planning	  position	  in	  the	  South	  Central	  Connecticut	  planning	  division.	  He	  was	  
34	  when	  he	  was	  invited	  to	  New	  Orleans	  to	  fill	  a	  position	  as	  a	  senior	  planner	  for	  the	  regional	  
planning	  center.	  He	  believed	  deeply	  that	  growing	  a	  diverse	  economy	  and	  developing	  mass	  
public	  services	  could	  reverse	  poverty	  trends.	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  "Two	  Blight	  Areas	  Need	  180	  
Million,	  15	  years,"	  September	  29,	  1972,	  8.	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and	  extreme	  poverty	  were	  to	  be	  cut	  off	  from	  vital	  federal	  funding.26	  The	  idea	  of	  
beginning	  renewal	  efforts	  in	  an	  area	  whose	  “priority	  for	  such	  treatment	  has	  not	  
been	  established”	  only	  showed	  how	  the	  city	  administration	  was	  plagued	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  
priorities,	  particularly	  concerning	  the	  livelihood	  of	  poor	  people,	  Keevers	  
admonished.27	  Responding	  to	  rumors	  that	  the	  pilot	  program	  would	  receive	  funding	  
through	  urban	  renewal,	  the	  director	  cautioned	  that	  amid	  Nixon’s	  housing	  
moratorium,	  further	  diluting	  his	  agency’s	  capacity	  to	  service	  low-­‐income	  
neighborhoods	  was	  entirely	  irresponsible.28	  	  
Keevers	  was	  not	  the	  only	  one	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  program.	  The	  anxiety	  of	  
lower-­‐income	  Irish	  Channel	  residents	  emerged	  early	  on	  in	  discussions	  with	  
planners.	  The	  design	  of	  the	  project	  included	  little	  community	  participation	  outside	  
of	  traditional	  (and	  largely	  white)	  networks,	  leaving	  some	  residents	  with	  scant	  
security	  as	  to	  how	  their	  opinions	  would	  be	  considered.	  Residents	  questioned	  how	  a	  
community-­‐based	  project	  could	  function	  without	  appealing	  to	  a	  broader	  vision	  of	  
their	  needs.	  While	  the	  program	  was	  geared	  toward	  retaining	  homeowners,	  75	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  New	  Orleans’s	  chief	  administrative	  officer,	  Richard	  Kernion,	  announced	  that	  with	  
the	  moratorium	  on	  HUD	  program	  funds	  for	  Model	  Cities,	  urban	  renewal,	  open	  space	  and	  
land,	  among	  other	  cutbacks,	  the	  city	  could	  end	  the	  next	  fiscal	  quarter	  with	  a	  net	  loss	  of	  $10	  
million.	  The	  budget	  for	  the	  city’s	  antipoverty	  agency,	  Total	  Community	  Action	  (TCA),	  would	  
be	  cut	  from	  $13	  million	  to	  $4	  million;	  the	  New	  Orleans	  Housing	  Authority	  would	  operate	  at	  
the	  bare	  minimum	  of	  services	  and	  the	  improvement	  agency	  would	  need	  to	  operate	  on	  less	  
than	  $1.8	  million	  in	  the	  three	  Model	  Cities	  neighborhoods.	  See	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “25	  Pct	  of	  
the	  City’s	  Federal	  Funding	  is	  Cut	  by	  Budget,”	  February	  29,	  1973,	  8.	  
	  
27	  Memo,	  Francis	  Keevers	  to	  Strategy	  Review	  Team,	  February	  22,	  1973,	  Box	  8,	  
Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  1971-­‐1973,	  Moon	  Landrieu	  Collection,	  Loyola	  University	  
Libraries,	  Loyola	  University,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
28	  Memo,	  Francis	  Keevers	  to	  Strategy	  Review	  Team,	  February	  22,	  1973,	  Box	  8,	  
Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  1971-­‐1973,	  Moon	  Landrieu	  Collection,	  Loyola	  University	  
Libraries,	  Loyola	  University,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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percent	  of	  area	  residents	  were	  actually	  renters.	  And	  nearly	  all	  of	  the	  homeowners	  in	  
the	  Irish	  Channel—85	  percent	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s—were	  white.29	  The	  “community-­‐
based	  approach”	  of	  planners,	  residents	  noted,	  was	  ultimately	  centered	  on	  a	  much	  
smaller	  group	  of	  residents	  than	  the	  area	  boasted.30	  For	  low-­‐income	  black	  residents,	  
the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  adjoining	  St.	  Thomas	  homes	  projects	  induced	  suspicion	  that	  the	  
project’s	  ultimate	  goal	  was,	  in	  fact,	  their	  removal.31	  	  The	  fate	  of	  those	  who	  did	  not	  
conform	  to	  that	  vision	  remained	  vulnerable,	  residents	  felt.	  	  	  
	  
Hardware	  or	  People:	  Differing	  strategies	  for	  development	  
The	  misgivings	  of	  Irish	  Channel	  residents	  that	  urban	  revitalization	  would	  be	  
constituted	  through	  exclusion	  seemed	  to	  be	  confirmed	  by	  the	  very	  different	  
treatment	  proposed	  for	  an	  urban	  renewal	  area,	  Central	  City,	  which	  sat	  adjacent	  to	  
both	  pilot	  sites.	  In	  response	  to	  freezes	  on	  urban	  renewal	  project	  funding	  and	  the	  
introduction	  of	  block	  grant	  legislation,	  the	  improvement	  agency	  concluded	  that	  
efforts	  devoted	  to	  planning	  for	  major	  project	  treatment	  would	  be	  futile.”32	  Without	  
targeted	  funds	  for	  job	  creation	  and	  low-­‐income	  housing	  production,	  officials	  would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  US	  Census	  of	  Population	  and	  Housing,	  1970:	  “Housing	  Characteristics:	  Louisiana.”	  
(Washington:	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1971).	  
	  
30	  Real	  Estate	  Research	  Corporation,	  Neighborhood	  Preservation:	  A	  Catalogue	  of	  
Local	  Programs,	  US	  Department	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  




32	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency,	  “Conclusions	  about	  Central	  City	  Area,	  1974,”	  
Box	  2,	  Folder	  CG-­‐CIA	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  
Analysis	  Central	  Files	  1973-­‐1979,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  
New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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not	  be	  able	  to	  “justify	  the	  levels	  of	  clearance	  that	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  eliminate	  
the	  ‘slum’	  conditions	  that	  exist	  in	  the	  area.”33	  Unlike	  the	  improvement	  zones,	  the	  
unlikelihood	  of	  securing	  "market	  support"	  for	  Central	  City	  made	  widespread	  
revitalization	  inconceivable.34	  While	  troubled	  by	  the	  clear	  links	  between	  racism,	  
poverty,	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  resources,	  planners	  considered	  that	  the	  socioeconomic	  shifts	  
occurring	  in	  the	  neighborhood	  might	  be	  evidence	  of	  the	  neighborhood’s	  natural	  
cycle.	  Amid	  funding	  realities,	  the	  decline	  of	  Central	  City—irrespective	  of	  
treatment—might	  be	  inevitable.35	  
Fig.	  2-­‐4:	  Map	  of	  Central	  City	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Section	  7:	  Conclusions	  about	  Central	  City	  Area,	  New	  Orleans	  Office	  of	  the	  Mayor	  
Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Central	  Files	  1973-­‐1979,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  
Box	  2,	  Folder	  CG-­‐CIA	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  New	  
Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
34	  Nearly	  half	  of	  all	  the	  area’s	  residents	  lived	  at	  or	  below	  the	  poverty	  line.	  	  
	  
35	  Section	  7:	  Conclusions	  about	  Central	  City	  Area,	  New	  Orleans	  Office	  of	  the	  Mayor	  
Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Central	  Files	  1973-­‐1979,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	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Source:	  Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Community	  Data	  Center,	  www.gnocdc.org.	  
While	  planners	  clearly	  felt	  immobilized	  by	  the	  city’s	  fiscal	  limitations,	  the	  
“naturalization”	  of	  decline	  in	  an	  all-­‐black,	  poor	  neighborhood	  obscured	  the	  
structural	  conditions	  responsible	  for	  the	  area’s	  downturn.	  Instead	  of	  addressing	  the	  
link	  between	  substandard	  housing	  and	  inadequate	  educational	  and	  economic	  
opportunities,	  the	  theory	  that	  the	  dilapidation	  of	  urban	  neighborhoods	  was	  part	  of	  a	  
normal	  cycle	  relieved	  planners	  of	  the	  obligation	  to	  tackle	  how	  persistent	  racism	  and	  
economic	  inequality	  diminished	  the	  opportunities	  of	  the	  area	  to	  recover.	  Though	  
renewal	  agencies	  were	  indeed	  limited	  by	  political	  and	  economic	  realities,	  the	  
improvement	  agency	  planners	  failed	  to	  relate	  the	  neighborhood’s	  decline	  to	  
citywide	  disparities	  of	  any	  kind.	  Thus,	  while	  the	  PIPs	  were	  promoted	  as	  having	  the	  
potential	  to	  create	  a	  “ripple	  effect,”	  the	  unwillingness	  to	  link	  revitalization	  activities	  
in	  more	  stable	  neighborhoods	  to	  those	  in	  poverty	  zones	  diminished	  this	  prospect.	  
As	  a	  result,	  the	  agency’s	  solutions	  reflected	  the	  viewpoint	  that	  these	  neighborhoods	  
would	  not	  be	  renewed.	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Planners	  suggested	  creating	  an	  industrial	  corridor	  through	  the	  area	  of	  
Central	  City,	  bordered	  on	  one	  side	  by	  the	  high-­‐rise	  city	  projects—the	  Guste	  
Homes—and	  on	  the	  other	  by	  the	  Pontchartrain	  Expressway.	  City	  officials	  
understood	  that	  in	  order	  to	  retain	  jobs	  for	  low-­‐income	  residents,	  it	  was	  imperative	  
to	  diversify	  the	  economy.	  Earlier	  efforts	  to	  encourage	  the	  expansion	  of	  
manufacturing	  had	  failed,	  and	  planners	  now	  hoped	  that	  developing	  a	  location	  with	  
proximity	  to	  the	  business	  district	  could	  entice	  new	  interest.	  The	  ability	  to	  channel	  
commodities	  freely	  in	  and	  out	  of	  downtown	  could	  make	  the	  proposal	  “attractive	  to	  
the	  Central	  Business	  District”	  and	  the	  city’s	  broader	  growth	  interests,	  planners	  
argued.36	  “To	  overlook	  this	  opportunity	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  close-­‐in	  industrial	  
district	  and	  the	  elimination	  of	  a	  substantial	  concentration	  of	  slum	  residential	  
conditions	  would,	  in	  our	  view,	  be	  a	  mistake,”	  they	  determined.37	  	  	  
The	  treatment	  would	  require	  removing	  residents	  from	  the	  area	  altogether.	  
While	  job	  creation	  was	  imperative,	  their	  means	  for	  dealing	  with	  displaced	  residents	  
was	  troubling.	  The	  improvement	  agency	  proposed	  that	  since	  nearby	  public	  housing	  
had	  recently	  been	  expanded,	  residents	  could	  be	  relocated	  to	  the	  extension.38	  Built	  in	  
1964,	  the	  Guste	  Homes	  housing	  complex	  was	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  public	  housing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Section	  7:	  Conclusions	  about	  Central	  City	  Area,	  New	  Orleans	  Office	  of	  the	  Mayor	  
Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Central	  Files	  1973-­‐1979,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  
Box	  2,	  Folder	  CG-­‐CIA	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  New	  
Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
37	  Section	  7:	  Conclusions	  about	  Central	  City	  Area,	  New	  Orleans	  Office	  of	  the	  Mayor	  
Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Central	  Files	  1973-­‐1979,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	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projects	  adjacent	  to	  the	  Central	  Business	  District.39	  Within	  the	  first	  10	  years	  of	  
occupancy,	  the	  city	  expanded	  the	  homes	  to	  include	  six	  buildings,	  including	  a	  
monstrous	  high	  rise	  for	  senior	  citizens.	  The	  building	  dominated	  New	  Orleans's	  
stunted	  skyline.	  Like	  most	  of	  the	  public	  housing	  in	  New	  Orleans,	  the	  Guste	  Homes	  
were	  in	  total	  disrepair	  by	  the	  early	  1970s.40	  The	  planners,	  rather	  than	  seeing	  the	  
relocation	  plan	  as	  controversial,	  believed	  it	  was	  the	  only	  option	  for	  clearing	  space	  
for	  new	  industry	  to	  develop.	  While	  aggregating	  public	  housing	  populations	  was	  
certainly	  not	  ideal,	  city	  officials	  were	  not	  optimistic	  that	  well-­‐off	  neighborhoods	  
would	  accept	  new	  low-­‐income	  housing	  without	  encouraging	  further	  flight	  from	  the	  
city.41	  That	  was	  something	  they	  were	  unwilling	  to	  set	  in	  motion.42	  	  
	  
The	  Public	  Improvement	  Projects:	  Renewing	  the	  Middle	  Class	  
In	  an	  attempt	  to	  prevent	  opposition	  to	  the	  proposal,	  the	  administration	  
sought	  ways	  to	  circumvent	  utilizing	  the	  city’s	  general	  budget	  and	  urban	  renewal	  
funding.	  In	  mid-­‐1973,	  mayoral	  aide	  Anthony	  Gagliano	  petitioned	  the	  city’s	  budget	  
office	  for	  approval	  to	  use	  general	  revenue-­‐sharing	  funds	  to	  commence	  work	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Martha	  Mahoney,	  "Law	  and	  Racial	  Geography:	  Public	  Housing	  and	  the	  Economy	  in	  
New	  Orleans,"	  Stanford	  Law	  Review	  42,	  no.	  5	  (1990),	  1277.	  
	  
40	  Martha	  Mahoney,	  "Law	  and	  Racial	  Geography:	  Public	  Housing	  and	  the	  Economy	  in	  
New	  Orleans,"	  Stanford	  Law	  Review	  42,	  no.	  5	  (1990),	  1280.	  
	  
41	  “Section	  7:	  Conclusions	  about	  Central	  City	  Area,”	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  Box	  2,	  
Folder	  CG-­‐CIA	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  
Central	  Files	  1973-­‐1979,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana,	  3.	  	  
	  
42	  Report,	  Program	  Inventory	  and	  Development	  Plan	  for	  the	  Community	  
Improvement	  Agency,	  March	  25,	  1974,	  New	  Orleans	  Office	  of	  the	  Mayor	  Office	  of	  Policy	  
Planning	  and	  Analysis,	  Box	  6,	  Folder	  Program	  Inventory	  1974,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  
Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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Irish	  Channel.	  Gagliano	  expected	  that	  if	  the	  city	  secured	  funding,	  it	  could	  formalize	  
an	  agreement	  with	  the	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  to	  provide	  oversight	  on	  
project	  development.	  With	  city	  departments	  championing	  the	  project’s	  mission,	  the	  
project	  would	  move	  forward	  immediately.43	  Although	  the	  project	  had	  not	  been	  
approved	  by	  council	  vote,	  and	  general	  revenue-­‐sharing	  funds	  had	  already	  been	  
allocated	  through	  the	  year,	  the	  budget	  office	  chose	  to	  divert	  funds	  to	  begin	  the	  
project.	  44	  On	  July	  12,	  1973,	  the	  City	  Planning	  Commission	  voted	  to	  utilize	  $250,000	  
of	  general	  revenue-­‐sharing	  funds	  to	  begin	  the	  first	  Public	  Improvement	  Project	  in	  
the	  Irish	  Channel.45	  
Despite	  earlier	  reservations,	  Keevers	  and	  the	  improvement	  agency	  took	  the	  
project’s	  helm.	  Landrieu’s	  efforts	  to	  formally	  absorb	  the	  Community	  Improvement	  
Agency	  into	  city	  government	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  urban	  development	  wing	  were	  aided,	  
ironically,	  by	  the	  president’s	  HUD	  moratorium.	  Nixon’s	  attack	  on	  HUD-­‐funded	  urban	  
aid	  programs	  left	  the	  future	  of	  further	  federal	  funding,	  and	  the	  agencies	  that	  
oversaw	  it,	  in	  jeopardy.	  Additionally,	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  block	  grant	  legislation,	  
urban	  renewal	  would	  be	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  mayor.	  Thus,	  the	  livelihood	  of	  the	  
improvement	  agency	  depended	  on	  making	  alliances	  with	  city	  departments	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Memo,	  Tony	  Gagliano	  to	  Richard	  J.	  Kernion,	  June	  5,	  1973,	  Box	  8,	  Folder	  
Community	  Improvement	  Agency,	  August	  1971-­‐1973,	  Moon	  Landrieu	  Collection,	  Loyola	  
University	  Libraries,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
44	  This	  was	  common	  in	  cities’	  use	  of	  revenue-­‐sharing	  funds.	  Projects	  that	  would	  not	  
classify	  for	  antipoverty	  funds	  got	  life	  out	  of	  the	  “no-­‐strings”	  approach	  of	  general	  revenue	  
sharing.	  Studies	  found	  that	  revenue	  sharing	  was	  often	  used	  to	  encourage	  gentrification,	  
sometimes	  more	  explicitly	  than	  how	  the	  Public	  Improvement	  Project	  operated	  in	  New	  
Orleans.	  See	  Wayne	  A.	  Clark,	  Discrimination	  in	  general	  revenue	  sharing	  in	  the	  South,	  
Southern	  Governmental	  Monitoring	  Project	  (1975:	  Southern	  Regional	  Council).	  
	  
45	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  City	  Planning	  Commission	  Approves	  Budget	  for	  1974,	  July	  12,	  
1973,	  56.	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gaining	  formal	  recognition	  within	  the	  mayor’s	  office,	  a	  point	  made	  obvious	  by	  
Keevers’s	  newfound	  public	  support	  for	  PIPs.	  	  	  
Closely	  aligning	  himself	  with	  the	  mayor’s	  office,	  Keevers	  spoke	  highly	  of	  the	  
upcoming	  Public	  Improvement	  Project	  in	  the	  Irish	  Channel.	  While	  the	  agency’s	  
reputation	  was	  most	  closely	  associated	  with	  urban	  renewal	  efforts,	  Keevers	  now	  
attempted	  to	  distance	  his	  agency	  from	  that	  work.	  He	  distinguished	  the	  undertaking	  
of	  the	  Irish	  Channel	  from	  that	  of	  urban	  renewal	  activities	  in	  antipoverty	  zones—
careful	  to	  gesture	  to	  the	  differences	  between	  a	  curated	  process	  of	  attracting	  more	  
investment	  and	  the	  wholesale	  destruction	  of	  neighborhoods.46	  Homeowners,	  
lenders,	  and	  nonprofit	  supporters	  clearly	  needed	  to	  understand	  that	  public	  
improvement	  was	  a	  process	  of	  stabilization.	  
By	  1973,	  the	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  hired	  two	  urban	  planners	  to	  
oversee	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Public	  Improvement	  Projects:	  Tom	  Taylor,	  the	  
author	  of	  the	  original	  PIP	  proposal,	  and	  Mart	  A.	  Black,	  another	  project	  planner	  from	  
the	  improvement	  agency.47	  The	  project	  leaders	  began	  implementing	  a	  strategy	  to	  
beautify	  the	  areas	  that	  included	  planting	  trees,	  fixing	  sidewalks,	  and	  providing	  
counsel	  to	  homeowners	  seeking	  to	  begin	  repairs.	  The	  Landrieu	  administration	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  Beautification	  Program	  Slated	  for	  Irish	  Channel,	  July	  27,	  1973,	  66.	  
Despite	  the	  more	  limited	  experience	  with	  urban	  renewal,	  federally	  funded	  renewal-­‐type	  
programs	  had	  cleared	  the	  way	  through	  the	  historic	  black	  neighborhood	  of	  Tremé	  for	  a	  new	  
interstate	  highway,	  and	  leveled	  nearly	  60	  acres	  in	  what	  natives	  called	  Back	  of	  Town—the	  
childhood	  community	  of	  jazz	  great	  Louis	  Armstrong—for	  the	  Superdome.	  See	  Anne	  E.	  
Mosher,	  Barry	  D.	  Keim	  and	  Susan	  A.	  Franques,	  "Downtown	  Dynamics,"	  Geographical	  Review	  
85,	  no.	  4	  (1995),	  508.	  
	  
47	  The	  original	  idea	  for	  public	  improvement	  came	  from	  Tom	  Taylor’s	  term	  paper	  in	  a	  
University	  of	  New	  Orleans	  class	  taught	  by	  Keevers.	  Taylor	  had	  been	  very	  interested	  in	  how	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believed	  that	  the	  project	  could	  generate	  national	  interest	  in	  the	  city’s	  revitalization	  
and	  hoped	  to	  enlist	  the	  expertise	  of	  Neighborhood	  Housing	  Services	  (NHS)—a	  
national	  nonprofit	  engaged	  in	  triage-­‐type	  redevelopment	  efforts.48	  As	  the	  model	  for	  
moderate-­‐income,	  property-­‐owning	  community	  revitalization,	  NHS	  was	  heralded	  
nationwide	  as	  proof	  of	  RERC’s	  model.	  By	  1973,	  just	  months	  after	  the	  low-­‐income	  
housing	  moratorium	  began,	  the	  task	  force	  received	  some	  $2.75	  million	  in	  funding	  
from	  HUD	  and	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Federal	  Home	  Loan	  Bank	  Association.49	  The	  
umbrella	  organization	  formed	  through	  these	  affiliations,	  the	  Urban	  Reinvestment	  
Task	  Force,	  chartered	  the	  duplication	  of	  “totally	  private”	  local	  NHS	  chapters	  
engendered	  to	  facilitate	  neighborhood	  turn-­‐around	  in	  areas	  the	  Task	  Force	  
determined	  to	  be	  acceptable.	  Offering	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  development,	  consulting,	  and	  
strategy	  services,	  NHS	  marketed	  its	  approach	  as	  being	  easily	  reproduced	  all	  over	  the	  
country.50	  With	  the	  same	  efficiency	  of	  the	  private	  sector,	  directors	  at	  NHS	  suggested	  
that	  their	  leadership	  could	  save	  entire	  areas	  from	  the	  red	  tape	  of	  government	  
housing	  programs	  and	  the	  slow	  decline	  that	  would	  force	  abandonment.	  Yet,	  their	  
model	  was	  one	  that	  could	  not	  work	  in	  all	  urban	  areas.	  	  
NHS-­‐selected	  neighborhoods,	  much	  like	  the	  PIPs,	  needed	  to	  be	  sound,	  despite	  
suffering	  mild	  deterioration.	  To	  be	  chosen,	  a	  neighborhood’s	  residents	  had	  to	  have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  NHS,	  founded	  in	  Pittsburgh,	  Pennsylvania,	  in	  1968,	  had	  grown	  as	  an	  organization	  
devoted	  to	  reinvesting	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  neighborhood	  preservation	  and	  development.	  	  
	  
49	  Though	  I	  am	  using	  the	  term	  “triage	  planning,”	  this	  is	  not	  the	  way	  planners	  
conceived	  of	  their	  work.	  Instead,	  they	  believed	  that	  this	  type	  of	  project	  was	  necessary	  to	  
reverse	  flight	  from	  urban	  centers	  and	  hoped	  that	  it	  would	  improve	  poverty	  areas	  as	  well.	  	  
	  
50	  Neighborhood	  Reinvestment	  Corporation,	  Annual	  Report,	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  US	  
Printing	  Office,	  1984),	  4.	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an	  average	  income	  of	  80	  percent	  of	  the	  city’s	  median	  income,	  and	  at	  least	  50	  percent	  
of	  the	  housing	  needed	  to	  be	  owner	  occupied	  and	  to	  consist	  of	  predominantly	  single-­‐
family	  structures.51	  While	  the	  program	  was	  funded	  through	  HUD,	  the	  federal	  office	  
had	  very	  little	  authority	  over	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  projects,	  whose	  leadership	  reported	  
instead	  to	  the	  director	  of	  the	  Urban	  Reinvestment	  Task	  Force,	  William	  A.	  
Whiteside.52	  Though	  asked	  to	  provide	  initial	  funding	  and	  ongoing	  grant	  support,	  city	  
administrations	  were	  similarly	  limited,	  allowed	  only	  an	  advisory	  role	  on	  the	  work	  
that	  the	  nonprofit	  did	  in	  local	  communities.	  Despite	  this	  lack	  of	  oversight,	  city	  
governments	  were	  nevertheless	  encouraged	  to	  sign	  on	  by	  the	  promise	  of	  effective	  
blight	  treatment	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  fiscal	  uncertainty.	  
The	  emergence	  of	  federal	  support	  of	  the	  Neighborhood	  Reinvestment	  Task	  
Force	  in	  the	  same	  moment	  that	  funding	  for	  Model	  Cities	  and	  Urban	  Renewal	  
(programs	  designed	  to	  conduct	  the	  same	  range	  of	  activities—tenant	  education,	  
community	  participation	  workshops,	  building	  recreational	  space,	  and	  cleanup	  
drives)	  was	  curtailed	  was	  not	  a	  coincidence.	  It	  underscored	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  Nixon	  
administration,	  and	  growing	  sentiment	  of	  the	  public,	  that	  it	  was	  no	  longer	  the	  
responsibility	  of	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  provide	  programs	  promoting	  equality.53	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Report,	  Site	  Selection	  Committee	  Progress	  Report,	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  Neighborhood	  
Housing	  Services,	  Human	  Relations	  Committee	  Papers,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  
Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  	  
	  
52	  Whiteside	  was	  also	  president	  of	  the	  Federal	  Home	  Loan	  Association.	  
	  
53	  Roger	  S.	  Ahlbrandt	  and	  Paul	  C.	  Brophy,	  The	  Neighborhood	  Housing	  Services	  
Model:	  A	  Progress	  Assessment	  of	  the	  Related	  Activites	  of	  the	  Urban	  Reinvestment	  Task	  
Force,	  US	  Department	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Office	  of	  
Policy	  Development	  and	  Research,	  1976),	  34.	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With	  the	  diminishing	  prospect	  of	  support	  for	  antipoverty	  programs,	  and	  the	  
constriction	  of	  federal	  aid	  in	  general,	  it	  was	  now	  the	  primary	  responsibility	  of	  cities	  
to	  facilitate	  private-­‐sector	  urban	  revitalization.	  Symbolic	  development	  was	  
paramount,	  local	  officials	  believed.	  	  Select	  neighborhoods,	  old	  but	  not	  in	  complete	  
decline,	  could	  emerge	  as	  “untapped	  markets,”	  attracting	  the	  kind	  of	  private	  
investment	  necessary	  to	  avoid	  budgetary	  collapse.54	  	  
Thus,	  when	  in	  November	  1974,	  the	  Urban	  Reinvestment	  Task	  Force	  
scheduled	  a	  visit	  to	  the	  Crescent	  City,	  Landrieu	  impressed	  upon	  his	  staff	  the	  
importance	  of	  their	  visit.55	  Neighborhoods	  that	  could	  become	  the	  bulwark	  of	  
middle-­‐class	  stability	  were	  the	  most	  realistic	  means	  to	  overall	  growth	  in	  the	  city,	  the	  
mayor	  underscored.	  Members	  of	  his	  staff	  were	  to	  display	  their	  willingness,	  and	  
indeed	  deference,	  to	  the	  NHS	  model.56	  	  	  	  
To	  inaugurate	  the	  visit,	  task	  force	  members	  were	  given	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  mid-­‐
term	  report	  on	  PIP.	  The	  Public	  Improvement	  Project	  had,	  in	  a	  short	  span	  of	  time,	  
done	  quite	  a	  bit	  to	  slow	  deterioration.	  In	  conjunction	  with	  the	  Broadmoor	  
Improvement	  Association	  and	  the	  newly	  formed	  Neighborhood	  Improvement	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Kathe	  Newman	  and	  Robert	  W.	  Lake,	  “Democracy,	  Bureaucracy	  and	  difference	  in	  
US	  Community	  Development	  Politics	  since	  1968,”	  Progress	  in	  Human	  Geography	  30,	  1	  
(2006),	  48.	  Newman	  and	  Lake’s	  article	  investigates	  the	  emergence	  of	  Community	  
Development	  Corporations	  and	  nonprofits	  as	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  local	  governance.	  Calling	  
these	  organizations	  the	  “shadow	  state,”	  they	  argue	  that	  this	  reliance	  on	  outside	  
organizations	  to	  fulfill	  the	  “human”	  part	  of	  governance	  allows	  the	  local	  government	  to	  
divest	  responsibility	  for	  issues	  of	  poverty	  and	  instead	  focus	  on	  the	  commoditization	  of	  those	  
neighborhoods.	  
	  
55	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Housing	  Idea	  May	  Be	  Tried	  Here,”	  September	  27	  1974,	  12.	  
	  
56	  Memo,	  Moon	  Landrieu	  to	  Staff,	  “Visit	  of	  the	  Urban	  Reinvestment	  Task	  Force,”	  
September	  11,	  1974.	  Box	  15,	  Folder	  Urban	  Reinvestment	  Task	  Force,	  Moon	  Landrieu	  
Collection,	  Loyola	  University	  Libraries,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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Association	  of	  the	  Irish	  Channel,	  PIP	  staff	  cleared	  trash	  and	  weeds	  from	  vacant	  lots,	  
and	  abandoned	  automobiles	  (totaling	  nearly	  40	  between	  the	  two	  neighborhoods)	  
had	  been	  removed.57	  Buildings	  had	  been	  surveyed	  and	  inspected;	  where	  there	  were	  
repairs	  needed,	  homeowners	  had	  been	  counseled.	  Nearly	  400	  trees	  were	  planted	  in	  
the	  two	  neighborhoods	  to	  encourage	  new	  homebuyers	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  area.	  In	  the	  
Irish	  Channel,	  the	  Neighborhood	  Improvement	  Association	  lobbied	  for	  the	  renewal	  
of	  Clay	  Square,	  an	  old-­‐time	  promenade	  park-­‐turned-­‐playground.	  Both	  
neighborhoods	  began	  preparing	  to	  launch	  a	  multi-­‐street-­‐paving	  program	  funded	  
through	  CDBG.	  With	  a	  concerted	  effort	  by	  city	  departments,	  including	  sanitation	  and	  
the	  sewerage	  board,	  there	  had	  been	  a	  steady	  increase	  in	  the	  city	  services	  received	  
by	  the	  neighborhood.	  The	  projects	  were	  proving	  successful.58	  	  
Planners	  emphasized	  that	  without	  intervention	  the	  areas	  would	  have	  
experienced	  the	  process	  of	  decline	  detailed	  by	  RERC.	  	  Housing	  would	  deteriorate,	  
density	  would	  increase,	  and	  “the	  social	  and	  psychological	  problems	  so	  well	  
documented	  in	  the	  daily	  news”	  would	  take	  over.	  Decline	  would	  not	  limit	  “itself	  to	  a	  
small	  area.	  It	  spreads,	  bringing	  surrounding	  areas	  down	  with	  it.”59	  Those	  who	  
opposed	  efforts	  that	  diverted	  potential	  funding	  from	  more	  impoverished	  
neighborhoods	  were	  wrong.	  The	  PIP	  program	  had	  been	  critical	  in	  counteracting	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  Staff.	  Interim	  Report	  on	  the	  Public	  Improvement	  
Programs	  I	  and	  II,	  December	  13,	  1973,	  Private	  Collection	  of	  Tom	  Taylor,	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  
author,	  13.	  
	  
58	  	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  Staff.	  Interim	  Report	  on	  the	  Public	  Improvement	  
Programs	  I	  and	  II,	  December	  13,	  1973;	  Private	  Collection	  of	  Tom	  Taylor,	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  
author,	  15.	  
	  
59	  Interim	  Report,	  1973,	  3.	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city’s	  decline	  process,	  planner	  Tom	  Taylor	  emphasized.	  He	  concluded	  that	  the	  
program's	  success,	  however,	  would	  have	  to	  be	  measured	  by	  the	  area’s	  ability	  to	  
generate	  private-­‐sector	  interest.60	  The	  planning	  team	  would	  do	  all	  in	  their	  power	  to	  
attract	  such	  investment.	  	  	  
To	  facilitate	  market	  participation,	  planners	  for	  the	  Public	  Improvement	  
Project	  discouraged	  the	  same	  process	  of	  industrialization	  they	  had	  promoted	  in	  
Central	  City.	  Reflecting	  the	  suggestions	  of	  the	  Curtis	  and	  Davis	  Housing	  Preservation	  
Study,	  a	  survey	  of	  the	  city’s	  housing	  stock	  available	  for	  historic	  preservation,	  the	  
planners	  suggested	  that	  the	  industrial	  section	  of	  the	  Irish	  Channel	  was	  actually	  a	  
detriment	  to	  the	  neighborhood’s	  vitality.	  In	  fact,	  they	  moved	  swiftly	  to	  block	  the	  
industrial	  border	  zones	  near	  the	  Mississippi	  River	  from	  spreading	  north	  toward	  the	  
heart	  of	  the	  neighborhood.	  	  
In	  a	  series	  of	  meetings	  with	  the	  City	  Planning	  Commission,	  they	  derided	  
the	  use	  of	  industry,	  suggesting	  a	  mixed	  residential	  and	  commercial	  area	  instead.61	  
Industry	  destroyed	  community	  cohesion,	  planners	  argued	  (obviously	  not	  
considered	  amid	  Central	  City	  development).	  In	  some	  areas	  of	  the	  neighborhood,	  
Taylor	  even	  encouraged	  upzoning	  for	  preservation	  purposes.	  He	  proposed	  that	  
upzoning,	  a	  term	  used	  by	  planners	  to	  denote	  neighborhoods	  rapidly	  transitioning	  
into	  mixed	  commercial	  and	  residential	  use,	  could	  be	  employed	  in	  the	  Channel	  to	  
ensure	  that	  historical	  structures	  remained	  intact	  and	  industry	  did	  not	  spread.	  Far	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Robert	  K.	  Whelan,	  Alma	  H.	  Young	  and	  Mickey	  Lauria,	  "Urban	  Regimes	  and	  Racial	  Politics	  
in	  New	  Orleans,"	  Journal	  of	  Urban	  Affairs	  16,	  no.	  1	  (1994),	  12.	  
	  
61	  Oral	  History	  with	  Tom	  Taylor,	  June	  10,	  2012.	  See	  also	  Curtis	  and	  Davis	  Architects	  
and	  Planners,	  "New	  Orleans	  Housing	  and	  Preservation	  Study,"	  (New	  Orleans,	  1974).	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from	  disrupting	  the	  neighborhood-­‐like	  feel,	  upzoning	  was	  a	  way	  to	  encourage	  
conservation	  of	  landmark	  buildings.62	  	  
	  To	  further	  promote	  residential	  cohesion,	  the	  city	  sought	  historic	  landmark	  
status	  for	  the	  Irish	  Channel,	  a	  rank	  the	  neighborhood	  would	  obtain	  in	  1976.	  As	  
something	  young	  professionals	  looked	  for	  when	  moving	  back	  to	  cities,	  the	  
designation	  was	  highly	  predictive	  of	  gentrification.63	  Yet	  there	  were	  other	  reasons	  
that	  historic	  preservation	  would	  benefit	  the	  area.	  By	  declaring	  an	  area	  a	  historic	  
landmark,	  under	  new	  CDBG	  provisions,	  the	  city	  could	  provide	  neighborhoods	  
previously	  unqualified	  to	  receive	  federal	  aid	  with	  grant	  funding.64	  Rather	  than	  view	  
such	  activity	  as	  a	  loophole,	  officials	  at	  HUD	  encouraged	  cities	  to	  utilize	  preservation	  
as	  a	  means	  of	  encouraging	  middle-­‐class	  renewal.65	  As	  the	  city	  exercised	  new	  
authority	  to	  promote	  middle-­‐class	  cohesion	  in	  the	  Irish	  Channel,	  the	  mayor	  hoped	  
that	  developing	  an	  alliance	  with	  NHS	  to	  oversee	  revitalization	  in	  Broadmoor	  would	  
offer	  an	  even	  more	  valuable	  set	  of	  resources.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Paper,	  Tom	  Taylor,	  “Upzoning	  in	  the	  PIP	  area,”	  October	  15,	  1973,	  in	  possession	  of	  
the	  author.	  	  
	  
63	  See	  John	  O'Loughlin	  and	  Douglas	  C.	  Munski,	  "Housing	  Rehabilitation	  in	  the	  Inner	  
City:	  A	  Comparison	  of	  Two	  Neighborhoods	  in	  New	  Orleans,"	  Economic	  Geography	  55,	  no.	  1	  
(1979).	  See	  also	  Mickey	  Lauria	  and	  Michael	  E.	  Stout,	  The	  Significance	  of	  Scale	  in	  the	  Analysis	  
of	  Gentrification,	  College	  of	  Urban	  and	  Public	  Affairs,	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans	  (New	  
Orleans:	  UNO	  Scholarworks,	  1995).	  
	  
64	  This	  factor	  will	  be	  discussed	  more	  in	  the	  following	  chapters	  as	  the	  city	  
landmarked	  the	  Central	  Business	  District	  for	  precisely	  these	  reasons,	  opening	  it	  up	  to	  
community	  development	  funding	  as	  well	  as	  scandal.	  
	  
65	  In	  the	  same	  discussion,	  they	  emphasize	  that	  private-­‐sector	  investment	  is	  not	  
enough	  for	  poverty	  neighborhoods	  like	  Central	  City.	  See	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Public	  View	  by	  
Ballot	  Asked	  on	  Activating	  Agency	  to	  spur	  housing	  Starts,”	  December	  23,	  1974,	  16.	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Broadmoor	  fulfilled	  the	  nonprofit’s	  strict	  classifications	  of	  widespread	  
homeownership	  and	  less	  than	  20	  percent	  of	  families	  in	  poverty.66	  Significantly,	  the	  
single	  poverty	  census	  tract	  qualified	  the	  neighborhood	  for	  community	  development	  
as	  well,	  thus	  providing	  the	  city	  with	  funds	  to	  launch	  and	  support	  NHS	  efforts.67	  In	  
1977,	  Broadmoor	  was	  incorporated	  as	  an	  NHS	  neighborhood	  with	  Taylor,	  now	  the	  
former	  director	  of	  PIP,	  at	  the	  helm.	  The	  negotiations	  with	  the	  city	  had	  been	  long,	  but	  
with	  a	  promise	  of	  steady	  funding,	  NHS	  had	  agreed	  to	  come	  into	  the	  neighborhood.	  
Building	  on	  the	  experience	  in	  the	  Irish	  Channel,	  Taylor	  pushed	  the	  city	  to	  provide	  
upgraded	  city	  services,	  sanitation,	  and	  street	  improvement.	  Within	  two	  years,	  
Taylor	  and	  the	  local	  NHS	  chapter	  had	  built	  a	  city-­‐subsidized	  budget	  of	  $600,000	  for	  
improvements.	  And	  while	  the	  area	  had	  little	  by	  way	  of	  sheer	  poverty,	  NHS	  received	  
a	  steady	  stream	  of	  funds	  from	  CDBG.68	  By	  1978,	  the	  organization	  boasted	  of	  
encouraging	  over	  one	  million	  dollars	  of	  reinvestment,	  a	  symbol	  of	  how	  
neighborhoods,	  once	  a	  detriment	  to	  city	  growth,	  were	  now	  central	  to	  renewing	  the	  
city.69	  Of	  course,	  this	  was	  easiest	  to	  achieve	  in	  neighborhoods	  whose	  redevelopment	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Homeownership	  in	  Irish	  Channel	  was	  too	  low	  in	  1974	  to	  qualify.	  	  
	  
67	  Report,	  Site	  Selection	  Committee	  Progress	  Report,	  Box	  1,	  Folder	  Neighborhood	  
Housing	  Services,	  Human	  Relations	  Committee,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  
Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
68	  More	  and	  more,	  provisions	  for	  social	  services	  and	  community	  development	  were	  
delegated	  to	  nonprofits	  and	  community	  development	  corporations.	  With	  fewer	  fiscal	  
resources,	  city	  governments	  saw	  this	  practice	  as	  a	  means	  of	  conserving	  resources	  and	  
expanding	  service	  outreach.	  See	  Memo,	  Rene	  Steinkamp	  to	  Mayor’s	  Executive	  Staff,	  January	  
20,	  1977,	  21,	  Folder	  Re:	  ADP:	  7/01-­‐	  Incoming	  Memos;	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  
Analysis;	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
69	  Annual	  Report,	  New	  Orleans	  Neighborhood	  Housing	  Services	  (New	  Orleans:	  1978),	  
in	  possession	  of	  author;	  see	  also	  Kathe	  Newman	  and	  Robert	  W.	  Lake,	  "Democracy,	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could	  aid	  the	  dual	  projects	  of	  physical	  redevelopment	  and	  retention	  of	  the	  city’s	  
middle	  class.70	  
Yet,	  in	  a	  city	  like	  New	  Orleans,	  where	  the	  poverty	  population	  continued	  to	  
grow,	  the	  expansion	  of	  such	  an	  agency	  into	  other	  areas	  of	  the	  city	  was	  largely	  
unfruitful.	  In	  fact,	  the	  model	  of	  the	  program,	  with	  its	  qualifications	  for	  widespread	  
home	  ownership	  and	  narrow	  inclusion	  of	  residents	  in	  poverty,	  excluded	  most	  of	  the	  
city.	  By	  1980,	  the	  New	  Orleans	  NHS	  program	  had	  been	  unable	  to	  expand	  into	  any	  
other	  neighborhood,	  finding	  its	  ability	  to	  duplicate	  its	  success	  in	  Broadmoor	  stilted	  
amid	  increasing	  poverty	  and	  joblessness.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  agency	  continued	  to	  be	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Bureaucracy	  and	  Difference	  in	  U.S.	  Community	  Development	  Politics,"	  Progress	  in	  Human	  
Geography	  30,	  no.	  44	  (2006),	  48.	  
	  
70	  This	  model	  of	  nonprofit	  organizations	  operating	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  city	  
government,	  despite	  oftentimes	  being	  controlled	  by	  agents	  from	  outside	  the	  city	  altogether	  
(as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  D.C.-­‐based	  NHS),	  became	  a	  norm.	  Amid	  the	  dearth	  of	  resources	  
available	  to	  local	  governments,	  the	  outlook	  that	  private	  nonprofits	  could	  execute	  programs	  
more	  efficiently	  came	  to	  dictate	  the	  dispersion	  of	  aid.	  This	  was	  not	  without	  consequence,	  
however,	  as	  it	  meant	  that	  federal	  urban	  aid	  was	  now	  operated	  without	  ties	  to	  antipoverty	  
directives	  and	  outside	  the	  purview	  of	  policy	  options	  articulated	  by	  the	  local	  state.	  
Organizations	  that	  endured	  this	  shift	  in	  policy,	  like	  the	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  or	  
NHS,	  rarely	  challenged	  the	  structural	  disparities	  between	  programs	  that	  were	  now	  funded	  
and	  the	  position	  of	  low-­‐income	  residents	  in	  the	  urban	  political	  economy;	  instead,	  they	  
operated	  on	  changes	  that	  provided	  concrete,	  visible	  outcomes.	  
	  
71	  In	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  new	  director,	  Mayor	  Dutch	  Morial	  expresses	  his	  concern	  that	  the	  
Broadmoor	  NHS	  has	  been	  unable	  to	  expand	  its	  model	  into	  other	  neighborhoods.	  See	  Memo,	  
Ernest	  Morial	  to	  the	  head	  of	  the	  NHS,	  August	  8,	  1980,	  Folder	  K22,	  Neighborhood	  Housing	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The	  City	  Improved:	  A	  Legacy	  of	  Public	  Improvement	  
Preservation	  and	  beautification	  were	  successful	  in	  the	  Irish	  Channel	  as	  
well.	  While	  racial	  and	  class	  gentrification	  had	  not	  been	  the	  stated	  goal	  of	  the	  Public	  
Improvement	  Project,	  it	  occurred	  quickly.	  At	  first,	  the	  number	  of	  vacancies	  had	  
given	  Taylor’s	  team	  the	  impression	  that	  young	  artists	  and	  college	  students	  would	  be	  
able	  to	  move	  into	  the	  area	  without	  displacing	  the	  area’s	  low-­‐income	  black	  (and	  to	  a	  
lesser	  degree,	  white)	  residents.72	  	  Yet,	  with	  programs	  that	  encouraged	  home	  
improvement	  and	  private	  investment,	  the	  resultant	  hike	  in	  housing	  prices	  and	  rents	  
rendered	  the	  newly	  improved	  neighborhood	  unaffordable	  to	  low-­‐income	  residents.	  
As	  early	  as	  1977,	  the	  neighborhood	  had	  clearly	  changed,	  a	  reality	  Taylor	  and	  others	  
at	  the	  improvement	  agency	  found	  dismaying.	  Reports	  described	  the	  residents	  of	  the	  
Irish	  Channel	  as	  noticeably	  whiter	  and	  clearly	  more	  affluent.	  An	  early	  study	  on	  
gentrification	  charted	  just	  how	  quickly	  the	  program	  was	  displacing	  lower-­‐income	  
residents.	  	  
Instead	  of	  promoting	  neighborhood	  revitalization	  that	  could	  sustain	  low-­‐
income	  populations,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  Irish	  Channel	  PIP	  had	  been	  quite	  the	  reverse.73	  
The	  most	  disconcerting	  aspect	  of	  this	  gentrification	  was	  the	  process	  of	  displacement	  
it	  had	  triggered.	  While	  white	  residents,	  presumably	  renters,	  had	  found	  new	  homes	  
in	  adjacent	  neighborhoods	  and	  thus	  derived	  fringe	  benefits	  from	  the	  area's	  
gentrification,	  displaced	  black	  residents	  were	  most	  often	  forced	  into	  public	  housing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  Tom	  Taylor,	  Oral	  History,	  June	  14,	  2012.	  
	  
73	  Helen	  Rosenberg,	  "Areas	  of	  Relocation	  of	  Displaced	  Lower	  Garden	  District	  and	  
Irish	  Channel,"	  Unpublished	  M.A.	  Thesis,	  The	  Urban	  Studies	  Institute,	  University	  of	  New	  
Orleans	  (New	  Orleans,	  1977),	  35.	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projects,	  namely	  the	  St.	  Thomas	  Homes,	  that	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  program’s	  
reach.	  This	  pattern,	  in	  particular,	  was	  troubling	  given	  that	  other	  city	  programs,	  such	  
as	  the	  Central	  City	  redevelopment	  design,	  were	  also	  relocating	  low-­‐income	  
residents	  into	  the	  public	  housing	  market.	  As	  voucher	  programs	  like	  Section	  8	  
struggled	  to	  get	  off	  the	  ground,	  public	  housing	  projects—overcrowded,	  under-­‐
maintained,	  and	  with	  a	  standing	  waitlist—were	  becoming	  the	  terrible	  only	  option	  
for	  low-­‐income	  people	  of	  color.74	  Thus,	  while	  the	  PIP	  offered	  a	  vision	  of	  community	  
characterized	  by	  revitalization	  and	  self-­‐sustained	  individualism,	  those	  efforts	  were	  
also,	  by	  definition,	  exclusionary.	  
The	  willingness	  of	  city	  department	  heads	  to	  direct	  a	  bevy	  of	  new	  resources	  
into	  target	  areas	  was	  not	  extended	  to	  other,	  less	  stable	  (and	  less	  white)	  areas.75	  In	  
fact,	  attempts	  to	  create	  similar	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  in	  New	  Orleans's	  poverty	  
neighborhoods	  were	  disastrous,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Four.	  They	  were	  
never	  funded	  at	  levels	  necessary	  to	  produce	  comprehensive	  strategies	  and	  lacked	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  	  Susan	  S.	  Fainstein	  and	  Norman	  I.	  Fainstein,	  "Economic	  Change,	  National	  Policy,	  
and	  the	  System	  of	  Cities,"	  in	  Restructuring	  the	  City:	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Urban	  
Redevelopment,	  ed.	  Susan	  S.	  Fainstein	  and	  Norman	  I.	  Fainstein,	  (London:	  Longman,	  1986),	  
14.	  
	  
75	  While	  I	  am	  certainly	  not	  contending	  that	  all	  city	  department	  chairs	  were	  racist,	  
there	  were	  deep	  traditions	  of	  inequity	  in	  the	  way	  services	  were	  provided	  that	  often	  boiled	  
over	  around	  issues	  of	  race	  and	  access.	  Throughout	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  allegations	  that	  
low-­‐income	  neighborhoods	  received	  unequal	  police	  patrol,	  trash	  collection,	  and	  street	  
sweeping	  were	  common.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade,	  the	  mayor	  was	  waging	  a	  public	  battle	  
with	  the	  Sewerage	  and	  Water	  Board	  over	  just	  these	  issues.	  What	  I	  am	  suggesting	  is	  that	  city	  
departments	  rallied	  around	  efforts	  to	  revitalize	  white,	  middle-­‐class	  areas	  while	  not	  
providing	  poverty	  areas	  with	  the	  same	  attention.	  See	  Lower	  Ninth	  Ward	  Comments	  and	  
Suggestions;	  Box	  3,	  Folder	  CG:	  NGH:	  Lower	  Ninth	  Ward	  (16);	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  
Analysis	  Papers,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  For	  
more	  on	  the	  mayor’s	  embattlement	  with	  the	  SWB,	  see	  Eric	  Hardy,	  The	  New	  Order	  Has	  
Arrived:	  Dutch	  Morial,	  Reform,	  and	  the	  Sewerage	  and	  Water	  Board	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  1980-­‐
1981,	  MA	  Thesis,	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans	  (New	  Orleans:	  UNO	  Scholarworks,	  2004).	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the	  kind	  of	  constant	  governmental	  support	  needed	  to	  surmount	  vulnerabilities	  
engendered	  by	  shifting	  economic	  and	  demographic	  conditions.	  Thus,	  by	  the	  mid-­‐
1970s,	  the	  crisis	  of	  low-­‐income	  housing	  had	  become	  acute.	  While	  the	  priorities	  of	  
new	  urban	  aid	  legislation	  offered	  mechanisms	  to	  promote	  revitalization	  in	  middle-­‐
income	  neighborhoods,	  community	  development	  proffered	  far	  less	  instruction	  on	  
how	  to	  develop	  quality	  low-­‐income	  housing.	  	  	  
	  
Showdown	  in	  Parkchester	  
Community	  Development	  Block	  Grants	  and	  the	  attendant	  Section	  8	  housing	  
program	  encouraged	  local	  authorities	  to	  attenuate	  their	  reliance	  on	  traditional	  
public	  housing	  by	  using	  new	  federal	  programs	  to	  create	  access	  for	  low-­‐income	  
residents	  in	  the	  private	  marketplace.	  This	  philosophy,	  based	  on	  an	  assumption	  that	  
private-­‐sector	  housing	  would	  prove	  more	  deft	  at	  supplying	  adequate	  and	  stable	  
housing	  for	  low-­‐income	  residents,	  overlooked	  the	  clear	  inconsonance	  of	  that	  
prospect.	  The	  mandate	  assumed	  that	  private	  landlords	  would,	  at	  will,	  ensure	  upkeep,	  
enforce	  codes,	  and	  respond	  to	  low-­‐income	  residents	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  they	  did	  
with	  renters	  paying	  market	  price.	  It	  also	  carried	  a	  presupposition	  of	  supply—that	  
low-­‐income	  people,	  armed	  with	  vouchers,	  would	  quickly	  be	  accepted	  into	  the	  
private	  housing	  market.	  Yet,	  this	  reasoning	  ignored	  the	  base-­‐level	  racism	  and	  
prejudice	  that	  excluded	  low-­‐income	  residents	  from	  entire	  sections	  of	  the	  city,	  and	  
that	  had	  virtually	  closed	  off	  the	  suburbs.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s,	  a	  conflict	  over	  the	  
Parkchester	  Apartments,	  a	  1,200-­‐unit	  building	  complex	  in	  the	  middle-­‐income	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Gentilly	  neighborhood,	  highlighted	  the	  limitations	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  revitalization	  for	  
low-­‐income	  residents.	  	  
A	  stone’s	  throw	  from	  Lake	  Pontchartrain,	  Parkchester	  had	  been	  conceived	  of	  
as	  a	  private	  middle-­‐income	  development	  for	  nearly	  6,000	  residents	  in	  the	  mid-­‐
1940s.76	  Built	  under	  Section	  608,	  part	  of	  housing	  legislation	  enacted	  during	  World	  
War	  II	  to	  insure	  mortgages	  for	  real	  estate	  developers	  through	  the	  Federal	  Housing	  
Administration	  (FHA),	  the	  buildings	  were	  shoddy	  from	  inception.77	  Within	  six	  years,	  
the	  FHA	  had	  foreclosed	  on	  the	  property	  after	  the	  original	  owners	  failed	  to	  pay	  on	  
the	  mortgage.	  Yet	  two	  years	  later,	  the	  FHA	  turned	  the	  mortgage	  back	  over	  to	  the	  
private	  development	  company,	  offering	  the	  owners	  another	  chance.	  The	  property	  
was	  sold	  many	  times	  before	  ending	  up	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Kauffman	  brothers,	  a	  New	  
York-­‐based	  real	  estate	  firm	  operating	  in	  absentia.	  Although	  early	  residents	  
described	  the	  buildings	  as	  well	  maintained	  and	  respectable,	  by	  the	  1970s,	  the	  poorly	  
constructed	  buildings	  began	  to	  show	  their	  age:	  hallway	  lights	  were	  perpetually	  out,	  
broken	  glass	  littered	  the	  stairwells,	  and	  leaky	  drains	  dripped	  water	  from	  one	  
apartment	  to	  the	  next.	  Rats	  were	  more	  common	  than	  working	  electricity.	  On	  the	  eve	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  G.	  Lee	  Caston	  and	  Rose	  Drill,	  "Input	  New	  Orleans,"	  Career	  Education	  Department,	  
Spectrum	  High	  School	  (New	  Orleans,	  1975),	  79.	  
	  
77	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  wartime	  crunch,	  Section	  608	  was	  constructed	  with	  glaring	  
inconsistencies	  that	  sought	  to	  encourage	  private	  developers	  to	  act	  quickly	  to	  fill	  the	  demand	  
for	  moderate-­‐income	  housing.	  In	  return,	  the	  federal	  government	  would	  look	  the	  other	  way	  
as	  private	  developers	  sent	  applications	  with	  over-­‐budget	  costs,	  pocketed	  profits,	  and	  built	  
with	  less	  durable	  materials.	  See	  Harry	  K.	  Schwartz,	  “Sin	  and	  Section	  608,”	  Crimson	  Magazine,	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of	  Landrieu’s	  election,	  virtually	  the	  entire	  complex	  consisted	  of	  black	  residents	  and	  
all	  but	  a	  few	  were	  living	  at	  or	  below	  the	  poverty	  line.78	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  2-­‐5:	  Map	  of	  former	  site	  of	  the	  Parkchester	  Apartments	  
	  
	  
Source:	  Google	  Maps.	  
	  
Local	  HUD	  officials	  inspecting	  the	  buildings	  in	  late	  1969	  found	  nearly	  
unlivable	  conditions.	  They	  wrote	  to	  Secretary	  Romney	  recommending	  that	  the	  
national	  office	  expedite	  foreclosure	  on	  the	  property	  and	  help	  local	  government	  seek	  
solutions	  for	  the	  buildings'	  residents.79	  Despite	  the	  laundry	  list	  of	  things	  wrong	  with	  
the	  buildings,	  HUD’s	  revelations	  about	  the	  state	  of	  the	  buildings	  went	  unaddressed.	  	  
Even	  an	  attempt	  by	  the	  city’s	  housing	  authority	  to	  convert	  the	  buildings	  to	  public	  
housing	  was	  ignored.	  While	  civil	  rights	  leader	  A.P.	  Tureaud	  warned	  the	  City	  Council	  
that	  public	  housing	  was	  better	  than	  a	  private	  slum,	  the	  idea	  was	  rejected	  by	  city	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Paul	  Atkinson,	  "Housing	  Sale	  Plan	  Offered,"	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  May	  25,	  1968,	  1.	  
	  
79	  Rose	  Drill	  and	  G.	  Lee	  Caston,	  Input	  New	  Orleans,	  “Parkchester	  Case,”	  Career	  
Education	  Department	  (New	  Orleans:	  Orleans	  Parish	  Schools,	  1976),	  Tom	  Taylor	  Personal	  
Collection,	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  author,	  75.	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councilors	  wary	  of	  taking	  responsibility	  for	  the	  dilapidated	  property.80	  Nevertheless,	  
there	  was	  a	  critical	  need	  for	  low-­‐income	  housing	  and	  the	  mayor’s	  housing	  
committee	  reported	  that	  “only	  the	  public	  housing	  programs	  have	  been	  able	  to	  
provide	  housing	  for	  those	  who	  need	  it	  most,	  the	  very	  poor.”81	  The	  committee	  had	  
found	  that	  in	  high-­‐poverty	  areas	  like	  Parkchester,	  nearly	  80	  percent	  of	  housing	  was	  
substandard.	  Within	  that	  context,	  the	  loss	  of	  another	  1,200	  units	  of	  low-­‐income	  
housing	  seemed	  unimaginable.82	  	  
The	  city	  administration,	  however,	  felt	  there	  was	  little	  that	  could	  be	  done	  to	  
reverse	  the	  spiral	  of	  deterioration.83	  Irrespective,	  the	  mayor	  noted	  the	  severity	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Arthur	  C.	  Roane,	  "Housing	  Offer	  Study	  Pledged,"	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  June	  6,	  1968,	  45.	  
	  
81	  James	  H.	  Gillis,	  "Action	  Housing	  Plan	  Outlined,"	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  July	  31,	  1971,	  1.	  
See	  also	  Report,	  “Housing	  Strategy	  for	  the	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans,”	  Mayor’s	  Housing	  Committee,	  
1971,	  Box	  13,	  Folder	  3,	  Bernard	  Lemann	  Collection,	  Jones	  Library,	  Tulane	  University,	  New	  
Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
82	  Despite	  the	  conundrum	  of	  high	  poverty	  rates	  and	  high	  rent	  costs,	  nearly	  80	  
percent	  of	  the	  demolition	  permits	  issued	  by	  the	  city	  from	  1970	  to	  1976	  were	  to	  bulldoze	  
low-­‐income	  housing.	  If	  taking	  into	  account	  only	  those	  demolition	  permits	  issued	  to	  private-­‐
market	  contractors,	  then	  the	  percentage	  for	  bulldozing	  low-­‐income	  housing	  grew	  even	  
higher,	  around	  95	  percent.	  New	  construction	  could	  not	  make	  up	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  housing:	  
While	  the	  city	  issued	  building	  permits	  for	  12,	  674	  units	  of	  housing	  in	  that	  period	  from	  1970	  
to	  1976,	  only	  473	  of	  those	  were	  to	  become	  public	  units.	  See	  James	  R.	  Bobo,	  “Housing	  in	  New	  
Orleans,”	  paper	  presented	  to	  the	  Task	  Force	  on	  Assisted	  Housing,	  Subcommittee	  on	  Housing	  
and	  Community	  Development,	  US	  House	  of	  Representatives	  Committee	  on	  Banking,	  Finance	  
and	  Urban	  Affairs,	  February	  10,	  1978,	  Box	  101,	  Folder	  17,	  Ernest	  Morial	  Transition	  
Collection,	  Amistad	  Research	  Center,	  Tulane	  University,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana,	  23.	  
	  
83	  They	  were	  however,	  deeply	  aware	  of	  the	  severe	  shortage	  of	  quality	  low-­‐income	  
housing.	  In	  1970,	  the	  mayor	  announced	  that	  he	  understood	  that	  “housing	  is	  one	  of	  the	  
community’s	  critically	  important	  problems.	  We	  are	  very	  much	  aware	  of	  the	  serious	  need	  to	  
upgrade	  existing	  housing	  among	  low-­‐income	  people.”	  Within	  months	  of	  his	  
acknowledgment,	  the	  mayor	  had	  assembled	  a	  team	  enjoined	  with	  the	  task	  of	  formulating	  
strategies	  for	  housing	  production	  and	  stability.	  The	  committee	  found	  that	  nearly	  40	  percent	  
of	  private	  housing	  in	  the	  city	  was	  substandard	  and	  code	  enforcement	  had	  become	  
nonexistent.	  Its	  solution	  was	  to	  tether	  public	  subsidies	  to	  the	  private	  housing	  market.	  
Committee	  members	  believed	  that	  only	  through	  alliances	  with	  private-­‐sector	  landlords	  and	  
developers	  could	  the	  city	  begin	  to	  make	  a	  dent	  in	  the	  housing	  crisis.	  See	  James	  H.	  Gillis,	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the	  housing	  crisis.	  By	  1971,	  the	  buildings	  were	  in	  complete	  disrepair.	  The	  OEO-­‐	  
funded	  New	  Orleans	  Legal	  Assistance	  Corps	  condemned	  both	  HUD	  and	  the	  city	  
government	  for	  not	  addressing	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  Parkchester	  residents	  
were	  living.84	  HUD	  had	  a	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  the	  interest	  of	  taxpayer	  dollars	  
that	  financed	  the	  FHA	  loan,	  the	  lawyers	  group	  insisted.	  To	  allow	  private	  landlords	  to	  
let	  the	  buildings	  deteriorate	  was	  not	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  tenants,	  or	  HUD	  itself,	  the	  
group's	  press	  release	  read.	  City	  officials,	  the	  lawyers	  argued,	  were	  also	  implicated.	  
For	  years,	  local	  governing	  officials	  had	  made	  excuses	  for	  why	  they	  could	  not	  
interfere	  with	  private-­‐sector	  housing.85	  Now	  they	  had	  a	  crisis	  on	  their	  hands.	  
With	  local	  media	  beginning	  to	  narrate	  the	  story	  as	  a	  scandal,	  the	  mayor’s	  
housing	  aide,	  Bob	  Tucker,	  was	  sent	  to	  meet	  with	  residents.	  What	  Tucker	  found	  was	  
appalling:	  In	  visiting	  just	  one	  of	  the	  apartment	  buildings,	  containing	  only	  eight	  of	  the	  
1,200	  apartments,	  the	  city	  inspector	  accompanying	  Tucker	  had	  uncovered	  more	  
than	  150	  housing	  code	  violations.86	  The	  city	  moved	  quickly	  to	  address	  Tucker’s	  
findings	  and	  formulate	  a	  plan	  of	  action.	  The	  mayor	  announced	  that	  the	  city	  could	  not	  
“tolerate	  such	  a	  large	  area	  as	  Parkchester	  to	  deteriorate	  and	  become	  a	  blight	  on	  New	  
Orleans.”87	  He	  assured	  citizens	  that	  the	  buildings	  would	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  decline	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
"Action	  Housing	  Plan	  Outlined,"	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  July	  31,	  1971,	  1.	  See	  also	  Report,	  Housing	  
Strategy	  for	  the	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  Mayor’s	  Housing	  Committee,	  1971,	  Box	  13,	  Folder	  3;	  
Bernard	  Lemann	  Collection,	  Jones	  Library,	  Tulane	  University,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
84	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Action	  Urged	  on	  Apartments,”	  July	  15,	  1971,	  106.	  
	  
85	  Ibid.	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any	  further.	  Organizing	  a	  bus	  tour	  of	  the	  area,	  Tucker	  returned	  with	  the	  heads	  of	  
nearly	  every	  single	  city	  department.88	  Tucker	  hoped	  that	  by	  illuminating	  some	  of	  
these	  conditions,	  the	  mayor’s	  office	  could	  compel	  enhanced	  sanitation,	  lighting,	  and	  
police	  presence	  within	  the	  area.	  	  	  
Yet,	  one	  by	  one,	  city	  department	  chairs	  responded	  to	  the	  mayor’s	  call	  to	  
action	  expressing	  that	  there	  was	  little	  that	  they	  could	  do	  on	  private	  property.89	  Real	  
efforts	  to	  clean	  up	  the	  area	  would	  have	  to	  come	  from	  the	  property	  owners	  
themselves,	  one	  department	  director	  told	  Tucker.90	  Whether	  their	  inability	  to	  act	  
was	  truthful	  or	  not,	  without	  the	  cooperation	  of	  city	  services,	  there	  was	  little	  the	  city	  
could	  do	  to	  enforce	  improvement.	  Residents	  suggested	  the	  city	  impose	  city	  building	  
codes	  as	  a	  means	  of	  forcing	  repairs.91	  
	  However,	  there	  was	  a	  conundrum:	  Bringing	  the	  buildings	  up	  to	  code	  would	  
facilitate	  a	  rent	  increase	  that	  would	  compel	  nearly	  across-­‐the-­‐board	  evictions	  in	  
poor	  neighborhoods.	  Many	  landlords,	  when	  confronted	  with	  code	  violations,	  would	  
enact	  evictions	  instead	  of	  going	  through	  the	  process	  of	  making	  changes	  and	  
increasing	  rent.	  It	  was	  easier	  to	  remove	  people	  entirely	  or	  allow	  conditions	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  Memo,	  Robert	  H.	  Tucker	  to	  City	  Department	  Heads,	  July	  2,	  1971,	  Box	  H16,	  Folder	  
Parkchester,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Mayoral	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  
Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
89	  Memo,	  F.	  L.	  Schmitt,	  Director	  of	  Utilities	  to	  Robert	  H.	  Tucker,	  July	  9,	  1971,	  Box	  
H16,	  Folder	  Parkchester,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Mayoral	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  
Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
90	  Memo,	  F.	  L.	  Schmitt,	  Director	  of	  Utilities	  to	  Robert	  H.	  Tucker,	  July	  9,	  1971,	  Box	  
H16,	  Folder	  Parkchester,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Mayoral	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  
Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
91	  Larry	  Jones	  and	  Lyn	  LeBeaud,	  "Parkchester:	  The	  Beginning	  and	  the	  End,"	  in	  Input	  
New	  Orleans,	  113	  (New	  Orleans:	  Orleans	  Parish	  Schools,	  1975).	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deteriorate	  and	  hope	  the	  government	  looked	  the	  other	  way,	  which	  it	  did	  more	  often	  
than	  not.	  Thus,	  code	  enforcement	  in	  New	  Orleans	  had	  been	  almost	  nonexistent	  as	  
city	  officials	  continued	  to	  turn	  a	  blind	  eye.92	  By	  the	  1970s,	  housing	  officials	  and	  
management	  alike	  excused	  the	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  city	  standards.	  	  	  
Despite	  the	  mayor’s	  rhetoric,	  little	  was	  done	  about	  the	  complex	  and	  
conditions	  continued	  to	  worsen.	  In	  March	  1974,	  the	  issue	  emerged	  once	  again.	  As	  
rumors	  rumbled	  through	  the	  decrepit	  apartment	  complex	  that	  the	  buildings	  might	  
be	  torn	  down,	  tenants,	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  the	  St.	  Bernard	  Community	  Center,	  
sprang	  into	  action.	  Filing	  with	  the	  City	  Council	  a	  petition	  signed	  by	  more	  than	  1,700	  
people,	  the	  residents	  claimed	  that	  they	  could	  not	  get	  owners	  to	  take	  basic	  actions	  to	  
board	  up	  vacant	  apartments	  or	  keep	  hallways	  clear	  of	  rubbish.	  Such	  inaction	  
compromised	  the	  tenants'	  safety	  while	  violating	  city	  housing	  codes.93	  This	  was	  a	  city	  
problem,	  a	  city	  responsibility,	  residents	  claimed.	  They	  demanded	  that	  the	  buildings	  
be	  held	  to	  code	  and	  repaired	  with	  city	  financing.	  Led	  by	  local	  housing	  activists	  Larry	  
Jones,	  director	  of	  the	  St.	  Bernard	  Community	  Center,	  and	  Lyn	  LeBeaud,	  they	  
demanded	  action	  by	  HUD	  as	  well.	  The	  Department	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  
Development	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  monitoring	  the	  viability	  of	  low-­‐
income	  housing,	  residents	  said.	  Now,	  HUD	  had	  shirked	  that	  mandate.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  Report,	  “Mayor’s	  Housing	  Committee	  Housing	  Strategy	  draft,”	  September	  6,	  1973,	  
City	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  Tom	  Taylor	  personal	  collection,	  in	  custody	  of	  author.	  
	  
93	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  "N.O.	  Toughens	  Position	  on	  Apartments,"	  March	  29,	  1974,	  8.	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The	  mayor	  believed	  his	  hands	  were	  tied.	  The	  buildings	  had	  become	  a	  public	  
“nuisance”	  and	  the	  only	  “moral”	  choice,	  at	  this	  point,	  was	  to	  tear	  them	  down.94	  In	  
April	  1974,	  the	  mayor’s	  office	  had	  staff	  members	  hold	  closed-­‐door	  sessions	  with	  the	  
Parkchester	  owners.	  They	  devised	  an	  agreement	  whereby	  the	  owners	  would	  
oversee	  demolition	  and	  the	  city	  would	  initiate	  the	  land	  sale.	  The	  mayor	  announced	  
that	  demolition	  would	  begin	  in	  30	  days;	  evictions	  would	  commence	  immediately.	  
The	  schedule	  left	  little	  time	  for	  displaced	  residents	  to	  seek	  other	  housing	  options.	  	  It	  
also	  circumvented	  avenues	  for	  public	  participation	  that	  could	  provide	  a	  more	  
democratic	  vision	  for	  the	  area's	  future.95	  The	  hope	  of	  city	  officials	  that	  the	  conflict	  
would	  resolve	  itself	  was	  lost	  as	  a	  rumor	  found	  its	  way	  to	  the	  media	  that	  the	  city	  was	  
negotiating	  a	  deal	  to	  construct	  single-­‐family	  homes	  and	  luxury	  retail	  stores	  on	  the	  
former	  site.	  Finally,	  community	  tensions	  boiled	  over.96	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Memo,	  Robert	  Tucker	  to	  Judge	  Alvin	  B.	  Rubin,	  January	  15,	  1974,	  Box	  14,	  Folder	  
Parkchester,	  January	  1975-­‐	  February	  1978,	  Moon	  Landrieu	  Papers,	  Loyola	  University	  
Libraries,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
95	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Apartment	  Owners	  Agree	  to	  Demolition—Councilman,”	  April	  16,	  
1974,	  54.	  
	  
96	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  Parkchester	  Tenants	  Association,	  organized	  to	  
manage	  the	  rent	  strike,	  was	  run	  in	  part	  by	  Larry	  Jones,	  a	  resident	  of	  the	  neighboring	  St.	  
Bernard	  Housing	  Project.	  Nationwide,	  the	  early	  1970s	  saw	  protracted	  rent	  strikes	  
throughout	  public	  housing	  projects.	  However,	  there	  were	  far	  fewer	  public	  housing	  strikes	  in	  
New	  Orleans	  during	  the	  1970s.	  There	  have	  been	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  suggested	  as	  to	  why	  
this	  may	  have	  been.	  One	  possible	  reason	  is	  that	  unlike	  other	  cities,	  where	  public	  housing	  
has	  typically	  been	  isolated	  in	  the	  central	  city,	  New	  Orleans	  public	  housing	  was	  spread	  
throughout	  the	  city.	  Areas	  such	  as	  Desire-­‐Florida,	  the	  Lower	  Ninth	  Ward,	  and	  the	  St.	  
Bernard	  Homes	  were	  all	  geographically	  isolated	  and	  socially	  disenfranchised.	  These	  factors	  
may	  have	  made	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  create	  a	  collective	  movement	  across	  housing	  projects.	  
Landrieu’s	  Housing	  Authority	  Director	  Clyde	  T.	  J.	  McHenry	  suggested	  a	  similar	  reason.	  
McHenry	  relayed	  that	  the	  prior	  director	  of	  the	  Housing	  Authority	  of	  New	  Orleans	  (HANO),	  
Gilbert	  Scheib,	  refused	  tenant	  participation	  within	  the	  management	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  
housing	  projects.	  In	  his	  30-­‐year	  tenure,	  Scheib	  outlawed	  tenant	  organizations	  in	  order	  to	  
keep	  residents	  from	  mobilizing.	  Even	  after	  his	  departure,	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  get	  tenants	  to	  
	  
	   135	  
On	  June	  10,	  1974,	  angry	  Parkchester	  residents	  made	  their	  way	  to	  the	  mayor’s	  
Broadmoor	  home,	  demanding	  an	  audience	  with	  Landrieu.	  Earlier	  that	  month,	  the	  
tenants,	  assisted	  by	  Jones,	  the	  fiery	  housing	  activist,	  had	  begun	  a	  rent	  strike.	  
Residents	  had	  alleged	  that	  the	  landlords	  had	  intentionally	  allowed	  the	  apartments	  
to	  deteriorate	  once	  the	  socioeconomic	  and	  racial	  composition	  of	  residents	  began	  to	  
change.	  Now,	  with	  eviction	  notices	  in	  hand,	  they	  demanded	  that	  the	  city	  protect	  
their	  right	  to	  a	  decent	  home.97	  The	  protesters	  carried	  with	  them	  a	  list	  of	  Parkchester	  
tenants	  who	  had	  been	  told	  to	  vacate	  their	  crumbling	  apartments.	  The	  self-­‐
proclaimed	  Parkchester	  Tenants	  Association	  demanded	  that	  city	  officials	  assist	  
residents	  in	  navigating	  the	  limited	  terrain	  of	  low-­‐income	  housing.	  If	  they	  were	  not	  
given	  alternatives,	  residents	  would	  refuse	  their	  evictions.	  While	  the	  mayor	  looked	  
on,	  silent,	  residents	  demanded	  to	  know	  whether	  his	  government	  would	  be	  with	  or	  
against	  the	  city’s	  poor.	  Landrieu's	  lack	  of	  response	  was	  immediately	  interpreted	  as	  a	  
refusal	  to	  advocate	  for	  low-­‐income	  residents.	  What	  this	  represented,	  Jones	  told	  
reporters,	  was	  not	  just	  the	  failure	  to	  protect	  Parkchester	  residents,	  but	  the	  
systematic	  removal	  of	  poor	  people	  across	  the	  city	  in	  order	  to	  encourage	  
gentrification.98	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
form	  collective	  organizations,	  perhaps	  because	  there	  was	  no	  such	  tradition.	  Widespread	  
rent	  strikes	  in	  New	  Orleans	  public	  housing	  did	  not	  occur	  until	  the	  1980s.	  (Oral	  History	  with	  
Clyde	  T.	  J.	  McHenry,	  October	  19,	  2011);	  See	  also	  Martha	  Mahoney,	  "Law	  and	  Racial	  
Geography:	  Public	  Housing	  and	  the	  Economy	  in	  New	  Orleans,"	  Stanford	  Law	  Review	  42,	  no.	  
5	  (1990).	  
	  
97	  Louisiana	  Weekly,	  “Parkchester	  Fight	  Takes	  New	  Direction,”	  July	  27,	  1974.	  
Reprinted	  in	  Rose	  Drill	  and	  G.	  Lee	  Caston,	  Input	  New	  Orleans,	  “Parkchester	  Case,”	  Career	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By	  October,	  any	  progress	  on	  resolving	  the	  Parkchester	  conflict	  had	  stopped.	  
The	  rent	  strike	  was	  now	  in	  its	  fifth	  month.	  Evictions	  were	  temporarily	  postponed,	  
but	  so	  was	  any	  regular	  maintenance	  of	  the	  buildings	  themselves.	  The	  city,	  compelled	  
to	  include	  citizen	  participation	  in	  attempts	  to	  alleviate	  the	  ramifications	  of	  a	  
prolonged	  strike,	  proposed	  open	  hearings	  on	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Parkchester	  site.	  On	  
October	  2,	  1974,	  city	  officials,	  Parkchester	  residents,	  and	  their	  allied	  housing	  
activists	  gathered	  in	  council	  chambers	  to	  discuss	  potential	  zoning	  ordinances	  that	  
would	  allow	  the	  proposed	  development	  to	  move	  forward.	  Because	  planning	  
commission	  hearings	  had	  in	  previous	  months	  become	  a	  battleground	  between	  
Centurion,	  the	  Atlanta-­‐based	  company	  seeking	  to	  redevelop	  the	  land,	  and	  the	  
remaining	  Parkchester	  residents,	  tensions	  were	  high.	  The	  city,	  Jones	  argued,	  had	  
promised	  that	  planners	  would	  complete	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  area	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
rest	  of	  the	  city	  to	  determine	  the	  best	  use	  of	  the	  land.	  By	  proceeding	  with	  zoning	  
changes,	  he	  contended,	  the	  city	  not	  only	  had	  failed	  to	  uphold	  that	  promise,	  it	  was	  
ensuring	  that	  low-­‐income	  housing	  would	  not	  be	  built	  in	  Parkchester’s	  stead.	  
Centurion	  confirmed	  those	  fears.	  The	  company's	  spokesperson	  told	  residents	  that	  
the	  firm	  could	  see	  no	  profitable	  way	  to	  build	  housing	  that	  Parkchester	  residents	  
would	  be	  able	  to	  afford.99	  	  	  
Not	  everyone	  agreed	  with	  Centurion’s	  prognosis	  or	  the	  idea	  that	  private	  
profit	  would	  somehow	  be	  better	  for	  a	  city	  of	  poor	  people	  than	  investing	  in	  low-­‐
income	  housing.	  Vernon	  Winslow,	  an	  art	  professor	  at	  New	  Orleans’s	  historically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  Larry	  Jones	  and	  Lyn	  LeBeaud,	  Parkchester:	  The	  Beginning	  and	  the	  End,	  Input	  New	  
Orleans	  (New	  Orleans:	  Orleans	  Parish	  Schools),	  1976,	  113.	  
	  
	  
	   137	  
black	  Dillard	  University,	  disparaged	  the	  priorities	  of	  the	  city	  government.	  It	  was	  
time	  that	  the	  planning	  commission	  develop	  plans	  that	  “grow	  with	  people,	  not	  
corporations,”	  he	  said.100	  The	  city	  should	  consider	  the	  positive	  developments	  that	  
the	  conflict	  fostered	  in	  the	  Parkchester	  community.	  For	  years,	  low-­‐income	  residents	  
had	  been	  systematically	  and	  socioeconomically	  disenfranchised,	  but	  the	  conflict	  had	  
engendered	  a	  new	  sense	  of	  community	  by	  uniting	  residents	  for	  the	  betterment	  of	  
their	  area.	  This	  unity	  was	  something,	  Winslow	  said,	  that	  could	  be	  utilized	  to	  stabilize	  
the	  at-­‐risk	  neighborhood.	  But	  if	  the	  complex,	  fraught	  with	  issues	  as	  it	  was,	  were	  
demolished,	  he	  said,	  the	  city	  would	  be	  “killing	  off	  a	  great	  potential	  for	  the	  city	  of	  
New	  Orleans."	  "Our	  new	  leadership	  is	  here,”	  the	  professor	  argued.101	  	  	  
State	  Senator	  Sidney	  Barthelemy	  reiterated	  Winslow’s	  evaluation.	  Whether	  
or	  not	  luxury	  development	  was	  an	  attractive	  prospect	  to	  reclaiming	  a	  middle	  class,	  
“there	  is	  a	  crying	  need	  for	  low-­‐income	  housing,"	  he	  said.	  "Low-­‐income	  housing	  is	  
constantly	  torn	  down,	  forcing	  people	  to	  relocate	  outside	  the	  city.	  And	  there	  are	  very	  
few	  places	  to	  go.”102	  Neighborhood	  stabilization	  should	  be	  a	  goal	  for	  low-­‐income	  
areas	  as	  well,	  he	  suggested.	  To	  allow	  Centurion	  to	  move	  forward,	  the	  city	  would	  be	  
complicit	  in	  the	  grossly	  irresponsible	  displacement	  of	  the	  city’s	  poor.	  
The	  Louisiana	  Advisory	  Committee	  to	  the	  United	  States	  Commission	  on	  Civil	  
Rights	  underscored	  this	  critique	  of	  local	  inaction.	  The	  committee's	  research	  
elucidated	  how	  pervasive	  racism—by	  lenders,	  landlords,	  and	  real	  estate	  agencies—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




102	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Parkchester	  Issue	  Pulls	  Angry	  Clash,”	  October	  17,	  1974,	  13.	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left	  low-­‐income	  people	  of	  color,	  particularly	  in	  New	  Orleans,	  with	  few	  means	  to	  
pursue	  decent	  housing.	  Given	  the	  paucity	  of	  low-­‐income	  housing,	  the	  committee	  
observed,	  nearly	  all	  housing	  obtainable	  by	  low-­‐income	  people	  of	  color	  was	  
substandard,	  far	  from	  up	  to	  code.	  The	  exigency	  for	  low-­‐income	  housing	  was	  only	  
intensified	  by	  the	  discrepancies	  in	  income	  between	  black	  and	  white	  urban	  residents.	  
Black	  residents,	  the	  report	  detailed,	  made	  more	  than	  50	  percent	  less	  than	  their	  
white	  counterparts.	  Their	  housing	  options	  then	  had	  far	  greater	  limitations	  that	  
would	  only	  be	  exacerbated	  by	  demand-­‐side	  programs	  like	  Section	  8.103	  As	  city	  
officials	  continued	  to	  hold	  steadfast	  that	  there	  was	  little	  they	  could	  do,	  the	  report	  
dismissed	  their	  inertia	  altogether.	  Enforcing	  city	  codes	  and	  emboldening	  city	  
inspectors	  could,	  the	  committee	  noted,	  provide	  a	  path	  to	  upholding	  standards	  for	  
low-­‐income	  residents,	  not	  just	  the	  city’s	  middle	  class.	  The	  city	  should	  be	  advocates	  
for	  low-­‐income	  residents,	  not	  bystanders	  promoting	  private-­‐sector	  housing	  
irrespective	  of	  quality.104	  	  	  
To	  stave	  off	  allegations	  of	  racial	  discrimination,	  the	  city	  began	  to	  advocate	  
and	  won	  federal	  relocation	  vouchers	  for	  “cooperative”	  residents.	  To	  qualify,	  
residents	  were	  required	  to	  continue	  to	  pay	  rent	  despite	  the	  insufficient	  maintenance	  
of	  the	  buildings.	  They	  must	  be	  willing	  to	  comply	  with	  eviction	  notices.	  In	  turn,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  Louisiana	  Weekly,	  “Low	  Cost	  Housing	  Shortage	  Hits	  Local	  Blacks	  Hardest,”	  
November	  9,	  1974,	  1.	  Reprinted	  in	  Rose	  Drill	  and	  G.	  Lee	  Caston,	  Input	  New	  Orleans:	  
Parkchester	  Case,	  Career	  Education	  Department	  (New	  Orleans:	  Orleans	  Parish	  Schools,	  
1976).	  See	  also	  Report,	  James	  R.	  Bobo,	  "Housing	  in	  New	  Orleans	  ,"	  February	  10,	  1978,	  Box	  
101,	  17,	  Ernest	  Morial	  Mayoral	  Transition	  Papers,	  Amistad	  Research	  Center,	  Tulane	  
University,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
104	  Louisiana	  Weekly,	  “Low	  Cost	  Housing	  Shortage	  Hits	  Local	  Blacks	  Hardest,”	  
November	  9,	  1974,	  1.	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city	  would	  provide	  relocation	  fees	  and	  facilitate	  a	  transition	  into	  traditional	  public	  
housing	  or	  the	  new	  Section	  8	  program.	  Residents,	  however,	  saw	  these	  options	  as	  
unacceptable,	  stating	  that	  they	  would	  only	  further	  poor	  people’s	  isolation.	  Rumors	  
that	  the	  city	  was	  allowing	  slumlords	  to	  participate	  in	  Section	  8	  housing	  only	  fueled	  
speculation	  that	  local	  officials	  were	  attempting	  to	  rid	  the	  city	  of	  poor	  people.105	  
Residents	  countered	  that	  the	  city's	  plan	  was	  not	  enough.106	  	  
The	  tenant	  collective	  employed	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  Louisiana	  Advisory	  
Committee	  to	  file	  suit	  against	  HUD	  in	  District	  Court	  alleging	  that	  the	  deterioration	  of	  
the	  building	  was	  a	  result	  of	  racial	  discrimination.107	  The	  judge,	  Alvin	  B.	  Rubin,	  
quickly	  issued	  a	  stay	  of	  order	  against	  demolition	  proceedings	  until	  the	  case	  was	  
resolved.	  Yet	  the	  temporary	  injunction	  did	  little	  to	  stop	  the	  steady	  stream	  of	  eviction	  
notices.	  Less	  than	  a	  week	  later,	  10	  more	  families	  were	  told	  they	  had	  less	  than	  a	  week	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105	  	  There	  was	  overwhelming	  suspicion	  on	  the	  part	  of	  local	  residents	  about	  how	  
Section	  8	  would	  provide	  better	  options	  for	  low-­‐income	  people.	  Officials	  at	  the	  city’s	  Human	  
Relations	  Committee	  warned	  that	  any	  “provision	  of	  safe,	  standard	  housing	  for	  all	  is	  nothing	  
more	  than	  a	  statement”	  if	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  break	  the	  barriers	  of	  low-­‐income	  housing	  
segregation	  in	  the	  private	  marketplace.	  While	  local	  officials	  hoped	  Section	  8	  would	  open	  
other	  neighborhoods	  of	  the	  city,	  thus	  diluting	  the	  concentrated	  poverty	  found	  in	  areas	  like	  
Central	  City	  and	  the	  Lower	  Ninth	  Ward,	  they	  had	  found	  it	  hard	  to	  encourage	  more	  affluent	  
neighborhoods	  to	  accept	  even	  a	  minuscule	  number	  of	  units	  of	  Section	  8	  housing.	  Thus,	  more	  
often	  than	  not,	  Section	  8	  housing,	  which	  Congress	  intended	  as	  a	  means	  to	  deconcentrate	  
areas	  with	  high	  poverty,	  was	  located	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  traditional	  housing	  projects.	  See	  
Memo,	  Carol	  Swain	  to	  Darlene	  Walk,	  Review	  on	  Housing	  Needs	  Assessments,	  October	  10,	  
1977,	  Box	  11,	  Folder	  GT-­‐NA-­‐HOUS:	  Housing	  Needs	  Assessments,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  
and	  Analysis	  Collection,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
106	  Louisiana	  Weekly,	  “Injunction	  Hearing	  Opens	  in	  2	  Million	  Parkchester	  Suit,	  
December	  7,	  1974.	  Reprinted	  in	  Rose	  Drill	  and	  G.	  Lee	  Caston,	  Input	  New	  Orleans,	  
“Parkchester	  Case,”	  Career	  Education	  Department	  (New	  Orleans:	  Orleans	  Parish	  Schools,	  
1976).	  
	  
107	  The	  tenant	  organization	  argued	  that	  because	  HUD	  owned	  the	  mortgage	  on	  the	  
building,	  it	  was	  the	  department's	  responsibility	  to	  enforce	  the	  antidiscrimination	  laws	  
associated	  with	  buildings	  constructed	  with	  federal	  aid.	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to	  clear	  their	  apartments.	  On	  the	  day	  of	  eviction,	  angry	  tenants	  led	  by	  Jones	  met	  the	  
deputy-­‐hired	  movers	  at	  the	  doors	  of	  the	  complex.	  Tenants	  used	  their	  own	  bodies	  to	  
surround	  the	  building	  and	  entreated	  the	  movers	  to	  walk	  away.	  Media	  outlets,	  
perched	  in	  their	  vehicles,	  waited	  for	  what	  they	  believed	  would	  quickly	  escalate	  into	  
riots.	  However,	  despite	  the	  tension,	  both	  sides	  stayed	  calm.	  After	  hushed	  
deliberations,	  the	  hired	  movers	  decided	  to	  return	  to	  their	  vehicles.	  A	  reporter	  
shouted,	  demanding	  to	  know	  what	  was	  going	  on.	  One	  of	  the	  movers	  turned	  around,	  
“It’s	  not	  my	  job	  to	  move	  my	  own	  black	  people’s	  furniture	  out.”108	  The	  striking	  
tenants	  rejoiced.	  
The	  Kauffman	  brothers	  quickly	  found	  laborers	  willing	  to	  cross	  the	  tenant	  line.	  
Following	  a	  string	  of	  forced	  evictions,	  the	  remaining	  members	  of	  the	  tenant	  group,	  
some	  50	  people,	  marched	  into	  City	  Hall	  demanding	  a	  conference	  with	  the	  mayor.	  
Tenants	  refused	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  city	  was	  without	  options	  to	  intervene	  on	  behalf	  
of	  those	  who	  resided	  in	  Parkchester.	  With	  the	  prospect	  of	  CDBGs,	  residents	  
tendered	  that	  community	  development	  funds	  could	  be	  used	  to	  rehabilitate	  the	  
buildings	  to	  their	  prior	  state.	  The	  buildings,	  lacking	  proper	  lighting	  and	  sanitation	  
and	  literally	  crumbling	  at	  the	  foundation,	  certainly	  qualified	  under	  legislative	  
standards	  as	  “blight,”	  residents	  argued.	  To	  blight	  the	  buildings,	  or	  the	  entire	  area,	  
would	  allow	  the	  city	  the	  opportunity	  to	  make	  a	  concerted	  stand	  to	  protect	  the	  area’s	  
low-­‐income	  community.	  The	  mayor	  never	  emerged	  from	  his	  office.	  
	  After	  residents	  left,	  the	  mayor	  angrily	  denied	  the	  city’s	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  
fate	  of	  the	  buildings.	  He	  said,	  “The	  federal	  government,	  which	  holds	  $5	  million	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108Millie	  Ball,	  “Eviction	  Attempt	  Thwarted,	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  October	  31,	  1974,	  1.	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mortgages	  on	  Parkchester,	  says	  it	  should	  be	  torn	  down.	  The	  people	  here	  at	  City	  Hall,	  
who	  are	  experts	  in	  that	  field,	  say	  it	  should	  be	  torn	  down	  and	  the	  answer	  is	  not	  to	  fix	  
it	  up.”109	  While	  Landrieu	  insisted	  that	  the	  city	  was	  following	  the	  protocol	  of	  experts,	  
it	  remained	  unclear	  where	  city	  officials	  imagined	  the	  remaining	  tenants	  would	  go	  
after	  eviction.	  Residents	  worried	  about	  their	  prospects	  of	  finding	  quality	  low-­‐
income	  housing	  elsewhere.	  They	  feared	  that	  blacklisting	  and	  rumors	  that	  developed	  
around	  the	  rent	  strike	  would	  hinder	  their	  capacity	  to	  relocate	  in	  private	  housing	  
settlements.	  The	  other,	  more	  plausible,	  conclusion	  was	  public	  housing—an	  option	  
that	  promised	  isolation	  and	  fast-­‐deteriorating	  conditions	  due	  to	  decreased	  federal	  
and	  local	  support.110	  	  	  
Testifying	  to	  this	  outlook	  at	  the	  district	  hearing,	  tenants	  argued	  that	  the	  
buildings	  had	  deteriorated	  not	  due	  to	  age,	  but	  with	  the	  integration	  of	  the	  
apartments	  in	  the	  late	  1960s.	  Apartments	  with	  white	  residents	  were	  better	  
maintained	  and	  enjoyed	  swift	  response	  from	  maintenance,	  residents	  described,	  
while	  black	  tenants	  often	  found	  apartments	  deteriorating	  upon	  their	  arrival.	  Dyan	  
French	  Cole,	  soon-­‐to-­‐be-­‐elected	  president	  of	  the	  local	  chapter	  of	  the	  National	  
Association	  for	  the	  Advancement	  of	  Colored	  People	  (NAACP),	  told	  the	  judge	  that	  
when	  she	  arrived	  in	  1968,	  the	  apartment	  complex	  was	  functioning	  and	  decent.	  As	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  Paul	  Atkinson,	  "Only	  Solution	  for	  Parkchester:	  ‘Tear	  it	  Down,'	  ”	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  
November	  14,	  1974,	  1.	  
	  
110	  There	  was	  also	  a	  waiting	  list	  to	  be	  accepted	  into	  public	  housing	  that	  was	  almost	  
8,000	  people	  long	  just	  a	  few	  years	  later	  in	  1978.	  	  See	  James	  R.	  Bobo,	  "Housing	  in	  New	  
Orleans,"	  in	  Task	  Force	  on	  Assisted	  Housing,	  Subcommittiee	  on	  Housing	  and	  Community	  
Development,	  US	  House	  of	  Representatives	  Committee	  on	  Banking,	  Finance	  and	  Urban	  
Affairs	  (Washington)	  and	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  "Parkchester	  loss	  said	  ‘Devastating,’	  ”	  November	  
28,	  1974,	  1.	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white	  residents	  left,	  that	  all	  changed.	  Maintenance	  clearly	  stopped	  as	  the	  population	  
of	  the	  Parkchester	  units	  became	  increasingly	  black—lights	  went	  out	  and	  were	  never	  
fixed,	  garbage	  was	  left	  on	  sidewalks.111	  The	  city,	  residents	  claimed,	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  
decline,	  and	  did	  little	  to	  stop	  the	  Kauffmans	  from	  operating	  the	  buildings	  as	  slum	  
landlords.112	  	  	  
Support	  for	  the	  residents	  was	  broad.	  Ralph	  Thayer,	  the	  director	  of	  the	  
University	  of	  New	  Orleans’s	  Urban	  Studies	  Institute,	  told	  the	  judge	  that	  there	  was	  no	  
good	  reason	  why	  the	  buildings	  should	  not	  be	  preserved.	  Displacement	  of	  the	  400-­‐
odd	  families	  remaining	  in	  the	  Parkchester	  apartments	  would	  not	  only	  be	  
“devastating”	  for	  the	  livelihood	  of	  those	  individuals,	  but	  would	  only	  further	  
exacerbate	  the	  city’s	  damaged	  housing	  supply.113	  Thayer	  argued	  that	  the	  city	  had	  
failed	  to	  provide	  the	  most	  basic	  accommodation—housing—to	  its	  poor	  residents.	  
With	  the	  “acute”	  shortage	  of	  low-­‐income	  housing,	  relocation	  payments	  would	  do	  
little	  to	  aid	  residents	  in	  finding	  quality	  housing,	  an	  “impossibility”	  in	  the	  current	  
climate,	  the	  professor	  claimed.	  The	  city’s	  plan	  to	  demolish	  the	  buildings	  would,	  by	  
displacing	  low-­‐income	  tenants,	  only	  intensify	  the	  crisis	  of	  public	  housing,	  which	  in	  
New	  Orleans	  was	  contending	  with	  long	  waiting	  lists	  and	  a	  shortage	  of	  funds	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  Rosemary	  James,	  “The	  Uproar	  Over	  Parkchester,”	  Figaro,	  July	  23,	  1975,	  3.	  
	  
112	  Louisiana	  Weekly,	  “Parkchester	  Tenants	  Picket	  in	  Protest	  at	  HUD,”	  August	  10,	  
1974.	  Found	  in	  Rose	  Drill	  and	  G.	  Lee	  Caston,	  Input	  New	  Orleans:	  Parkchester	  Case,	  Career	  
Education	  Department	  (New	  Orleans:	  Orleans	  Parish	  Schools,	  1976),	  91.	  
	  
113	  Ibid.	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maintenance.114	  If	  New	  Orleans	  failed	  to	  develop	  a	  strategy	  to	  promote	  equitable	  
housing	  opportunities,	  the	  city	  would	  see	  “more	  Parkchesters,”	  Thayer	  concluded.115	  	  	  
Despite	  the	  damning	  implications,	  Judge	  Rubin	  found	  against	  the	  residents.	  	  
Dismissing	  claims	  of	  discrimination,	  the	  judge	  offered	  an	  alternative:	  The	  buildings	  
were	  simply	  no	  longer	  economically	  viable.	  It	  was	  not	  race	  that	  motivated	  the	  willful	  
disregard	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  owners.	  In	  fact,	  they	  had	  not	  barred	  black	  residents	  
from	  moving	  into	  the	  complex.	  In	  actuality,	  the	  judge	  decided,	  the	  profit	  from	  rent	  
was	  simply	  not	  enough	  to	  sustain	  rising	  operating	  costs.	  There	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  
market	  for	  housing	  of	  that	  kind.	  The	  court	  concluded	  that	  future	  land	  use	  in	  the	  area	  
was	  at	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  city	  and	  the	  future	  owners	  in	  conjunction	  with	  HUD.	  The	  
attendant	  shift,	  from	  low-­‐income	  to	  the	  proposed	  luxury	  housing,	  was,	  Rubin	  
concluded,	  “on	  balance,	  better	  for	  the	  city.”116	  	  	  
	  	  The	  decision	  came	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Centurion	  bid,	  
motivating	  HUD	  to	  consider	  foreclosure.	  As	  word	  of	  the	  decision	  trickled	  down	  to	  
residents,	  the	  Parkchester	  Tenant	  Association	  once	  again	  implored	  that	  the	  city	  
mobilize	  community	  development	  funds	  to	  rehabilitate	  the	  building	  under	  HUD	  
supervision.	  In	  a	  city-­‐sponsored	  town	  hall	  meeting	  at	  the	  neighboring	  St.	  Bernard	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  Ralph	  E.	  Thayer,	  "The	  Parkchester	  Apartment	  Controversy:	  Act	  I	  in	  the	  Drama	  of	  
the	  70's,"	  in	  Input	  New	  Orleans	  (New	  Orleans,	  1975),	  106.	  	  	  
	  
115	  Ralph	  E.	  Thayer,	  "The	  Parkchester	  Apartment	  Controversy:	  Act	  I	  in	  the	  Drama	  of	  
the	  70's,"	  in	  Input	  New	  Orleans	  (New	  Orleans,	  1975),	  107.	  
	  
116	  Elouise	  Jones	  v.	  the	  Department	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development,	  Civ.	  A.	  No.	  74-­‐
2628.	  (United	  States	  District	  Court,	  E.	  D.	  Louisiana.,	  December	  12,	  1974).	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housing	  projects,	  residents	  gathered	  to	  make	  one	  last	  plea.117	  Jones,	  speaking	  as	  the	  
tenant	  leader,	  argued	  that	  the	  mandate	  of	  federal	  aid	  was	  to	  provide	  adequate	  low-­‐
income	  housing	  in	  areas	  suffering	  from	  blight.	  As	  city	  officials	  asked	  residents	  to	  
rank	  their	  needs	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  priority,	  Jones	  interrupted,	  yelling,	  “Our	  first	  need	  is	  
housing,	  and	  it's	  our	  second,	  our	  third,	  fourth,	  fifth,	  and	  sixth.”	  Residents	  warned	  
that	  renewal	  activities	  that	  did	  not	  include	  provisions	  for	  low-­‐income	  housing	  
would	  not	  be	  accepted.118	  City	  officials	  had	  no	  answers.	  
In	  1975,	  the	  Parkchester	  complex,	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  privately	  owned	  low-­‐
income	  housing	  developments	  in	  the	  South,	  was	  torn	  down.	  In	  1977,	  the	  land	  
remained	  condemned	  and	  undeveloped.	  New	  Orleans	  city	  officials	  applied	  CDBG	  
funds	  to	  hire	  a	  consulting	  agency	  to	  formulate	  plans	  for	  the	  land	  where	  Parkchester	  
once	  was.	  The	  company’s	  report	  insisted	  that	  there	  was	  no	  feasible	  way	  to	  build	  
low-­‐income	  housing	  without	  accruing	  considerable	  cost	  amid	  a	  climate	  of	  uncertain	  
support	  for	  low-­‐income	  housing	  subsidies.	  The	  most	  readily	  available	  option	  would	  
be	  to	  adopt	  a	  plan	  to	  build	  limited	  moderate-­‐income	  homes,	  and	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  
single-­‐family	  homes	  and	  luxury	  apartments.119	  Ronald	  Brignac,	  a	  leading	  member	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117Memo,	  Cynthia	  Lewis	  to	  Emmet	  Moten,	  “Report	  of	  Citizen	  Participation	  Meetings,”	  
January	  2,	  1975,	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  CD-­‐CD1,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Central	  Files,	  
New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
118	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Neighborhoods	  Tell	  their	  Needs	  in	  Seeking	  $14.2	  Million	  Share,”	  
January	  3,	  1975,	  18.	  
	  
119	  Interestingly,	  William	  Smolkin	  sat	  on	  the	  mayor’s	  housing	  committee	  organized	  
to	  develop	  a	  citywide	  housing	  strategy;	  all	  of	  the	  concerns	  suggested	  in	  that	  report,	  
particularly	  the	  need	  for	  more	  low-­‐income	  housing,	  were	  neglected	  in	  the	  study	  of	  
Parkchester.	  See	  Smolkin	  Consulting	  Services	  Inc.	  Marketing,	  Economic	  and	  Development	  
Consultants	  (New	  Orleans:	  Prepared	  for	  the	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  1977),	  III-­‐18,	  Earl	  K.	  Long	  
Library,	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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the	  Metropolitan	  Action	  Committee	  and	  director	  of	  the	  Urban	  Corporation,	  a	  private	  
consulting	  firm	  the	  city	  used	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  its	  planning	  department,	  affirmed	  
that	  building	  high	  rises	  and	  luxury	  shopping	  centers	  was	  vital	  in	  “creating	  the	  
market.”120	  Such	  construction,	  he	  said,	  would	  revitalize	  the	  area,	  creating	  a	  new	  
patron	  class	  for	  downtown.	  
On	  September	  20,	  1979,	  the	  former	  Parkchester	  land	  was	  re-­‐zoned	  for	  single-­‐	  
family	  development,	  thus	  ensuring	  that	  the	  area	  would	  not	  be	  used	  to	  ease	  the	  low-­‐
income	  housing	  crisis.121	  In	  affirmation	  of	  that	  decision,	  HUD	  announced	  that	  it	  
would	  sell	  the	  land	  to	  the	  highest	  bidder.122	  Amid	  rumors	  that	  City	  Hall	  officials	  had	  
blocked	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  land	  to	  a	  nonprofit	  organization	  seeking	  to	  build	  low-­‐income	  
housing,	  the	  parcel	  was	  sold	  to	  developer	  Wilson	  P.	  Abraham	  to	  renew	  the	  area	  with	  
middle-­‐income	  homes.123	  While	  even	  the	  developer	  made	  amenities	  in	  his	  plans	  for	  
some	  moderate-­‐income	  housing,	  surrounding	  white	  middle-­‐class	  residents	  warned	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  Memo,	  Ronald	  Brignac	  to	  William	  Smolkin,	  September	  16,	  1977,	  Ernest	  Morial	  
Transition	  Papers,	  Box	  48,	  Folder	  5,	  Amistad	  Resource	  Center,	  Tulane	  University,	  New	  
Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
121	  Memo,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  to	  Avery	  Alexander,	  January	  5,	  1981,	  Box	  77,	  Folder	  1,	  
Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Urban	  League	  Collection,	  Amistad	  Research	  Center,	  Tulane	  University,	  
New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
122	  Memo,	  Mark	  A.	  Moreau	  to	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial,	  August	  10,	  1981,	  Box	  K25,	  Folder	  
Parkchester	  (2	  of	  2),	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Papers,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  
Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  	  
	  
123	  Memo,	  Mark	  A.	  Moreau	  to	  Arnold	  Broussard,	  August	  17,	  1981,	  Box	  K25,	  Folder	  
Parkchester	  (2	  of	  2),	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Papers,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  
Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  See	  also	  Mike	  Montgomery,	  "Paris	  Oaks	  Subdivision	  Rises	  from	  
Parkchester,"	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  February	  11,	  1984,	  109.	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that	  to	  do	  so	  would	  ensure	  the	  area	  became	  just	  another	  city	  ghetto.124	  As	  taxpaying	  
property	  owners,	  these	  residents	  constituted	  a	  powerful	  lobby	  against	  a	  more	  
equitable	  development	  plan.	  The	  City	  Council	  supported	  their	  position	  and	  voted	  
against	  low-­‐income	  housing.	  After	  years	  of	  protracted	  community	  struggle	  against	  it,	  
development	  started	  in	  1983	  on	  the	  Paris	  Oaks	  houses.	  Paris	  Oaks	  would	  have	  73	  
moderately	  priced	  town	  homes;	  the	  rest	  would	  be	  market-­‐rate	  single-­‐family	  houses.	  	  
As	  the	  new	  housing	  was	  developed,	  the	  future	  of	  low-­‐income	  housing	  remained	  
uncertain.	  
The	  housing	  options	  for	  low-­‐income	  residents	  continued	  to	  diminish	  
throughout	  the	  1970s.	  An	  attempt	  to	  pass	  protective	  legislation	  establishing	  a	  
tenant-­‐landlord	  relations	  agency	  to	  oversee	  conditions	  and	  complaints,	  protect	  
against	  retaliatory	  evictions,	  and	  enforce	  rental	  control	  garnered	  more	  than	  10,000	  
signatures	  across	  the	  city,	  but	  was	  voted	  down	  by	  the	  City	  Council,	  who	  feared	  it	  
would	  repel	  private	  investors.125	  Low-­‐income	  city	  residents	  began	  to	  feel	  as	  if	  there	  
was	  no	  one	  on	  their	  side.	  The	  courts	  were	  “landlord	  courts,”	  HUD	  was	  “bank	  and	  
development	  oriented,”	  and	  City	  Council	  members	  were	  “lawyers	  representing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  Joe	  Massa,	  “Parkchester	  Rezoned	  for	  Single	  Family	  Units,”	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  March	  
16,	  1979,	  6.	  
	  
125	  The	  effort	  gained	  national	  attention	  from	  the	  National	  Tenants	  Organization	  and	  
its	  leader,	  Louisiana	  native	  Jesse	  Gray.	  Though	  the	  umbrella	  organization	  overseeing	  the	  
bill,	  the	  Citywide	  Housing	  Coalition,	  won	  a	  plea	  to	  the	  District	  Court	  to	  allow	  New	  Orleans	  to	  
vote	  on	  the	  referendum,	  it	  lost	  on	  appeal	  and	  the	  bill	  was	  never	  passed.	  See	  Lovell	  Beaulieu,	  
“Tenant-­‐Landlord	  Body	  on	  Nov.	  2	  Ballot	  is	  Aim,”	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  October	  1,	  1976,	  3;	  Arthur	  
Roane	  Jr.	  “Ruling	  Expected	  on	  Tenant-­‐Landlord	  Plan,”	  Times-­‐Picayune;	  September	  18,	  1976,	  
22;	  James	  R.	  Bobo,	  "Housing	  in	  New	  Orleans	  ,"	  in	  Task	  Force	  on	  Assisted	  Housing,	  
Subcommittee	  on	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development,	  US	  House	  of	  Representatives	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landlords.”	  This	  was	  the	  promise	  of	  the	  “Great	  Society	  being	  reversed,”	  activists	  
warned.126	  As	  conditions	  worsened,	  tenant	  strikes	  and	  demands	  became	  more	  
frequent.127	  Increasingly,	  public	  housing	  was	  the	  only	  real	  option	  for	  low-­‐income	  
renters.	  
Yet,	  by	  1977,	  a	  survey	  of	  the	  Housing	  Authority	  found	  the	  agency	  on	  the	  
“brink	  of	  fiscal	  disaster,	  deeply	  in	  debt,	  and	  unable	  to	  obtain	  enough	  credit	  to	  even	  
provide	  the	  most	  basic	  services.”128	  Although	  efforts	  were	  being	  made	  to	  modernize	  
all	  traditional	  housing	  projects,	  the	  work	  could	  not	  keep	  pace	  with	  the	  continued	  
deterioration	  of	  both	  buildings	  and	  services.129	  And	  while	  policy	  experts	  advanced	  
the	  idea	  that	  public	  housing	  should	  be	  abandoned,	  the	  number	  of	  people	  in	  public	  
housing	  had	  increased	  to	  nearly	  54,000;	  more	  than	  8,500	  residents	  awaited	  
placement.130	  Scattered	  site	  housing	  had	  only	  limited	  success	  in	  New	  Orleans;	  the	  
profound	  racism	  in	  affluent	  areas	  of	  the	  city	  barred	  the	  building	  of	  low-­‐income	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  Charles	  M.	  Hargroder,	  “Racism	  Rearing	  Its	  Head,	  Educator	  Warns	  Officials,”	  
Times-­‐Picayune,	  April	  24,	  1978,	  5.	  	  
	  
127	  Rent	  strikes	  occurred	  in	  low-­‐income	  housing	  across	  the	  city	  in	  1980,	  both	  in	  
privately	  owned	  and	  public	  housing.	  For	  background	  information,	  see	  John	  D.	  Arena,	  Driven	  
from	  New	  Orleans:	  How	  Nonprofits	  Betray	  Public	  Housing	  and	  Promote	  Privatization	  
(Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2013).	  
	  
128	  Memo,	  O.C.	  Kottemann	  to	  W.	  White,	  February	  24,	  1978,	  “	  Status	  of	  the	  
Modernization	  and	  TPP-­‐Modernization”,	  Box	  50,	  Folder	  6,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Transition	  
Collection,	  Amistad	  Resource	  Center,	  Tulane	  University,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
129	  Ronald	  Brignac	  and	  Merlin	  Toups,	  Review	  of	  the	  Housing	  Authority	  of	  New	  
Orleans,	  March	  1978,	  Box	  50,	  Folder	  6,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Mayoral	  Transition	  Collection,	  
Amistad	  Resource	  Center,	  Tulane	  University,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
130	  James	  R.	  Bobo,	  "Housing	  in	  New	  Orleans,"	  February	  10,	  1978,	  Box	  101,	  Folder	  17,	  
Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Mayoral	  Transition	  Collection,	  Amistad	  Resource	  Center,	  Tulane	  
University,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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private	  housing	  in	  nearly	  every	  sector	  of	  white	  New	  Orleans.	  Across	  both	  public	  and	  
private	  housing,	  buildings	  that	  had	  once	  been	  in	  fine	  condition	  looked	  increasingly	  
like	  Parkchester.	  
	  
The	  Tipping	  Point	  
Housing	  initiatives	  that	  flourished	  in	  New	  Orleans	  did	  so	  because	  they	  were	  
supported	  by	  the	  preferences	  of	  private-­‐sector	  interests.	  They	  could	  be	  completed	  
with	  diminished	  funds,	  could	  spawn	  gentrification,	  and	  were	  in	  alignment	  with	  new	  
theories	  of	  market-­‐led	  revitalization.	  In	  New	  Orleans,	  the	  public	  improvement	  
model	  fostered	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  city	  was	  making	  a	  comeback	  and,	  indeed,	  the	  area	  
benefited	  rather	  quickly	  from	  the	  return	  of	  middle-­‐income	  residents.	  Yet	  areas	  that	  
appeared	  “renewable”	  were	  confined	  to	  neighborhoods	  where	  historic	  districting	  
and	  sustained	  private	  efforts	  engendered	  pockets	  of	  gentrification.	  These	  areas,	  
successful	  as	  they	  were,	  were	  not	  indicative	  of	  a	  working	  political	  economy,	  
although	  in	  the	  city’s	  political	  discourse	  they	  continued	  to	  be	  represented	  as	  such.	  In	  
fact,	  in	  many	  ways,	  they	  masked	  the	  growing	  incongruity	  between	  the	  city’s	  
changing	  political	  economy	  and	  the	  needs	  of	  low-­‐income	  residents.131	  	  	  	  
The	  success	  of	  the	  improvement	  model	  also	  distorted	  the	  discussion	  about	  
how	  to	  provide	  quality	  low-­‐income	  housing	  when	  federal	  directives	  increasingly	  
advertised	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  should	  be	  involved	  in	  doing	  so.	  Though	  public	  
housing	  was	  increasingly	  derided,	  local	  governing	  officials	  had	  little	  authority	  to	  
hold	  private	  landlords	  accountable	  to	  their	  low-­‐income	  tenants.	  Often,	  as	  was	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131	  See	  Colin	  Gordon,	  Mapping	  Decline:	  St.	  Louis	  and	  the	  Fate	  of	  the	  American	  City	  
(Philadelphia,	  PA:	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania,	  2008),	  224.	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case	  of	  apathetic	  code	  enforcement	  or	  the	  failure	  to	  provide	  measures	  for	  low-­‐
income	  housing	  in	  the	  PIP	  model,	  government	  officials	  feared	  intervention	  would	  
only	  further	  circumscribe	  the	  options	  of	  low-­‐income	  residents.	  Yet,	  staying	  the	  
course,	  as	  local	  officials	  often	  did,	  rendered	  the	  same	  effect.	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CHAPTER	  THREE	  
Potemkin	  Village	  Policy:	  Transitioning	  from	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty	  
	  to	  Community	  Development	  
	   	  
The	  belief	  that	  the	  new	  strategies	  encouraging	  private	  housing	  could	  remake	  
the	  city	  emerged	  from	  a	  broader	  transformation	  in	  the	  discourse	  surrounding	  urban	  
planning	  and	  analysis.	  	  As	  a	  rejoinder	  to	  claims	  that	  War	  on	  Poverty	  programs	  had	  
failed	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  efficiency	  and	  efficacy	  in	  design,	  new	  top-­‐down	  approaches	  
linking	  sophisticated	  data	  analysis	  to	  effective	  revitalization	  were	  promoted	  as	  
critical	  to	  the	  success	  of	  local	  Community	  Development	  Block	  Grant	  (CDBG)	  
program	  efforts.1	  In	  response,	  the	  proliferation	  of	  new	  theories,	  methods,	  and	  
research	  agencies	  that	  had	  grown	  alongside	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty	  were	  quickly	  
adapted	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  community	  development	  agenda.2	  This	  new	  cadre	  of	  
experts,	  armed	  with	  technical	  expertise	  and	  professional	  training,	  were	  seen	  as	  
critical	  to	  urban	  growth	  and	  revitalization.	  Responding	  to	  the	  prerequisite	  that	  cities	  
produce	  neighborhood-­‐level	  statistical	  analysis	  to	  support	  their	  strategic	  planning,	  
local	  New	  Orleans	  leaders	  encouraged	  a	  professionalization	  of	  data	  collection	  that	  
would	  replace	  “community	  knowledge”	  generated	  through	  community	  action	  
networks	  with	  professional	  analysis.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  Judith	  Innes,	  "The	  Power	  of	  Data	  Requirements,"	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  
Planning	  Association	  54,	  no.	  3	  (1998),	  275.	  
	  
2	  See	  Laurence	  H.	  Tribe	  for	  a	  philosophical	  discussion	  about	  the	  limitations	  of	  
objectivity	  in	  social	  science	  research	  and	  methodology.	  As	  many	  scholars	  have	  noted,	  the	  
specific	  policy	  directives	  within	  which	  social	  scientists	  seek	  data	  often	  determine	  the	  
pursued	  research	  agendas.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  not	  just	  the	  way	  data	  are	  mobilized	  that	  is	  the	  result	  of	  
political	  manipulation;	  the	  actual	  measures	  we	  choose	  to	  collect	  data	  on	  are	  also	  political.	  
Laurence	  H.	  Tribe,	  "Policy	  Science:	  Analysis	  or	  Ideology?,"	  Philosophy	  &	  Public	  Affairs	  2,	  no.	  
1	  (1972),	  66-­‐110.	  
	  
	   151	  
	  In	  New	  Orleans,	  the	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  (OPPA)	  was	  
constituted	  to	  compile	  and	  analyze	  data	  capable	  of	  informing	  planning	  in	  ways	  that	  
produced	  more	  efficient,	  more	  targeted	  responses	  to	  community	  need.	  Therein,	  the	  
leadership	  role	  of	  the	  data	  analysis	  unit	  gave	  its	  staff	  an	  unprecedented	  power	  to	  
define	  the	  parameters	  within	  which	  community	  development	  programs	  emerged.3	  	  	  
Programs	  often	  directly	  reflected,	  even	  when	  not	  making	  use	  of,	  the	  assumptions	  
and	  preferences	  emerging	  from	  how	  analysts	  constituted	  their	  data.4	  As	  the	  unit	  
advanced	  recommendations	  for	  setting	  local	  policy,	  data	  legitimized	  specific	  
program	  choices	  while	  eliminating	  the	  discourse	  on	  alternatives.	  	  
Yet,	  as	  much	  as	  data	  inputs	  defined	  the	  distribution	  of	  programs,	  they	  were	  
equally	  defined	  by	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  CDBG	  legislation.	  While	  data	  analysts	  
frequently	  noted	  the	  connections	  between	  physical	  dilapidation	  and	  socioeconomic	  
inequalities,	  the	  strict	  parameters	  of	  the	  grant	  compelled	  planners	  to	  retreat	  to	  far	  
more	  narrow	  input/output	  measures.	  Indeed,	  structural,	  political,	  and	  economic	  
disparities	  rarely	  could	  be	  translated	  into	  the	  kind	  of	  neat	  programmatic	  responses	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Much	  of	  the	  work	  on	  “poverty	  research”	  locates	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  this	  field	  
within	  public	  policy,	  local	  governments,	  and	  private-­‐sector	  think	  tanks	  emerging	  out	  of	  the	  
War	  on	  Poverty.	  See	  Alice	  O'Connor,	  Poverty	  Knowledge:	  Social	  Science,	  Social	  Policy	  and	  the	  
Poor	  in	  Twentieth	  Century	  U.S.	  History	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2001);	  Robert	  
Haveman,	  Poverty	  Policy	  and	  Poverty	  Research	  (Madison:	  University	  of	  Wisconsin	  Press,	  
1987);	  Sheldon	  H.	  Danziger	  and	  Robert	  H.	  Haveman,	  Understanding	  Poverty	  (Cambridge:	  
Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2002).	  
	  
4	  Critiques	  of	  social	  science	  and	  policy	  research	  have	  made	  the	  point	  that	  even	  when	  
policy	  research	  is	  used	  in	  “bad”	  ways,	  policy	  analysts	  rarely	  hold	  the	  research	  techniques	  
and	  tools	  accountable	  for	  those	  ends.	  Consequently,	  even	  when	  the	  outcomes	  are	  not	  
neutral,	  the	  tools	  themselves	  are	  treated	  as	  if	  they	  are	  always	  neutral,	  thus	  negating	  the	  
built-­‐in	  preferences	  and	  assumptions	  that	  they	  manifest.	  There	  is	  rarely	  interrogation	  of	  
how	  the	  frameworks	  for	  research	  dictate	  the	  kind	  of	  policy	  outputs,	  not	  just	  the	  way	  those	  
frameworks	  are	  used.	  See	  Laurence	  H.	  Tribe,	  "Policy	  Science:	  Analysis	  or	  Ideology?,"	  
Philosophy	  &	  Public	  Affairs	  2,	  no.	  1	  (1972),	  75.	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most	  readily	  available	  through	  community	  development.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  data	  
analysis	  unit	  failed	  to	  question	  how	  its	  deployment	  of	  data	  shaped	  the	  discourse	  on	  
blight	  in	  ways	  that	  ultimately	  shifted	  the	  conversation	  away	  from	  substantive	  
conversations	  about	  political	  and	  economic	  inclusion.	  	  	  	  
In	  fact,	  the	  authority	  of	  this	  new	  unit,	  hinging	  on	  claims	  to	  scientific	  
objectivity	  and	  technical	  training,	  engendered	  distinctions	  between	  agency	  and	  
community	  that	  often	  worked	  to	  undermine	  the	  role	  of	  former	  antipoverty	  
leadership	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  projects	  they	  oversaw)	  in	  designing	  new	  programs.5	  	  
Perceiving	  themselves	  as	  intermediaries	  between	  the	  data	  and	  the	  people,	  planners	  
believed	  that	  community	  leadership	  was	  something	  to	  be	  suspicious	  of	  and	  that	  it	  
hindered	  more	  widespread	  participation.	  Thus,	  planners	  actively	  engaged	  models	  of	  
citizen	  participation	  that	  excluded	  the	  leadership	  of	  community-­‐based	  organizations.	  
In	  doing	  so,	  planners	  failed	  to	  realize	  how	  their	  actions	  reinforced	  hierarchies	  of	  
expertise	  in	  which	  community	  participation	  was	  best	  in	  response	  to	  the	  technical	  
suggestions	  of	  planners.	  Ultimately,	  the	  models	  for	  community	  input	  circumscribed	  
participation,	  mitigating	  responses	  through	  polling	  and	  surveying.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  articulation	  of	  this	  idea	  is	  taken	  directly	  from	  Alice	  O’Connor’s	  work	  on	  the	  
institutionalization	  of	  social	  science	  knowledge	  on	  poverty	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  both	  policy	  
and	  discourse.	  Her	  work	  offers	  a	  far	  more	  extensive	  examination	  of	  how	  the	  proliferation	  of	  
new	  agencies,	  organizations,	  nonprofits,	  and	  government-­‐funded	  private	  research	  
companies	  have	  altered	  the	  discourse	  surrounding	  poverty	  than	  can	  be	  offered	  in	  this	  
chapter.	  However,	  my	  analysis	  begins	  with	  her	  critical	  point—that	  poverty	  research	  has	  
served	  as	  a	  way	  of	  legitimizing	  certain	  approaches	  to	  inequity	  while	  obscuring	  others	  by	  
advancing	  that	  professional	  training	  and	  scientific	  approaches	  (which	  often	  exclude	  people	  
of	  color;	  women;	  and,	  almost	  always,	  poor	  people)	  offer	  us	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  policy	  
options	  than	  other	  formations	  of	  knowledge.	  Alice	  O'Connor,	  Poverty	  Knowledge:	  Social	  
Science,	  Social	  Policy	  and	  the	  Poor	  in	  Twentieth	  Century	  U.S.	  History	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  
University	  Press,	  2001),	  11.	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  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade,	  the	  vast	  preponderance	  of	  statistical	  data	  proved	  
to	  have	  few	  implications	  in	  the	  way	  the	  city	  government	  implemented	  community	  
development	  programs.	  Though	  proponents	  claimed	  that	  CDBG	  funding	  would	  
engender	  broad	  tools	  to	  fight	  blight,	  planners	  struggled	  to	  develop	  strategies	  
beyond	  visible	  markers	  of	  progress.	  	  	  
	  
The	  People	  and	  the	  Planners:	  Post-­‐War	  on	  Poverty	  Planning	  Strategies	  
In	  1972,	  the	  Landrieu	  administration	  hired	  Washington,	  D.C.-­‐based	  planning	  
agency	  McManis	  Associates	  to	  develop	  a	  pipeline	  for	  expanding	  the	  local	  
government’s	  capacity	  for	  management.	  The	  resultant	  study	  recommended	  a	  
dramatic	  overhaul	  of	  the	  way	  city	  government	  functioned.6	  The	  agency	  thought	  it	  
was	  critical	  that	  New	  Orleans	  establish	  a	  new	  unit	  of	  local	  government	  devoted	  to	  
data	  collection	  and	  analysis	  and	  policy	  development.	  As	  proposed,	  the	  analysis	  unit	  
would	  function	  with	  flexible	  autonomy	  under	  the	  mayor’s	  office	  to	  unify	  department	  
goals	  and	  enhance	  citywide	  development	  strategies	  by	  producing	  data	  on	  
neighborhood	  blight.	  Stating	  the	  importance	  of	  such	  an	  entity	  to	  the	  mayor,	  the	  firm	  
wrote:	  “As	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  city’s	  problems	  become	  more	  complex	  and	  challenging,	  
the	  need	  for	  new	  and	  better	  methods	  of	  solving	  these	  problems	  becomes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  This	  included	  reorganizing	  city	  departments	  under	  a	  new	  hierarchical	  structure	  
giving	  more	  authority	  to	  the	  mayor’s	  office;	  annexing	  city	  agencies	  outside	  of	  mayoral	  
control,	  including	  former	  antipoverty	  agencies;	  and	  re-­‐ordering	  city	  taxation	  codes	  to	  give	  
the	  mayor’s	  office	  more	  control	  over	  spending.	  McManis	  Associates,	  The	  comprehensive	  
planning	  and	  community	  development	  capacities	  of	  the	  city	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana:	  
findings	  and	  recommendations.,	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  McManis	  Associates,	  1973).	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increasingly	  acute.”7	  Wherein	  the	  directives	  of	  the	  CDBG	  funding	  required	  increased	  
local	  autonomy	  in	  decision-­‐making,	  the	  data	  analysis	  unit	  was	  imagined	  as	  the	  
essential	  link	  between	  local	  government	  planning	  and	  better	  programs.	  
On	  the	  eve	  of	  enactment	  of	  the	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  Act	  of	  
1974,	  the	  city	  of	  New	  Orleans	  inaugurated	  OPPA.	  The	  unit—like	  the	  PIP	  planners-­‐-­‐	  
reflected	  the	  movement	  of	  social	  scientists	  who,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty’s	  
perceived	  failure,	  sought	  to	  redefine	  their	  roles	  through	  quantifiable	  measures.	  If	  a	  
contention	  with	  the	  antipoverty	  framework	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  discernable	  results,	  data	  
analysts	  and	  policy	  units	  throughout	  the	  country	  now	  positioned	  themselves	  to	  
provide	  such	  hardline	  statistics	  and	  cost-­‐benefit	  models	  to	  ensure	  new	  mechanisms	  
of	  efficiency.8	  Those	  making	  up	  the	  new	  unit	  represented	  a	  nascent	  professional	  
cadre	  trained	  in	  election	  sciences	  and	  social	  science	  research.	  The	  young	  men	  and	  
women	  of	  this	  new	  agency	  shared	  a	  belief	  that	  with	  better	  data,	  they	  could	  uncover	  
untapped	  solutions	  to	  the	  city’s	  most	  pressing	  issues.	  Emmett	  Moten	  Jr.,	  a	  fiery	  New	  
Orleans	  native,	  helmed	  the	  office.9	  Despite	  a	  lack	  of	  planning	  experience,	  Moten	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  McManis	  Associates,	  The	  comprehensive	  planning	  and	  community	  development	  
capacities	  of	  the	  city	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana:	  findings	  and	  recommendations,	  (Washington,	  
D.C.:	  McManis	  Associates,	  1973),	  7.	  	  
	  
8	  One	  of	  the	  more	  popular	  critiques	  of	  the	  Community	  Action	  Program	  was	  that	  it	  
lacked	  tangible	  evidence	  of	  its	  affect	  on	  low-­‐income	  communities.	  While	  proponents	  argued	  
that	  there	  were	  intangible	  benefits—the	  formation	  of	  community	  and	  new	  leadership,	  
etc.—the	  lack	  of	  data	  became	  a	  way	  of	  denigrating	  the	  program	  in	  its	  entirety.	  See	  Denis	  F.	  
Johnston,	  "Some	  Reflections	  on	  the	  United	  States,"	  Journal	  of	  Public	  Policy	  9,	  no.	  4	  (1989),	  
434.	  
	  
9	  In	  the	  late	  1960s,	  Moten	  Jr.	  returned	  to	  New	  Orleans	  to	  head	  the	  athletic	  program	  
at	  the	  prominent	  St.	  Augustine	  High	  School.	  Hand-­‐picked	  to	  become	  deputy	  director	  of	  the	  
New	  Orleans	  Recreational	  Department,	  Moten	  quickly	  moved	  up	  the	  ladder	  in	  Landrieu’s	  
cabinet.	  	  Known	  for	  what	  journalists	  in	  the	  city	  coined	  as	  the	  “Moten	  school	  of	  speech,”	  he	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nevertheless	  embodied	  the	  tenacity	  and	  forward-­‐thinking	  vision	  of	  progress	  the	  
mayor	  sought	  for	  the	  landmark	  agency.	  Reflecting	  the	  widely	  accepted	  rhetoric	  that	  
an	  inability	  to	  plan	  and	  execute	  programming	  was	  a	  result	  of	  disorganized	  and	  
overlapping	  planning	  goals,	  OPPA	  was	  organized	  as	  the	  city’s	  mainframe	  for	  data	  
collection	  and	  analysis.10	  	  	  	  
Immediately,	  the	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  sought	  to	  develop	  
data	  sets	  that	  could	  respond	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  community	  development.	  While	  
antipoverty	  programs,	  in	  particular	  Model	  Cities,	  necessitated	  neighborhood-­‐level	  
statistical	  profiling,	  OPPA	  analysts	  discovered	  that	  outside	  of	  areas	  where	  prior	  
federal	  aid	  programs	  had	  operated,	  there	  had	  been	  little	  effort	  to	  construct	  solid	  
data	  or	  define	  distinct	  neighborhoods.	  Citywide	  data	  sets	  were	  most	  often	  the	  result	  
of	  nongovernmental	  studies	  and,	  where	  there	  was	  statistical	  information,	  it	  was	  
disorganized	  and	  incomplete.	  Yet	  routinely,	  analysts	  found	  no	  data	  at	  all.11	  	  
Accordingly,	  the	  unit’s	  first	  task	  was	  to	  classify	  area-­‐level	  blight	  as	  it	  was	  found	  and	  
operated	  in	  the	  city’s	  specific	  neighborhoods.	  Developing	  a	  system	  by	  which	  blight	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
was	  a	  fast-­‐talking	  politician	  able	  to	  make	  any	  simple	  answer	  more	  complicated.	  See	  Times-­‐	  
Picayune,	  “Eschew	  sesquipedalian	  obscurity,”	  May	  18,	  1980,	  21.	  
	  
10	  By	  those	  long	  entrenched	  in	  civil	  service	  positions,	  this	  new	  unit	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  
group	  of	  “arrogant	  lightweights”	  attempting	  to	  disrupt	  the	  status	  quo.	  This	  stereotype	  made	  
department	  heads	  less	  willing	  to	  follow	  the	  lead	  of	  the	  new	  unit.	  See	  Report,	  John	  A.	  Pecoul	  
Jr.	  "Final	  Report	  to	  Mayor-­‐Elect	  Ernest	  Morial	  on	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis,"	  
March	  23,	  1978,	  p.	  32,	  Box	  M22,	  Folder	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Task	  Force,	  
Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Mayoral	  Papers,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  
Louisiana.	  
	  
11	  McManis	  Associates,	  The	  comprehensive	  planning	  and	  community	  development	  
capacities	  of	  the	  city	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana:	  findings	  and	  recommendations,	  (Washington,	  
D.C.:	  McManis	  Associates,	  1973),	  10.	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could	  be	  ranked,	  compared,	  and	  scaled,	  analysts	  believed,	  would	  allow	  city	  leaders	  
to	  make	  the	  “right	  choices”	  as	  they	  designed	  new	  programs.12	  	  
This	  process	  required	  finding	  “meaningful	  measurements”	  of	  “social	  and	  
physical	  blight”	  that	  constituted	  the	  city’s	  increasingly	  dilapidated	  nature.13	  
Although	  CDBG	  legislation	  provided	  no	  true	  definition	  of	  blight,	  it	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  
a	  concept	  that	  evaded	  tangible	  meaning.	  The	  eight	  urban	  specialists	  making	  up	  the	  
core	  of	  OPPA	  sought	  to	  apply	  a	  workable	  definition	  of	  blight.	  Encompassed	  in	  an	  
ambiguous	  synopsis	  that	  understood	  the	  concept	  as	  anything	  that	  threatened	  life	  or	  
property,	  analysts	  included	  more	  than	  a	  page	  of	  considerations	  that	  planners	  could	  
use	  in	  evaluating	  blight.	  Inadequate	  street	  lighting,	  lack	  of	  open	  space,	  unsanitary	  
neighborhood	  conditions,	  broken	  windows	  and	  locks,	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  health	  care,	  
and	  “a	  combination	  of	  such	  conditions	  which	  substantially	  impair	  or	  arrest	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Blight	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most-­‐used	  words	  within	  the	  Housing	  and	  Community	  
Development	  Act	  of	  1974,	  but	  it	  remains	  undefined	  within	  the	  legislation.	  For	  a	  detailed	  
history	  of	  the	  word’s	  use	  within	  planning	  circles	  and	  policy	  measures,	  see	  Brian	  David	  
Robick’s	  2011	  dissertation,	  “Blight:	  The	  Development	  of	  a	  Contested	  Concept.”	  In	  a	  detailed	  
history	  of	  how	  the	  concept	  of	  blight	  was	  incorporated	  into	  planning	  and	  policy	  discussions,	  
Robick	  argues	  that	  originally	  it	  was	  used	  almost	  exclusively	  to	  describe	  environmentally	  
unsound	  conditions	  in	  commercial	  areas.	  While	  accompanied	  by	  social	  issues,	  blight	  was,	  in	  
most	  cases,	  interpreted	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  growth.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  1960s	  that	  blight	  took	  
on	  more	  ambiguous,	  open-­‐ended	  forms	  that	  encompass	  social,	  political,	  geographic,	  and	  
economic	  issues.	  See	  Report,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis,	  "List	  of	  
Accomplishments,"	  New	  Orleans,	  1975-­‐1976.	  Box	  17,	  Folder	  OD-­‐OPPA-­‐ACC:	  Office	  of	  Policy	  
Planning	  and	  Analysis,	  list	  of	  accomplishments	  (1975-­‐76),	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  
Analysis	  Collection	  Archives	  of	  the	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  
Louisiana.	  	  See	  also	  Brian	  David	  Robick,	  Blight:	  The	  development	  of	  a	  contested	  concept,	  PhD	  
Dissertation,	  Carnegie	  Mellon	  University	  (Ann	  Arbor:	  ProQuest,	  UMI	  Dissertations	  
Publishing,	  2011).	  
	  
13	  Darlene	  Walk,	  “An	  Analysis	  of	  Blight	  in	  the	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans:	  Blight	  Index	  
1974,”	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis,	  1974,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library	  Vertical	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sound	  growth	  of	  the	  city”	  were	  all	  factors	  contributing	  to	  blighted	  urban	  conditions,	  
analysts	  determined.14	  	  	  
Within	  this	  broad	  constitution	  of	  factors,	  however,	  it	  was	  unclear	  as	  to	  what	  
relationship	  blight	  had	  to	  conditions	  of	  poverty.	  Although	  Community	  Development	  
Block	  Grants	  replaced	  antipoverty	  funds,	  blight	  and	  poverty	  were	  not	  the	  same	  
condition,	  though	  the	  legislation	  treated	  them	  as	  such.	  Socioeconomic	  and	  political	  
inequalities,	  once	  the	  focus	  of	  antipoverty	  efforts	  (at	  least	  in	  theory),	  were	  now	  
examined	  only	  after	  they	  could	  be	  reduced	  to	  measurable	  indicators.	  These	  
measures	  were	  just	  part	  of	  what	  constituted	  blight	  and	  that	  was,	  in	  fact,	  a	  bigger	  
threat,	  analysts	  believed.	  	  Even	  without	  definition,	  the	  term	  invoked	  a	  crisis.	  The	  
myriad	  of	  physical	  indicators	  of	  blight—broken	  sidewalks	  and	  windows,	  lack	  of	  
trees	  and	  open	  space,	  sanitation	  issues,	  etc.—did	  not	  only	  occur	  in	  poverty	  areas.	  
Blight,	  the	  planning	  team	  acknowledged,	  was	  nondiscriminating.	  It	  could	  occur	  
anywhere	  in	  any	  area	  and,	  left	  unchecked,	  would	  begin	  to	  attack	  the	  city	  itself.15	  	  	  
The	  office’s	  specialists	  sought	  to	  ensure	  that	  blight	  was	  “measurable”	  by	  
disaggregating	  factors	  into	  neat	  empirical	  frameworks	  that	  could	  define	  policy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Darlene	  Walk,	  “An	  Analysis	  of	  Blight	  in	  the	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans:	  Blight	  Index	  
1974,”	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis,	  1974,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library	  Vertical	  
Files,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana,	  14.	  
	  
15	  Much	  like	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  RERC,	  OPPA	  staff	  believed	  and	  discussed	  blight	  as	  a	  
disease	  that	  could	  spread	  through	  communities	  like	  a	  plague.	  This	  equating	  of	  
environmental,	  physical,	  and	  social	  factors	  with	  notions	  of	  disease	  construed	  blight	  as	  
imminent	  and	  pathological.	  See	  Report,	  “Community	  Development	  Area,”	  Box	  1,	  Folder	  CD-­‐
REC-­‐75:	  Recommendation	  worksheets,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Archives,	  City	  
of	  New	  Orleans	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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outputs	  and	  assess	  social	  progress.16	  The	  methodology	  employed	  by	  planners	  to	  
develop	  a	  dossier	  of	  statistics	  derived	  from	  a	  nationwide	  discourse	  in	  planning	  
circles	  loosely	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  social	  indicators	  movement.	  Seeking	  tangible	  
measures	  of	  progress,	  the	  field	  of	  social	  science	  traded	  qualitative	  approaches	  to	  
analyzing	  urban	  issues	  for	  systems-­‐based	  modeling.	  The	  demand	  for	  evidence	  to	  
substantiate	  program	  results	  led	  to	  a	  growing	  insistence	  on	  applying	  economic	  
metrics	  to	  social	  issues.	  Social	  indicators	  were	  measurable	  units	  that	  were	  
emblematic	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  life	  that	  urban	  residents	  enjoyed.	  Proponents	  of	  the	  
field	  insisted	  that	  the	  utilization	  of	  social	  indicators	  could	  create	  output	  models	  that	  
would	  enhance	  both	  efficiency	  and	  efficacy	  of	  program	  planning.17	  Data	  could	  thus	  
be	  the	  prescriptive	  analysis	  for	  policy.	  	  	  
The	  inherent	  obstacle	  to	  the	  success	  of	  this	  practice	  was	  that,	  much	  like	  
notions	  of	  blight,	  social	  indicators	  themselves	  were	  ambiguous	  and	  subjective	  in	  
nature.18	  While	  national	  debates	  centered	  on	  what	  indicators	  should	  measure—
wealth	  gaps	  or	  more	  elusive	  conditions	  such	  as	  happiness	  with	  one’s	  health	  care—
the	  questions	  about	  applicability	  within	  policy	  making	  were	  even	  more	  starkly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Darlene	  Walk,	  “An	  Analysis	  of	  Blight	  in	  the	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans:	  Blight	  Index	  
1974,”	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis,	  1974,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library	  Vertical	  
Files,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana,	  14.	  
	  
17	  Mark	  Schneider,	  "The	  'Quality	  of	  Life'	  and	  Social	  Indicators	  Research,"	  Public	  
Administration	  Review	  36,	  no.	  3	  (1976),	  298.	  
	  
18	  For	  a	  brief	  history	  of	  social	  indicators	  in	  social	  science,	  see	  Clifford	  W.	  Cobb	  and	  
Craig	  Rixford,	  "Lessons	  Learned	  from	  the	  History	  of	  Social	  Indicators,"	  Redefining	  Progress,	  
1988,	  1-­‐33	  and	  Judith	  Eleanor	  Innes,	  Social	  indicators	  and	  public	  policy:	  Interactive	  processes	  
of	  design	  and	  application	  (New	  York:	  Elsevier	  Scientific	  Pub.	  Co.	  ,	  1975).	  For	  a	  critique	  of	  
some	  of	  the	  flaws	  of	  the	  movement,	  see	  Peter	  Marcuse,	  "Social	  Indicators	  and	  Housing	  
Policy,"	  Urban	  Affairs	  Review	  7,	  no.	  2	  (1971),	  193-­‐217.	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divided.	  Was	  an	  indicator	  merely	  a	  statistic	  or	  should	  its	  measurement	  be	  attached	  
to	  specific	  policy	  aims,	  social	  planners	  questioned.19	  Although	  the	  debate	  went	  un-­‐
reconciled,	  this	  attempt	  to	  reduce	  social	  issues	  to	  operational	  diagnoses	  
marginalized	  structural	  and	  political	  issues,	  which	  were	  not	  readily	  reduced	  to	  
empirical	  values.	  	  
Despite	  the	  internal	  debate	  over	  methods	  and	  motives,	  social	  indicator	  
research	  remained	  salient	  to	  communities	  attempting	  to	  formulate	  directives	  for	  
their	  community	  development	  program.	  In	  late	  1974,	  OPPA	  analysts	  met	  over	  the	  
course	  of	  several	  days	  to	  hone	  a	  set	  of	  indicators	  they	  felt	  would	  best	  address	  the	  
city’s	  urban	  blight.	  The	  analysts	  weighed	  the	  efficacy	  of	  potential	  indicators	  against	  
one	  another,	  questioning	  what	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  problematic	  about	  each,	  discussing	  
what	  would	  be	  important	  in	  measuring	  them,	  and	  calculating	  how	  they	  would	  be	  
measured.	  The	  team	  drew	  links	  between	  poverty,	  unemployment,	  education,	  and	  
female	  headed-­‐households,	  and	  concluded	  that	  unless	  programs	  addressed	  the	  links	  
between	  indicators,	  they	  would	  not	  be	  effective.	  The	  emergent	  blight	  index	  
consisted	  of	  twenty-­‐five	  discrete	  indicators	  that	  would	  be	  used	  to	  measure	  
conditions	  in	  each	  neighborhood	  of	  the	  city.	  The	  causes	  of	  blight,	  according	  to	  the	  
planning	  team,	  were	  structural,	  physical,	  and	  sometimes	  even	  aesthetic	  in	  nature.	  
Yet,	  blight	  could	  also	  stem	  from	  social	  characteristics.20	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Peter	  Marcuse,	  "Social	  Indicators	  and	  Housing	  Policy,"	  Urban	  Affairs	  Review	  7,	  no.	  
2	  (1971),	  198.	  
	  
20	  While	  the	  blight	  index	  was	  certainly	  comprehensive	  in	  many	  ways,	  it	  also	  
reflected	  the	  new	  ideas	  about	  the	  pathology	  of	  poverty	  that	  predominated	  much	  of	  the	  
collection	  of	  poverty	  data	  occurring	  at	  the	  time.	  Following	  the	  release	  of	  Daniel	  Patrick	  
Moynihan’s	  The	  Negro	  Family:	  The	  Case	  for	  National	  Action,	  much	  of	  the	  social	  science—
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Figure	  3-­‐1.	  Map	  showing	  gradients	  of	  blight	  in	  the	  city,	  1976	  
	  
Source:	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  
	  
The	  simplest	  illustration	  of	  the	  way	  OPPA	  planners	  used	  social	  statistics	  was	  
in	  the	  way	  analysts	  derived	  demographic	  information.	  Blight	  indices	  provided	  room	  
to	  record	  only	  the	  number	  of	  black	  residents.21	  While	  planners	  insisted	  that	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
irrespective	  of	  political	  leaning—relied	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  poverty	  could,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  
become	  pathological	  if	  left	  “untreated.”	  Though	  Moynihan	  was	  not	  the	  first,	  nor	  the	  last,	  to	  
make	  claims	  to	  a	  “culture	  of	  poverty,”	  he	  importantly	  linked	  economic	  causes	  to	  signs	  of	  
social	  pathology.	  The	  influence	  of	  this	  work	  on	  the	  analysts	  at	  the	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  
and	  Analysis	  was	  evident	  in	  the	  indicators	  they	  chose	  to	  use	  to	  determine	  a	  blight	  scale.	  	  
	  
21	  Report,	  Community	  Development	  Inventory	  Form,	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  CG-­‐CD1:	  Planning	  
Package	  Inventory	  forms	  for	  the	  CD	  Neighborhoods,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  
files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
	   161	  
demography	  was	  to	  ensure	  that	  low-­‐income	  black	  neighborhoods	  received	  
community	  development	  resources,	  the	  practice	  of	  recording	  percentages	  strictly	  of	  
a	  black	  population	  had	  troubling	  implications	  for	  the	  way	  that	  policy	  analysts	  
understood	  both	  blight	  and	  its	  solutions.	  The	  reduction	  of	  blight	  to	  a	  racial	  
characteristic	  masked	  the	  sociostructural	  policies	  that	  fostered	  racial	  isolation.	  Yet	  
it	  also	  construed	  the	  presence	  of	  black	  residents	  with	  the	  infiltration	  of	  blight.	  The	  
implication	  inherent	  in	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  blight	  index	  was	  that	  whiteness,	  
absent	  as	  it	  was	  from	  the	  statistical	  narrative,	  was	  both	  positive	  and	  normative.	  In	  
the	  same	  manner	  that	  the	  Downs’s	  neighborhood	  life-­‐cycle	  model	  instinctively	  
coded	  healthy	  neighborhoods	  as	  predominantly	  white,	  the	  New	  Orleans	  index	  
assumed	  that	  to	  be	  white	  was	  to	  be	  immune	  to	  blight.	  Whether	  or	  not	  this	  is	  what	  
planners	  believed,	  it	  conditioned	  both	  planners	  and	  residents	  to	  understand	  black	  
spaces	  as	  conditions	  for	  blight.	  Not	  surprisingly	  then,	  community	  development	  was	  
described	  by	  planners	  as	  “black	  money,”	  divorced	  from	  the	  function	  it	  was	  designed	  
to	  serve.22	  
Similarly,	  specialists	  evaluating	  neighborhood	  conditions	  were	  asked	  to	  
record	  the	  number	  of	  female-­‐headed	  households,	  welfare	  users,	  and	  “family	  
stability”	  by	  measuring	  the	  number	  of	  juveniles	  in	  households	  headed	  by	  women.23	  
The	  classification	  of	  blight	  through	  social	  traits	  gestured	  to	  the	  salience	  of	  theories	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
22	  Anonymous	  interview	  with	  official	  in	  Office	  of	  Program	  Development,	  Landrieu	  
administration.	  Interview	  conducted	  June	  26,	  2012,	  Metarie,	  Louisiana.	  	  
	  
23	  Family	  stability	  was	  a	  term	  used	  interchangeably	  with	  “normal	  life,”	  again	  
asserting	  a	  normative	  two-­‐parent	  household	  against	  an	  "abnormal"	  single	  mother	  
household.	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that	  understood	  a	  "culture	  of	  poverty"	  as	  central	  to	  the	  urban	  crisis.24	  These	  cultural	  
tendencies	  not	  only	  explained	  the	  presence	  of	  blight	  in	  majority-­‐black	  poverty	  
communities	  but,	  more	  importantly,	  were	  understood	  as	  causes	  of	  neighborhood	  
demise.	  Without	  attendant	  structural	  analysis,	  these	  "indicators"	  gestured	  at	  false	  
equivalencies,	  linking	  human	  characteristics	  with	  physical	  dilapidation.	  The	  way	  
planners	  interpreted	  blight	  made	  a	  single	  mother	  raising	  children	  analogous	  to	  
potholes	  and	  deteriorating	  structures.	  	  
En	  masse,	  these	  indices	  of	  analysis	  presented	  a	  kind	  of	  impenetrability	  to	  
extracting	  causation	  of	  these	  symptoms,	  though	  it	  was	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  blight	  index	  
was	  designed	  to	  extrapolate	  the	  causes	  behind	  the	  urban	  crisis	  at	  all.	  The	  OPPA	  staff	  
discussed	  chosen	  indicators	  as	  if	  they	  were	  causes	  of	  blight	  rather	  than	  symptoms	  of	  
poverty.	  This	  slippage	  went	  beyond	  terminology.	  Despite	  OPPA's	  mission	  to	  utilize	  
data	  to	  find	  the	  systematic	  causality	  of	  blight,	  symptoms—current	  and	  
quantifiable—became	  talking	  points	  on	  the	  city’s	  most	  pressing	  problems	  for	  local	  
governing	  officials.	  As	  programs	  aimed	  at	  alleviating	  poverty	  were	  replaced	  with	  
those	  directed	  at	  correcting	  physical	  blight,	  this	  misappropriation	  was,	  at	  least	  in	  
part,	  not	  solely	  the	  error	  of	  analysts.	  The	  legislation	  certainly	  did	  not	  empower	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  While	  by	  the	  1970s,	  much	  of	  the	  "culture	  of	  poverty"	  discourse	  had	  been	  
debunked,	  it	  nonetheless	  continued	  to	  inform	  the	  way	  that	  planners	  and	  policy	  makers	  
conceived	  of	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods.	  Assigning	  behavioral	  characteristics	  as	  the	  cause	  
of	  dilapidated	  low-­‐income	  conditions	  imagined	  poverty	  to	  be	  an	  individual’s	  failings	  rather	  
than	  a	  result	  of	  institutional	  racism	  or	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  opportunity.	  The	  argument	  was	  
perhaps	  most	  infamously	  forwarded	  by	  Daniel	  Patrick	  Moynihan	  in	  The	  Negro	  Family:	  The	  
Case	  for	  National	  Action,	  better	  known	  as	  the	  "Moynihan	  Report,"	  but	  social	  scientists	  on	  
both	  sides	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum	  contributed	  to	  the	  field	  as	  well,	  even	  if	  inadvertantly.	  
See	  The	  Negro	  Family:	  The	  Case	  For	  National	  Action,	  (Washington:	  Government	  Printing	  
Office,	  1965);	  Michael	  Harrington,	  The	  Other	  America:	  Poverty	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (London:	  
MacMillan,	  1962);	  Oscar	  Lewis,	  The	  Children	  of	  Sanchez	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  1961).	  
	  
	   163	  
planners	  to	  employ	  data	  in	  more	  complex	  ways.	  The	  legislative	  directives	  that	  
bounded	  program	  design	  to	  physical	  development	  seemed	  to	  assume	  that	  attacking	  
blight	  could	  intervene	  on	  the	  same	  problems	  that	  caused	  poverty.	  This	  approach	  
marginalized	  structural	  and	  socioeconomic	  processes	  that	  were	  not	  readily	  pared	  to	  
empirical	  measures.	  
The	  reliance	  on	  defining	  social	  indicators	  as	  if	  the	  act	  of	  classifying	  them	  
would	  lead	  to	  better,	  more	  objective	  solutions	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  limiting	  what	  
analysts’	  qualitative	  observations	  in	  neighborhoods	  could	  reveal.25	  Windshield	  
surveys,	  envisioned	  as	  a	  means	  to	  excavate	  details	  that	  were	  not	  evident	  in	  the	  data,	  
did	  little	  to	  aid	  planners	  in	  developing	  a	  critique	  of	  more	  structural	  approaches	  to	  
ending	  poverty.26	  The	  technique,	  in	  which	  an	  analyst	  would	  sit	  in	  her/his	  car	  
recording	  observations	  of	  neighborhood	  function,	  only	  further	  distanced	  the	  
planning	  team	  from	  residents.	  Analysts	  took	  on	  a	  role	  of	  omniscient	  bystander,	  but	  
far	  from	  being	  objective,	  the	  exercise	  reinforced	  the	  understanding	  that	  blight	  was	  
visible.27	  Within	  this	  framework,	  reading	  poverty	  and	  blight	  as	  interchangeable	  only	  
affirmed	  the	  belief	  that	  physical	  development	  programs	  could	  actually	  create	  
change.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  James	  B.	  Rule,	  "The	  Problem	  with	  Social	  Problems,"	  Politics	  and	  Society	  2,	  no.	  1	  
(1971),	  55.	  
	  
26	  Report,	  “Windshield	  Surveys,	  Fischer,”	  Box	  34,	  Folder	  Windshield	  Surveys,	  Office	  
of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  
Louisiana.	  
	  
27	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  later,	  the	  idea	  also	  reinforced	  that	  planners	  could	  better	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The	  aim	  of	  devising	  specific	  CDBG-­‐funded	  programs	  for	  specific	  
neighborhoods	  necessitated	  that	  the	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  take	  
inventory	  of	  community	  development	  zones.	  The	  task,	  seemingly	  simple,	  entailed	  a	  
process	  of	  delineating	  boundaries.	  The	  OPPA	  staff	  urged	  that	  this	  process	  be	  
objective,	  but	  the	  act	  of	  establishing	  perimeters	  to	  blight	  zones	  (and	  access	  to	  
funding)	  remained	  distinctly	  political.	  Absent	  of	  any	  citywide	  planning	  process,	  the	  
city’s	  planning,	  zoning,	  and	  political	  districts	  intersected	  and	  overlapped	  one	  
another,	  making	  a	  straightforward	  classification	  difficult.	  Those	  neighborhoods	  that	  
retained	  distinct	  social,	  and	  sometimes	  political,	  identities	  varied	  in	  physical	  size,	  
population,	  and—of	  relevance	  to	  planners—access	  to	  political	  resources.28	  Analysts	  
saw	  an	  opportunity	  in	  the	  partitioning	  of	  neighborhoods	  to	  generate	  democratic	  and	  
scientific	  approaches	  to	  neighborhood-­‐level	  problems.	  Though	  few	  of	  OPPA’s	  
analysts	  had	  ever	  ventured	  into	  low-­‐income	  areas	  of	  the	  city,	  their	  insistence	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Where	  planners	  were	  able,	  they	  followed	  the	  lead	  of	  residents	  in	  defining	  
neighborhood	  boundaries.	  Planners	  designed	  their	  neighborhood	  classification	  program	  
after	  suggestions	  emerged	  from	  HUD	  theorizing	  that	  neighborhoods	  that	  had	  been	  clearly	  
delineated	  by	  residents	  would	  participate	  more	  in	  the	  planning	  process	  than	  those	  that	  had	  
been	  solely	  defined	  by	  planners.	  Occasionally,	  this	  design	  proved	  problematic.	  The	  Lower	  
Ninth	  Ward,	  a	  neighborhood	  on	  the	  outskirts	  of	  the	  city,	  received	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  
antipoverty	  money	  under	  the	  Modal	  Cities	  Program,	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  Southern	  
Organization	  of	  Unified	  Leadership	  (SOUL)	  and	  its	  connections	  to	  the	  city’s	  bureaucracy.	  
The	  neighborhood	  argued	  against	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  neighborhood,	  referred	  to	  sometimes	  
as	  Holy	  Cross,	  that	  was	  just	  across	  a	  dividing	  street.	  Though	  the	  two	  neighborhoods	  shared	  
similar	  demographic	  and	  socioeconomic	  characteristics,	  and	  had	  often	  been	  considered	  
synonymous,	  political	  activists	  in	  the	  upper	  Lower	  Ninth	  ward	  were	  far	  better	  organized	  
and	  able	  to	  move	  their	  constituencies.	  OPPA	  negotiated	  with	  residents	  and	  leadership	  to	  
draw	  a	  divider	  between	  the	  two	  neighborhoods.	  In	  another	  neighborhood,	  tucked	  in	  the	  
west	  corner	  of	  the	  city	  and	  bordered	  by	  some	  of	  the	  wealthiest	  areas	  of	  the	  city,	  residents	  
identified	  the	  area	  as	  “Niggertown.”	  Members	  of	  OPPA	  acknowledged	  the	  irony	  in	  applying	  
for	  federal	  funds	  with	  antidiscrimination	  clauses	  for	  a	  neighborhood	  with	  such	  a	  racially	  
charged	  name.	  It	  was	  quickly	  decided	  that	  the	  area	  would	  be	  renamed	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  grant	  
applications;	  the	  team	  settled	  on	  Black	  Pearl.	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developing	  new	  data	  implied	  that	  existing	  neighborhood	  networks	  were	  unable	  to	  
deploy	  egalitarian	  approaches	  to	  community	  development	  on	  their	  own.29	  OPPA	  
planners	  believed	  that	  their	  neutrality	  was	  retained	  by	  the	  infallibility	  of	  statistical	  
data,	  which	  was	  intrinsically	  unbiased,	  whereas	  community	  leadership	  always	  had	  
an	  agenda.	  
The	  process	  established	  sixty-­‐three	  neighborhoods	  to	  which	  the	  blight	  index	  
would	  be	  applied.30	  The	  data	  analysis	  unit	  outlined	  a	  systematic	  approach:	  Data	  
would	  be	  collected	  on	  all	  twenty-­‐five	  indicators	  of	  blight	  through	  uniform	  methods	  
in	  each	  neighborhood.	  Analysts	  would	  be	  asked	  to	  draw	  qualitative	  conclusions	  as	  
to	  how	  these	  indications	  affected	  neighborhood	  life	  and	  overall	  conditions.	  Then	  
specialists	  would	  compile	  both	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  research	  into	  a	  
comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  community	  development	  needs.	  The	  resultant	  
neighborhood	  model	  was	  then	  framed	  around	  classifications	  derived	  from	  RERC’s	  
scale	  of	  neighborhood	  intervention.31	  The	  inventory	  list	  thus	  ranked	  neighborhoods	  
on	  a	  spectrum	  designating	  neighborhood	  health:	  safe,	  endangered,	  critical,	  and	  
severe	  would	  define	  not	  only	  the	  state	  of	  the	  neighborhood,	  but	  also	  the	  means	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Analysts	  also	  understood	  the	  process	  of	  drawing	  boundaries	  as	  solely	  positive,	  
despite	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  designations	  often	  hardened	  distinctions	  between	  adjacent	  areas.	  	  
While	  such	  distinctions	  could	  open	  new	  resources	  for	  newly	  engendered	  “neighborhoods,”	  
they	  also	  marked	  these	  areas	  with	  the	  language	  and	  stereotypes	  that	  came	  along	  with	  being	  
classified	  as	  “blighted.”	  
	  	  
30	  Notes,	  “Minutes	  of	  Monday,	  May	  6,	  1974	  Meeting,”	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  HRC	  Meeting	  
Agenda	  April/May/June	  1974,	  Human	  Relations	  Committee	  Files,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  
Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
31	  RERC	  had	  long	  had	  a	  formal	  relationship	  with	  the	  city’s	  governing	  officials.	  Prior	  
to	  the	  CDBG	  program,	  RERC	  developed	  a	  long-­‐term	  plan	  for	  economic	  development	  
centered	  on	  constructing	  the	  city	  as	  a	  convention	  destination	  in	  the	  1960s.	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intervention.32	  Neighborhoods	  were	  shown	  to	  be	  improving	  or	  deteriorating	  by	  
placing	  them	  within	  a	  positive-­‐negative	  axis	  representing	  potential	  change.	  In	  this	  
way,	  neighborhood	  conditions	  were	  not	  stagnant;	  rather,	  changes	  to	  specific	  
indicators	  could	  instigate	  transformation—either	  constructive	  or	  unfavorable.	  	  	  
Significantly,	  the	  construction	  of	  blight	  surveys	  did	  not	  happen	  in	  isolation.	  	  
On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  index	  mirrored	  popular	  trends	  in	  national	  planning	  circles	  and	  
attested	  to	  the	  participation	  of	  OPPA	  planners	  in	  a	  broader	  discourse	  on	  blight.	  The	  
innumerable	  conferences,	  workshops,	  and	  training	  sessions	  attended	  by	  OPPA	  
planners	  affirmed	  the	  supremacy	  of	  their	  expertise,	  providing	  new	  technical	  
approaches	  to	  community	  development.	  RERC’s	  association	  with	  HUD—the	  
corporation	  was	  contracted	  by	  the	  federal	  agency	  to	  write	  official	  recommendations	  
on	  the	  applicability	  of	  community	  development	  according	  to	  neighborhood	  status—
encouraged	  duplication	  of	  the	  corporation's	  model.33	  Constituted	  as	  an	  adaptation	  
of	  life-­‐cycle	  theory,	  RERC’s	  model	  acknowledged	  the	  “inherent	  inconsistencies”	  of	  
attempting	  to	  eradicate	  blight	  while	  also	  encouraging	  “maximum	  feasible	  
redevelopment.”34	  Significantly,	  RERC	  noted	  that	  attempts	  to	  cure	  blight	  through	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  In	  many	  ways,	  these	  qualitative	  appraisals	  were	  far	  more	  influential	  in	  the	  way	  
analysts	  determined	  intervention	  plans	  for	  neighborhoods,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  residents	  
interpreted	  the	  problems	  facing	  the	  city.	  	  
	  
33	  Many	  cities	  hired	  RERC	  directly	  to	  oversee	  development	  of	  their	  CDBG	  application	  
and	  planning	  trajectory.	  See	  Sarah	  F.	  Liebschutz,	  "Neighborhood	  Conservation:	  Political	  
Choices	  under	  the	  Community	  Development	  Program,"	  Publius	  13,	  no.	  2	  (1983),	  23-­‐37;	  also	  
See	  Real	  Estate	  Research	  Corporation,	  “Recommendations	  for	  Community	  Development	  
Planning,”	  1975,	  (Washington:	  Government	  Printing	  Office).	  
	  
34	  Real	  Estate	  Research	  Corporation,	  Recommendations	  for	  Community	  Development	  
Planning:	  Derived	  from	  RERC's	  Nationwide	  Urban	  Renewal	  and	  Neighborhood	  Preservation	  
Studies	  for	  HUD,	  (Washington:	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1975),	  II-­‐12.	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tackling	  one	  or	  two	  problems	  constituting	  neighborhood	  dilapidation	  would	  
inevitably	  fail,	  and	  yet,	  there	  were	  no	  longer	  funds	  for	  more	  comprehensive	  
approaches.	  Thus,	  RERC	  continued	  to	  promote	  community	  development	  of	  “in-­‐
between	  neighborhoods”	  much	  like	  the	  Irish	  Channel.35	  Curing	  those	  neighborhoods	  
would	  be	  the	  only	  chance	  of	  creating	  a	  trickle-­‐down	  affect	  in	  low-­‐income	  areas.	  
However	  OPPA	  analysts	  certainly	  did	  not,	  nor	  want	  to,	  replicate	  the	  model	  in	  
its	  entirety.	  Indeed,	  the	  Office	  for	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  staff	  believed	  that	  the	  
CDBG	  funding	  was	  the	  only	  means	  available	  to	  attempt	  to	  address	  conditions	  in	  
truly	  deteriorated	  neighborhoods.	  While	  department	  heads	  were	  more	  willing	  to	  
embrace	  the	  "modified	  triage"	  model,	  believing	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  marshal	  funds	  in	  
areas	  “that	  will	  benefit	  its	  [New	  Orleans's]	  tax	  base,”	  OPPA	  planners	  felt	  that	  to	  do	  
so	  would	  be	  morally	  wrong.36	  Instead,	  the	  city	  needed	  to	  use	  the	  block	  grants	  to	  
“fulfill	  a	  moral	  obligation	  to	  the	  have-­‐not	  citizens	  of	  this	  city,”	  even	  if	  it	  was	  one	  that	  
could	  only	  be	  symbolic.37	  However,	  the	  planning	  staff	  was	  impressed	  by	  the	  
neighborhood	  scale	  as	  a	  means	  of	  developing	  distinct	  categories	  for	  intervention.38	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Real	  Estate	  Research	  Corporation,	  Recommendations	  for	  Community	  Development	  
Planning:	  Derived	  from	  RERC's	  Nationwide	  Urban	  Renewal	  and	  Neighborhood	  Preservation	  
Studies	  for	  HUD,	  (Washington:	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1975),	  II-­‐18.	  
	  
36	  Memo,	  Victor	  Dubuclet	  III	  to	  Emmett	  Moten	  Jr.,	  November	  12,	  1974,	  Box	  25,	  
Folder	  RF-­‐4/11-­‐OPPA:	  Staff	  Correspondence,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  
Collection,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
37	  Memo,	  Victor	  Dubuclet	  III	  to	  Emmett	  Moten	  Jr.,	  November	  12,	  1974,	  Box	  25,	  
Folder	  RF-­‐4/11-­‐OPPA:	  Staff	  Correspondence,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  
Collection,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
38	  Early	  in	  the	  planning	  process,	  Wayne	  Collier,	  director	  of	  the	  Vieux	  Carre	  
Commission,	  a	  public-­‐private	  oversight	  agency	  for	  the	  French	  Quarter,	  relayed	  to	  Moon	  
Landrieu	  the	  salience	  of	  the	  Downs’s	  model	  for	  New	  Orleans	  planning.	  Collier	  had	  just	  
attended	  a	  national	  conference	  on	  urban	  renewal	  and	  development	  where	  Downs	  had	  been	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While	  ultimately	  modifying	  RERC’s	  neighborhood-­‐specific	  directives,	  the	  Office	  of	  
Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  preserved	  the	  idea	  that	  classifying	  neighborhoods	  on	  a	  
scale	  could	  aid	  the	  city	  in	  determining	  priorities.	  	  
	  The	  1975	  blight	  index	  exposed	  a	  troubling	  portrait	  of	  the	  city’s	  
socioeconomic	  landscape.	  Analysts	  classified	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  city’s	  
neighborhoods	  as	  ranging	  from	  endangered	  to	  suffering	  from	  severe	  blight.	  Twenty	  
of	  the	  most	  dilapidated	  neighborhoods	  lacked	  permanently	  paved	  streets;	  more	  
than	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  city’s	  neighborhoods	  had	  no	  access	  to	  recreational	  facilities.	  
Despite	  the	  recent	  efforts	  to	  address	  the	  housing	  crisis,	  nearly	  half	  of	  the	  city’s	  
housing	  units	  in	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods	  were	  classified	  as	  substandard.39	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the	  keynote.	  He	  informed	  the	  mayor	  that	  it	  may	  be	  of	  particular	  relevance	  to	  invite	  Downs	  
to	  the	  city	  to	  review	  its	  community	  development	  application.	  Downs,	  Collier	  noted,	  had	  
provided	  critical	  insight	  into	  the	  problem	  facing	  cities	  with	  community	  development.	  There	  
were	  not	  enough	  funds	  coming	  from	  anywhere	  to	  address	  “all	  the	  city’s	  problems,	  and	  
therefore,	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  big	  problems	  and	  tiny	  tools,”	  Collier	  told	  the	  mayor.	  While	  
RERC	  would	  not	  be	  involved	  in	  directly	  shaping	  the	  city’s	  community	  development	  agenda,	  
their	  model	  would	  nevertheless	  inform	  the	  allocation	  of	  resources	  and	  how	  the	  city	  
developed	  its	  programs.	  	  The	  RERC	  model	  designed	  to	  deploy	  CDBG	  resources	  differed	  
slightly	  from	  that	  of	  earlier	  neighborhood	  life-­‐cycle	  models.	  Using	  a	  modified	  neighborhood	  
life-­‐cycle	  scale,	  RERC	  suggested	  that	  cities	  classify	  neighborhoods	  in	  three	  categories:	  
healthy,	  in-­‐between,	  and	  deteriorated.	  Each	  classification	  of	  neighborhood	  would	  warrant	  a	  
different	  “treatment.”	  	  Healthy	  neighborhoods,	  though	  generally	  outside	  of	  low-­‐income	  
zones,	  should	  nevertheless	  receive	  CDBG	  funds	  for	  high-­‐visibility	  projects	  that	  offered	  
symbolic	  value.	  In-­‐between	  zones	  should	  receive	  the	  majority	  of	  funds	  to	  work	  on	  physical	  
development	  projects	  capable	  of	  leveraging	  private	  investment.	  Deteriorated	  
neighborhoods	  should	  receive	  social	  services	  to	  sustain	  the	  resident	  population	  until	  the	  
neighborhood	  was	  abandoned.	  See	  Memo,	  Wayne	  Collier	  to	  Moon	  Landrieu,	  June	  10,	  1975;	  
Box	  26,	  Folder	  RF:5/06	  OPPA:	  Incoming	  Mail,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  
Collection,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana;	  also	  Real	  
Estate	  Research	  Corporation,	  Recommendations	  for	  Community	  Development	  Planning:	  
Derived	  from	  RERC's	  Nationwide	  Urban	  Renewal	  and	  Neighborhood	  Preservation	  Studies	  for	  
HUD,	  (Washington:	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1975).	  
	  
39	  Report,	  Community	  Development	  Blight	  Index,	  Box	  134,	  Folder	  Community	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Undeterred	  by	  the	  limitations	  of	  CDBG	  programs,	  OPPA	  promised	  that	  rational	  
planning	  would	  inspire	  programs	  that	  could	  “operate	  more	  efficiently	  and	  better	  
utilize	  available	  funding.”40	  	  
	  
Redefining	  Citizen	  Participation	  in	  CDBG	  
	   Armed	  with	  new	  statistical	  support,	  OPPA	  turned	  its	  attention	  to	  formulating	  
methods	  of	  community	  participation.	  While	  War	  on	  Poverty	  programs	  provided	  for	  
specific,	  though	  imperfect,	  instruments	  for	  community	  participation—through	  
neighborhood	  councils,	  citizen	  voting	  programs,	  and	  community-­‐action	  networks—
citizen	  participation	  was	  far	  more	  ambiguously	  defined	  within	  the	  CDBG	  funding	  
directives.	  Though	  citizen	  involvement	  was	  required	  throughout	  the	  planning	  
process,	  the	  parameters	  of	  that	  participation	  were	  left	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  
municipality.	  From	  the	  outset,	  OPPA	  director	  Moten	  expressed	  the	  city’s	  intention	  to	  
have	  a	  citizen	  participation	  program	  that	  could	  cast	  as	  wide	  a	  net	  as	  possible.	  In	  
preparing	  for	  a	  State	  of	  the	  City	  address,	  leadership	  in	  OPPA	  acknowledged	  that	  
effective	  community	  development	  necessitated	  an	  “increased	  openness	  with	  the	  
people	  we	  serve.	  True	  citizen	  participation	  consists	  of	  a	  dialogue,”	  the	  leaders	  
wrote.41	  The	  optimism	  of	  select	  community	  leaders	  strengthened	  support	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Comprehensive	  Planning	  Grant	  Application;	  Box	  10,	  Folder	  GD-­‐CPA-­‐GRNT:	  
Comprehensive	  Planning	  Assistance	  Grant,	  Semi-­‐Annual	  Report	  (1974),	  Office	  of	  Policy	  
Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  
Louisiana.	  
	  
41	  Speech,	  “Draft,	  State	  of	  the	  City	  Report;”	  Box	  17,	  Folder	  OD-­‐SOC-­‐75:	  State	  of	  the	  
City,	  draft	  (1975);	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  
Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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expanding	  this	  dialogue.	  For	  certain	  New	  Orleans	  neighborhoods,	  the	  
administration’s	  ties	  to	  powerful	  black	  political	  organizations	  demonstrated	  a	  
readiness	  to	  shift	  the	  relationship	  between	  government	  and	  people,	  particularly	  in	  
communities	  that	  had	  been	  systematically	  disenfranchised	  from	  discussions	  of	  how	  
to	  allocate	  resources.42	  Despite	  such	  affirmations	  for	  expanding	  mechanisms	  for	  
citizen	  participation,	  the	  specific	  systems	  through	  which	  participation	  would	  
develop	  remained	  in	  dispute.	  
Contestations	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  citizen	  participation	  commenced	  prior	  to	  
the	  enactment	  of	  the	  CDBG	  funding	  scheme,	  and	  that	  discourse	  remained	  a	  tenuous	  
debate	  during	  the	  formation	  of	  OPPA.	  In	  a	  1972	  city-­‐sponsored	  workshop,	  citizen	  
participation	  materialized	  as	  a	  hotly	  contested	  topic,	  pitting	  new	  philosophies	  about	  
the	  supremacy	  of	  studied	  data	  analysis	  against	  the	  insistence	  of	  grassroots	  activists	  
that	  residents	  construct	  the	  core	  for	  deciding	  how	  resources	  were	  spent.43	  	  
Considering	  the	  forum	  was	  public,	  speakers	  quickly	  affirmed	  their	  belief	  that	  
residents	  were	  essential	  to	  the	  planning	  process.	  The	  scope	  of	  that	  participation,	  
however,	  was	  quickly	  challenged.	  City	  administrators	  and	  chief	  planner	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Landrieu	  garnered	  new	  support	  from	  black	  leadership	  after	  withdrawing	  
approval	  of	  a	  new	  bridge	  across	  the	  Mississippi	  when	  the	  bridge’s	  proposed	  site	  was	  shifted	  
from	  an	  affluent	  uptown	  neighborhood	  to	  a	  predominantly	  black	  neighborhood.	  
Nevertheless,	  this	  support	  was	  not	  monolithic.	  	  Other	  community	  groups	  had	  been	  
marginalized	  by	  their	  patronage	  and	  ascribed	  to	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  mayor’s	  inclusion	  of	  
black	  middle	  class	  political	  leadership	  masked	  a	  larger	  exclusion	  of	  low-­‐income	  people	  of	  
color.	  See	  Marlene	  Keller	  and	  Michael	  Peter	  Smith,	  "'Managed	  Growth'	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  
Uneven	  Development	  in	  New	  Orleans,"	  in	  Restructuring	  the	  City:	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  
Urban	  Redevelopment,	  ed.	  Susan	  Fainstein	  and	  Norman	  Fainstein,	  (New	  York:	  Longman,	  
1986),	  138.	  
	  
43	  Urban	  Studies	  Institute,	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  "Citizen	  Participation	  
Symposium"	  (New	  Orleans:	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans	  ,	  1973),	  4.	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architectural	  firm	  Curtis	  and	  Davis,	  Bob	  Tannen,	  argued	  that	  formalizing	  citizen	  
participation	  within	  the	  planning	  process	  would	  inevitably	  slow	  down	  program	  
development	  and	  impede	  policy	  execution.	  Citizens	  with	  valid	  and	  pressing	  
complaints	  still	  lacked	  the	  necessary	  training	  and	  technical	  expertise	  to	  devise	  
solutions,	  said	  Tannen.44	  Recounting	  Model	  Cities,	  Tannen	  argued	  that	  if	  residents	  
were	  truly	  capable	  of	  assisting	  in	  coordinated	  city	  planning	  efforts,	  it	  would	  have	  
been	  seen	  in	  the	  impact	  of	  that	  program.45	  	  	  
Planners	  at	  the	  public	  workshop	  argued	  that	  the	  issue,	  in	  theory,	  was	  not	  
citizen	  participation	  but	  the	  failure	  of	  city	  governments	  to	  create	  effective	  models	  
for	  its	  deployment.	  Current	  formations	  for	  participation	  were	  quickly	  reduced	  to	  
popularity	  contests,	  city	  polling	  expert	  Allen	  Rosenzweig	  observed.	  Instead	  of	  
offering	  broad	  community	  perspectives,	  existing	  channels	  of	  community	  
participation	  often	  exposed	  community	  hierarchies	  where	  the	  majority	  of	  residents	  
remained	  silent,	  he	  told	  the	  audience.	  There	  were	  obvious	  dilemmas,	  he	  noted,	  if	  the	  
city	  was	  unable	  to	  find	  more	  democratic	  means	  of	  administering	  citizen	  
participation	  forums.	  Rosenzweig	  maintained	  those	  discrepancies	  were	  best	  
resolved	  by	  employing	  new	  polling	  techniques	  designed	  to	  expand	  the	  procedure’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  The	  architectural	  firm	  Curtis	  and	  Davis	  were	  the	  architects	  of	  the	  Superdome.	  The	  
firm	  was	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  “Courteous	  and	  Devious”	  due	  to	  its	  design	  of	  a	  
preservation	  study	  in	  the	  early	  1970s	  that	  residents	  felt	  excluded,	  and	  would	  ultimately	  
displace,	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods.	  Residents	  believed	  that	  preservation	  would	  work	  to	  
isolate	  black	  and	  poor	  residents	  in	  the	  oldest,	  most	  unattractive	  areas	  of	  the	  city.	  See	  J.	  E.	  
Bourgoyne,	  “Historic	  N.O.	  Areas	  to	  Vanish,”	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  March	  24,	  1974,	  6.	  	  
	  
45	  Urban	  Studies	  Institute,	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  "Citizen	  Participation	  
Symposium"	  (New	  Orleans:	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans	  ,	  1973),	  4.	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reach.	  Polls,	  utilizing	  the	  same	  objectivity	  of	  the	  blight	  index,	  were	  both	  democratic	  
and	  nondiscriminatory,	  the	  planner	  argued.46	  	  
While	  polling	  was	  increasingly	  popular	  among	  government	  circles	  and	  urban	  
planning	  institutes,	  other	  panelists	  cautioned	  that,	  used	  as	  a	  device	  for	  citizen	  
participation,	  polling	  would	  actually	  diminish	  opportunities	  for	  residents	  to	  
participate	  in	  shaping	  community	  development.	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans	  
economist	  James	  R.	  Bobo	  was	  a	  vocal	  opponent	  of	  polling	  for	  this	  purpose.	  The	  city	  
could	  not	  maintain	  channels	  for	  honest	  “communication,	  nor	  community,	  from	  a	  
polling	  device,”	  Bobo	  noted.47	  There	  was	  both	  a	  political	  and	  moral	  imperative	  to	  
construct	  citizen	  participation	  in	  ways	  that	  furthered	  the	  development	  of	  
communities	  themselves,	  he	  contended.	  	  	  
Community	  activists	  went	  further	  to	  reject	  the	  presumed	  failure	  of	  
preexisting	  citizen	  participation	  networks.	  These	  programs	  had	  actually	  permitted	  
activist	  circles	  to	  take	  root	  within	  low-­‐income	  communities,	  participants	  argued.	  	  
The	  failure	  of	  those	  networks	  to	  affect	  program	  development	  was	  the	  result	  of	  the	  
means	  by	  which	  local	  governments	  engaged,	  and	  more	  often	  ignored,	  those	  
channels,	  seasoned	  civil	  rights	  activist	  Oretha	  Haley	  Castle	  noted.	  Local	  officials	  
actively	  limited	  the	  authority	  of	  these	  citizen	  networks	  in	  planning	  processes,	  
reinforcing	  “the	  terrible	  lesson	  that	  poor	  people	  and	  black	  people	  tried	  to	  unlearn:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Urban	  Studies	  Institute,	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  "Citizen	  Participation	  
Symposium"	  (New	  Orleans:	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans	  ,	  1973),	  18.	  
	  
47	  Urban	  Studies	  Institute,	  “Citizen	  Participation	  Symposium,”	  18.	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‘thou	  shalt	  be	  second-­‐class	  citizens.’	  ”48	  In	  agreement,	  Edgar	  Poree	  Jr.,	  a	  black	  
businessman,	  noted	  that	  the	  real	  “fallacy”	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  citizen	  participation	  was	  the	  
idea	  that	  residents	  had	  any	  say	  in	  the	  way	  resources	  were	  allocated.	  Citizen	  
participation	  was	  an	  illusion	  to	  distract	  residents	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  were	  only	  
called	  to	  participate	  in	  decisions	  over	  “where	  to	  put	  the	  trees,	  but	  they’re	  never	  
involved	  in	  who	  should	  the	  trees	  be	  purchased	  from.”49	  Residents	  had	  no	  say	  in	  the	  
decisions	  that	  mattered	  most.	  
With	  the	  advent	  of	  block	  grants,	  citizen	  participation	  would	  become	  even	  
more	  tenuous,	  Clarence	  Barney,	  director	  of	  the	  Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Urban	  League,	  
cautioned.	  Rather	  than	  be	  an	  opportunity	  to	  expand	  avenues	  for	  participation,	  local	  
autonomy	  over	  funding	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  circumvention	  of	  citizen	  participation	  
altogether,	  he	  prophesized.50	  At	  its	  core,	  the	  proposed	  system	  of	  urban	  aid	  carried	  
the	  implicit	  assumption	  that	  expertise	  was	  appropriately	  vested	  within	  government	  
and	  not	  the	  people,	  Barney	  insisted.	  While	  representatives	  of	  the	  administration	  
were	  quick	  to	  dismiss	  Barney’s	  concern,	  the	  evening	  nonetheless	  ended	  with	  the	  
troubling	  acknowledgement	  that	  while	  governing	  officials	  publicly	  welcomed	  
resident	  input,	  they	  often	  were	  hostile	  to	  formal	  mechanisms	  designed	  to	  ensure	  it.	  
To	  counteract	  that	  paradigm,	  local	  planners	  would	  have	  to	  formulate	  a	  more	  
meaningful	  approach	  to	  citizen	  participation.	  Community	  leaders	  like	  Barney	  and	  
Castle	  insisted	  that	  creating	  effective	  mechanisms	  for	  citizen	  participation	  would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Ibid,	  11.	  
	  
49	  Ibid,	  14.	  	  
	  
50	  Ibid,	  18.	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require	  far	  more	  than	  simply	  re-­‐inventing	  the	  stream	  of	  City	  Council	  hearings	  and	  
advisory	  councils	  offered	  as	  participation;	  it	  would	  necessitate	  formalizing	  resident	  
partnerships	  into	  the	  structure	  of	  knowledge	  creation	  and	  program	  development.	  	  
Principally,	  trust	  would	  be	  established	  only	  if	  government	  entities	  were	  willing	  to	  
engage	  with	  the	  structures	  that	  low-­‐income	  communities	  saw	  as	  effective	  outlets	  for	  
participation.	  	  	  
By	  1974,	  however,	  the	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  had	  resolved	  
very	  few	  of	  the	  tensions	  between	  community	  leadership	  and	  local	  government	  
expertise.	  Undeterred	  by	  the	  reservations	  of	  community	  leadership	  to	  polling,	  OPPA	  
employed	  Rosenzweig	  to	  devise	  a	  multiple-­‐choice	  telephone	  and	  neighborhood	  
survey	  designed	  to	  extract	  citizen	  opinion	  on	  community	  development	  priorities.	  	  
The	  survey	  would	  sample	  one	  hundred	  people,	  representative	  of	  neighborhood	  
demographics,	  in	  each	  potential	  community	  development	  area.	  In	  lieu	  of	  asking	  
people	  to	  define	  their	  own	  community	  development	  needs,	  the	  survey	  asked	  
residents	  to	  rank	  particular	  pre-­‐defined	  priorities.	  The	  uniform	  scale	  maintained	  
not	  only	  the	  surveyor’s	  objectivity,	  ensuring	  that	  the	  surveyor	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  
influence	  resident	  answers,	  but	  a	  standard	  that	  could	  be	  replicated	  and	  would	  be	  
beyond	  manipulation,	  OPPA	  staff	  believed.51	  Additionally,	  surveying	  eliminated	  the	  
pitfalls	  of	  engaging	  the	  political	  and	  social	  contests	  so	  often	  present	  in	  community	  
forums,	  OPPA	  planners	  maintained.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Report,	  Semi-­‐Annual	  Report	  for	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development,	  Box	  8,	  Folder	  GD-­‐
CPA-­‐GRNT:	  Comprehensive	  Planning	  Assistance	  Grant	  Semi	  Annual	  report,	  Office	  of	  Policy	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Planners	  applauded	  themselves	  for	  considering	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  survey	  
approach.	  Not	  all	  low-­‐income	  people	  had	  telephones	  or	  listed	  numbers;	  many	  low-­‐	  
income	  people	  were	  hesitant	  to	  talk	  to	  public	  officials	  for	  fear	  it	  could	  create	  
backlash.	  Prior	  administrations	  neglected	  cultivating	  positive	  relationships	  with	  
low-­‐income	  communities,	  and	  thus,	  planners	  acknowledged,	  trust	  was	  not	  always	  
readily	  established	  between	  city	  officials	  and	  community	  residents.	  To	  overcome	  
such	  impediments,	  OPPA	  determined	  that	  trained	  staff	  would	  need	  to	  venture	  into	  
low-­‐income	  neighborhoods	  and	  communicate	  with	  those	  residents	  most	  on	  the	  
periphery.	  Staffers	  would	  be	  sent	  door	  to	  door	  in	  order	  to	  survey	  a	  diverse	  array	  of	  
citizens	  and	  develop	  the	  new	  neighborhood	  blight	  maps.52	  As	  ambassadors	  of	  the	  
city	  government,	  the	  team	  would	  spend	  actual	  time	  with	  actual	  residents,	  make	  
observations	  of	  daily	  neighborhood	  functions,	  continue	  collecting	  windshield	  data,	  
and	  represent	  OPPA	  at	  diverse	  community	  functions.53	  Community	  visits	  only	  
enhanced	  the	  scope	  of	  OPPA's	  data.	  
Planners	  thought	  that	  their	  commitment	  to	  scientific	  precision	  was	  
jeopardized	  by	  the	  hierarchical	  nature	  of	  neighborhood	  councils	  and	  action	  
networks.	  In	  former	  Model	  Cities	  neighborhoods	  like	  the	  Lower	  Ninth	  Ward,	  council	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  While	  OPPA	  planners	  had	  worked	  closely	  with	  black	  political	  networks,	  many	  of	  
them	  had	  not	  set	  foot	  in	  Desire,	  Florida,	  Holy	  Cross,	  or	  Hollygrove.	  Moten	  and	  the	  mayor’s	  
executive	  staff	  hoped	  that	  these	  encounters	  between	  planners	  and	  residents	  would	  promote	  
channels	  of	  trust,	  demonstrating	  a	  commitment	  from	  planners,	  who	  were	  often	  perceived	  
by	  community	  members	  as	  disinterested	  and	  elitist.	  Local	  administrators	  believed	  residents	  
would	  interpret	  their	  presence	  of	  a	  symbol;	  this	  was,	  after	  all,	  the	  first	  time	  planners	  were	  
visiting	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods	  to	  ask	  residents	  what	  they	  needed.	  
	  
53	  Notes,	  “Monthly	  Report	  Notes,	  June	  1975,”	  Box	  17,	  Folder	  OD-­‐PMTG-­‐RPRT:	  
Monthly	  Report	  Notes	  10/74-­‐08/75,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Archives,	  New	  
Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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leadership	  often	  operated	  without	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  people,	  the	  Office	  of	  Policy	  
Planning	  and	  Analysis	  analysts	  suggested.54	  The	  dictatorial	  nature	  of	  councils	  
created	  power	  imbalances,	  not	  only	  within	  neighborhoods,	  but	  among	  them,	  OPPA	  
determined.	  Neighborhoods	  without	  prior	  experience	  in	  federal	  programs	  rarely	  
benefited	  from	  organized	  leadership,	  and	  still	  other	  neighborhoods	  had	  disparate	  
leadership	  with	  competing	  visions	  for	  development.	  The	  discrepancies	  in	  levels	  of	  
neighborhood	  mobilization	  struck	  planners	  as	  highly	  problematic.	  These	  disparities	  
would	  not	  only	  "taint"	  the	  objectivity	  of	  the	  data,	  offering	  skewed	  results	  where	  
leadership	  had	  urged	  residents	  to	  prioritize	  particular	  programs,	  they	  could	  also	  
eliminate	  the	  possibility	  of	  creating	  truly	  participatory	  forums.	  While	  OPPA	  staff	  
stopped	  at	  abandoning	  town	  hall	  community	  meetings	  altogether,	  the	  office	  did,	  
however,	  believe	  that	  polling	  was	  necessary	  to	  circumvent	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  
neighborhood	  political	  leadership.	  	  
The	  immediate	  suspicion	  with	  which	  planners	  confronted	  existing	  
mechanisms	  of	  citizen	  participation	  represented	  a	  worrisome	  misunderstanding	  in	  
how	  planners	  constituted	  trust	  within	  low-­‐income	  communities.	  Though	  OPPA	  
planners	  believed	  that	  networks	  rooted	  in	  antipoverty	  programs	  troubled	  the	  
prospect	  of	  securing	  widespread	  participation	  in	  community	  forums,	  for	  many	  low-­‐
income	  residents,	  these	  neighborhood	  councils	  were	  at	  the	  vanguard	  of	  advocating	  
for	  sociopolitical	  inclusion.	  Council	  leadership	  had	  lobbied	  for	  targeted	  federal	  
funding	  because	  these	  leaders	  had	  overseen	  community	  action	  projects	  and	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  Report,	  Subject	  Area:	  Planning	  and	  Administration,	  Blight	  Indicators	  by	  Subject	  
Area.	  Box	  134,	  Folder	  Community	  Development	  1974,	  Moon	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  Papers,	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monitored	  programs	  in	  impoverished	  areas.55	  Far	  from	  the	  undemocratic	  forum	  
that	  OPPA	  planners	  viewed	  them	  as,	  neighborhood	  councils—as	  viewed	  by	  
residents—had	  created	  and	  safeguarded	  mechanisms	  for	  citizen	  participation	  that	  
were	  now	  a	  part	  of	  how	  neighborhoods	  operated.	  For	  residents	  disenfranchised	  by	  
the	  socioeconomic	  and	  political	  isolation	  of	  their	  communities,	  these	  forums	  
continued	  to	  act	  as	  conduits	  between	  local	  government	  agencies	  and	  the	  poorest	  of	  
New	  Orleans	  neighborhoods.56	  Though	  neighborhood	  leadership	  was	  certainly	  not	  
unified,	  and	  often	  contested,	  these	  councils	  were,	  nevertheless,	  central	  to	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐
day	  deployment	  of	  resources	  and	  information	  in	  low-­‐income	  districts.	  
Planners	  did	  not	  see	  it	  that	  way.	  Rather	  than	  seeing	  community	  leadership	  as	  
a	  built-­‐in	  channel	  by	  which	  to	  encourage	  better	  government-­‐community	  relations,	  
planners	  viewed	  these	  participatory	  mechanisms	  as	  barricades	  to	  a	  broader	  
spectrum	  of	  perspectives.	  The	  planners'	  skepticism	  of	  the	  authority	  assigned	  to	  such	  
entities	  made	  it	  difficult	  for	  them	  to	  envision	  a	  capacity	  within	  which	  the	  councils	  
could	  continue	  to	  operate.	  In	  fact,	  OPPA	  resisted	  having	  any	  formalized	  structure	  for	  
citizen	  participation	  that	  would	  allow	  community	  leadership	  to	  dictate	  
conversations	  between	  planners	  and	  residents.57	  After	  much	  discussion,	  OPPA	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Kent	  B.	  Germany,	  New	  Orleans	  After	  the	  Promises:	  Poverty,	  Citizenship,	  and	  the	  
Search	  for	  the	  Great	  Society	  (Atlanta:	  University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  2007),	  16.	  
	  
56	  Report,	  Executive	  Summary:	  Central	  City	  Citizen	  Participation	  Report	  Folder,	  Box	  3,	  
Folder	  CP-­‐CTLC-­‐EVAL,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  
Archives,	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  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	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57	  McManis	  Associates,	  The	  Comprehensive	  Planning	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  Community	  Development	  
Capacities	  of	  the	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans,	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  :	  findings	  and	  recommendations.,	  
(Washington,	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planners	  chose	  to	  remove	  neighborhood	  councils	  from	  the	  suggested	  avenues	  for	  
participation	  in	  the	  community	  development	  process,	  in	  favor	  of	  broad	  town	  hall	  
meetings.58	  While	  neighborhood	  leadership	  may	  not	  embrace	  such	  meetings,	  
planners	  believed	  that	  the	  entire	  process	  would	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  promise	  to	  fulfill	  
community	  desires.	  	  
	   Hoping	  to	  reinforce	  this	  commitment,	  OPPA	  looked	  to	  establish	  other	  
community	  development	  mechanisms	  as	  well.	  By	  mid-­‐1974,	  Moten	  tapped	  the	  
Human	  Relations	  Committee	  (HRC)	  to	  supervise	  the	  development	  of	  the	  city’s	  
formal	  citizen	  participation	  plan.	  The	  HRC,	  as	  Moten	  proposed,	  would	  move	  from	  an	  
advisory	  role	  into	  one	  of	  direct	  advocacy	  and	  planning	  operating	  as	  OPPA’s	  liaison	  
to	  community	  affairs.59	  But	  HRC	  staff	  members	  worried	  about	  enabling	  citizen	  
participation	  without	  the	  direct	  input	  of	  the	  policy	  office.60	  The	  parameters	  of	  
citizen	  participation	  outlined	  by	  the	  federal	  government	  were	  murky,	  at	  best,	  and	  
offered	  little	  guidance	  on	  how	  to	  develop	  meaningful	  discourse	  with	  residents	  on	  
community	  development	  planning.	  While	  suspicious	  that	  their	  new	  authority	  was	  a	  
result	  of	  OPPA	  shirking	  responsibility	  for	  overseeing	  community	  relations,	  HRC	  staff	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58Report,	  The	  Planning	  Process:	  Rough	  Draft,	  Box	  6,	  Folder	  DU-­‐REQ-­‐PUBH	  Public	  
Hearing	  Handout	  Worksheets	  January	  1976,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	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  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	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59	  The	  HRC	  was	  created	  in	  1967	  as	  a	  response	  to	  pressure	  from	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  
Movement.	  The	  committee	  operated	  as	  an	  advising	  board	  to	  the	  city	  administration	  on	  
issues	  of	  racism	  and	  inequality,	  but	  had	  no	  real	  power	  over	  policy.	  See	  “Minutes	  of	  Monday,	  
May	  6,	  1974	  Meeting,”	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  HRC	  Meeting	  Agenda	  April/May/June	  1974,	  Human	  
Relations	  Committee	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  
Louisiana.	  
	  
60	  Notes,	  “Minutes	  of	  Monday,	  February	  4,	  1974,”	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  HRC	  Meetings	  and	  
Agendas	  Jan/Feb/March	  1974,	  Human	  Relations	  Committee	  Files,	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  Orleans	  City	  
Archives,	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  Orleans	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  Library,	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members	  felt	  an	  obligation	  to	  develop	  a	  rigorous	  participation	  plan.	  Even	  so,	  the	  
committee	  members	  soon	  realized	  that	  they	  had	  little	  power	  to	  make	  unilateral	  
decisions	  about	  what	  the	  influence	  of	  citizen	  participation	  would	  be.61	  	  	  
	   Later	  that	  year,	  OPPA,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  Human	  Relations	  Committee,	  
began	  developing	  a	  participation	  plan	  in	  tandem	  with	  its	  overall	  community	  
development	  application.	  Time	  had	  been	  constrained	  by	  the	  drawn-­‐out	  nature	  of	  
congressional	  hearings	  prior	  to	  enactment	  of	  the	  CDBG	  program,	  but	  the	  planning	  
team	  scheduled	  thirteen	  neighborhood	  meetings	  in	  some	  of	  the	  most	  “blight-­‐ridden”	  
areas	  to	  discuss	  community	  development.	  By	  hosting	  the	  meetings	  within	  target	  
neighborhoods,	  rather	  than	  City	  Council	  chambers,	  planners	  believed	  they	  would	  
attract	  a	  wider	  cross-­‐section	  of	  residents	  and	  continue	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  their	  
commitment	  to	  low-­‐income	  communities	  was	  different	  from	  their	  predecessors'.62	  
On	  December	  29,	  1974,	  the	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  launched	  its	  
community	  town	  hall	  meetings	  on	  the	  new	  funding.	  	  
Despite	  the	  optimism	  of	  planners,	  residents	  were	  far	  less	  enthusiastic	  about	  
the	  prospect	  of	  new	  funding	  opportunities.	  The	  inaugural	  meeting	  was	  with	  citizens	  
of	  the	  Lower	  Ninth	  Ward,	  the	  former	  Model	  Cities	  neighborhood	  devastated	  after	  
flooding	  from	  Hurricane	  Betty	  in	  1965.	  The	  area	  was	  notoriously	  impoverished—
the	  storm	  had	  wreaked	  havoc	  on	  the	  basic	  neighborhood	  infrastructure	  and	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  Notes,	  “Minutes	  of	  Monday,	  February	  4,	  1974,”	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  HRC	  Meetings	  and	  
Agendas	  Jan/Feb/March	  1974,	  Human	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  Committee	  Files,	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  Report,	  “Monthly	  Reports,”	  Box	  17,	  Folder	  OD-­‐PMTG-­‐RPRT:	  Monthly	  Reports	  
Notes	  10/74-­‐08/75,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	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burdened	  low-­‐income	  homeowners	  with	  insurmountable	  repairs.	  Yet,	  the	  
neighborhood	  had	  cultivated	  rich	  networks	  of	  grassroots	  leadership.	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  
the	  Voting	  Rights	  Act,	  the	  area	  had	  given	  rise	  to	  powerful	  black	  political	  associations,	  
including	  the	  Southern	  Organization	  of	  Unified	  Leadership	  (SOUL),	  that	  dominated	  
antipoverty	  programs	  and	  wielded	  great	  influence	  with	  the	  Landrieu	  administration	  
after	  mobilizing	  black	  voters	  on	  his	  behalf.63	  Although	  some	  members	  of	  the	  Lower	  
Ninth	  Ward	  leadership	  had	  been	  formally	  brought	  into	  the	  fold	  of	  the	  local	  
bureaucracy,	  skepticism	  that	  other	  leaders	  would	  influence	  resident	  opinion	  colored	  
the	  way	  planners	  approached	  the	  meeting.	  	  
Entering	  the	  Lower	  Ninth	  Ward	  Parent-­‐Child	  Center,	  a	  product	  of	  successful	  
War	  on	  Poverty	  investment,	  resident	  frustrations	  permeated	  the	  air.	  OPPA	  staff	  
planners,	  led	  by	  Terrence	  Duvernay,	  stood	  in	  front	  of	  the	  small	  crowd	  and	  detailed	  
the	  grant	  process,	  explaining	  to	  residents	  how	  they	  would	  determine	  priorities	  and	  
create	  a	  process	  for	  executing	  programs.	  While	  Community	  Development	  Block	  
Grants	  would	  certainly	  diminish	  the	  net	  of	  funds	  directed	  into	  the	  Lower	  Ninth,	  
being	  able	  to	  craft	  programs	  that	  immediately	  addressed	  resident	  concerns	  could	  
prove	  far	  more	  valuable,	  they	  noted	  with	  enthusiasm.	  Following	  the	  presentation,	  
the	  question-­‐and-­‐answer	  period	  let	  loose	  a	  flurry	  of	  suspicion.	  Planners	  tried	  their	  
best	  to	  assure	  residents	  that	  the	  CDBG	  program	  would	  not	  lead	  to	  wholesale	  neglect	  
of	  the	  neighborhood;	  they	  promised	  residents	  that	  they	  would	  encourage	  city	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Kent	  B.	  Germany,	  New	  Orleans	  After	  the	  Promises:	  Poverty,	  Citizenship,	  and	  the	  
Search	  for	  the	  Great	  Society	  (Atlanta:	  University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  2007),	  256;	  see	  also,	  Kim	  
Lacy	  Rogers,	  Righteous	  Lives:	  Narratives	  of	  the	  New	  Orleans	  Civil	  Rights	  Movement	  (New	  
York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  1995);	  Adam	  Fairclough,	  Race	  &	  Democracy:	  The	  Civil	  
Rights	  Struggle	  in	  Louisiana,	  1915-­‐1972	  (Atlanta,	  Georgia:	  University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  
1999).	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officials	  to	  extend	  support	  for	  the	  continuation	  of	  antipoverty	  programs	  and	  would	  
coordinate	  those	  efforts	  with	  new	  community	  development	  programs.	  But	  residents	  
expressed	  deep	  uncertainties	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  government	  could	  follow	  through	  
on	  those	  promises.	  One	  woman	  interrupted,	  saying,	  “It	  sounds	  like	  you	  all	  come	  here	  
as	  a	  salesman	  with	  a	  bag	  of	  goodies,	  then	  say,	  ‘You	  can’t	  have	  this.’	  All	  these	  people	  
are	  asking	  for	  is	  nice,	  clean	  streets	  like	  the	  Landrieus	  live	  on.”64	  Residents	  wondered	  
whether	  block	  grants	  represented	  a	  coup	  designed	  to	  dismantle	  the	  progress	  that	  
had	  only	  begun	  to	  occur	  through	  antipoverty	  programs.	  	  
	  It	  had	  been	  unclear	  to	  residents	  how	  community	  development	  aid	  would	  
work,	  but	  now	  it	  was	  painfully	  apparent	  that	  the	  $14.2	  million	  award	  would	  not	  
cultivate	  targeted	  approaches.	  Under	  Model	  Cities,	  three	  neighborhoods	  received	  
nearly	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  aid	  offered	  through	  the	  CDBG	  program.	  Now	  funding	  
would	  be	  so	  low,	  it	  wasn’t	  even	  “like	  putting	  a	  drop	  of	  water	  in	  an	  empty	  bucket,”	  
another	  man	  said.65	  The	  thirty	  or	  so	  residents	  gathered	  in	  the	  facility	  quickly	  rattled	  
off	  a	  list	  of	  other	  concerns	  that	  included	  sanitation	  issues,	  crime,	  health	  care,	  a	  lack	  
of	  playgrounds,	  and	  high	  rates	  of	  unemployment.66	  Yet,	  there	  was	  little	  faith	  on	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  “Neighborhoods	  Tell	  their	  Needs	  in	  Seeking	  $14.2	  Million	  Share,”	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  
January	  3,	  1975,	  19.	  
	  
65	  Ibid.	  	  
	  
66	  Report,	  “Lower	  Ninth	  Ward	  Citizen	  Meeting	  Comments	  and	  Suggestions,”	  Box	  3,	  
Folder	  16,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  
Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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brisk	  winter’s	  night	  that	  their	  neighborhood	  would	  actually	  benefit	  from	  the	  
transformation	  of	  federal	  aid.67	  
Believing	  that	  their	  efforts	  to	  engage	  within	  community	  spaces	  would	  
ameliorate	  this	  tension,	  planners	  were	  both	  surprised	  and	  troubled	  by	  resident	  
skepticism.	  The	  most	  scathing	  critique	  of	  the	  city’s	  administration	  appeared	  in	  the	  
anonymous	  “priority	  setting”	  survey	  distributed	  throughout	  the	  meeting.	  In	  their	  
survey	  responses,	  residents	  once	  again	  articulated	  distrust	  of	  the	  planning	  team,	  
citing	  the	  failure	  of	  previous	  city	  agencies	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  pattern.	  Respondents	  
blamed	  the	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  for	  dragging	  its	  feet	  on	  low-­‐income	  
housing	  rehabilitation,	  and	  noted	  that	  the	  police	  ignored	  neighborhoods	  where	  
crime	  was	  actually	  occurring.	  Residents	  used	  the	  forms	  to	  demand	  jobs	  that	  paid	  a	  
decent	  wage	  and	  schools	  that	  produced	  students	  who	  could	  actually	  have	  a	  future.68	  	  
The	  survey	  itself,	  as	  residents	  saw	  it,	  was	  part	  of	  the	  systematic	  exclusion	  of	  low-­‐
income	  people	  from	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  The	  meetings	  and	  surveys	  were	  
not	  additional	  participation	  outlets,	  but	  a	  diversion,	  residents	  claimed.	  They	  were	  
convinced	  that	  the	  city	  had	  already	  made	  decisions	  about	  where	  funding	  would	  go	  
and	  that	  these	  interactions	  were	  only	  to	  coerce	  residents	  into	  believing	  they	  had	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  The	  neighborhood	  was	  struggling	  even	  with	  the	  influx	  of	  antipoverty	  aid.	  Nearly	  
30	  percent	  of	  the	  population	  lived	  below	  the	  poverty	  line	  and	  nearly	  half	  of	  those	  in	  poverty	  
were	  children;	  unemployment	  in	  the	  area	  occurred	  at	  one	  of	  the	  highest	  rates	  in	  the	  city.	  
See	  Report,	  Statistical	  Profile	  of	  the	  Lower	  Ninth	  Ward,	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  CG-­‐NGH:	  Lower	  Ninth	  
Ward,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  
Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
68	  Report,	  “Lower	  Ninth	  Ward	  Citizen	  Meeting	  Comments	  and	  Suggestions,”	  Box	  3,	  
Folder	  CG:CDI,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  
Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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voice.	  One	  respondent	  seemed	  to	  summarize	  the	  meeting’s	  tone,	  “Please	  do	  not	  use	  
this	  as	  a	  ‘Nigger	  Getting	  Over	  Game.’	  Do	  something	  positive!	  This	  is	  not	  a	  game,	  and	  I	  
am	  tired	  of	  empty	  words!”69	  
The	  interpretation	  of	  the	  town	  hall	  meetings	  as	  some	  sort	  of	  rigged	  game	  
was	  a	  common	  response	  from	  residents.	  At	  the	  Desire-­‐Florida	  town	  hall	  forum,	  a	  
resident	  articulated	  the	  same	  wariness	  of	  OPPA’s	  intentions.70	  She	  believed	  planners	  
might	  just	  be	  presenting	  residents	  with	  “a	  game	  in	  progress.”71	  Another	  angry	  
resident	  construed	  OPPA	  motives	  as	  “throwing	  out	  change	  to	  the	  communities	  to	  
have	  them	  fight	  among	  themselves.”72	  In	  meeting	  after	  meeting,	  the	  planners	  found	  
residents	  to	  be	  “highly	  suspicious	  and	  distrustful”	  of	  the	  staff’s	  presence.73	  Contrary	  
to	  OPPA’s	  presupposed	  logic,	  residents	  did	  not	  believe	  in	  the	  good-­‐will	  attempt	  by	  
city	  government	  to	  become	  more	  responsive	  and	  accessible	  to	  low-­‐income	  residents.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Report,	  “Lower	  Ninth	  Ward	  Citizen	  Meeting	  Comments	  and	  Suggestions,”	  Box	  3,	  
Folder	  CG:CDI,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  
Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
70	  By	  1970,	  the	  Desire	  Projects	  had	  10,574	  residents;	  75	  percent	  of	  the	  population	  
was	  under	  the	  age	  of	  21.	  	  For	  more	  background	  information	  on	  the	  Desire	  housing	  projects,	  
see	  Martha	  Mahoney,	  "Law	  and	  Racial	  Geography:	  Public	  Housing	  and	  the	  Economy	  in	  New	  
Orleans,"	  Stanford	  Law	  Review	  42,	  no.	  5	  (1990).	  For	  another	  case	  study,	  see	  D.	  Bradford	  
Hunt,	  Blueprint	  for	  Disaster:	  The	  Unraveling	  of	  Chicago	  Public	  Housing	  (Chicago:	  University	  
of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2009).	  
	  
71	  Report,	  Desire	  Florida	  January	  2,	  1975	  CP	  Meeting,	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  CG-­‐CD1:	  
Planning	  Package	  Inventory	  forms	  for	  the	  CD	  Neighborhoods,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  
Analysis,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  	  
	  
72	  Dwight	  Ott,	  "Community	  Act	  Program	  is	  'Nightmare,"	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  January	  4,	  
1975,	  5.	  
	  
73	  Memo,	  Cynthia	  Lewis	  to	  the	  OPPA	  Staff,	  January	  7,	  1975	  Report	  on	  CP	  Meetings,	  
Box	  2,	  Folder	  CG-­‐CD1:	  Planning	  Package	  Inventory	  forms	  for	  the	  CD	  Neighborhoods,	  Office	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Instead,	  any	  façade	  constructed	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  citizen	  participation	  was	  
perceived	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  “pacify	  the	  people.”74	  Fundamentally,	  residents	  
understood	  the	  reorganization	  of	  federal	  aid	  as	  an	  instrument	  to	  undermine	  the	  
political	  power	  of	  low-­‐income	  residents.	  Ironically,	  residents	  interpreted	  the	  
disregard	  for	  traditional	  citizen	  participation	  networks	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  subvert	  the	  
little	  power	  that	  low-­‐income	  communities	  could	  retain.	  Clearly,	  residents	  and	  
planners	  had	  different	  ideas	  of	  how	  citizen	  participation	  would	  be	  most	  effective.	  	  
By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  night,	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  process	  had	  frustrated	  everyone.	  
OPPA	  staff	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  stave	  off	  disillusionment	  early	  on.	  Departing	  
from	  Desire-­‐Florida,	  Gagliano	  expressed	  helplessness	  in	  attempting	  to	  address	  the	  
concerns	  of	  low-­‐income	  residents.	  Powerless	  to	  refuse	  the	  changes	  in	  federal	  
funding,	  he	  acknowledged	  the	  sheer	  disappointment	  of	  residents	  in	  poverty-­‐
stricken	  areas	  who	  had	  come	  to	  realize	  that	  community	  development	  could	  halt	  the	  
slow	  progress	  begun	  through	  Model	  Cities.	  There	  was	  little	  he	  or	  anyone	  in	  local	  
government	  could	  do,	  he	  said,	  but	  residents	  had	  to	  understand	  that	  the	  federal	  
programs	  that	  had	  once	  buoyed	  New	  Orleans’s	  most	  dilapidated	  neighborhoods	  “do	  
not	  exist	  anymore.	  They	  have	  been	  legislated	  out	  of	  existence.”75	  Although	  he	  hoped	  
that	  residents	  would	  be	  able	  to	  “see	  it	  that	  way,”	  it	  was	  hard	  to	  view	  the	  CDBG	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Memo,	  Cynthia	  Lewis	  to	  the	  OPPA	  Staff,	  January	  7,	  1975	  Report	  on	  CP	  Meetings,	  
Box	  2,	  Folder	  CG-­‐CD1:	  Planning	  Package	  Inventory	  forms	  for	  the	  CD	  Neighborhoods,	  Office	  
of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  
Library,	  Louisiana.	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process	  as	  anything	  but	  a	  “nightmare.”76	  As	  Gagliano	  noted,	  “At	  one	  time	  there	  were	  
three	  neighborhoods	  we	  had	  dissatisfied	  with	  lack	  of	  funds.	  Now	  we	  have	  sixteen	  
others	  to	  include	  who	  will	  be	  dissatisfied	  and	  we	  have	  almost	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  
funds	  available.”77	  The	  expectations	  of	  forging	  more	  productive	  alliances	  with	  
community	  members	  seemed	  to	  be	  dissolving	  just	  as	  OPPA	  was	  getting	  started.	  
As	  residents	  discovered	  the	  material	  limitations	  of	  the	  CDBG	  funding,	  their	  
dissatisfaction	  was	  only	  sharpened	  by	  the	  interactions	  of	  OPPA	  planning	  members	  
and	  community	  leadership.	  Planners	  immediately	  understood	  the	  presence	  of	  
community	  leaders	  at	  the	  neighborhood	  town	  hall	  meetings	  as	  combative.	  Yet,	  
particularly	  in	  former	  Model	  Cities	  neighborhoods,	  where	  federal	  aid	  and	  persistent	  
grassroots	  activity	  had	  produced	  alternative	  political	  arrangements,	  those	  in	  
leadership	  roles	  demanded	  an	  audience	  with	  OPPA	  planners.	  Evaluating	  the	  Desire-­‐	  
Florida	  community	  meeting,	  planners	  were	  dismayed	  by	  the	  attempts	  of	  Democratic	  
State	  Representative	  Johnny	  Jackson	  Jr.,	  who	  represented	  the	  area	  in	  the	  Legislature,	  
to	  dominate	  the	  conversation.	  When	  discussing	  the	  retention	  of	  citizen	  participation	  
programs,	  Jackson’s	  presence	  made	  it	  difficult	  for	  OPPA	  planners	  to	  cultivate	  fruitful	  
relations	  with	  the	  community	  itself.	  Planners	  felt	  they	  were	  never	  given	  a	  chance	  to	  
appear	  friendly	  as	  Jackson	  launched	  a	  verbal	  assault	  on	  Gagliano	  just	  as	  the	  mayor’s	  
aide	  attempted	  to	  describe	  the	  community	  development	  process.	  While	  Jackson’s	  
outbursts	  were	  identified	  as	  hostile,	  the	  planning	  team	  described	  Carl	  Galmon,	  
spokesperson	  for	  the	  local	  chapter	  of	  the	  National	  Association	  for	  the	  Advancement	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of	  Colored	  People	  (NAACP),	  as	  a	  “thorn	  in	  the	  side”	  whose	  presence	  prohibited	  any	  
productive	  exchange	  between	  residents	  and	  planners.78	  The	  interaction	  seemed	  to	  
confirm	  the	  unproductive	  role	  of	  community	  leadership	  as	  planners	  immediately	  
interpreted	  the	  antagonism	  of	  community	  members	  as	  symbolic	  of	  the	  coercive	  
nature	  of	  neighborhood	  leadership.	  Ironically,	  the	  planning	  team	  members	  spent	  
little	  time	  interrogating	  the	  ways	  their	  own	  official	  position,	  authority,	  and	  
perceived	  dominance	  may	  have	  influenced	  resident	  perceptions.	  	  
That	  oversight	  was	  evident	  as	  communities	  interpreted	  the	  devaluation	  of	  
local	  leadership	  as	  a	  show	  of	  how	  little	  OPPA	  valued	  community	  priorities.	  In	  a	  
surprising	  display	  of	  public	  animosity,	  residents	  of	  the	  Tremé	  neighborhood,	  which	  
borders	  the	  French	  Quarter,	  rejected	  the	  city’s	  offer	  of	  $500,000	  in	  community	  
development	  funding	  to	  complete	  the	  Tremé	  Community	  Center.	  The	  idea	  for	  the	  
center	  was	  conceived	  in	  response	  to	  widespread	  community	  protests	  following	  the	  
city’s	  decision	  to	  raze	  part	  of	  the	  historically	  black	  neighborhood	  to	  make	  way	  for	  
the	  Louis	  Armstrong	  Park	  in	  1968.	  The	  center	  remained	  unfinished	  due	  to	  cost	  
overages	  despite	  ongoing	  construction	  on	  the	  park.79	  Remaining	  Tremé	  residents	  
balked	  at	  the	  city’s	  offer,	  not	  trusting	  that	  it	  would	  come	  without	  penalty.	  Residents	  
of	  the	  community,	  which	  had	  in	  just	  a	  few	  years	  been	  divided	  not	  only	  by	  the	  park	  
but	  the	  construction	  of	  Interstate	  10,	  a	  highway	  built	  for	  access	  to	  the	  downtown,	  
believed	  that	  if	  they	  accepted	  the	  city’s	  offer,	  then	  more	  pressing	  priorities	  would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Report,	  “Desire-­‐Florida	  January	  2,	  1975	  CP	  Meeting,”	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  CG-­‐CD1:	  
Planning	  Package	  Inventory	  forms	  for	  the	  CD	  Neighborhoods,	  OPPA	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  
Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
79	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  "Towards	  Urban	  Partnerships,"	  January	  8,	  1975,	  10.	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not	  receive	  funding.80	  Despite	  the	  effort	  of	  planners	  to	  assure	  residents	  otherwise,	  
community	  members	  did	  not	  have	  confidence	  that	  city	  officials	  would	  use	  the	  block	  
grants	  to	  expand	  access	  to	  resources	  for	  those	  most	  in	  need.	  	  
Yet	  it	  was	  not	  only	  community	  residents	  who	  remained	  unconvinced	  of	  the	  
legitimacy	  of	  the	  CDBG	  process.	  City	  Council	  members	  also	  raised	  questions	  about	  
how	  the	  distribution	  of	  resources	  would	  be	  allocated,	  though	  perhaps	  for	  different	  
reasons	  than	  their	  constituencies.	  For	  councilors,	  their	  concerns	  focused	  less	  on	  the	  
mechanisms	  by	  which	  priorities	  were	  being	  determined	  and	  far	  more	  on	  ensuring	  
funding	  for	  areas	  newly	  opened	  to	  community	  development	  aid.81	  By	  early	  1975,	  the	  
town	  hall	  meetings	  had	  become	  media	  circuses	  with	  reporters	  scrambling	  to	  cover	  
the	  battle	  over	  resources.	  Newly	  appointed	  District	  A	  Councilman	  Frank	  Friedler	  Jr.	  
capitalized	  on	  the	  media	  presence	  to	  lay	  claim	  to	  CDBG	  funding	  at	  a	  town	  hall	  
meeting	  held	  in	  Gert	  Town.	  	  Gert	  Town	  sat	  just	  north	  of	  the	  Central	  City	  Model	  Cities	  
area,	  nestled	  between	  the	  Pontchartrain	  Expressway	  and	  the	  historically	  black	  
Xavier	  University.	  While	  ranked	  as	  one	  of	  the	  top	  ten	  worst	  neighborhoods	  on	  the	  
city’s	  blight	  index,	  and	  in	  spite	  of	  an	  ongoing	  relationship	  with	  Xavier,	  Gert	  Town	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Eventually	  the	  city	  would	  finish	  the	  multimillion-­‐dollar	  community	  center.	  
However,	  the	  center	  would	  remain	  a	  bittersweet	  symbol	  for	  Tremé	  residents.	  While	  it	  
represented	  the	  success	  of	  community	  organizations	  to	  demand	  concessions	  from	  the	  city,	  
it	  also	  reminded	  residents	  that	  their	  neighborhood	  had	  been	  destroyed	  for	  something	  that	  
was	  not	  built	  for	  them.	  The	  adjacent	  Louis	  Armstrong	  Park	  had	  ten-­‐foot	  walls	  surrounding	  
it.	  Residents	  claimed	  the	  walls	  were	  built	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  those	  in	  the	  area	  would	  be	  kept	  
out.	  	  
	  
81	  This	  was	  one	  of	  the	  congressional	  critiques	  of	  the	  block	  grant	  system	  in	  general.	  	  
Members	  of	  Congress	  worried	  that	  by	  divesting	  funding	  and	  program	  decisions	  to	  local	  
governments,	  it	  would	  encourage	  local	  officials	  to	  use	  the	  funds	  to	  dispense	  patronage	  
among	  political	  allies,	  as	  well	  as	  be	  forced	  to	  spread	  resources	  among	  benefactors.	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had	  received	  little	  federal	  money.82	  Friedler,	  demonstrating	  a	  vote	  of	  solidarity	  with	  
residents,	  entered	  the	  meeting	  in	  a	  fury.	  He	  quickly	  accused	  city	  officials	  of	  
misleading	  residents	  about	  the	  CDBG	  process.	  Residents	  had	  little	  of	  the	  choice	  or	  
power	  that	  OPPA	  planners	  had	  described,	  the	  angry	  councilor	  noted.	  Presenting	  the	  
meetings	  as	  a	  chance	  for	  residents	  to	  assist	  government	  officials	  in	  setting	  funding	  
priorities	  led	  community	  members	  to	  believe	  that	  they	  would	  have	  authoritative	  
control	  of	  where	  the	  $14.2	  million	  in	  funding	  would	  be	  directed,	  Friedler	  stated.	  	  
While	  planners	  were	  giving	  the	  impression	  that	  these	  meetings	  would	  be	  reflected	  
in	  city	  programming,	  Friedler	  reiterated	  accusations	  that	  town	  halls	  were	  just	  a	  
smokescreen	  disguising	  the	  reality	  that	  OPPA	  entered	  with	  a	  preset	  agenda.	  “They	  
are	  building	  up	  expectations	  in	  peoples’	  minds	  when	  the	  money	  just	  isn’t	  there,”	  the	  
councilor	  stated.	  All	  he	  could	  do	  was	  urge	  residents	  to	  think	  small,	  to	  demand	  
projects	  with	  finite	  and	  visible	  results	  that	  might	  actually	  gain	  approval.83	  	  	  
In	  a	  reactionary	  moment	  of	  frustration,	  Mayor	  Landrieu	  lashed	  out	  at	  the	  
criticism	  of	  his	  planning	  team.	  There	  were	  funding	  limitations	  outside	  the	  control	  of	  
local	  government	  that	  necessitated	  flexibility	  and	  compromise	  on	  the	  part	  of	  local	  
residents,	  the	  mayor	  said.	  The	  administration	  had	  established	  a	  planning	  and	  
analysis	  unit	  to	  construct	  feasible	  courses	  of	  action	  from	  community	  suggestions.	  
Residents	  unsatisfied	  with	  that	  process	  should	  remember	  that	  what	  the	  planners	  
were	  seeking	  through	  these	  town	  halls	  “was	  advice—not	  decision	  making.”84	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “XU	  Completes	  Planning	  Work,”	  April	  18,	  1972,	  8.	  
	  
83	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  	  “Friedler:	  Officials	  Mislead	  Residents,”	  January	  4,	  1975,	  6.	  
	  
84	  Paul	  Atkinson,	  “Mayor	  Claims	  no	  Power	  in	  the	  Strike,”	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  January	  11,	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Community	  members	  felt	  this	  sentiment	  affirmed	  precisely	  what	  they	  had	  been	  
saying	  all	  along	  about	  how	  they	  were	  going	  to	  be	  allowed	  to	  participate	  in	  planning.	  	  
Yet,	  as	  first-­‐year	  programming	  came	  up	  for	  review	  in	  public	  City	  Council	  hearings,	  
Landrieu	  bemoaned	  the	  first	  year	  of	  the	  citizen	  participation	  process.	  	  
	  To	  the	  ambitious	  mayor,	  the	  process	  had	  been	  a	  “great	  disappointment,”	  
only	  really	  including	  “constituency	  groups,	  some	  neighborhood	  politicians,	  and	  
some	  professional	  rhetoricians.”	  As	  the	  mayor	  saw	  it,	  the	  city	  had	  launched	  a	  
“Herculean	  effort	  to	  get	  people	  involved.”85	  The	  mayor	  believed,	  at	  least	  publicly,	  
that	  this	  effort	  failed	  because	  residents	  refused	  to	  be	  involved	  and	  had	  instead	  
succumbed	  to	  apathy.	  Though	  participation	  was	  indeed	  dismal	  in	  comparison	  to	  
neighborhood	  population	  statistics—there	  were	  rarely	  more	  than	  40	  residents	  at	  
any	  of	  the	  meetings—the	  mayor’s	  comments	  undermined	  the	  efforts	  of	  those	  who	  
attempted	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  planning	  process	  as	  well	  as	  those	  who	  had	  been	  
excluded.	  The	  comments	  left	  some	  community	  members	  wondering	  whether	  the	  
mayor	  was	  disappointed	  in	  the	  turnout	  of	  citizen	  participation	  or	  with	  the	  
perspectives	  put	  forth	  through	  citizen	  participation.	  	  	  
The	  efforts	  of	  the	  administration	  to	  garner	  participation	  were	  perhaps	  
overstated	  by	  the	  mayor,	  as	  city	  planners	  pursued	  few	  channels	  outside	  of	  the	  
Model	  Cities	  neighborhoods	  through	  which	  to	  reach	  neighborhood	  residents.	  
Additionally,	  they	  ignored	  the	  possibility	  that	  by	  circumventing	  pre-­‐existing	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community	  networks,	  they	  had,	  in	  fact,	  undermined	  their	  own	  credibility	  in	  the	  eyes	  
of	  low-­‐income	  residents.	  The	  dual	  practices	  of	  isolating	  the	  opinions	  of	  community	  
powerbrokers	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  residents	  and	  approaching	  activists	  as	  inevitably	  
hostile	  to	  compromise	  created	  divisions	  between	  those	  that	  residents	  saw	  as	  
leaders	  and	  local	  officials.	  Nor	  did	  planners	  consider	  that	  outside	  of	  the	  town	  hall	  
meetings,	  city	  officials	  had	  done	  little	  to	  institutionalize	  channels	  of	  communication	  
with	  marginalized	  low-­‐income	  communities.	  While	  Model	  Cities	  neighborhoods	  
retained	  ongoing	  citizen	  participation	  networks,	  though	  they	  too	  operated	  outside	  
the	  official	  bureaucratic	  city	  structure,	  many	  of	  the	  remaining	  antipoverty	  program	  
boards	  actually	  discouraged	  citizen	  participation	  outside	  of	  the	  sanctioned	  city	  
hierarchical	  structures.86	  	  Such	  a	  system	  forced	  communities	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  
government	  to	  create	  those	  networks.	  But	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  planning	  process,	  
outside	  of	  Model	  Cities	  neighborhoods,	  there	  were	  sixteen	  other	  neighborhoods	  
selected	  for	  community	  development	  that	  had	  no	  organized	  avenues	  for	  citizen	  
participation.	  	  	  
Invariably,	  despite	  the	  differences	  in	  political	  organization	  and	  
neighborhood	  composition,	  the	  priorities	  listed	  by	  neighborhoods	  were	  surprisingly	  
uniform.87	  Tabulating	  and	  ranking	  “need”	  from	  both	  citizen	  comments	  and	  surveys,	  
planners	  worked	  to	  divide	  community	  issues	  among	  the	  categories	  eligible	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Kent	  B.	  Germany,	  New	  Orleans	  After	  the	  Promises:	  Poverty,	  Citizenship,	  and	  the	  
Search	  for	  the	  Great	  Society	  (Atlanta:	  University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  2007),	  91.	  
	  
87	  Report,	  Community	  Development	  Blight	  Index,	  Box	  1,	  Folder	  CD-­‐PBH-­‐MIN:	  CD	  
Public	  Hearing	  Transcripts	  1976,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  
City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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community	  development:	  public	  works,	  human	  services,	  housing,	  economic	  
development,	  and	  citizen	  participation.	  Housing	  ranked	  as	  one	  of	  the	  top	  priorities	  
in	  every	  neighborhood	  surveyed.	  Other	  top	  priorities	  were	  drainage,	  transportation,	  
jobs	  and	  job	  training,	  recreational	  and	  community	  facilities,	  and	  sanitation	  
services.88	  The	  stated	  priorities	  across	  communities	  actually	  reflected	  many	  of	  the	  
statistical	  findings	  of	  the	  blight	  indices	  as	  well.	  For	  those	  at	  OPPA,	  the	  data’s	  
homogeny	  signaled	  a	  triumph	  of	  the	  scientific	  process;	  now,	  OPPA	  staff	  could	  start	  
creating	  solutions.89	  Yet,	  it	  also	  reflected	  the	  manner	  through	  which	  data	  had	  been	  
collected:	  pre-­‐set	  priorities	  would	  produce	  pre-­‐set	  answers.	  
The	  data	  unit	  operated	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  better	  data	  could	  compel	  
better	  action	  if	  government	  were	  actively	  informed.	  Yet,	  the	  first	  year’s	  experience	  
with	  blight	  indices	  and	  community	  participation	  produced	  results	  that	  were	  both	  
surprisingly	  uniform	  and	  painstakingly	  obvious.	  The	  resident	  priority	  lists	  
reproduced	  the	  same	  kinds	  of	  things	  that	  had	  been	  asked	  for	  in	  earlier	  eras	  without	  
the	  assistance	  of	  a	  data	  unit.	  This	  begged	  the	  question	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  
block	  grants—where	  programs	  were	  largely	  constrained	  to	  physical	  development—
whether	  such	  data	  were	  necessary	  at	  all.	  That	  these	  kinds	  of	  priorities	  could	  be	  
readily	  obtained	  without	  rigorous	  data	  further	  destabilized	  any	  myth	  that	  prior	  
failures	  to	  address	  low-­‐income	  resident	  needs	  were	  the	  result	  of	  limited	  data.	  If	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “14,808,000	  for	  Orleans	  and	  How	  Mayor	  Landrieu	  Proposes	  to	  
Use	  It,”	  February	  16,	  1975,	  3.	  
	  
89	  Notes,	  “July	  1975	  Staff	  Notes,”	  Box	  15,	  Folder	  OD-­‐PMTG-­‐RPRT:	  Monthly	  Reports	  
Notes	  10/74-­‐08/75,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  
New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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anything,	  the	  process	  of	  data	  collection	  and	  the	  belief	  planners	  had	  that	  it	  would	  aid	  
them	  in	  developing	  more	  responsive	  programs	  obscured	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  
program	  itself.	  	  	  
Though	  unquestioning	  of	  the	  role	  of	  data,	  analysts	  were	  self-­‐consciously	  
aware	  of	  the	  limitations	  in	  what	  they	  were	  able	  to	  accomplish.	  Actually,	  their	  
frustrations	  centered	  on	  the	  lack	  of	  time	  they	  had	  to	  develop	  concrete	  data	  sets	  and	  
program	  modeling.	  Although	  CDBG	  legislation	  encouraged	  data	  analysis,	  it	  did	  not	  
provide	  ample	  time	  or	  funding	  for	  the	  unit	  to	  establish	  policy	  goals	  to	  support	  
program	  deployment.	  Consequentially,	  the	  first	  year	  of	  planning	  offered	  little	  more	  
than	  a	  “piecemeal	  effort”	  at	  comprehensive	  policy	  making.90	  Planners	  concluded	  
that	  their	  failure	  to	  develop	  effective	  long-­‐range	  policy	  derived	  most	  obviously	  from	  
a	  lack	  of	  research.	  Disappointed	  by	  the	  legislation’s	  circumspect	  agenda	  for	  
community	  development,	  planners	  believed	  that	  they	  could	  still	  develop	  
mechanisms	  to	  make	  community	  development	  responsive.91	  
The	  city’s	  Human	  Relations	  Committee	  was	  also	  frustrated	  with	  the	  first-­‐	  
year	  progress	  of	  community	  development.	  The	  HRC	  maintained	  that	  the	  city	  
government’s	  community	  participation	  strategy,	  including	  town	  hall	  meetings	  and	  
City	  Council	  hearings,	  was	  too	  piecemeal	  and	  underdeveloped	  to	  be	  institutionalized.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Report,	  OPPA	  Process	  Critique,	  Box	  17,	  Folder	  OD-­‐PLPR-­‐74:	  Planning	  process	  
critique	  and	  recommendations	  (AIME-­‐1974),	  OPPA	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  
Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  See	  also	  Notes,	  Emmett’s	  Notes	  on	  Functional	  Areas,	  1977,	  
Box	  18,	  Folder	  Emmett's	  Notes	  on	  Functional	  Areas	  from	  Meeting	  1/27/77,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  
Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  
Louisiana.	  
	  
91	  Report,	  OPPA	  Process	  Critique,	  Box	  17,	  Folder	  OD-­‐PLPR-­‐74:	  Planning	  process	  
critique	  and	  recommendations	  (AIME-­‐1974),	  OPPA	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	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Orleans	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  Library,	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Members	  of	  the	  HRC	  had	  once	  hoped	  that	  the	  CDBG	  program	  would	  be	  an	  
opportunity	  to	  create	  a	  model	  for	  how	  to	  engage	  and	  better	  define	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  
city’s	  most	  dispossessed	  areas.	  Yet,	  for	  many	  at	  the	  HRC,	  it	  remained	  unclear	  
whether	  local	  officials	  actually	  wanted	  to	  create	  forums	  for	  residents	  to	  participate	  
in	  at	  all.	  The	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  had	  enlisted	  the	  HRC	  to	  devise	  a	  
plan	  for	  community	  involvement,	  but	  the	  HRC’s	  board	  observed	  that	  the	  planning	  
agency	  continued	  to	  operate	  without	  standardized	  structures	  of	  community	  
involvement.	  Writing	  to	  OPPA's	  staff,	  Human	  Relations	  Committee	  staffer	  Juliette	  
Aime	  related	  that	  it	  would	  be	  “’nice’	  if	  OPPA	  could	  work	  closely	  with	  the	  HRC	  to	  
develop	  the	  Citizen	  Participation	  Plan”	  instead	  of	  conducting	  the	  haphazard	  and	  
unfocused	  hearings	  that	  had	  become	  commonplace.92	  While	  Landrieu’s	  comments	  
about	  the	  lack	  of	  citizen	  participation	  seemed	  to	  blame	  residents,	  the	  HRC	  felt	  that	  
blame	  lay	  with	  OPPA.	  For	  the	  HRC,	  it	  seemed	  that	  if	  “the	  city	  continues	  to	  expend	  
dollars	  on	  citizen	  participation	  with	  little	  or	  no	  accountability,”	  then	  creating	  a	  
formal	  plan	  for	  citizen	  participation	  would	  be	  irrelevant,	  or	  worse,	  entirely	  
deceptive.93	  Far	  from	  providing	  clear	  channels	  for	  residents	  to	  interact	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  Memo,	  Juliette	  Aime	  to	  Anne	  Farrier	  on	  Citizen	  Participation	  Budget	  Requests,	  
September	  30,	  1975,	  Box	  18,	  Folder	  Operating	  Budget	  Hearings	  Summary	  1976,	  Office	  of	  
Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	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  Public	  Library,	  
Louisiana.	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  Memo,	  Juliette	  Aime	  to	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  on	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  Budget	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   194	  
governing	  officials,	  the	  block	  grant	  process,	  as	  far	  as	  the	  HRC	  was	  concerned,	  had	  
further	  confused	  those	  lines	  of	  communication.94	  	  
While	  those	  who	  argued	  for	  revenue	  sharing	  had	  suggested	  that	  local	  
control	  of	  spending	  would	  bring	  municipal	  government	  closer	  to	  its	  citizenry,	  the	  
Southern	  Monitoring	  Project	  findings	  revealed	  the	  opposite.95	  The	  findings	  indicated	  
that,	  in	  actuality,	  citizens	  were	  given	  no	  opportunity	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  allocation	  
of	  funds.	  Revenue	  sharing,	  as	  a	  prototype	  for	  block	  grants,	  had	  actually	  created	  a	  
lack	  of	  accountability,	  allowing	  governments	  to	  expand	  projects	  while	  not	  having	  to	  
raise	  taxes	  or	  bonds,	  and	  thus	  avoiding	  the	  necessity	  of	  public	  hearings.96	  The	  report	  
seemed	  to	  reaffirm	  resident	  opinion	  that	  the	  city	  would	  circumvent	  what	  was	  good	  
for	  low-­‐income	  residents	  despite	  federal	  clauses	  for	  citizen	  input.	  There	  was	  
nothing	  to	  assure	  that	  the	  CDBG	  program	  would	  be	  implemented	  any	  differently.	  
As	  residents	  continued	  to	  press	  for	  more	  involvement,	  the	  city	  announced	  
that	  citizen	  opinion	  had	  been	  compiled	  to	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  first	  year	  of	  
community	  development	  programming.	  On	  February	  15,	  1975,	  Mayor	  Landrieu	  
released	  a	  list	  of	  programs	  that	  would	  comprise	  the	  first	  year	  of	  Community	  
Development	  funding.	  The	  funding	  would	  be	  split	  between	  housing	  programs,	  open	  
space,	  health	  services,	  day	  care	  centers,	  community	  participation	  programs,	  and	  a	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  Ibid.	  	  
	  
95	  “Alleges	  Revenue-­‐Sharing	  Programs	  Discriminate,”	  Louisiana	  Weekly,	  February	  28,	  
1976,	  1.	  	  See	  also	  Carol	  M.	  Rose,	  Citizen	  participation	  in	  revenue	  sharing:	  a	  report	  from	  the	  
South,	  Southern	  Governmental	  Monitoring	  Project	  (Southern	  Regional	  Council,	  1975).	  
	  
96	  See	  Carol	  M.	  Rose,	  Citizen	  participation	  in	  revenue	  sharing:	  a	  report	  from	  the	  South,	  
Southern	  Governmental	  Monitoring	  Project	  (Southern	  Regional	  Council,	  1975),	  14.	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program	  to	  repave	  city	  streets.97	  The	  large	  majority	  of	  funding,	  particularly	  what	  
was	  concentrated	  in	  human	  and	  health	  services,	  went	  to	  the	  continuance	  of	  scaled-­‐
down	  Model	  Cities	  programs,	  which	  were	  scheduled	  to	  end	  in	  1977.	  The	  Office	  of	  
Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  announced	  that	  it	  was	  “better	  to	  affect	  the	  greatest	  
number	  of	  people	  possible	  with	  housing	  programs,	  rather	  than	  concentrate	  the	  
program	  and	  affect	  a	  smaller	  number.”98	  OPPA	  described	  the	  program’s	  wide	  area	  
coverage	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  build	  consensus	  on	  “problems	  and	  priorities,	  which	  
transcend	  neighborhood	  boundaries.”99	  Reflecting	  beliefs	  consistent	  with	  RERC	  and	  
HUD	  literature,	  Landrieu	  announced	  that	  community	  development	  would	  work	  best	  
if	  funds	  were	  used	  to	  revitalize	  the	  city	  as	  a	  whole,	  not	  just	  isolated	  neighborhoods.	  	  
Broad	  and	  disparate,	  the	  proliferation	  of	  new	  programs	  demonstrated	  the	  inability	  
of	  the	  CDBG	  funding	  to	  move	  the	  city’s	  lowest	  income	  neighborhoods	  forward.	  	  
On	  one	  level,	  first-­‐year	  programs	  were	  precisely	  what	  residents	  had	  asked	  
for,	  addressing	  housing,	  streets,	  recreational	  facilities,	  sanitation,	  and	  sewerage	  
problems.	  Yet	  those	  programs	  were	  only	  attendant	  to	  what	  residents	  demanded	  
most	  acutely:	  to	  be	  incorporated	  into	  the	  socioeconomic	  structure	  of	  the	  city.	  	  
Invariably,	  community	  development	  could	  direct	  money	  toward	  the	  visible	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “14,808,000	  for	  Orleans	  and	  How	  Mayor	  Landrieu	  Proposes	  to	  
Use	  It,”	  February	  16,	  1975,	  3.	  
	  
98	  Report,	  Community	  Development	  Plan,	  Box	  7,	  Folder	  DU-­‐WKPR-­‐CD,	  Work	  program,	  
Community	  Development	  (10/75),	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  
City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
99	  Report,	  Community	  Development	  Plan,	  Box	  7,	  Folder	  DU-­‐WKPR-­‐CD:	  Work	  
program,	  Community	  Development	  (10/75),	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  
New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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inadequacies	  of	  the	  city’s	  physical	  landscape,	  but	  the	  programs	  designed	  using	  the	  
CDBG	  funds,	  compensatory	  at	  best,	  were	  not	  capable	  of	  challenging	  the	  vast	  
inequities	  in	  power	  and	  access	  that	  characterized	  the	  city’s	  lowest-­‐income	  
neighborhoods.	  	  	  
In	  the	  first	  citywide	  meeting	  following	  the	  city’s	  CDBG	  proposal,	  residents	  
erupted	  with	  dissatisfaction.	  The	  program	  design	  was	  simply	  not	  what	  residents	  
wanted,	  they	  stated.	  “None	  of	  this	  money	  has	  found	  its	  way	  to	  the	  poorest	  people,”	  
one	  man	  observed.	  “If	  it’s	  not	  going	  to	  the	  poor,	  then	  we	  don’t	  need	  this	  kind	  of	  
program.”100	  The	  residents	  who	  gathered	  in	  City	  Council	  chambers	  resented	  the	  
stopgap	  nature	  of	  the	  proposed	  programs,	  and	  what	  they	  perceived	  as	  an	  inability	  of	  
those	  programs	  to	  expand	  opportunity	  in	  tangible	  ways.	  Another	  resident	  
elaborated,	  “black	  and	  poor	  people	  have	  played	  all	  their	  lives,	  we	  don’t	  need	  more	  
playgrounds…	  people	  need	  to	  be	  about	  the	  business	  of	  work.”101	  Residents	  implored	  
OPPA	  officials	  to	  consider	  alternatives	  that	  were	  wider	  in	  reach	  than	  the	  programs	  
offered	  by	  the	  first-­‐year	  application.	  While	  they	  needed	  housing	  rehabilitation,	  and	  
streets,	  and	  playgrounds,	  they	  told	  OPPA	  staff	  that	  the	  programs	  were	  not	  what	  they	  
had	  requested.	  	  
By	  November	  1975,	  the	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  and	  the	  HRC	  
had	  reorganized	  mechanisms	  for	  community	  participation.	  Reducing	  the	  number	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   100	  Clancy	  DuBos,	  “Most	  Needy	  Emphasized	  in	  CD	  Talk,”	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  January	  20,	  
1976,	  8.	  
	  
101Report,	  Community	  Development	  Public	  Hearing	  April	  22,	  1976,	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  CD-­‐
PBH-­‐MIN:	  CD	  Public	  Hearing	  Transcripts	  (1976),	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  Files,	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town	  hall	  meetings	  from	  thirteen	  to	  six,	  the	  HRC	  proposed	  that	  meetings	  center	  on	  
subjects	  rather	  than	  individual	  neighborhood	  needs	  to	  draw	  in	  more	  people.	  
Abandoning	  the	  neighborhood-­‐centric	  approach	  to	  information	  dissemination,	  the	  
majority	  of	  town	  hall	  meetings	  were	  shifted	  back	  to	  City	  Council	  chambers.	  Within	  
the	  retrenchment	  of	  citizen	  involvement,	  the	  importance	  of	  polling	  increased.102	  
Though	  OPPA	  continued	  to	  be	  disappointed	  in	  community	  response,	  residents	  were	  
determined	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  only	  forums	  left.	  
Residents	  committed	  to	  holding	  the	  CDBG	  process	  accountable	  to	  low-­‐
income	  communities	  were	  undeterred	  by	  the	  relocation	  of	  community	  development	  
aid	  hearings.	  More	  than	  one	  hundred	  people	  crowded	  into	  City	  Council	  chambers	  to	  
discuss	  second-­‐year	  funding.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  new	  blight	  index	  data,	  nearly	  fifty-­‐four	  
percent	  of	  the	  city’s	  population	  was	  eligible	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  community	  
development	  program’s	  second	  year,	  adding	  ten	  new	  neighborhoods	  in	  total.103	  Far	  
from	  the	  targeted	  antipoverty	  approach	  pursued	  through	  Model	  Cities,	  the	  inclusion	  
of	  more	  than	  half	  the	  city	  troubled	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  community	  development	  
as	  providing	  continuity	  to	  that	  work.	  Planners	  at	  OPPA,	  however,	  reinforced	  the	  
importance	  of	  wide	  program	  areas,	  reminding	  residents	  that	  not	  only	  was	  much	  of	  
the	  city	  poor,	  but	  there	  was	  an	  imperative	  to	  ensure	  that	  blight	  did	  not	  continue	  to	  
spread.	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  Monthly	  Reports	  (CD	  Related	  Information),	  Box	  17,	  Folder	  OD-­‐PMTG-­‐
RPRT:	  Monthly	  Reports	  Notes	  10/74-­‐08/75,	  Office	  of	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  Planning	  and	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The	  response	  of	  low-­‐income	  residents	  was	  hardly	  what	  OPPA	  expected.	  	  
Challenging	  the	  measure	  of	  blight	  altogether,	  residents	  argued	  that	  the	  “indicators”	  
through	  which	  OPPA	  determined	  a	  blight	  scale	  were	  less	  than	  representative	  of	  
residents'	  needs.	  There	  were	  other	  measures	  and	  certainly	  other	  problems	  that	  
were	  more	  indicative	  of	  how	  a	  neighborhood	  was	  functioning.	  Though	  residents	  
understood	  that	  recreational	  facilities	  and	  more	  trees	  could	  help	  constitute	  a	  
healthier,	  more	  beautiful	  neighborhood,	  low-­‐income	  isolation,	  faulty	  transportation,	  
limited	  access	  to	  quality	  social	  services,	  suspension	  of	  job	  training	  programs,	  and	  
failing	  public	  schools	  were	  issues	  far	  more	  representative	  of	  immediate	  community	  
need.104	  OPPA,	  not	  oblivious	  to	  such	  real	  issues,	  discerned	  a	  futility	  in	  trying	  to	  
pursue	  that	  kind	  of	  comprehensive	  effort.	  To	  be	  sure,	  it	  was	  the	  only	  way	  to	  correct	  
such	  conditions,	  but	  without	  the	  funding	  or	  framework	  to	  initiate	  those	  efforts	  
throughout	  the	  city,	  any	  attempt	  would	  need	  to	  be	  concentrated	  in	  one	  area	  and	  
thus	  was	  politically	  impossible.	  	  	  
In	  the	  following	  year,	  resident	  involvement	  continued	  to	  flounder,	  as	  did	  
the	  relationship	  between	  OPPA	  and	  the	  Human	  Relations	  Committee.	  While	  the	  HRC	  
continued	  to	  push	  OPPA	  to	  get	  beyond	  the	  “vagueness”	  in	  how	  the	  planners	  
conceptualized	  citizen	  participation,	  tensions	  between	  the	  two	  agencies	  grew.105	  
HRC	  head	  Marion	  Kelly	  felt	  as	  if	  OPPA	  used	  the	  HRC	  for	  appearances,	  but	  failed	  to	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  Box	  25,	  Folder	  RF-­‐
5/02-­‐OPPA:	  Incoming;	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  
Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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communicate	  in	  ways	  that	  would	  make	  her	  agency	  capable	  of	  operating	  a	  developed	  
citizen	  participation	  program.106	  	  
Finally,	  planners	  announced	  that	  while	  there	  would	  be	  “no	  formal	  
mechanism”	  to	  include	  citizen	  opinion,	  communities	  were	  nevertheless	  “invited	  to	  
participate.”107	  Residents	  determined	  that	  really	  meant	  they	  would	  not	  be	  heard.	  	  
The	  Association	  of	  Community	  Organizations	  for	  Reform	  Now	  (ACORN),	  a	  national	  
grassroots	  organization,	  alleged	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  citizen	  participation	  in	  New	  Orleans	  
was	  entirely	  “farcical.”108	  Ultimately,	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  contain	  the	  tension	  between	  
notions	  of	  efficient	  planning	  that	  necessitated	  trained	  professionals	  and	  communal	  
planning	  inclusive	  of	  community	  “experts.”	  The	  mayor’s	  comment	  in	  which	  he	  made	  
distinctions	  between	  planners	  and	  the	  advisement	  role	  of	  the	  community,	  though	  
clearly	  a	  sign	  of	  frustration,	  plainly	  demonstrated	  the	  paradoxes	  of	  the	  newly	  
decentralized	  landscape	  of	  federal	  urban	  aid.	  Cities	  attempted	  to	  show	  their	  
readiness	  for	  management	  by	  cultivating	  data	  analysis	  and	  new	  forums	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  Writing	  to	  Moten,	  director	  of	  OPPA,	  Kelly	  expressed	  this	  sentiment:	  “It	  appears	  
necessary	  to	  request	  again	  that	  your	  office	  and	  this	  office	  communicate	  shared	  
responsibilities	  in	  a	  timely	  manner…	  sharing	  the	  planning	  does	  not	  mean	  HRC	  will	  try	  to	  
take	  over.”	  See	  Memo,	  Marion	  Kelly	  to	  Emmett	  Moten,	  January	  12,	  1976,	  Box	  27,	  Folder	  RF-­‐
6/01-­‐OPPA:	  Incoming	  Memos;	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  
City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  	  
	  
107	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “CD	  Hearing	  Confuses,”	  February	  15,	  1978,	  4.	  
	  
108	  Founded	  by	  former	  National	  Welfare	  Rights	  Organization	  activist	  and	  New	  
Orleanian	  Wade	  Rathke,	  ACORN	  was	  envisioned	  as	  an	  umbrella	  organization	  that	  could	  aid	  
local	  organizers	  to	  launch	  campaigns	  around	  issues	  of	  housing,	  education,	  living	  wages,	  and	  
welfare.	  See	  ACORN,	  Press	  Release,	  “ACORN	  files	  HUD	  Protest	  against	  N.O.	  CD	  
Misallocations,”	  June	  17,	  1977,	  Box	  22,	  Folder	  RF-­‐7/06-­‐ADP:	  Incoming	  Mail,	  Office	  of	  Policy	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participation	  and	  hoped	  that	  residents	  would	  view	  the	  new	  technicians	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  
progress.	  	  
Yet	  often,	  the	  new	  channels	  for	  citizen	  participation	  only	  fostered	  further	  
mistrust—residents	  suspicious	  of	  “experts”	  and	  planners	  seeing	  leadership	  in	  the	  
community	  as	  an	  impediment	  to	  broader	  conversations.	  While	  residents	  were	  asked	  
to	  attend	  meetings	  and	  make	  recommendations,	  programs	  were	  implemented	  “that	  
none	  of	  the	  residents	  that	  participate	  in	  the	  hearing	  ever	  heard	  of,	  let	  along	  [sic]	  
approved,”	  said	  John	  Armant,	  director	  of	  the	  Central	  City	  Economic	  Opportunity	  
Corporation	  (CCEOC).109	  Planners	  shared	  the	  disappointment	  felt	  by	  communities	  
and	  found	  that	  their	  optimistic	  vision	  of	  local	  decision-­‐making	  was	  thwarted	  by	  the	  
inherent	  restrictions	  of	  the	  CDBG	  funding	  directives.	  The	  director	  of	  Program	  
Development,	  Rene	  Steinkamp,	  concluded	  that	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  CDBG	  
program	  had	  been	  “poor.”110	  Community	  development,	  while	  quickly	  becoming	  
essential	  to	  preventing	  local	  disaster,	  was	  neither	  enough	  capital	  nor	  broad	  enough	  
in	  focus	  to	  do	  much	  but	  slow	  the	  acceleration	  of	  the	  city’s	  physical	  decline.	  	  	  
As	  members	  of	  the	  planning	  team	  continued	  their	  compilation	  of	  data,	  
planning	  was	  easier	  done	  without	  the	  city’s	  residents.	  In	  an	  early	  self-­‐evaluation,	  
members	  of	  OPPA’s	  data	  unit	  admitted	  that	  citizen	  participation	  had	  become	  “non-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  Memo,	  John	  Armant	  to	  Terrence	  Duvernay,	  February	  25,	  1997,	  Box	  22,	  Folder	  
RF-­‐7/03-­‐ADP:	  Incoming	  Mail-­‐OPPA;	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  New	  
Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
110	  Memo,	  Rene	  Steinkamp	  to	  Mayor's	  Executive	  Staff,	  February	  2,	  1977,	  Box	  22,	  
Folder	  RF-­‐ADP-­‐7/03:	  Incoming	  Memos,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  New	  
Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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existent,	  except	  for	  dubious	  data	  collection.”111	  While	  some	  staff	  expressed	  
misgivings	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  citizen	  participation,	  planners	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  
imagine	  forums	  that	  could	  provide	  residents	  and	  planners	  with	  the	  tools	  necessary	  
to	  make	  the	  CDBG	  program	  a	  success.	  Accordingly,	  early	  assistance	  programs	  
initiated	  through	  block	  grants	  failed	  to	  aid	  residents	  most	  in	  need	  and	  suffered	  as	  a	  
result.112	  The	  legislative	  constraints	  of	  block	  grants	  ensured	  that	  it	  was	  nearly	  
impossible	  for	  planners	  to	  devise	  programs	  in	  any	  other	  way,	  but	  abandoning	  
citizen	  participation	  would	  only	  reinforce	  the	  divide	  between	  planners	  and	  the	  
people.	  	  	  
	  
Community	  Development	  in	  Process	  
With	  city	  revenues	  increasingly	  constituted	  through	  intergovernmental	  
funds,	  residents	  and	  planners	  alike	  understood	  the	  CDBG	  funding	  as	  critical	  to	  the	  
survival	  of	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods.113	  By	  1978,	  block	  grants	  assisted	  in	  funding	  
more	  than	  120	  programs	  ranging	  from	  housing	  rehabilitation	  to	  building	  
preservation	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  health	  care	  facilities	  established	  through	  Model	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  Report,	  OPPA	  Process	  Critique	  June	  1974,	  Box	  17,	  Folder	  Planning	  Process	  
Critique	  and	  Recommendations	  1974,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  New	  
Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  	  
112Notes,	  Minutes	  of	  HRC	  Meeting	  Monday,	  February	  7,	  1977,	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  HRC	  
Meeting	  1977,	  Human	  Relations	  Committee	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  
Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
113	  City	  Councilor	  Brod	  Bogert	  once	  described	  CDBG	  funds	  as	  “blood,”	  saying	  that	  	  
“we	  can’t	  live	  without	  it,	  but	  it	  has	  a	  long	  way	  to	  get	  through	  the	  system	  and	  to	  the	  heart.”	  
See	  Community	  Development	  Comments,	  Special	  Edition	  1977-­‐1978.	  January	  1977,	  Earl	  K.	  
Long	  Library,	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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Cities.114	  Though	  planners	  clearly	  understood	  that	  substantive	  change	  necessitated	  
comprehensive	  intervention,	  legislative	  edicts	  that	  encouraged	  local	  officials	  to	  
utilize	  community	  development	  to	  aid	  and	  prevent	  physical	  blight	  left	  planners	  with	  
few	  constructive	  tools	  by	  which	  to	  pursue	  redistributive	  ends.	  Unable	  to	  influence	  
voters	  to	  support	  new	  taxation—measures	  to	  equalize	  property	  taxation	  and	  to	  
better	  fund	  the	  school	  board	  continued	  to	  be	  defeated—the	  growing	  need	  of	  
residents	  further	  compelled	  the	  city	  to	  mobilize	  funds	  for	  broadly	  disparate,	  but	  
highly	  visible,	  “fixes”	  to	  city	  problems.	  	  
	  While	  there	  is	  not	  enough	  room	  here	  to	  enumerate	  the	  city’s	  myriad	  of	  
community	  development	  programs,	  this	  brief	  discussion	  of	  three	  citywide	  initiatives	  
in	  housing	  rehabilitation,	  street	  paving,	  and	  recreation	  offers	  insight	  into	  the	  
limitations	  that	  CDBG	  legislation	  presented	  for	  cities	  attempting	  to	  launch	  
substantive	  reforms	  alongside	  parallel	  needs	  to	  maintain	  fiscal	  stability	  and	  stave	  
off	  middle-­‐class	  flight.	  The	  dissonance	  between	  these	  priorities	  often	  informed	  the	  
decisions	  of	  city	  officials	  to	  use	  funds	  in	  ways	  that	  could	  leverage	  other	  development,	  
in	  hopes	  that	  it	  would	  trickle	  down,	  rather	  than	  in	  targeted	  antipoverty	  approaches.	  
This	  "balancing	  act"	  often	  inhibited	  planners	  from	  developing	  programs	  that	  could	  
have	  material	  benefits	  for	  low-­‐income	  recipients.	  Further,	  programs	  mobilized	  by	  
city	  departments	  often	  materialized	  in	  ways	  counter	  to	  OPPA	  prescriptions.	  Without	  
the	  authority	  to	  intervene	  on	  how	  city	  departments	  operated,	  OPPA	  was	  unable	  to	  
assure	  that	  the	  benefits	  of	  these	  programs	  would	  reach	  low-­‐income	  communities.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114Report,	  Staff	  Recommendations	  for	  Fourth	  Year,	  April	  4,	  1978,	  Box	  B20,	  Folder	  
Community	  Development	  1978-­‐1979,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Collection,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  
Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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Though	  bounded	  by	  Community	  Development	  Block	  Grant	  directives,	  which	  
confined	  housing	  initiatives	  to	  rehabilitation	  mechanisms,	  OPPA	  nevertheless	  
solicited	  mechanisms	  to	  broaden	  the	  affect	  of	  its	  activities.	  City	  leadership	  recruited	  
the	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  to	  oversee	  development	  of	  a	  long-­‐range	  
housing	  rehabilitation	  program	  targeting	  low-­‐income	  homeowners.	  Unlike	  the	  city,	  
the	  renewal	  agency	  had	  the	  manpower	  and	  expertise	  to	  deploy	  resources	  
expeditiously.115	  Yet,	  the	  agency,	  intent	  on	  preserving	  part	  of	  its	  antipoverty	  mission,	  
clashed	  with	  the	  mayor’s	  office	  over	  mechanisms	  for	  broadening	  the	  target	  
constituency.	  	  	  
Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  Director	  Frank	  Keevers,	  attempting	  to	  
expand	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  housing	  rehab	  program,	  advocated	  an	  approach	  that	  would	  
eliminate	  reliance	  on	  local	  lending	  institutions.	  Noting	  that	  prior	  rehabilitation	  
efforts	  excluded	  those	  inhabiting	  the	  most	  destitute	  housing,	  he	  assured	  City	  Council	  
members	  that	  low-­‐income	  homeowners	  in	  areas	  of	  the	  Lower	  Ninth	  and	  Central	  City	  
could	  hardly	  afford	  the	  proposed	  three	  percent	  interest	  rate.	  If	  the	  city	  were	  to	  
manage	  loans	  directly,	  thus	  removing	  the	  risk	  of	  default	  and	  the	  prejudice	  of	  private	  
investors,	  the	  program	  could	  reach	  into	  neighborhoods	  previously	  redlined	  by	  local	  
banking	  institutions	  and	  provide	  flexible	  rates.	  Considering	  the	  revolving	  loan	  fund	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115	  Being	  able	  to	  use	  funding	  in	  a	  timely	  manner	  was	  actually	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  
problems	  facing	  cities	  with	  CDBG	  funds.	  HUD	  required	  that	  funds	  be	  utilized	  within	  
program	  years	  or	  they	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  repossession.	  While	  in	  poverty	  cities	  like	  New	  
Orleans,	  it	  would	  seem	  as	  if	  there	  was	  never	  enough	  money,	  developing	  substantial	  
programs	  with	  a	  real	  effect	  on	  poverty	  was	  a	  painstakingly	  slow	  process,	  particularly	  for	  
local	  governments	  that	  had	  never	  engaged	  in	  widespread	  planning	  processes	  prior	  to	  the	  
CDBG	  program.	  Thus,	  planners	  were	  consistently	  caught	  between	  the	  need	  to	  develop	  
programs	  that	  were	  easy	  and	  quick	  to	  deploy	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  create	  programs	  that	  would	  
provide	  benefits	  for	  low-­‐income	  communities.	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proposed	  for	  areas	  like	  the	  Irish	  Channel	  Public	  Improvement	  Project	  (PIP),	  Keevers	  
believed	  that	  the	  same	  instrument	  could	  ensure	  that	  the	  housing	  rehab	  program	  
extended	  far	  beyond	  moderate-­‐income	  families	  and	  non-­‐resident	  owners.116	  	  	  
There	  was	  significant	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  director’s	  position.	  Using	  
national	  data	  derived	  from	  local	  312	  rehabilitation	  loans,	  a	  program	  that	  gave	  small	  
direct	  federal	  loans	  to	  private	  owners	  for	  home	  improvement,	  the	  director	  
demonstrated	  that	  when	  city	  governments	  assumed	  responsibility	  for	  the	  risk	  of	  
loans,	  participation	  in	  the	  program,	  particularly	  of	  lower-­‐income	  residents,	  
broadened	  significantly.117	  The	  city	  could	  employ	  $2	  million	  in	  community	  
development	  funding	  to	  open	  lines	  of	  credit	  with	  local	  lending	  institutions	  in	  order	  
for	  the	  city	  to	  finance	  the	  loans	  directly	  to	  low-­‐income	  residents.	  Buffering	  the	  
interests	  of	  low-­‐income	  residents	  from	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  private	  loans,	  the	  program	  
would	  operate	  with	  the	  flexibility	  and	  protection	  necessary	  to	  begin	  aiding	  the	  
redevelopment	  of	  poverty	  neighborhoods.	  Ultimately,	  Keevers	  suggested,	  this	  would	  
be	  the	  only	  way	  to	  renew	  housing	  in	  the	  city’s	  most	  downtrodden	  areas.118	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116Memo,	  Francis	  P.	  Keevers	  to	  City	  Council,	  Recommendations	  for	  Rehabilitation	  
Loan	  Program	  November	  23,	  1976,	  Box	  11,	  Folder	  Housing	  Rehabilitation	  1976,	  Office	  of	  
Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archive,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  
Louisiana.	  
	  
117	  Memo,	  Francis	  P.	  Keevers	  to	  City	  Council,	  Recommendations	  for	  Rehabilitation	  
Loan	  Program	  November	  23,	  1976,	  Box	  11,	  Folder	  Housing	  Rehabilitation	  1976,	  Office	  of	  
Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archive,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  
Louisiana.	  
	  
118	  Others	  noted	  that	  to	  pursue	  a	  program	  of	  rehabilitation	  where	  private	  lending	  
institutions	  profited	  seemed	  to	  be	  counterintuitive	  to	  antipoverty	  efforts.	  John	  Armant,	  a	  
representative	  of	  Central	  City,	  exclaimed	  in	  a	  public	  hearing	  that	  it	  sounded	  like	  the	  city	  was	  
creating	  a	  “welfare	  problem	  for	  the	  rich,”	  by	  placing	  CDBG	  funds	  in	  lending	  institutions.	  See	  
Community	  Development	  Hearing,	  April	  22,	  1976,	  Box	  1,	  Folder	  CD-­‐PBH-­‐MIN:	  CD	  Public	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   Though	  sensitive	  to	  the	  issues	  that	  Keevers	  addressed,	  the	  mayor’s	  office	  
moved	  to	  organize	  the	  housing	  rehab	  program	  through	  traditional	  networks	  of	  
lending	  and	  mortgage	  associations.	  The	  city	  wanted	  to	  put	  together	  a	  program	  that	  
could	  encourage	  the	  “deep	  involvement	  of	  the	  private	  sector.”119	  	  The	  city	  would	  act	  
as	  an	  intermediary	  only,	  matching	  homeowners	  with	  local	  lending	  institutions,	  but	  
not	  offering	  sustained	  oversight	  during	  the	  project.	  Planners,	  accepting	  that	  
antipoverty	  efforts	  were	  largely	  unsuccessful	  in	  renovating	  low-­‐income	  
neighborhoods,	  noted	  that	  private	  sector-­‐led	  rehabilitation	  may	  have	  “less	  negative	  
impact”	  and	  approach	  redevelopment	  in	  ways	  that	  were	  less	  disruptive	  than	  urban	  
renewal	  efforts	  had	  been.120	  With	  efficiency	  that	  could	  not	  be	  matched	  by	  
government-­‐led	  endeavors,	  the	  private	  sector	  would	  ensure	  that	  rehabilitation	  was	  
done	  the	  right	  way,	  planners	  reasoned.121	  Planners	  believed	  that	  allowing	  lenders	  to	  
operate	  outside	  city	  bureaucracy,	  while	  risky	  for	  some	  low-­‐income	  homeowners,	  
would	  ensure	  that	  those	  institutions	  remained	  within	  city	  limits.	  Ultimately,	  if	  banks	  
turned	  their	  back	  on	  the	  city,	  all	  renovation	  efforts	  would	  crumble;	  this	  structure	  
gave	  lending	  institutions	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  the	  program,	  city	  leadership	  suggested.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Hearing	  Transcripts	  1976,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  
Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  	  
	  
119	  Memo,	  Richard	  Kernion	  to	  Thomas	  J.	  Armstrong,	  October	  10,	  1975,	  Box	  27,	  
Folder	  RF-­‐5/10-­‐OPPA:	  Incoming,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  
Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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   While	  residents	  protested	  the	  limited	  nature	  of	  the	  program,	  within	  two	  
years,	  the	  “Rehab	  Your	  House”	  program	  seemed	  to	  prove	  that	  public-­‐	  private	  
partnerships	  were	  the	  vanguard	  for	  community	  improvement.122	  The	  improvement	  
agency's	  deputy	  director,	  King	  Wells,	  boasted	  that	  the	  program	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
successful	  in	  the	  country;	  most	  cities	  of	  New	  Orleans’s	  size	  were	  “rehabilitating	  
fewer	  houses”	  and	  operating	  in	  more	  narrow	  areas	  than	  the	  New	  Orleans	  
program.123	  Wells	  explained	  that	  the	  program’s	  substantial	  capacity	  derived	  from	  
the	  autonomy	  the	  improvement	  agency	  extended	  to	  private	  lending	  institutions	  and	  
contractors.	  Instead	  of	  	  “holding	  the	  homeowner’s	  hand,”	  the	  agency	  merely	  
oversaw	  the	  application	  process;	  recipients	  were	  responsible	  for	  managing	  their	  
loan,	  choosing	  between	  contractors	  and	  supervising	  the	  work.124	  Heralding	  the	  
program’s	  success,	  the	  city	  contended	  that	  the	  program	  represented	  a	  wave	  of	  new	  
ventures	  in	  which	  federal	  aid,	  no	  longer	  capable	  of	  providing	  substantive	  change	  in	  
truly	  deteriorated	  areas,	  could	  be	  used	  to	  leverage	  private-­‐sector	  investment	  to	  
participate	  in	  citywide	  revitalization.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  Residents	  believed	  that	  since	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  city’s	  low-­‐income	  population	  
consisted	  of	  renters,	  community	  development	  funds	  used	  to	  rehabilitate	  housing	  would	  be	  
directed	  to	  slumlord	  owners	  who	  would,	  in	  turn,	  kick	  residents	  out.	  The	  city	  could	  not,	  
beyond	  an	  agreement	  that	  prevented	  evictions	  in	  the	  first	  two	  years,	  guarantee	  that	  
renovations	  would	  not	  lead	  to	  this.	  Report,	  Housing	  and	  Historic	  Preservation	  Community	  
Participation	  Meeting,	  January	  12,	  1976,	  Box	  1,	  Folder	  CD-­‐PBH-­‐MIN:	  CD	  Public	  Hearing	  
Transcripts	  1976,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  
New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  	  	  
	  
123	  “N.O.	  Program	  Better	  than	  Most”	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  October	  15,	  1978,	  158;	  Report,	  
Community	  Development	  Program	  Status	  Report	  as	  of	  December	  31,	  1978,Box	  1,	  Folder	  CD-­‐
PUBH-­‐9/01:	  First	  Community	  Hearing	  for	  the	  5th,	  6th	  and	  7th	  Year	  Programs,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  
Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  
Louisiana.	  	  
	  
124	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “N.O.	  Program	  Better	  than	  Most,”	  October	  15,	  1978,	  158.	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As	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  program	  depended	  on	  the	  presumption	  that	  private-­‐	  
sector	  partners	  were	  inherently	  more	  efficient	  in	  marshaling	  resources,	  
governmental	  oversight	  of	  the	  private-­‐sector	  partners'	  practices	  was	  tepid.	  By	  1980,	  
more	  than	  $8	  million	  was	  obligated	  to	  the	  “Rehab	  Your	  House”	  program,	  eliminating	  
the	  risk	  for	  banks	  and	  financing	  private	  contractors.	  Yet	  those	  supposedly	  benefiting	  
from	  the	  program	  began	  to	  allege	  that	  they	  had	  not	  been	  beneficiaries	  at	  all.125	  OPPA	  
had	  not	  been	  able	  to	  regulate	  the	  way	  improvement	  agency	  employees	  determined	  
the	  eligibility	  of	  recipients.	  Rumors	  had	  emerged	  that	  improvement	  agency	  officers	  
had	  approved	  rehabilitation	  loans	  to	  residents	  where	  repairs	  would	  require	  more	  
than	  twenty-­‐five	  percent	  of	  their	  income,	  irrespective	  of	  what	  their	  gross	  income	  
was,	  thus	  subsidizing	  middle	  class	  home	  repairs.	  What	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  
“program	  to	  serve	  the	  needy”	  was	  clearly	  being	  used	  for	  other	  purposes.126	  Other	  
complaints	  were	  made	  as	  well.	  An	  ACORN-­‐led	  hearing	  in	  March	  1980	  exposed	  a	  
litany	  of	  citizen	  complaints:	  contractors	  stealing	  private	  property,	  work	  left	  
unfinished	  for	  weeks	  at	  a	  time,	  shoddy	  results,	  and	  threats.	  The	  agency’s	  hands-­‐off	  
management	  had	  allowed	  contractors	  and	  lenders	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  “Community	  Development	  Funds	  Must	  Stretch,”	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  January	  10,	  
1980,	  16.	  
	  
126	  Memo,	  Terrence	  Duvernay	  to	  Frank	  Keevers,	  April	  6,	  1977,	  Box	  22,	  Folder	  RF-­‐
7/04-­‐ADP:	  Incoming	  Mail,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  
Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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homeowners	  across	  the	  city.127	  Residents	  claimed	  that	  the	  program	  was	  not	  even	  
designed	  to	  assist	  low-­‐income	  owners	  at	  all.128	  
Now	  those	  low-­‐income	  participants	  were	  saddled	  with	  loans	  on	  repairs	  that	  
had	  not	  even	  been	  done.	  While	  the	  city	  attempted	  to	  counteract	  the	  charges,	  
directing	  attention	  to	  the	  upgrades	  that	  occurred	  without	  abuse,	  ACORN	  charged	  
that	  the	  city	  had	  permitted	  a	  program	  to	  develop	  that	  not	  only	  underserved	  low-­‐
income	  residents,	  but	  was	  actually	  also	  harming	  those	  communities.	  	  The	  allegations	  
launched	  a	  widespread	  federal	  investigation	  into	  housing	  rehabilitations	  programs	  
across	  the	  country.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  "Rehab	  Your	  House"	  program	  was	  shuttered	  
unceremoniously,	  an	  example	  of	  “poor	  program	  design	  and	  poor	  program	  
administration.”129	  The	  housing	  rehabilitation	  program	  had	  represented	  the	  third-­‐
largest	  expenditure	  from	  the	  city’s	  CDBG	  outlays	  throughout	  the	  1970s.	  Yet,	  its	  
capacity	  to	  provide	  tangible	  benefits	  to	  low-­‐income	  residents	  was	  circumscribed	  by	  
the	  belief	  that	  private-­‐sector	  involvement	  would,	  by	  design,	  enhance	  the	  impact	  of	  
the	  project.	  	  	  
This	  guiding	  ideology	  informed	  the	  arrangement	  of	  the	  city’s	  paving	  program	  
as	  well.	  Abandoning	  earlier	  designs	  that	  provided	  free	  paving	  in	  low-­‐income	  
communities,	  planners	  devised	  a	  lien	  program	  to	  surface	  the	  nearly	  1,300	  blocks	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “City	  Rehab	  Program	  Hit	  with	  Abuses,”	  March	  12,	  1980,	  17.	  
	  
128	  Memo,	  John	  Armant	  to	  Terrance	  Duvernay,	  February	  25,	  1977,	  Box	  22,	  Folder	  
RF-­‐7/03-­‐ADP:	  Incoming	  Mail-­‐OPPA,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  
Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
129	  Joan	  Treadway,	  “FBI,	  Volz	  Launch	  Probe	  of	  Home	  Fix-­‐up	  Program,”	  Times-­‐
Picayune,	  July	  3,	  1985,126.	  
	  
	  
	   209	  
within	  community	  development	  areas	  suffering	  from	  inadequate	  or	  temporary	  
paving.130	  Under	  the	  new	  program,	  CDBG	  funding	  would	  provide	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  
cost	  of	  street	  paving,	  while	  property	  owners	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  
balance.131	  Amid	  the	  clear	  funding	  limitations,	  planners	  believed	  the	  program	  
offered	  a	  fair	  opportunity	  to	  pave	  in	  nearly	  all	  of	  the	  community	  development	  
areas.132	  	  	  
	   Community	  organizations	  and	  low-­‐income	  residents	  opposed	  the	  program	  
immediately.	  Residents	  claimed	  that	  the	  proposal,	  unaffordable	  for	  most	  low-­‐
income	  families,	  demonstrated	  the	  incongruity	  between	  the	  revitalization	  strategy	  
dispatched	  by	  city	  officials	  and	  the	  reality	  facing	  most	  families	  living	  in	  poverty.	  	  
That	  accusation	  was	  confirmed	  by	  rumors	  that	  city	  officials	  had	  used	  CDBG	  money	  
to	  fund	  street	  paving	  in	  affluent	  areas	  and	  tourism	  sites.133	  Plans	  for	  paving	  in	  
Central	  City	  radiated	  out	  from	  the	  Superdome	  arena.134	  	  Reports	  circulated	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130	  Report,	  Streets	  Summary,	  Box	  3,	  Folder	  CG-­‐NGH:	  Lower	  Ninth	  Ward	  (16),	  Office	  of	  
Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  
Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
131	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Sh...	  Keep	  it	  Down	  to	  85	  Decibels,”	  December	  13,	  1975,	  20.	  
	  
132	  Report,	  Community	  Development	  Plan,	  Box	  7,	  Folder	  DU-­‐WKPR-­‐CD:	  Work	  
program,	  Community	  Development	  (10/75),	  OPPA	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  
Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
133	  ACORN	  found	  major	  discrepancies.	  	  One	  middle-­‐income	  uptown	  neighborhood	  
that	  had	  only	  18	  percent	  of	  its	  streets	  unpaved	  had	  been	  granted	  access	  to	  a	  CDBG-­‐funded	  
paving	  lien	  due	  to	  the	  residents’	  capacity	  to	  fund	  their	  two-­‐thirds	  share	  of	  the	  cost,	  while	  
the	  poor	  Holy	  Cross	  neighborhood,	  an	  area	  with	  nearly	  60	  percent	  of	  its	  streets	  unpaved,	  
was	  scheduled	  for	  no	  paving	  at	  all.	  See	  Memo,	  ACORN	  to	  Carl	  Geyer,	  June	  23,	  1977,	  Box	  22,	  
Folder	  RF-­‐7/06-­‐ADP:	  Incoming	  Mail,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  City	  
Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
134	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  "Residents	  Say	  Central	  City	  Project	  is	  Ineffective,"	  June	  7,	  1973,	  
52.	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funds	  were	  also	  being	  used	  to	  refurbish	  neutral	  grounds	  on	  major	  thoroughfares,	  
infuriating	  residents	  faced	  with	  the	  prospect	  of	  being	  forced	  to	  fund	  their	  own	  street	  
renovations.135	  OPPA	  planners	  were	  equally	  distressed	  by	  reports	  that	  Community	  
Development	  Block	  Grant	  funds	  for	  street	  repair	  had	  been	  channeled	  into	  higher-­‐
income	  areas	  of	  the	  city.	  Reporting	  the	  discrepancies,	  they	  noted	  that	  the	  Streets	  
Department	  had	  disregarded	  their	  suggestions	  entirely,	  focusing	  efforts	  on	  blocks	  
with	  the	  highest	  area	  income.136	  	  
Though	  city	  officials	  attempted	  to	  amend	  the	  program	  to	  offer	  payment	  
options,	  residents	  were	  outraged.137	  Seeking	  to	  avoid	  a	  stalemate,	  the	  city	  redirected	  
resources	  to	  less-­‐impoverished	  neighborhoods	  to	  begin	  paving	  areas	  of	  downtown	  
and	  Broadmoor,	  which	  were	  willing	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  lien	  program,	  rather	  than	  
the	  Lower	  Ninth	  and	  Desire-­‐Florida.138	  This	  re-­‐directing	  of	  resources	  flew	  in	  the	  face	  
of	  the	  original	  intent	  of	  the	  CDBG	  funding,	  ACORN	  activists	  argued.	  In	  the	  spring	  of	  
1978,	  community	  leaders	  arranged	  a	  bus	  tour	  for	  municipal	  officials	  to	  visit	  Desire-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  Community	  Development	  Comments	  2,	  no.	  3	  (June	  1978),	  1.	  
	  
136	  In	  a	  memo	  to	  the	  city’s	  chief	  administrative	  officer,	  Terrence	  Duvernay,	  Moten	  
explained	  that	  the	  Streets	  Department	  had	  decided	  to	  pave	  “only	  the	  higher	  income	  section	  
of	  a	  neighborhood	  which	  was	  included	  in	  community	  development	  because	  of	  its	  
predominantly	  low-­‐	  and	  moderate-­‐income	  residents.”	  This	  occurred	  frequently	  where	  
middle	  or	  upper	  income	  neighborhoods	  adjacent	  to	  poverty	  zones	  were	  included	  as	  part	  of	  
community	  development	  zones	  and	  then	  funds	  were	  targeted	  to	  those	  areas	  only.	  See	  
Memo,	  Emmett	  Moten	  Jr.	  to	  Terrence	  Duvernay,	  March	  14,	  1977,Box	  22,	  Folder	  RF-­‐7/03-­‐
ADP:	  Outgoing	  Mail,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  
Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
137	  Paul	  Atkinson,	  “Council’s	  Action	  on	  Liens	  Put	  Off,”	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  September	  10,	  
1976,	  3.	  
	  
138Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Paving	  Program	  OK'd,”	  October	  22,	  1976,	  4;	  Paul	  Atkinson,	  
“Streets,	  Housing	  Lead	  City’s	  Bid	  for	  Development	  Funds,”	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  April	  25,	  1976,	  1.	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Florida,	  Central	  City,	  and	  the	  Lower	  Ninth	  Ward,	  areas	  of	  the	  city	  with	  the	  most	  
dilapidated	  streets.139	  The	  pressure	  from	  ACORN	  moved	  city	  officials	  to	  repeal	  the	  
lien,	  beginning	  a	  steady	  program	  of	  free	  street	  paving	  in	  low-­‐income	  
neighborhoods.140	  Although	  the	  repeal	  of	  the	  lien	  represented	  a	  victory	  for	  the	  low-­‐
income	  residents,	  efforts	  to	  implement	  the	  free	  paving	  were	  slow	  to	  materialize,	  
offering	  little	  proof	  that	  the	  CDBG	  funds	  would	  engender	  revitalization	  in	  these	  
districts.141	  	  	  	  	  	  
Without	  the	  capacity	  to	  create	  programs	  capable	  of	  redistribution,	  the	  city	  
utilized	  programs	  with	  symbolic	  clout	  to	  mitigate	  resident	  frustration.	  In	  the	  first	  
program	  year,	  the	  city	  announced	  it	  would	  use	  CDBG	  funds	  to	  construct	  fifteen	  
playgrounds	  in	  areas	  lacking	  recreational	  facilities.	  Playgrounds,	  analysts	  reasoned,	  
improved	  the	  physical	  environment	  and	  offered	  new	  resources	  to	  communities	  in	  
desperate	  need.	  Recreational	  space	  also	  represented	  relatively	  inexpensive	  means	  
to	  display	  tangible	  community	  benefits.	  From	  the	  city’s	  perspective,	  the	  creation	  of	  
playgrounds,	  pools,	  and	  parks	  in	  neighborhoods	  that	  were	  systematically	  neglected	  
by	  earlier	  administrations	  offered	  clear	  symbols	  of	  the	  mayor’s	  efforts	  to	  create	  fair	  
and	  equal	  resources	  for	  low-­‐income	  people	  of	  color.	  Many	  leaders	  needed	  only	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  “N.O.	  Officials	  in	  a	  Pothole	  Parade,”	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  May	  13,	  1978,	  12.	  
	  
140	  ACORN	  continued	  to	  be	  the	  community	  watchdog	  organization	  for	  CDBG	  
programs	  throughout	  the	  early	  1980s.	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Morial	  Lauded	  for	  Paving	  Stand,”	  
October	  27,	  1978,	  18.	  
	  
141	  One	  analyst	  recounted	  a	  story	  in	  which	  the	  Office	  of	  Program	  Development	  
proposed	  paving	  streets	  with	  the	  more	  durable	  concrete,	  but	  officials	  in	  the	  mayor’s	  office	  
were	  concerned	  that	  the	  overall	  cost	  would	  limit	  their	  ability	  to	  create	  visible	  results.	  Even	  
though	  asphalt	  streets	  would	  deteriorate	  faster,	  it	  was	  a	  political	  imperative	  to	  pave	  as	  
many	  as	  possible,	  thus	  eliminating	  more	  long-­‐term	  solutions.	  Anonymous	  interview	  
conducted	  by	  the	  author.	  June	  26,	  2013.	  New	  Orleans.	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remind	  residents	  of	  the	  conflicts	  over	  swimming	  pool	  access	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  to	  
underscore	  the	  importance	  of	  swimming	  pools	  and	  playgrounds	  to	  New	  Orleans	  
neighborhoods.142	  
While	  many	  neighborhood	  residents	  applauded	  efforts	  to	  improve	  the	  city’s	  
inadequate	  recreational	  facilities,	  they	  noted	  still	  that	  enhancing	  recreation	  would	  
not	  eradicate	  neighborhood	  disparities.	  Residents	  argued	  that	  they	  had	  fought	  
bitterly	  for	  more	  comprehensive	  facilities.	  While	  recreational	  space	  was	  important,	  
they	  wanted	  assurances	  that	  playgrounds	  would	  not	  be	  built	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
health	  and	  human	  services,	  counseling,	  and	  education.	  In	  one	  protracted	  battle,	  low-­‐
income	  residents	  of	  Black	  Pearl	  claimed	  that	  the	  city	  had	  promised	  to	  build	  a	  
multiservice	  center	  equipped	  to	  offer	  such	  services.	  However,	  the	  city’s	  program	  
manifest	  revealed	  that	  the	  project	  had	  been	  scaled	  down	  to	  a	  small	  playground	  in	  
order	  to	  accommodate	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  private	  parking	  facility.143	  By	  1976,	  
resident	  uproar—culminating	  in	  a	  march	  on	  City	  Hall—compelled	  the	  city	  to	  agree	  
to	  fund	  parallel	  amenities,	  albeit	  at	  a	  small	  scale.144	  Nevertheless,	  constructing	  
playgrounds	  continued	  to	  be	  a	  frequent	  use	  of	  CDBG	  funds.	  By	  1978,	  there	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  The	  city	  government	  responded	  to	  federal	  integration	  measures	  by	  shutting	  
down	  every	  single	  swimming	  pool	  in	  the	  city	  during	  the	  hottest	  summer	  in	  years	  to	  avoid	  
integrating	  them.	  An	  account	  of	  community	  response	  can	  be	  read	  in	  Kent	  B.	  Germany,	  New	  
Orleans	  After	  the	  Promises:	  Poverty,	  Citizenship,	  and	  the	  Search	  for	  the	  Great	  Society	  (Atlanta:	  
University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  2007);	  for	  an	  account	  of	  recreational	  importance	  in	  
desegregation	  efforts,	  see	  Kim	  Lacy	  Rogers,	  Righteous	  Lives:	  Narratives	  of	  the	  New	  Orleans	  
Civil	  Rights	  Movement	  (New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  1995).	  
	  
143	  Dwight	  Ott,	  “Old,	  Young	  Picket	  for	  Playground,”	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  September	  14,	  
1975,	  4.	  
	  
144	  Paul	  Atkinson,	  “Planners	  OK	  Huge	  City	  Development	  Program,”	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  
May	  6,	  1976,	  7.	  
	  
	  
	   213	  
forty	  recreational	  facilities,	  playgrounds,	  or	  multiservice	  centers	  being	  built	  with	  
CDBG	  funding	  across	  the	  city.145	  In	  that	  sense,	  they	  offered	  the	  most	  visible	  
harbinger	  of	  what	  the	  new	  federal	  aid	  would	  offer.	  
What	  none	  of	  these	  programs	  offered,	  however,	  were	  material	  interventions	  
on	  poverty	  conditions	  in	  the	  city’s	  low-­‐income	  areas.	  The	  pattern	  of	  pursuing	  
programs	  that	  matched	  specific	  indications	  of	  blight	  eliminated	  any	  potential	  
comprehensive	  redress.	  Interventions	  thus	  ignored	  the	  caution	  that	  program-­‐
specific	  approaches	  to	  blight	  would	  fail	  to	  influence	  concentrated	  low-­‐income	  
populations.	  Although	  major	  outlays	  were	  kept	  for	  health	  and	  human	  services,	  those	  
programs	  also	  only	  maintained	  services	  rather	  than	  developed	  community	  
infrastructure.	  In	  the	  first	  three	  years	  of	  the	  program,	  the	  community	  development	  
area	  doubled	  in	  size,	  now	  encompassing	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  city’s	  population.146	  
Moten	  continued	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  proliferation	  of	  new	  programs	  that	  were	  far	  more	  
tailored	  to	  individual	  neighborhood	  needs	  were,	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  better	  for	  residents	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145	  Report,	  The	  Economy-­‐	  Business	  and	  Jobs,	  Box	  57,	  Folder	  14,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  
Transition	  Records,	  Amistad	  Research	  Center,	  Tulane	  University,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
146Report,	  Staff	  Recommendations	  Fourth	  Program	  Year	  Activities,	  April	  4,	  1978,	  Box	  
48,	  Folder	  Community	  Development	  1978-­‐1979,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Transition	  Records,	  
Amistad	  Research	  Center,	  Tulane	  University,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
147Community	  Development	  Comments	  2,	  no.	  1	  (January	  1978),	  1.	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Conclusion	  
	   The	  decentralization	  of	  federal	  funding	  left	  mayors	  across	  the	  country	  to	  
grapple	  with	  the	  appearance	  of	  newfound	  authority	  and	  decision-­‐making	  
capabilities	  that	  were,	  in	  many	  ways,	  a	  hollow	  prize.148	  The	  pretense	  of	  autonomy	  
masked	  how	  shifts	  in	  federal	  aid	  constrained	  the	  mayors'	  capacity	  to	  design	  
programs	  that	  could	  address	  socioeconomic	  conditions	  in	  substantive	  ways.	  The	  
block	  grant	  approach,	  with	  its	  concentration	  on	  alleviating	  blight,	  was	  more	  capable	  
of	  providing	  symbolic	  growth	  than	  developing	  concrete	  policy	  for	  alleviating	  
conditions	  in	  low-­‐income	  communities.	  	  
Though	  OPPA	  analysts	  often	  made	  overtures	  to	  adopt	  a	  systemic	  level	  of	  
analysis—one	  that	  identified	  the	  incongruity	  of	  brick-­‐and-­‐mortar	  programs	  with	  the	  
needs	  of	  low-­‐income	  residents	  for	  employment	  and	  quality	  schooling—the	  
programs	  proposed	  by	  OPPA	  mirrored	  little	  of	  that	  complexity.	  A	  transition	  report	  
analyzing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  OPPA	  acknowledged	  that	  “demands	  for	  accomplishing	  
immediate	  needs	  for	  programs	  overwhelm	  the	  concern	  for	  clear	  comprehensive	  
goals	  and	  strategies.”149	  In	  reality,	  the	  directives	  of	  the	  CDBG	  funding	  made	  such	  
strategies	  nearly	  impossible.	  The	  replacement	  of	  antipoverty	  programs	  with	  a	  
spectrum	  of	  physical	  development-­‐driven	  programs	  aimed	  at	  city	  revitalization	  led	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148	  In	  fact,	  the	  New	  Orleans	  programmatic	  response	  was	  not	  altogether	  any	  different	  
in	  its	  approach	  to	  community	  development	  than	  other	  cities	  across	  the	  nation.	  	  
	  
149	  The	  report	  also	  noted	  that	  if	  judged	  against	  the	  “adhocracy	  that	  existed	  in	  city	  
government	  policy	  making	  when	  OPPA	  began….	  OPPA	  has	  made	  enormous	  progress	  and	  
valuable	  contributions.”	  Report,	  John	  A.	  Pecoul	  Jr.	  "Final	  Report	  to	  Mayor-­‐Elect	  Ernest	  
Morial	  on	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis,"	  March	  23,	  1978,	  Box	  M22,	  Folder	  Office	  of	  
Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Task	  Force,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Mayoral	  Papers,	  City	  Archives	  of	  
New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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to	  a	  preoccupation	  with	  blight	  and	  the	  assumption	  of	  interchangeability	  with	  causes	  
of	  poverty,	  thus	  narrowing	  the	  approach	  of	  data	  analysts.	  While	  planners	  worked	  
from	  the	  idea	  that	  capable	  research	  could	  redefine	  the	  city,	  the	  indicators	  used	  to	  
determine	  blight—broken	  sidewalks	  and	  lack	  of	  code	  enforcement—became	  finite	  
definitions	  of	  social	  problems	  rather	  than	  pieces	  of	  complex	  socioeconomic	  trends.	  
Planners	  accepted	  that	  programs	  could	  be	  developed	  discretely	  as	  well.	  
Consequently,	  OPPA	  utilized	  the	  blight	  studies	  in	  ways	  that	  were	  clear,	  measurable,	  
and	  premeditated,	  creating	  programming	  that	  was	  readily	  deployed,	  easily	  
evaluated,	  and	  had	  concrete,	  visible	  results.	  For	  local	  government	  officials	  caught	  
between	  the	  need	  to	  demonstrate	  neighborhood	  improvement	  and	  the	  inability	  to	  
intervene	  in	  more	  tangible	  ways,	  treating	  symptoms	  as	  causes	  held	  more	  accessible,	  
and	  far	  less	  contentious,	  solutions.150	  	  
Ultimately,	  it	  was	  unclear	  whether	  data	  provided	  any	  means	  to	  deploy	  better	  
programming	  that	  was	  not	  readily	  apparent	  prior	  to	  the	  CDBG	  funding.	  As	  the	  
unemployment	  rate	  rose	  and	  the	  city’s	  poverty	  level	  remained	  virtually	  unchanged	  
throughout	  the	  1970s,	  what	  was	  clear	  was	  that	  the	  programs	  created	  through	  the	  
CDBG	  funding	  could	  do	  little	  to	  alter	  the	  socioeconomic	  conditions	  of	  low-­‐income	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150	  James	  B.	  Rule	  argues	  that	  by	  classifying	  something	  as	  a	  measurable	  problem,	  
social	  scientists	  have	  given	  the	  impression	  that	  there	  are	  scientific	  solutions	  for	  the	  issues	  
facing	  low-­‐income	  communities.	  Rule	  says	  that	  these	  “problems”	  are,	  in	  fact,	  political	  
conflicts	  over	  the	  distribution	  of	  resources,	  but	  the	  language	  that	  planners	  and	  social	  
scientists	  have	  used	  depoliticizes	  them,	  leading	  experts	  to	  contend	  that	  there	  are	  not	  
political	  interests	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  way	  that	  cities	  approach	  solutions.	  See	  James	  B.	  Rule,	  "The	  
Problem	  with	  Social	  Problems,"	  Politics	  and	  Society	  2,	  no.	  1	  (1971),	  18.	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residents.151	  Community	  development	  began	  to	  serve	  as	  something	  of	  a	  “Potemkin	  
village,”	  a	  visual	  Band-­‐Aid	  in	  neighborhoods	  that	  were	  quickly	  losing	  access	  to	  
limited	  resources	  while	  the	  middle	  class	  continued	  to	  flee	  the	  city.	  Thus,	  the	  focal	  
point	  of	  city	  efforts	  shifted	  to	  planning	  strategies	  that	  could	  attract	  a	  middle	  class,	  
retain	  a	  tax	  base,	  reinvigorate	  an	  economy,	  and	  restore	  prosperity.	  	  	  
The	  aggressive	  support	  that	  the	  Landrieu	  administration	  would	  throw	  
behind	  downtown	  tourism-­‐driven	  growth	  initiatives,	  while	  appearing	  unrelated	  to	  
the	  proliferation	  of	  development	  programs	  through	  the	  CDBG	  funding,	  further	  
undermined	  attempts	  to	  forward	  redistributive	  goals.	  These	  development	  forces	  
enjoyed	  an	  unquestioned	  authority	  never	  afforded	  to	  community-­‐level	  councils,	  
granting	  them	  sway	  in	  city	  planning	  strategies	  and	  eventually	  access	  to	  federal	  
funding.	  The	  influence	  of	  pro-­‐growth	  developers,	  strengthened	  by	  the	  instruction	  to	  
use	  CDBG	  funds	  to	  leverage	  private-­‐sector	  participation,	  undermined	  attempts	  by	  
city	  leadership	  to	  balance	  community	  development	  projects	  through	  opposing	  
goals—one	  being	  to	  develop	  projects	  that	  directly	  encouraged	  private	  investment	  
and	  the	  other	  to	  alleviate	  conditions	  of	  poverty.152	  Those	  competing	  ideologies	  
would	  be	  reconciled	  in	  favor	  of	  private	  development	  through	  new	  legislative	  
directives	  in	  1977.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151	  Kelly	  Frailing	  and	  Dee	  Wood	  Harper,	  "Crimes	  and	  Hurricanes	  in	  New	  Orleans,"	  in	  
The	  Sociology	  of	  Katrina:	  Perspectives	  on	  a	  Modern	  Catastrophe,	  ed.	  David	  L.	  Brunsma,	  David	  
Overfelt,	  Steven	  J.	  Picou	  and	  Carl	  L.	  Bankston	  III,	  	  (New	  York	  City:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  
Publishers,	  2010),	  88.	  
	  
152Report,	  Mayor's	  Presentation	  of	  the	  community	  development	  plan,	  April	  29,	  1976,	  
Box	  1,	  Folder	  CD-­‐PLAN-­‐PUBH,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  
Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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CHAPTER	  FOUR	  
Chapter	  Four:	  “Civilized	  Decay	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Growth”	  
	  
By	  the	  mid	  1970s,	  the	  city’s	  fiscal	  instability—a	  product	  of	  middle-­‐class	  flight,	  
concentrated	  poverty,	  and	  limited	  economic	  and	  educational	  opportunity—was	  
made	  apparent	  as	  was	  the	  insufficiency	  of	  Community	  Development	  Block	  Grant	  
(CDBG)	  aid	  to	  mitigate	  it.	  Without	  federal	  or	  state	  policies	  that	  would	  support	  dual	  
aims	  of	  alleviating	  poverty	  and	  expanding	  the	  city’s	  tax	  base,	  redistributive	  
programs	  risked	  catalyzing	  further	  flight,	  municipal	  officials	  claimed.	  This	  
intersection	  between	  the	  economic	  crisis	  and	  a	  shift	  in	  federal	  programs	  dispelled	  
any	  notion	  that	  local	  autonomy	  would	  be	  enough	  to	  address	  the	  urban	  crisis.	  
Consequently,	  new	  theories	  promoted	  marshaling	  resources,	  including	  federal	  aid,	  
to	  cultivate	  private-­‐sector	  development—a	  mandate	  clearly	  endorsed	  by	  
community	  development	  legislation.	  The	  very	  real	  need	  for	  revenue	  enabled	  
downtown	  developers	  in	  New	  Orleans	  to	  insist	  that	  private	  sector-­‐led	  growth	  
offered	  the	  only	  practical	  strategy	  for	  renewal.	  
Far	  from	  being	  a	  reluctant	  partner	  in	  this	  venture,	  city	  leadership	  embraced	  
the	  opportunity	  to	  promote	  growth.	  Local	  leadership,	  convinced	  that	  quick	  and	  
visible	  development	  was	  imperative,	  ceded	  oversight	  of	  economic	  development	  
strategies	  to	  private-­‐sector	  interests,	  permitting	  those	  interests	  to	  pursue	  a	  narrow	  
tourism-­‐driven	  approach.	  Claiming	  that	  the	  approach	  promised	  better	  employment	  
opportunities	  and	  means	  to	  fund	  increased	  supportive	  services,	  the	  city	  promoted	  
downtown	  developers	  as	  critical	  to	  revitalization.	  Further,	  local	  leaders	  argued,	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these	  efforts	  offered	  the	  best	  opportunity	  for	  the	  city	  to	  recover,	  making	  developers	  
legitimate	  beneficiaries	  of	  federal	  urban	  aid.	  	  	  	  
Ultimately,	  this	  strategy	  had	  powerful	  implications.	  The	  choice	  to	  promote	  
touristic	  development	  ignored	  that	  such	  an	  approach	  would	  do	  little	  to	  reduce	  the	  
larger	  structural	  impediments	  to	  redistributive	  efforts—an	  incapacity	  to	  alter	  
municipal	  tax	  structure,	  weak	  provisions	  for	  education,	  and	  an	  enduring	  
segregationist	  culture.	  With	  community	  development	  acting	  as	  a	  provisional	  
stopgap,	  city	  officials	  suggested	  that	  the	  benefits	  of	  downtown	  development,	  like	  
that	  of	  public	  improvement,	  would	  eventually	  “trickle	  down.”	  Yet,	  economic	  
development	  efforts	  excluded	  low-­‐income	  communities	  from	  the	  prosperity	  of	  
growth,	  both	  literally	  as	  downtown	  growth	  areas	  circumvented	  adjacent	  poverty	  
zones,	  and	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  a	  low-­‐wage	  service	  sector	  industry	  that	  
encumbered	  economic	  mobility.	  Efforts	  to	  counteract	  this	  development	  strategy,	  
which	  focused	  on	  generating	  comprehensive	  community	  economic	  development	  
approaches,	  lacked	  the	  resources	  and	  financial	  strength	  to	  amass	  the	  same	  
enthusiasm	  from	  government	  officials.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  not	  
being	  able	  to	  stave	  off	  middle-­‐class	  flight,	  New	  Orleans’	  low-­‐income	  residents	  were	  
more	  and	  more	  economically	  isolated.	  	  
By	  1980,	  although	  new	  economic	  development	  had	  done	  little	  to	  aid	  low-­‐
income	  residents	  or	  create	  sustainable	  economic	  growth,	  the	  idea	  that	  public	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resources—both	  federal	  and	  local—should	  be	  used	  to	  incentivize	  private-­‐sector	  
investment	  dominated	  national	  dogma	  and	  local	  decision-­‐making.1	  
	  	  	  
Shaping	  the	  Growth	  Regime:	  1973-­‐1977	  
By	  1970,	  the	  fear	  of	  riots,	  economic	  stagnation,	  and	  threats	  of	  imposed	  
integration—conditions	  that	  had	  engendered	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty—also	  fostered	  the	  
rise	  of	  a	  downtown	  growth	  coalition.	  The	  city’s	  leadership	  was	  quick	  to	  cast	  
economic	  growth	  and	  antipoverty	  activity	  as	  synonymous,	  arguing	  that	  growth	  
would	  channel	  new	  revenue	  not	  only	  to	  the	  downtown,	  but	  into	  poor	  neighborhoods	  
as	  well.	  Amid	  federal	  aid	  reductions,	  downtown	  development	  was	  now	  imperative	  
to	  successful	  community	  development,	  growth	  advocates	  argued.	  Despite	  the	  
obvious	  contradictions,	  reformers	  acquiesced	  to	  the	  prevailing	  ideology	  that	  growth	  
would	  alter	  the	  socioeconomic	  conditions	  that	  antipoverty	  programs	  could	  not.	  
Thus,	  city	  leadership	  called	  for	  broad	  support	  for	  bringing	  the	  private	  sector	  back	  to	  
downtown.	  	  	  
Economic	  action	  was	  clearly	  necessary	  given	  the	  city’s	  fiscal	  plight.	  Estimates	  
throughout	  the	  1960s	  forecast	  the	  city	  accruing	  larger	  and	  larger	  deficits	  until	  
bankruptcy	  would	  be	  inevitable.2	  Without	  the	  legal	  authority	  to	  levy	  progressive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  idea	  permeated	  both	  national	  and	  local	  planning	  circles	  prior	  to	  President	  
Reagan’s	  election,	  though	  free-­‐market	  rhetoric	  is	  most	  closely	  associated	  with	  him.	  See	  
President's	  Commission	  for	  a	  National	  Agenda	  for	  the	  Eighties.	  A	  National	  Agenda	  for	  the	  
Eighties:	  Report	  of	  the	  President's	  Commission	  for	  a	  National	  Agenda	  for	  the	  Eighties,	  
(Washington,	  D.C.:	  United	  States,	  1980).	  	  
	  
2	  A	  1966	  assessment	  said	  the	  city’s	  budget	  deficit	  would	  rise	  to	  $45	  million	  by	  1970.	  
See	  Matteson	  Associates,	  Dimensions	  and	  Solutions	  of	  New	  Orleans'	  Financial	  Dilemma:	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taxes,	  the	  city’s	  tax	  structure	  grew	  increasingly	  regressive.	  Economic	  growth	  
promised	  to	  forestall	  fiscal	  doom,	  modernize	  the	  city,	  bring	  back	  the	  middle	  class,	  
provide	  new	  revenue,	  and	  alleviate	  poverty.	  A	  long-­‐standing	  growth	  advocate,	  
Mayor	  Landrieu	  planned	  to	  use	  City	  Hall	  “not	  as	  an	  enemy,	  but	  as	  a	  friend,	  catalyst,	  
supportive	  service	  for	  the	  downtown	  area.”3	  	  
Appropriating	  the	  national	  trend	  of	  reinvesting	  in	  central	  business	  districts,	  
Landrieu	  sought	  out	  the	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce’s	  leadership	  to	  devise	  a	  plan	  for	  
comprehensive	  downtown	  development	  focused	  on	  tourism	  and	  conventions.	  They	  
worked	  quickly	  to	  create	  a	  strategy	  that	  could	  withstand	  the	  antigrowth	  sentiment	  
of	  the	  state	  government	  and	  local	  elite.4	  In	  May	  1972,	  with	  changes	  to	  the	  tax	  
structure	  possible	  only	  through	  state	  referendum,	  the	  city	  introduced	  a	  legislative	  
act	  to	  create	  a	  development	  district	  in	  downtown	  New	  Orleans.	  The	  bill	  would	  
authorize	  a	  self-­‐imposed	  special	  tax	  on	  Central	  Business	  District	  (CBD)	  owners	  that,	  
through	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  centralized	  board	  of	  directors,	  would	  facilitate	  additional	  
services	  for	  the	  area.	  As	  Landrieu	  advocated	  for	  the	  bill,	  he	  reminded	  the	  state	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Report	  of	  a	  Reconnaissance	  Study,	  (New	  Orleans:	  Bureau	  of	  Governmental	  Research,	  1966),	  
vi.	  
	  
3	  Quoted	  in	  Arnold	  R.	  Hirsch,	  "New	  Orleans:	  Sunbelt	  in	  the	  Swamp,"	  in	  Sunbelt	  Cities:	  
Politics	  and	  Growth	  Since	  World	  War	  II	  (Austin:	  University	  of	  Texas	  Press,	  1983),124.	  
Landrieu	  was	  chairman	  of	  the	  Superdome	  Commision	  and	  an	  advocate	  of	  highway	  
expansion.	  
	  
4	  The	  city’s	  social	  elite	  became	  preservationists	  to	  protect	  the	  closed	  nature	  of	  their	  
customs,	  but	  also	  because	  they	  feared	  that	  new	  growth	  would	  create	  new	  wealth	  that	  would	  
make	  their	  social	  dominance	  obsolete.	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Legislature	  that	  “central	  cities	  throughout	  the	  United	  States	  have	  been	  dying”;	  this	  
was	  the	  legislators'	  chance	  to	  halt	  that	  trend	  in	  New	  Orleans.5	  	  
Although	  the	  proposed	  amendment	  was	  immediately	  resisted	  by	  the	  state	  
Legislature,	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  anti-­‐New	  Orleans	  attitude	  of	  most	  Louisiana	  voters,	  
city	  officials	  moved	  to	  implement	  a	  growth	  plan	  anyway.	  Aware	  that	  
preservationists	  continued	  to	  retain	  significant	  power	  with	  city	  boards	  and	  
commissions,	  and	  would	  resist	  large-­‐scale	  citywide	  development,	  Landrieu	  
promised	  that	  growth	  would	  be	  “managed”	  and	  confined	  to	  downtown.6	  In	  the	  fall	  of	  
1972,	  the	  Landrieu	  administration	  allocated	  nearly	  $250,000	  in	  general	  revenue-­‐
sharing	  funds	  to	  hire	  Wallace,	  McHarg,	  Roberts	  and	  Todd,	  a	  nationally	  recognized	  
planning	  firm,	  to	  generate	  a	  pipeline	  for	  managed	  growth	  of	  the	  CBD.7	  With	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  "Tax	  District	  Bill	  Approved,"	  June	  7,	  1972	  ,1;	  See	  also	  Mark	  T.	  
Carleton,	  "Elitism	  Sustained:	  The	  Louisiana	  Constitution	  of	  1974,"	  Tulane	  Law	  Review	  54	  
(1980),	  560-­‐589.	  
	  
6	  The	  concept	  of	  growth	  management,	  which	  emerged	  first	  as	  a	  strategic	  response	  to	  
protests	  against	  misuse	  of	  urban	  renewal	  funds,	  stressed	  that	  with	  careful	  planning	  and	  
evaluation,	  a	  city	  could	  monitor	  and	  contain	  the	  ways	  development	  occurred	  within	  the	  
city—both	  geographically	  and	  ideologically.	  Faced	  with	  a	  strong	  antigrowth	  lobby,	  Landrieu	  
was	  very	  much	  aware	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  push	  for	  growth	  in	  the	  city	  was	  to	  maintain	  that	  
it	  would	  be	  monitored	  from	  every	  angle.	  Furthermore,	  the	  mayor	  was	  convinced	  that	  the	  
Vieux	  Carre	  (French	  Quarter),	  the	  area	  of	  greatest	  vocal	  resistance,	  could	  become	  an	  asset	  
to	  Central	  Business	  District	  development.	  The	  French	  Quarter	  could	  be	  presented	  as	  the	  
“authentic”	  New	  Orleans	  experience,	  just	  steps	  away	  from	  one’s	  Central	  Business	  District	  
meeting	  or	  hotel	  room.	  	  
	  
7	  Founded	  in	  1963,	  the	  Philadelphia-­‐based	  urban	  planning	  and	  architectural	  firm	  
was	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  contending	  that	  the	  growth	  of	  central	  business	  districts	  could	  
revitalize	  failing	  economies	  in	  the	  country’s	  largest	  cities.	  As	  manufacturing	  bases	  moved	  
away	  from	  cities,	  and	  increasingly	  by	  the	  1980s,	  offshore,	  Wallace	  et	  al.	  re-­‐envisioned	  
central	  cities	  as	  centers	  for	  retail,	  commerce,	  corporate	  headquarters,	  and	  luxury	  residences.	  
Hospitable	  waterfronts	  and	  diverse	  walkways	  would	  draw	  people	  into	  former	  “wastelands”;	  
they	  also	  provided	  local	  governments	  with	  symbols	  of	  progress.	  Responding	  to	  the	  quickly	  
changing	  economy,	  the	  strategy	  of	  central	  business	  district-­‐centered	  growth	  sought	  to	  
reinvigorate	  a	  downtown	  specifically	  to	  regain	  the	  confidence	  of	  a	  white	  middle	  class.	  
However,	  this	  maneuver	  ignored	  the	  limitations	  of	  this	  strategy	  for	  cities	  with	  large	  poverty	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formation	  of	  the	  Growth	  Management	  Program	  Steering	  Committee,	  designed	  as	  a	  
partnership	  between	  the	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  and	  City	  Hall,	  the	  city	  began	  
outlining	  a	  growth	  strategy.	  Private	  developers	  and	  local	  planners	  were	  enthusiastic.	  
As	  one	  young	  downtown	  developer	  claimed,	  New	  Orleans	  was	  poised	  to	  prove	  to	  the	  
world	  how	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  could	  change	  a	  city’s	  downtown.8	  	  	  
In	  focusing	  the	  city’s	  economic	  strategy	  upon	  the	  downtown	  area,	  the	  mayor	  
drew	  on	  an	  array	  of	  new	  young	  developers	  anxiously	  anticipating	  an	  upswing	  in	  the	  
city.	  One	  was	  Joseph	  Canizaro.9	  Like	  most	  of	  the	  new	  builders,	  he	  was	  a	  newcomer	  
to	  New	  Orleans.	  Hailing	  from	  Biloxi,	  Mississippi,	  the	  brash	  and	  outspoken	  Canizaro	  
arrived	  in	  New	  Orleans	  in	  the	  late	  1960s,	  staking	  his	  claim	  within	  the	  nascent	  
corporate-­‐centered	  development	  climate.	  While	  supporting	  Landrieu	  for	  mayor,	  he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
populations.	  Wallace	  et	  al.	  were	  quickly	  hired	  to	  create	  renewal	  and	  development	  programs	  
in	  Philadelphia,	  Lower	  Manhattan,	  Baltimore’s	  Inner	  Harbor,	  and	  Indianapolis.	  By	  the	  1970s,	  
central	  business	  district	  development	  for	  corporate-­‐centered	  use	  was	  a	  widespread	  tool	  
aimed	  at	  economic	  revitalization.	  
	  
8	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  "Urban	  Renewal	  Woes	  Debated,"	  December	  12,	  1972,	  37.	  
	  
9	  The	  antigrowth	  force	  in	  New	  Orleans	  was	  not	  so	  much	  a	  united	  coalition	  as	  a	  
variety	  of	  interests	  that	  did	  not	  want	  to	  see	  downtown	  development	  for	  very	  different	  
reasons.	  For	  residents	  of	  the	  French	  Quarter,	  growth	  threatened	  to	  make	  the	  area	  a	  tourist	  
trap	  and	  drive	  out	  long-­‐term	  residents	  who,	  despite	  their	  advanced	  level	  of	  organization,	  
were	  not	  nearly	  as	  strong	  against	  growth	  forces	  as	  they	  hoped.	  In	  line	  with	  French	  Quarter	  
residents,	  a	  faction	  of	  historic	  preservationists	  had	  waged	  a	  series	  of	  successful	  campaigns	  
to	  preserve	  the	  authentic	  architecture	  of	  the	  city.	  The	  French	  Quarter	  was	  the	  first	  
designated	  historic	  landmark	  district	  in	  the	  city,	  gaining	  its	  status	  in	  1965.	  Yet,	  other	  
antigrowth	  forces	  were	  not	  so	  much	  interested	  in	  preserving	  certain	  areas	  of	  the	  city	  as	  in	  
maintaining	  their	  socioeconomic	  and	  cultural	  status.	  Antigrowth	  represented	  a	  way	  of	  life	  
that	  was	  threatened	  by	  the	  movement	  of	  capital	  in	  large-­‐scale	  development.	  For	  many	  of	  the	  
bank	  presidents	  and	  heads	  of	  the	  independent	  boards	  and	  commissions,	  their	  power	  was	  
preserved	  by	  keeping	  the	  city	  underdeveloped	  and	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  the	  governmental	  
fiefdoms	  they	  managed.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  powerful	  coalitions	  between	  antigrowth	  
preservationists	  and	  insulated	  (and	  insular)	  elite,	  the	  growth	  regime	  that	  emerged	  in	  New	  
Orleans	  was	  largely	  a	  coalition	  of	  local	  government	  forces	  and	  private	  developers	  who	  came	  
to	  New	  Orleans	  from	  outside	  the	  city.	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commissioned	  a	  scale	  model	  of	  the	  downtown	  area,	  hoping	  it	  would	  help	  the	  people	  
in	  New	  Orleans	  relate	  to	  growth.10	  Following	  Landrieu’s	  mayoral	  election	  in	  1970,	  
Canizaro	  and	  another	  young	  out-­‐of-­‐town	  real	  estate	  hopeful,	  Lester	  Kabacoff,	  
promised	  new	  streets	  and	  shopping	  districts	  with	  high-­‐rise	  luxury	  housing	  
dominating	  the	  landscape.11	  A	  new	  city	  would	  emerge	  when	  New	  Orleans	  was	  re-­‐
created	  as	  the	  cosmopolitan	  center	  of	  the	  South.	  
The	  mayor	  firmly	  supported	  this	  vision	  and	  continued	  to	  build	  links	  between	  
downtown	  developers	  and	  the	  city’s	  economic	  development	  strategy.	  “We	  are	  going	  
to	  be	  here	  supporting	  those	  projects,”	  he	  told	  reporters.	  “They	  can’t	  build	  fast	  
enough	  for	  me	  the	  new	  Hyatt	  House,	  the	  Pan-­‐Am	  building,	  the	  Canizaro	  tract,	  the	  
Kabacoff-­‐Coleman	  tract	  or	  the	  Roussel	  tract	  or	  anyone	  else	  who	  wants	  to	  make	  a	  
significant	  contribution.	  	  They	  are	  going	  to	  get	  nothing	  but	  support	  from	  this	  
administration—they	  are	  not	  going	  to	  find	  obstacles	  in	  their	  way.”12	  Landrieu	  was	  
certainly	  creative	  in	  promoting	  downtown	  improvements,	  appointing	  the	  new	  
development	  cohort	  to	  historically	  elite	  commission	  boards	  throughout	  the	  city,	  
unsettling	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  social	  elite	  over	  economic	  decisions.	  	  	  The	  young	  
Canizaro	  alone	  earned	  membership	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  important	  economic	  
organizations,	  including	  the	  French	  Market	  Corporation,	  a	  city-­‐created	  organization	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  "Downtown	  Model	  to	  be	  Displayed,"	  October	  11,	  1970,	  65.	  
	  
11	  Kabacoff	  was	  a	  native	  New	  Yorker.	  He	  was	  an	  active	  member	  of	  many	  of	  the	  city’s	  
civic	  associations,	  including	  the	  Council	  for	  a	  Better	  Louisiana	  and	  the	  Metropolitan	  Area	  
Committee.	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responsible	  for	  overseeing	  the	  redevelopment	  of	  an	  open-­‐air	  marketplace;	  the	  
Chamber	  of	  Commerce;	  and	  the	  New	  Orleans	  Tourist	  and	  Convention	  Commission.	  
Although	  unable	  to	  garner	  money	  from	  local	  banks	  that,	  with	  leadership	  tied	  to	  the	  
social	  elite,	  were	  still	  reluctant	  to	  support	  large-­‐scale	  real	  estate	  development,	  
Canizaro	  quickly	  became	  one	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  men	  in	  the	  business	  of	  city	  
revitalization.13	  	  	  
Landrieu’s	  support	  for	  the	  developers	  was	  so	  absolute	  that	  in	  a	  performance	  
that	  seemingly	  puzzled	  everyone,	  he	  held	  a	  minor	  1971	  City	  Hall	  press	  conference	  at	  
an	  unfinished	  construction	  site	  owned	  by	  Canizaro.	  The	  incomplete	  Lykes	  Center	  
was	  a	  twenty-­‐one-­‐story	  building	  on	  Poydras	  Street,	  a	  skyscraper	  on	  New	  Orleans’s	  
underdeveloped	  city	  skyline.	  The	  tower,	  centrally	  located	  on	  the	  street	  that	  city	  
officials	  hoped	  would	  become	  the	  main	  artery	  of	  the	  business	  community,	  was	  
already	  courting	  corporate	  oil	  firms—mimicking	  Houston—for	  its	  17,000	  square	  
feet	  of	  undeveloped	  office	  space.	  The	  mayor,	  resembling	  a	  real	  estate	  kingpin	  in	  a	  
pressed	  suit	  and	  hard	  hat,	  rode	  the	  only	  finished	  elevator	  through	  the	  skeletal	  
structure	  of	  the	  building.	  Exposed	  steel	  beams	  and	  unfinished	  windows	  revealed	  
views	  of	  the	  city	  below.	  The	  press	  followed	  in	  droves,	  curious	  why	  a	  mundane	  city	  
update	  was	  exposing	  them	  to	  the	  elements.	  But,	  Landrieu	  coyly	  noted	  to	  reporters	  
that	  the	  location	  was	  simply	  a	  necessary	  “change	  of	  scenery”	  in	  order	  to	  showcase	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Funding	  for	  Canizaro’s	  major	  downtown	  project	  came	  from	  an	  unlikely	  source:	  
the	  Iranian	  Omran	  bank.	  In	  its	  first	  U.S.	  development	  project,	  the	  Iranian	  bank,	  in	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“what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  New	  Orleans	  of	  a	  positive	  nature.”14	  Undoubtedly,	  this	  new	  
administration	  was	  on	  board	  with	  downtown	  development.	  	  
The	  efforts	  to	  subsidize	  downtown	  development	  were	  doubly	  evident	  in	  a	  
land	  deal	  brokered	  between	  the	  city	  and	  local	  developers.	  In	  1973,	  Councilor	  Joseph	  
DiRosa	  announced	  that	  the	  city	  would	  pursue	  a	  swap	  of	  prime	  acreage	  it	  owned	  
along	  the	  south	  end	  of	  Canal	  Street,	  the	  major	  commercial	  thoroughfare,	  for	  a	  small	  
parcel	  of	  land	  that	  Canizaro	  held	  near	  the	  City	  Hall	  building	  on	  Poydras	  Street.	  The	  
official	  purpose	  of	  the	  swap	  was	  to	  provide	  land	  upon	  which	  the	  city	  could	  build	  an	  
Italian-­‐style	  piazza,	  replete	  with	  fountains	  and	  cobblestones,	  celebrating	  the	  city’s	  
Italian	  heritage.	  Yet,	  the	  stated	  rationale	  masked	  other	  beneficiaries.	  The	  swap	  
would	  complete	  a	  jigsaw	  puzzle	  of	  land	  tracts	  owned	  by	  Canizaro,	  enabling	  him	  to	  
begin	  a	  large	  development	  project.	  As	  pitched	  to	  the	  City	  Council,	  the	  swap	  would	  
allow	  Canizaro	  to	  build	  a	  unique	  mix	  of	  hotels,	  office	  buildings,	  residential	  
apartments,	  and	  retail	  facilities	  necessary	  for	  revitalizing	  the	  downtown.	  Promoting	  
the	  development	  as	  a	  strategy	  for	  competing	  with	  flourishing	  suburban	  commercial	  
districts,	  Canizaro	  emphasized	  that	  only	  projects	  like	  his	  could	  encourage	  the	  
middle	  class	  to	  return	  to	  the	  depressed	  city	  center.15	  
	  Within	  a	  month	  of	  the	  proposal,	  the	  council	  approved	  the	  swap,	  despite	  it	  
being	  a	  losing	  deal	  for	  the	  city	  government.	  A	  prior	  appraisal	  of	  the	  city-­‐owned	  land	  
parcel	  assigned	  a	  value	  nearing	  $5	  million,	  and	  yet	  in	  the	  months	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  
exchange,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  land	  had	  miraculously	  declined.	  A	  new	  city	  appraisal	  set	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Mayor	  Takes	  Press	  for	  A	  Ride,”	  May	  22,	  1971,	  8.	  
	  
15	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Land	  Parcels	  Swap	  is	  Made,”	  April	  6,	  1974,	  20.	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the	  prime	  real	  estate’s	  value	  at	  a	  mere	  $1.7	  million.16	  City	  officials	  skirted	  questions	  
on	  the	  devaluation,	  reemphasizing	  the	  cultural	  significance	  of	  an	  Italian	  piazza	  and	  
the	  economic	  utility	  of	  Canizaro’s	  project.	  However,	  not	  everyone	  on	  the	  council	  was	  
persuaded	  to	  side	  with	  the	  developer.	  Demanding	  to	  see	  evidentiary	  support	  for	  a	  
66	  percent	  drop	  in	  the	  appraised	  value,	  Councilor	  Peter	  Beer	  opposed	  the	  plan.17	  
Immediately,	  Landrieu	  argued	  that	  the	  discrepancies	  in	  appraisals	  reflected	  only	  the	  
“un-­‐developable”	  nature	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  tract,	  made	  up	  of	  city	  streets.18	  While	  
questions	  about	  the	  swap’s	  validity	  continued	  to	  swirl,	  the	  mayor	  steered	  it	  through	  
a	  council	  vote.	  Canizaro	  was	  the	  big	  winner.	  Within	  a	  month,	  he	  took	  control	  of	  the	  
riverfront	  land	  and,	  simultaneously,	  was	  seated	  as	  vice	  president	  of	  the	  Italian	  
piazza’s	  newly	  formed	  steering	  committee.19	  In	  this	  calculated	  move	  to	  facilitate	  
private-­‐sector	  interests,	  it	  was	  unclear	  what	  the	  city	  had	  gained.20	  
	  
Aiding	  Development:	  The	  Use	  of	  Federal	  Funds	  in	  Private	  Development	  
Landrieu	  also	  looked	  for	  ways	  to	  use	  federal	  funds	  to	  implement	  an	  
incentives	  program	  for	  downtown	  development.	  By	  early	  1974,	  Chief	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Times-­‐Picayune,"	  Planning	  Unit	  Gives	  Okay	  to	  Swap	  of	  Land,”	  December	  27,	  1973,	  
1.	  See	  also,	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Canizaro	  Got	  Good	  Deal	  in	  Land	  Swap	  with	  City,”	  August	  10,	  
1979,	  1.	  
	  





19	  Times-­‐Picayune,”	  Land	  Parcels	  Swap	  is	  Made,”	  April	  6,	  1974,	  20.	  
	  
20	  The	  piazza,	  completed	  in	  1978,	  has	  continued	  to	  plague	  the	  city.	  	  Although	  initially	  
lauded	  for	  its	  architectural	  ingenuity,	  it	  quickly	  deteriorated	  and	  was	  in	  ruins	  by	  the	  mid	  
1980s.	  	  More	  recently,	  there	  have	  been	  private	  efforts	  to	  renovate	  it.	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Administrative	  Officer	  Douglas	  Augustin	  had	  authorized	  the	  use	  of	  revenue	  sharing	  
in	  the	  Central	  Business	  District	  for	  a	  myriad	  of	  beautification	  projects.	  Reporting	  to	  
the	  mayor,	  Augustin	  emphasized	  the	  role	  that	  federal	  aid	  could	  play	  in	  leveraging	  
investment	  in	  the	  city.	  If	  the	  city	  could	  guarantee	  developers	  access	  to	  federal	  aid,	  it	  
would	  be	  able	  to	  cultivate	  an	  environment	  for	  sustained	  downtown	  growth.21	  	  	  
Landrieu	  believed	  that	  alongside	  federal	  aid	  incentives,	  the	  city	  could	  employ	  
existing	  antipoverty	  resources	  to	  aid	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  developing	  its	  
institutional	  capacity.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  mayor’s	  query	  regarding	  resources,	  the	  
OPPA	  immediately	  suggested	  utilizing	  the	  expertise	  of	  the	  Community	  Improvement	  
Agency,	  whose	  renewal	  activities	  were	  slowed	  by	  the	  national	  moratorium	  on	  HUD	  
projects.	  If	  the	  CBD	  operated	  under	  the	  management	  of	  the	  Community	  
Improvement	  Agency,	  then	  the	  area's	  reclassification	  as	  a	  “community	  
improvement”	  district	  would	  be	  justified.	  That	  designation	  provided	  clear	  
advantages:	  It	  would	  offer	  access	  to	  trained	  urban	  specialists	  and	  provide	  
downtown	  developers	  with	  a	  planning	  staff	  with	  capabilities	  exceeding	  both	  those	  
of	  OPPA	  and	  the	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce.	  However,	  the	  most	  important	  channel	  that	  
would	  be	  opened	  from	  such	  a	  designation	  was	  a	  clear	  path	  to	  federal	  funding.22	  	  
The	  prospect	  of	  obtaining	  federal	  aid	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  business	  community.	  
As	  Landrieu	  took	  the	  lead	  among	  the	  U.S.	  Conference	  of	  Mayors	  to	  advocate	  for	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Memo,	  Douglas	  Augustin	  to	  John	  Papale,	  November	  1,	  1975,	  Box	  46,	  Folder	  
Revenue	  Sharing	  1974,	  Moon	  Landrieu	  Papers,	  Loyola	  University	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  
Louisiana.	  
	  
22	  Report,	  “Development	  Report,”	  Box	  53,	  Folder	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  
Development	  Plan	  1973,	  Moon	  Landrieu	  Papers,	  Loyola	  University	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  
Louisiana.	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Better	  Communities	  Act,	  the	  newly	  formed	  steering	  committee	  of	  the	  Growth	  
Management	  Program	  took	  the	  initiative,	  hiring	  the	  Community	  Improvement	  
Agency	  to	  investigate	  approaches	  to	  proving	  both	  the	  importance	  and	  the	  utility	  of	  
defining	  the	  downtown	  area	  as	  a	  community	  development	  district.	  Despite	  the	  
area’s	  relative	  prosperity	  and	  access	  to	  resources,	  the	  steering	  committee	  stressed	  
that	  federal	  funding	  was	  imperative	  to	  encouraging	  citywide	  revitalization.	  	  	  
In	  early	  1974,	  the	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  issued	  a	  report	  declaring	  
the	  downtown	  development	  center	  blighted.	  Where	  the	  improvement	  agency	  once	  
balked	  at	  its	  transition	  from	  an	  antipoverty	  renewal	  agency	  to	  a	  broader	  
neighborhood	  reinvestment	  organization,	  the	  leadership	  now	  strategically	  
embraced	  its	  role	  within	  the	  growth	  sector,	  understanding	  that	  antipoverty	  
programs,	  even	  renewal,	  were	  no	  longer	  viable.	  The	  agency	  stressed	  that	  in	  spite	  of	  
the	  relative	  wealth	  of	  the	  district	  when	  compared	  to	  other	  community	  development	  
areas,	  the	  downtown	  was,	  in	  fact,	  suffering	  from	  the	  same	  kinds	  of	  physical,	  social,	  
and	  economic	  blight	  found	  in	  residential	  neighborhoods.23	  	  	  
In	  some	  respects,	  downtown	  blight	  was	  more	  devastating	  to	  the	  city’s	  
infrastructure	  than	  neighborhood	  blight	  in	  that	  it	  weakened	  the	  ability	  to	  attract	  
new	  businesses	  and,	  therefore,	  new	  revenue,	  the	  agency	  offered.	  More	  than	  50	  
percent	  of	  buildings	  in	  the	  downtown’s	  historic	  core	  were	  substandard;	  there	  were	  
cracks	  in	  sidewalks,	  utility	  deficiencies,	  and	  a	  skid	  row	  where	  homeless	  vagrants,	  
drug	  addicts,	  and	  street	  peddlers	  gathered.	  Although	  these	  areas	  of	  blight	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Report,	  “Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  Report	  on	  the	  Central	  Business	  
District,”	  Box	  108,	  Folder	  Central	  Business	  District	  as	  Community	  Development	  Area	  1974,	  
Moon	  Landrieu	  Papers,	  Loyola	  University	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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relatively	  small,	  the	  issues	  they	  raised	  about	  the	  safety	  of	  tourists	  were	  “far-­‐
reaching.”24	  Anything	  that	  jeopardized	  the	  tourist	  economy	  would	  also	  imperil	  those	  
whose	  livelihood	  was	  derived	  from	  it.25	  	  	  
As	  Landrieu	  told	  the	  press,	  the	  whole	  city	  depended	  on	  the	  downtown.	  
Without	  the	  glittering	  signs	  of	  modern	  progress	  and	  a	  functioning	  infrastructure,	  
New	  Orleans	  would	  continue	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  closed	  socioeconomic	  
structure	  of	  the	  city’s	  past.	  Referring	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  new	  development,	  he	  
noted	  that	  whole	  neighborhoods	  would	  fail	  if	  they	  could	  not	  “keep	  the	  generator	  
working.”26	  If	  downtown	  blight	  were	  “spread	  into	  other	  areas,”	  there	  would	  be	  little	  
chance	  to	  preserve	  the	  remaining	  middle	  class.27	  Yet,	  if	  designated	  a	  “blighted”	  area,	  
the	  area	  could	  be	  eligible	  to	  receive	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  more	  than	  $14	  million	  expected	  
in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  block	  grant	  funding.28	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Interestingly,	  the	  report	  made	  no	  mention	  of	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  city’s	  actual	  
residents.	  Report,	  “Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  Report	  on	  the	  Central	  Business	  
District,”	  Box	  108,	  Folder	  Central	  Business	  District	  as	  Community	  Development	  Area	  1974,	  
Moon	  Landrieu	  Papers,	  Loyola	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
25	  Notes,	  Preparation	  for	  Citizen	  Participation	  Meeting,	  1974,	  Box	  1,	  Folder	  CD-­‐
PRGR-­‐74,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  
Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
26	  Quoted	  in	  Arnold	  R.	  Hirsch,	  "New	  Orleans:	  Sunbelt	  in	  the	  Swamp,"	  in	  Sunbelt	  
Cities:	  Politics	  and	  Growth	  Since	  World	  War	  II	  (Austin:	  University	  of	  Texas	  Press,	  1983),	  110.	  
	  
27	  Report,	  “Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  Report	  on	  the	  Central	  Business	  
District,”	  Box	  108,	  Folder	  Central	  Business	  District	  as	  Community	  Development	  Area	  1974,	  
Moon	  Landrieu	  Papers,	  Loyola	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
28	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency	  capitalized	  on	  the	  ambiguous	  
concept	  of	  blight.	  Despite	  OPPA’s	  pages	  of	  factors	  that,	  in	  tandem,	  were	  used	  to	  define	  blight,	  
the	  possibility	  of	  the	  downtown	  laying	  claim	  to	  community	  development	  funds	  
demonstrated	  that	  the	  category	  was	  clearly	  malleable	  to	  the	  political	  interests	  of	  the	  local	  
development	  coalition	  and	  those	  that	  supported	  it.	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The	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis's	  interpretation	  of	  CDBG	  
legislation	  legitimized	  the	  use	  of	  federal	  aid	  in	  non-­‐low-­‐income	  commercial	  districts.	  
Although	  Community	  Development	  Block	  Grants	  had	  the	  expressed	  aim	  of	  replacing	  
antipoverty	  programs	  with	  grants	  dispensed	  with	  local	  discretion	  (supposedly	  to	  
allow	  cities	  to	  make	  more	  informed	  choices	  about	  how	  to	  support	  low-­‐income	  
residents),	  OPPA	  stressed	  in	  its	  first	  memorandum	  on	  the	  CDBG	  program	  that	  it	  
would	  not	  and	  could	  not	  gauge	  the	  program’s	  success	  by	  its	  impact	  in	  poverty	  
neighborhoods	  alone.	  Instead,	  success	  would	  in	  large	  part	  be	  measured	  by	  “the	  
amount	  of	  private-­‐sector	  resources	  it	  is	  able	  to	  generate.”29	  Echoing	  national	  
sentiment	  that	  claimed	  the	  public	  sector	  had	  failed	  to	  revitalize	  city	  centers,	  OPPA	  
stressed	  that	  it	  sought	  mechanisms	  to	  involve	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  saving	  the	  city’s	  
deteriorating	  landscape.	  	  
OPPA	  explained	  that	  the	  diverse	  array	  of	  eligible	  activities	  through	  
Community	  Development	  Block	  Grant	  funding	  necessitated	  a	  wider	  area	  of	  service,	  
one	  that	  would	  include	  the	  city’s	  poorest	  areas,	  but	  also	  “endangered	  
neighborhoods	  whose	  reservoir	  of	  private	  resources	  make	  it	  a	  possibility	  of	  
arresting	  blight.”30	  OPPA	  planners	  relayed	  that	  funds	  would	  be	  used	  for	  activities	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Notes,	  Preparation	  for	  Citizen	  Participation	  Meeting,	  1974,	  Box	  1,	  Folder	  CD-­‐
PRGR-­‐74,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  
Orleans,	  Louisiana,	  1.	  
	  
30	  Notes,	  Preparation	  for	  Citizen	  Participation	  Meeting,	  1974,	  Box	  1,	  Folder	  CD-­‐
PRGR-­‐74,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  
Orleans,	  Louisiana,	  4.	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where	  they	  could	  be	  a	  “major	  multiplier”	  in	  attracting	  other	  investments.31	  As	  those	  
in	  the	  growth	  contingent	  argued,	  this	  interpretation	  made	  the	  CBD	  not	  only	  a	  
qualified	  target,	  but	  perhaps	  the	  most	  realizable.	  By	  1975,	  downtown	  development	  
was	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  city’s	  economic	  strategy.	  	  	  
In	  many	  ways,	  tourism	  did	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  only	  viable	  option	  for	  economic	  
growth.	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans	  economist	  James	  McLain	  described	  the	  paradox	  
facing	  the	  city	  as	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game:	  Although	  the	  pursuit	  of	  a	  tourism-­‐	  and	  
convention-­‐centered	  economic	  growth	  strategy	  would	  prove	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  needs	  
of	  the	  city’s	  low-­‐income,	  unskilled	  labor	  force,	  the	  possibility	  of	  adding	  new	  
manufacturing	  was	  unrealistic	  given	  national	  trends.32	  The	  city,	  McLain	  argued,	  had	  
very	  few	  economic	  choices.	  OPPA	  had	  come	  to	  similar	  conclusions.	  Despite	  the	  
office's	  acknowledgement	  that	  tourism	  jobs	  would	  be	  "dead	  end"	  for	  low-­‐income	  
residents,	  providing	  little	  opportunity	  for	  mobility,	  planners	  were	  stumped	  as	  to	  
how	  to	  create	  jobs	  more	  “suitable	  for	  (the)	  target	  population.”33	  	  
The	  means	  to	  do	  so,	  available	  some	  ten	  years	  prior,	  was	  quickly	  diminishing.	  
By	  1975,	  cities	  throughout	  the	  country	  were	  losing	  manufacturing	  to	  the	  lure	  of	  
cheaper	  production	  costs	  elsewhere.	  Detroit,	  Michigan;	  Newark,	  New	  Jersey;	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Notes,	  Preparation	  for	  Citizen	  Participation	  Meeting,	  1974,	  Box	  1,	  Folder	  CD-­‐
PRGR-­‐74,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  
Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
32	  Louisiana	  Weekly,	  “Forecasts	  Bleak	  Future	  for	  New	  Orleans	  Blacks,”	  October	  18,	  
1975,	  1.	  
	  
33	  Report,	  “Manpower	  Needs	  Assessment:	  Manpower	  Advisory	  Planning	  Council	  
Bylaws,	  Memberships	  and	  General	  Information	  March	  1976,”	  Box	  15,	  Folder	  MP-­‐MAPC-­‐GEN,	  
Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  
Public	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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Gary,	  Indiana,	  were	  all	  cautionary	  examples	  of	  failed	  reliance	  on	  industrial	  
economies.	  New	  Orleans	  had	  little	  of	  the	  skilled	  (white)	  labor	  that	  was	  attracting	  
manufacturing	  firms	  into	  the	  Sun	  Belt	  South.	  According	  to	  the	  Chamber	  of	  
Commerce,	  the	  inability	  to	  attract	  industry	  was	  not	  the	  result	  of	  the	  city’s	  high	  land	  
costs	  and	  unwieldy	  zoning	  restrictions,	  but	  because	  the	  labor	  force	  was	  desperately	  
unskilled	  and	  the	  elite	  were	  perceived	  as	  highly	  unmotivated.34	  Other	  studies	  found	  
manufacturing	  plants	  unwilling	  to	  move	  into	  cities	  where	  the	  labor	  force	  was	  poor,	  
black,	  and	  largely	  uneducated.35	  Over	  and	  over,	  OPPA	  planners	  and	  the	  mayor’s	  
executive	  team	  defined	  New	  Orleans’s	  problems	  as	  the	  result	  of	  an	  unskilled	  labor	  
force.	  Yet,	  to	  planners,	  addressing	  the	  comprehensive	  needs	  of	  education,	  resources,	  
and	  the	  economic	  preparation	  needed	  to	  train	  a	  different	  labor	  force	  was	  impossible	  
without	  tax	  reform.	  With	  efforts	  to	  pass	  municipal	  income	  levies	  doomed,	  the	  city	  
felt	  it	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  continue	  to	  pursue	  downtown	  development.	  
	   New	  amendments	  to	  the	  Louisiana	  Constitution	  only	  further	  promoted	  
downtown	  development	  as	  the	  most	  feasible	  avenue	  for	  economic	  growth.36	  In	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Report,	  “Manpower	  Needs	  Assessment:	  Manpower	  Advisory	  Planning	  Council	  
Bylaws,	  Memberships	  and	  General	  Information	  March	  1976,”	  Box	  15,	  Folder	  MP-­‐MAPC-­‐
GEN,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  
Public	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  	  
	  
35	  Michael	  Peter	  Smith	  and	  Marlene	  Keller,	  "Managed	  Growth	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  
Uneven	  Development	  in	  New	  Orleans,"	  in	  Restructuring	  the	  City:The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  
Urban	  Redevelopment,	  (London:	  Longman	  Group,	  1986),	  148.	  
	  
36	  In	  the	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Convention,	  the	  Landrieu	  administration	  
pursued	  a	  municipal	  earnings	  tax	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  equalize	  tax	  ratios	  between	  the	  city	  
and	  its	  surrounding	  suburbs.	  Because	  cities	  had	  to	  spend	  more	  money	  on	  social	  services	  
and	  infrastructural	  costs,	  tax	  rates	  skyrocketed	  throughout	  the	  1970s	  while	  they	  remained	  
far	  more	  stable	  in	  suburbs.	  By	  employing	  a	  municipal	  tax,	  as	  had	  been	  done	  in	  New	  York	  
City	  and	  some	  other	  major	  municipalities,	  the	  New	  Orleans	  government	  would	  garner	  
revenue	  from	  all	  who	  worked	  in	  the	  metropolitan	  area,	  irrespective	  of	  where	  they	  resided.	  
	  
	   233	  
only	  measure	  that	  provided	  local	  authority	  with	  more	  leeway	  in	  taxation,	  the	  new	  
constitution	  authorized	  the	  sought-­‐after	  special	  taxing	  zone	  within	  the	  CBD.	  The	  
legislation	  enabled	  the	  Growth	  Management	  Program	  to	  move	  forward	  with	  an	  
agenda	  of	  coordinated	  growth	  through	  the	  inauguration	  of	  the	  Core	  Area	  
Development	  District	  (CADD).	  The	  mayor’s	  office	  saw	  the	  legislation	  as	  a	  victory	  for	  
its	  pro-­‐growth	  development	  agenda,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  city	  in	  general.	  	  
	   The	  legislation	  emboldened	  CADD's	  leaders	  to	  seek	  further	  measures	  that	  
would	  grant	  them	  autonomy	  in	  developing	  the	  downtown.	  In	  1976,	  they	  petitioned	  
to	  create	  a	  nonprofit	  agency	  to	  oversee	  the	  development	  district.	  Managed	  by	  a	  core	  
board,	  the	  agency	  would	  be	  able	  to	  buy,	  sell,	  and	  develop	  land,	  much	  like	  a	  renewal	  
agency.37	  	  Adopting	  a	  neighborhood	  revolving	  fund	  similar	  to	  that	  deployed	  by	  
Neighborhood	  Housing	  Services,	  the	  downtown	  coalition	  mobilized	  the	  funding	  
mechanism	  for	  projects	  that	  furthered	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  Central	  Business	  District.	  	  
	   Amid	  the	  excitement	  surrounding	  the	  downtown,	  yet	  another	  report	  
surfaced	  cautioning	  overreliance	  on	  downtown	  and	  touristic	  development.	  
University	  of	  New	  Orleans	  economist	  James	  R.	  Bobo’s	  The	  New	  Orleans	  Economy:	  Pro	  
Bono	  Publico?,	  published	  in	  1975,	  was	  a	  scathing	  indictment	  of	  the	  economic	  
development	  strategy	  pursued	  by	  the	  city	  government.	  Offering	  a	  grim	  perspective	  
of	  the	  city’s	  future,	  Bobo	  accused	  business	  leaders	  of	  releasing	  overly	  optimistic	  job	  
reports	  to	  make	  the	  situation	  appear	  more	  favorable	  than	  it	  really	  was.	  While	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  city	  hoped	  that	  this	  would	  help	  stave	  off	  the	  flight	  of	  white	  and	  middle-­‐class	  residents	  
from	  the	  city.	  If	  the	  measure	  had	  passed,	  the	  city	  hoped	  it	  would	  relieve	  the	  local	  
government’s	  reliance	  on	  sales	  taxation	  and	  other	  regressive	  measures	  and	  expand	  their	  
capacity	  to	  fund	  social	  service	  provisions.	  	  	  
	  
37	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “CADD	  Plans	  CBD	  Corporation,”	  July	  28,	  1976,	  13.	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other	  cities,	  wealth	  disparities	  were	  actually	  shrinking	  throughout	  the	  1970s,	  Bobo	  
noted,	  in	  New	  Orleans	  that	  divide	  grew	  more	  and	  more	  stark.	  A	  sea	  of	  abject	  poverty	  
surrounded	  the	  new	  downtown	  prosperity.	  	  The	  top	  quartile	  of	  income	  earners	  in	  
the	  metropolis	  earned	  more	  than	  44	  percent	  of	  the	  city’s	  gross	  income,	  while	  the	  
bottom	  quartile	  earned	  less	  than	  5	  percent.38	  Though	  he	  acknowledged	  the	  
nationwide	  process	  of	  deindustrialization,	  Bobo	  concluded	  that:	  	  
The	  construction	  of	  motels	  and	  hotels,	  the	  dome	  stadium,	  and	  office	  
buildings;	  park	  improvements	  and	  the	  development	  of	  the	  central	  business	  
district,	  and	  the	  preservation	  of	  ancient	  forms	  and	  structures,	  though	  all	  
desirable	  and	  absolutely	  necessary	  for	  the	  existing	  viability	  of	  the	  
conventional	  economy—is	  almost	  unrelated	  to	  the	  solution	  of	  the	  problems	  
of	  the	  low-­‐income	  areas.39	  	  	  
	  
Low-­‐income	  areas	  needed	  “both	  basic	  educational	  opportunities	  and	  specific	  job	  
training	  for	  jobs	  that	  actually	  exist;	  and	  even	  this,	  which	  is	  a	  bare	  minimum,	  will	  not	  
ameliorate	  the	  problem.”40	  If	  tourism	  was	  the	  only	  economic	  development	  measure	  
pursued	  by	  local	  government,	  Bobo	  noted,	  it	  would	  only	  exacerbate	  the	  divide	  
between	  rich	  and	  poor.	  Without	  addressing	  these	  issues	  comprehensively,	  the	  city	  
would	  be	  merely	  postponing	  a	  graver	  crisis.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Quoted	  in	  Adam	  Clymer	  and	  Tracie	  Rozhon,	  “Progress	  mingles	  with	  past:	  New	  
Orleans,	  a	  paradox	  city,”	  Baltimore	  Sun,	  September	  19,	  1975,	  A1.	  See	  also	  James	  R.	  Bobo,	  The	  
New	  Orleans	  economy:	  pro	  bono	  publico?,	  (New	  Orleans:	  Division	  of	  Business	  and	  Economic	  
Research,	  College	  of	  Business	  Administration,	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  1975),	  26.	  
	  
39	  James	  R.	  Bobo,	  The	  New	  Orleans	  economy:	  pro	  bono	  publico?,	  (New	  Orleans:	  
Division	  of	  Business	  and	  Economic	  Research,	  College	  of	  Business	  Administration,	  University	  
of	  New	  Orleans,	  1975),	  35.	  
	  
40	  James	  R.	  Bobo,	  The	  New	  Orleans	  economy:	  pro	  bono	  publico?,	  (New	  Orleans:	  
Division	  of	  Business	  and	  Economic	  Research,	  College	  of	  Business	  Administration,	  University	  
of	  New	  Orleans,	  1975),	  85.	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The	  professor’s	  critique	  cut	  to	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  the	  contradictory	  nature	  of	  
the	  city	  government’s	  economic	  program.	  Despite	  prolific	  research	  into	  the	  making	  
and	  causes	  of	  blight,	  those	  in	  planning	  positions	  continued	  to	  ignore	  the	  
consequences	  of	  their	  approach	  in	  regards	  to	  economic	  development.	  In	  many	  ways,	  
their	  reaction	  had	  been	  to	  avoid	  the	  research	  results	  and	  continue	  to	  hope	  that	  the	  
initial	  downtown	  revitalization	  would	  open	  other	  avenues	  to	  addressing	  the	  needs	  
of	  low-­‐income	  residents.	  Bobo’s	  report,	  however,	  rejected	  wishful	  thinking.	  	  	  
The	  mayor	  scrambled	  to	  respond	  in	  a	  meaningful	  way.	  He	  announced	  a	  
citywide	  conference	  on	  economic	  development	  at	  which	  some	  two	  hundred	  
business	  leaders	  and	  finance	  experts	  would	  gather	  to	  discuss	  options	  for	  expanding	  
the	  economy.	  While	  privately,	  Landrieu	  and	  members	  of	  the	  OPPA	  staff	  questioned	  
whether	  Bobo’s	  findings	  had	  been	  exaggerated,	  they	  wanted	  to	  appear	  as	  if	  they	  
were	  actively	  seeking	  solutions.41	  	  In	  late	  1975,	  the	  city’s	  first	  conference	  on	  
economic	  development	  commenced	  amid	  allegations	  from	  community	  activists	  that	  
they	  had	  not	  been	  invited	  to	  participate.42	  In	  his	  opening	  remarks,	  Landrieu	  
reminded	  the	  audience	  that	  despite	  the	  practices	  of	  its	  civic	  elite,	  the	  city	  was	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Memo,	  Emmett	  Moten	  Jr.	  to	  Mayor	  Moon	  Landrieu,	  June	  1975,	  Box	  7,	  Folder	  
Analysis	  of	  Bobo’s	  Report	  on	  New	  Orleans	  Economy:	  Pro	  Bono	  Publico,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  
Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  
New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
42	  The	  exclusion	  of	  community	  leaders	  led	  to	  an	  alternative	  economic	  conference	  
organized	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans	  professor	  Joseph	  Logsdon.	  Titled	  
the	  People’s	  Economic	  Conference,	  it	  gathered	  a	  group	  of	  community	  and	  tenant	  leaders	  
from	  all	  over	  the	  country	  to	  discuss	  issues	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  low-­‐income	  resident	  life.	  However,	  
it	  did	  not	  have	  a	  major	  impact	  within	  city	  government	  circles.	  	  See	  Civil	  Rights	  and	  Social	  
Activism	  in	  the	  South,	  Series	  3,	  James	  A.	  Dombrowski	  and	  the	  Southern	  Conference	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“as	  isolated	  as	  (it)	  once	  was.”43	  Alluding	  to	  the	  New	  York	  City	  fiscal	  crisis,	  he	  
remarked	  on	  the	  similarities	  of	  the	  situations	  in	  the	  two	  cities.	  New	  York	  City	  was	  
losing	  jobs	  and	  its	  middle	  class;	  it	  was	  becoming	  increasingly	  poor,	  old,	  and	  reliant	  
on	  an	  ever-­‐growing	  sales	  tax.	  “Does	  that	  sound	  familiar?”	  the	  mayor	  enjoined.	  “You	  
leave	  the	  ‘New’	  and	  replace	  ‘York’	  with	  ‘Orleans’	  and	  it	  all	  sounds	  very	  familiar.”44	  
The	  crises	  of	  New	  York,	  Detroit,	  and	  Newark	  were	  not	  crises	  that	  would	  “bypass	  this	  
city,”	  he	  stated.45	  While	  New	  Orleans	  did	  not	  face	  the	  problem	  of	  deindustrialization	  
that	  many	  major	  Northern	  cities	  faced,	  it	  experienced	  the	  same	  jobs	  crisis	  for	  low-­‐
income,	  low-­‐skilled	  workers	  because	  of	  similar	  white	  flight	  and	  fiscal	  stagnation.	  
The	  mayor	  proclaimed	  that	  the	  responsibility	  of	  those	  attending	  was	  to	  find	  new	  
approaches.	  
During	  the	  two-­‐day	  conference,	  participants	  explored	  economic	  issues	  
troubling	  the	  city’s	  future.	  Co-­‐chair	  Gordon	  Saussy,	  an	  economist	  at	  the	  University	  of	  
New	  Orleans,	  reminded	  participants	  that	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  conference	  was	  to	  create	  
economic	  solutions	  that	  could	  respond	  to	  the	  whole	  labor	  force,	  not	  just	  white	  
middle-­‐class	  workers.	  	  Prior	  economic	  development	  had	  been	  mostly	  fragmentary	  
in	  nature,	  he	  said,	  producing	  Band-­‐Aids	  to	  a	  failing	  economy.46	  Speaker	  after	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Landrieu	  Tells	  Conference	  of	  Problems,”	  November	  18,	  1975,	  1.	  
	  
44	  Interestingly,	  at	  the	  time	  New	  York	  City	  declared	  bankruptcy,	  Landrieu	  was	  the	  
president	  of	  the	  US	  Conference	  of	  Mayors.	  As	  such,	  he	  was	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  lobbying	  
President	  Ford	  to	  provide	  the	  city	  with	  financial	  relief.	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Landrieu	  Tells	  
Conference	  of	  Problems,”	  November	  18,	  1975,	  1.	  
	  
45	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Landrieu	  Tells	  Conference	  of	  Problems,”	  November	  18,	  1975,	  1.	  
	  
46	  Report,	  Gordon	  A.	  Saussy,	  “Economic	  Development	  in	  the	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans,”	  
Position	  Paper,	  1975.	  Box	  B21,	  Folder	  Economic	  Development	  1978,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	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speaker	  concluded	  that	  the	  current	  economic	  course	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  sustain	  the	  
present	  population	  of	  the	  city.	  They	  acknowledged	  that	  there	  were	  certainly	  
impediments	  to	  diversification	  beyond	  the	  improbability	  of	  attracting	  industry:	  
Voters	  would	  never	  approve	  major	  tax	  raises	  to	  fund	  social	  services	  and	  public	  
schools,	  the	  state	  had	  outlawed	  the	  possibility	  of	  leveling	  regional	  tax	  inequities,	  and	  
the	  future	  of	  federal	  funding	  was	  still	  undetermined.	  Few	  options	  emerged	  that	  
differed	  from	  the	  course	  of	  relying	  on	  downtown	  development.	  	  	  
John	  Pecoul,	  a	  professor	  of	  political	  science	  at	  Xavier	  University,	  reiterated	  
this	  political	  reality,	  but	  found	  the	  conference	  entirely	  misguided.	  For	  all	  the	  reasons	  
listed	  as	  impediments	  to	  diversification,	  local	  government	  would	  not	  succeed	  in	  
creating	  more	  equitable	  economic	  practices.	  There	  would	  be	  no	  way	  to	  aid	  the	  city’s	  
poverty	  population	  without	  “federal	  policies	  that	  are	  redistributive	  on	  a	  mass	  scale,”	  
Pecoul	  commented.47	  	  Instead	  of	  attempting	  to	  find	  fixes	  for	  the	  “maldistribution	  of	  
wealth”	  that	  had	  created	  local	  poverty,	  governing	  officials	  needed	  to	  lobby	  the	  
federal	  government	  for	  national	  “measures	  that	  will	  reduce	  poverty.”	  It	  was	  the	  only	  
way	  they	  would	  truly	  correct	  urban	  inequality,	  he	  argued.48	  Despite	  his	  critique	  of	  
local	  priorities,	  tourism	  remained	  the	  best	  strategy,	  according	  to	  local	  leaders.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Mayoral	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  
Louisiana,	  11.	  
	  
47	  Memo,	  John	  A.	  Pecoul	  to	  Richard	  Bergner,	  November	  3,	  1975,	  Box	  25,	  Folder	  RF-­‐
5/11-­‐EAU:	  Incoming	  (1975),	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  
City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
48	  Memo,	  John	  A.	  Pecoul	  to	  Richard	  Bergner,	  November	  3,	  1975,	  Box	  25,	  Folder	  RF-­‐
5/11-­‐EAU:	  Incoming	  (1975),	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  
City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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The	  mayor	  cited	  the	  recent	  growth	  of	  the	  downtown	  as	  visible	  proof	  that	  
their	  efforts	  had	  led	  to	  revitalization.	  The	  number	  of	  hotel	  rooms	  in	  the	  downtown	  
area	  had	  increased	  from	  a	  mere	  4,750	  in	  1960	  to	  more	  than	  10,000	  in	  1975;	  in	  that	  
time,	  the	  city	  had	  added	  3.5	  million	  square	  feet	  in	  office	  space.49	  The	  downtown	  
development	  council,	  CADD,	  raised	  some	  $975,000	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  the	  special	  
taxing	  district	  and	  quickly	  distributed	  the	  funds	  for	  projects	  to	  make	  the	  downtown	  
more	  attractive:	  private	  sanitation,	  sidewalk	  repair,	  new	  trees,	  and	  additional	  
police.50	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1975,	  Canizaro	  announced	  the	  beginnings	  of	  his	  Canal	  Place	  
project,	  a	  four-­‐phase	  development	  of	  office	  high	  rises,	  luxury	  waterfront	  
condominiums,	  and	  a	  plethora	  of	  tourist	  attractions.	  	  Breaking	  ground	  on	  the	  land	  
swapped	  with	  the	  city,	  Canizaro	  noted	  that	  this	  type	  of	  construction	  would	  
transform	  not	  only	  the	  city’s	  landscape,	  but	  its	  livelihood	  as	  well.51	  	  
Members	  of	  the	  business	  community,	  organized	  under	  the	  Core	  Area	  
Development	  District,	  understood	  that	  the	  city’s	  narrow	  economic	  strategy	  
positioned	  them	  to	  request	  even	  greater	  governmental	  support	  for	  their	  efforts.	  By	  
early	  1977,	  CADD	  members	  began	  another	  lobbying	  effort	  for	  approval	  as	  a	  
community	  development	  area.	  Applying	  pressure	  to	  the	  mayor’s	  office,	  CADD	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Compared	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  city’s	  Sun	  Belt	  neighbors,	  Atlanta	  and	  Houston,	  the	  
‘boom’	  in	  New	  Orleans	  was	  actually	  quite	  modest;	  yet,	  for	  the	  city	  that	  prided	  itself	  on	  
stagnation,	  it	  was	  revolutionary.	  Alma	  H.	  Young	  and	  Jane	  S.	  Brooks,	  "Revitalising	  the	  Central	  
Business	  District	  in	  the	  face	  of	  decline:	  The	  case	  of	  New	  Orleans	  1973-­‐1993,"	  Town	  Planning	  
Review	  64,	  no.	  3	  (1993),	  262.	  Michael	  Peter	  Smith	  and	  Marlene	  Keller,	  "Managed	  Growth	  
and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Uneven	  Development	  in	  New	  Orleans,"	  in	  Restructuring	  the	  City:	  The	  
Political	  Economy	  of	  Urban	  Redevelopment,	  (London:	  Longman	  Group,	  1986),	  129.	  
	  
50	  Report,	  “Downtown	  Development	  District	  of	  the	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans,”	  Box	  39,	  
Folder	  Downtown	  Development	  District	  of	  the	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  Alma	  Young	  Collection,	  
University	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  	  
	  
51	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Canizaro	  CBD	  Vitality	  ‘Unique,’”	  June	  18,	  1975,	  60.	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Executive	  Director	  Warren	  L.	  Berault	  explained	  to	  Anthony	  Gagliano	  that	  while	  he	  
sympathized	  with	  the	  plight	  of	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods,	  many	  of	  which	  he	  knew	  
did	  not	  have	  adequate	  resources,	  community	  development	  funding	  was	  being	  used	  
throughout	  the	  country	  to	  subsidize	  central	  business	  districts’	  revitalization.	  It	  
would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  not	  make	  use	  of	  it	  for	  similar	  purposes	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  The	  
administration’s	  policies	  for	  first-­‐year	  CDBG	  programs,	  Berault	  argued,	  had	  been	  
perhaps	  too	  restrictive.	  	  He	  questioned	  whether	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  maintain	  “the	  
integrity	  of	  the	  [Housing	  and	  Community	  Development]	  Act,”	  officials	  had	  neglected	  
“the	  importance,	  function,	  dynamics	  and	  special	  needs”	  of	  the	  business	  district.	  At	  
this	  point,	  Berault	  claimed,	  it	  was	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  mayor	  to	  assuage	  the	  
fears	  of	  neighborhood	  and	  community	  organizations	  with	  a	  “good	  selling”	  of	  how	  
Central	  Business	  District	  projects	  could	  benefit	  everyone	  in	  the	  city.	  Noting	  that	  
nearly	  one	  in	  three	  New	  Orleanians	  was	  employed	  downtown,	  Berault	  reminded	  
Gagliano	  that	  the	  administration	  could	  not	  be	  without	  the	  support	  of	  downtown	  
leadership.52	  	  
Drawing	  on	  his	  personal	  friendship	  with	  Mayor	  Landrieu,	  Canizaro	  also	  
lobbied	  for	  a	  downtown	  community	  development	  status.	  Much	  like	  Berault,	  
Canizaro	  emphasized	  that	  CADD	  was	  sensitive	  to	  the	  demands	  placed	  on	  the	  city’s	  
limited	  funds.	  	  Nevertheless,	  he	  argued,	  the	  area	  fit	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  criteria	  needed	  
to	  qualify	  for	  community	  development	  funding.	  Moreover,	  the	  downtown	  projects	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Memo,	  Warren	  L.	  Berault	  to	  Anthony	  Gagliano,	  March	  22,	  1977,	  Box	  9,	  Folder	  Core	  
Area	  Development	  District:	  January-­‐August	  1977,	  Moon	  Landrieu	  Papers,	  Loyola	  University	  
Archives.	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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would	  not	  only	  attack	  blight,	  but	  “correct	  flight”	  and	  stabilize	  the	  city’s	  tax	  base.53	  
“Maintaining	  the	  vitality	  of	  the	  Central	  Business	  District	  is	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  all	  
citizens,”	  the	  developer	  wrote.54	  	  
	   The	  lobbying	  was	  successful.	  By	  May	  1977,	  CADD	  submitted	  a	  formal	  appeal	  
for	  inclusion	  in	  the	  Community	  Development	  Block	  Grant	  program.55	  The	  reality	  
was	  that	  the	  development	  district's	  request	  had	  received	  back-­‐door	  assurances	  
from	  City	  Hall	  prior	  to	  its	  submission.56	  With	  the	  assistance	  of	  the	  Community	  
Improvement	  Agency,	  the	  group	  identified	  more	  than	  $11	  million	  needed	  for	  
improvement	  projects	  they	  believed	  could	  be	  funded	  through	  the	  federal	  program.	  
The	  organization	  emphasized	  that	  the	  street	  improvements,	  construction	  of	  
pedestrian	  walkways,	  and	  historic	  preservation	  activities	  were	  essential	  to	  
“impacting	  low-­‐	  and	  moderate-­‐income	  persons.”57	  Within	  a	  month,	  the	  city	  formally	  
approved	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Central	  Business	  District	  as	  a	  community	  development	  
zone	  and	  allocated	  a	  small	  portion	  of	  CDBG	  funds	  to	  the	  area	  for	  sidewalk	  
improvements.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Memo,	  Joseph	  Canizaro	  to	  Moon	  Landrieu,	  April	  21,	  1977,	  Box	  9,	  Folder	  Core	  Area	  
Development	  District:	  January	  –August	  1977,	  Moon	  Landrieu	  Papers,	  Loyola	  University	  




55	  Memo,	  Warren	  L.	  Berault	  to	  Rene	  Steinkamp,	  May	  9,	  1977,	  Box	  9,	  Folder	  Core	  
Area	  Development	  District:	  January-­‐August	  1977,	  Moon	  Landrieu	  Papers,	  Loyola	  University	  




57	  Memo,	  Joseph	  Canizaro	  to	  Moon	  Landrieu,	  April	  21,	  1977,	  Box	  9,	  Folder	  Core	  Area	  
Development	  District:	  January	  –August	  1977,	  Moon	  Landrieu	  Papers,	  Loyola	  University	  
Archives,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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   The	  move	  frustrated	  community	  groups	  that	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  edict	  of	  
community	  development	  was	  represented	  in	  the	  CADD	  program.	  Community	  
residents	  found	  disconcerting	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  genuine	  connection	  between	  the	  
successful	  growth	  of	  the	  Central	  Business	  District	  and	  the	  state	  of	  the	  desperately	  
poor	  low-­‐income	  areas	  that	  surrounded	  it.	  The	  areas	  on	  the	  periphery	  of	  the	  CBD	  
were	  sites	  of	  three	  major	  public	  housing	  projects:	  the	  Guste	  Houses	  had	  a	  view	  of	  
the	  Superdome;	  the	  St.	  Thomas	  homes	  were	  within	  walking	  distance	  of	  Poydras	  
Street;	  and	  directly	  up	  Canal	  Street,	  bordering	  the	  French	  Quarter,	  the	  Iberville	  
Houses	  had	  been	  excluded	  from	  all	  plans	  to	  rejuvenate	  the	  Canal	  Street	  shopping	  
area.58	  The	  redevelopment	  program	  plans	  drew	  boundaries	  that	  clearly	  and	  
intentionally	  removed	  these	  neighborhoods	  from	  access	  to	  CADD	  programs.	  The	  
explicit	  parameters	  sought	  to	  create	  pockets	  of	  gentrification,	  ignoring	  potential	  
benefits	  to	  low-­‐income	  communities	  had	  they	  been	  included.	  	  Opportunities	  to	  aid	  
the	  development	  of	  low-­‐income	  zones	  were	  also	  ignored.	  What	  frustrated	  residents	  
most	  was	  that	  CADD’s	  leadership	  had	  been	  silent	  on	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  impact	  
of	  the	  Growth	  Management	  Program	  for	  low-­‐income	  residents.	  	  Community	  leaders	  
claimed	  that	  decision-­‐making	  of	  the	  Core	  Area	  Development	  District	  and	  the	  Growth	  
Management	  Program	  board	  had	  been	  conducted	  behind	  closed	  doors,	  without	  the	  
influence	  of	  the	  public,	  thus	  divorcing	  downtown	  economic	  development	  from	  those	  
areas	  most	  in	  need.59	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Residents	  often	  refer	  to	  the	  Guste	  Houses	  as	  the	  Melpomene	  Houses.	  
	  
59	  Wallace,	  McHarg,	  Roberts,	  and	  Todd,	  Central	  Area	  New	  Orleans	  Growth	  
Management	  Program:	  Technical	  Report	  Containing	  the	  Proposed	  CBD	  Community	  
Improvement	  Plan	  and	  Program,	  1974	  to	  the	  Year	  2000,	  (Bureau	  of	  Governmental	  Research,	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   Fig.	  4-­‐1.	  Growth	  Management	  Area	  
	  
The	  Growth	  Management	  Program	  area	  excluded	  major	  public	  housing	  from	  
its	  boundaries.	  The	  Iberville	  houses	  were	  just	  east	  of	  the	  CBD,	  and	  the	  St.	  
Thomas	  and	  Guste	  homes	  sat	  just	  west.	  	  Source:	  Growth	  Management	  
Program	  proposal,	  1975.	  
	  
The	  absence	  of	  community	  participation	  in	  the	  downtown	  plan	  led	  to	  more	  
serious	  allegations	  of	  preferential	  treatment	  in	  the	  area.	  In	  November	  1977,	  ACORN	  
filed	  suit	  with	  the	  regional	  HUD	  office	  alleging	  that	  the	  Landrieu	  administration	  was	  
responsible	  for	  abuses	  of	  the	  CDBG	  program.	  “The	  city	  of	  New	  Orleans	  is	  trying	  to	  
steal	  our	  tax	  money	  specifically	  intended	  to	  help	  low-­‐	  and	  moderate-­‐income	  
neighborhoods	  and	  use	  it	  to	  expand	  the	  city	  bureaucracy,	  preserve	  buildings	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1975),	  22.	  	  See	  also	  ACORN,	  Press	  Release,	  Folder	  “ACORN	  files	  HUD	  Protest	  against	  N.O.	  CD	  
Misallocations,”	  June	  17,	  1977,	  Box	  22,	  Folder	  RF-­‐7/06-­‐ADP:	  Incoming	  Mail,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  
Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	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  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  
Louisiana.	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Central	  Business	  District	  and	  fund	  other	  capital	  projects,"	  ACORN	  spokeswoman	  
Aveta	  Louis	  alleged.60	  	  	  
Almost	  immediately,	  a	  HUD-­‐led	  review	  of	  the	  city’s	  pending	  1978	  application	  
determined	  that	  the	  city	  had	  almost	  certainly	  misappropriated	  funds.	  HUD	  Area	  
Director	  Carl	  Geyer	  announced	  that	  nearly	  $2.6	  million	  of	  the	  city’s	  $16	  million	  
grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  was	  being	  used	  for	  purposes	  that	  did	  not	  serve	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  grant.	  
The	  most	  glaring	  abuses	  were	  allocations	  for	  the	  Central	  Business	  District’s	  
sidewalk	  improvements	  and	  its	  accompanying	  historic	  preservation	  program.	  Geyer	  
announced	  that	  he	  would	  give	  the	  city	  a	  limited	  timeframe	  to	  provide	  
documentation	  on	  the	  acceptability	  of	  such	  utilization.61	  Officials	  immediately	  
backtracked	  and	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  director	  Emmett	  Moten	  
responded	  to	  ACORN	  activists	  by	  saying	  the	  CBD	  funds	  had	  been	  proposed	  but	  not	  
yet	  allocated.62	  While	  the	  city	  scrambled	  to	  demonstrate	  accountability,	  the	  melee	  
did	  not	  stop	  CADD	  from	  continuing	  to	  lobby	  for	  federal	  funding.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Press	  Release,	  ACORN:	  “ACORN	  files	  HUD	  Protest	  against	  N.O.	  CD	  Misallocations,”	  
June	  17,	  1977,	  Box	  22,	  Folder	  RF-­‐7/06-­‐ADP:	  Incoming	  Mail,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  
Analysis	  Papers,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
61	  Other	  discrepancies	  included	  daycare	  centers	  for	  the	  mentally	  challenged,	  nearly	  
$900,000	  going	  toward	  the	  Desire	  Health	  Clinic,	  and	  some	  $100,000	  dedicated	  to	  a	  housing	  
rehabilitation	  training	  class	  and	  bonding	  program	  for	  contractors	  working	  in	  “Rehab	  Your	  
House”	  programs.	  While	  HUD	  continued	  to	  press	  the	  city	  for	  documentation	  on	  how	  the	  
money	  was	  being	  spent	  to	  benefit	  low-­‐	  and	  moderate-­‐	  income	  city	  residents,	  another	  audit	  
found	  other	  discrepancies	  in	  how	  the	  city	  had	  managed	  and	  accounted	  for	  funding	  going	  
into	  Model	  Cities	  programs.	  More	  than	  half	  a	  million	  dollars	  was	  discovered	  in	  
overpayments,	  unsupported	  costs,	  incorrect	  data	  entry,	  and	  other	  ineligible	  costs.	  See	  
Times-­‐Picayune,	  “HUD	  Says	  City	  Misallocated	  Grant	  Monies,”	  July	  23,	  1977,	  1.	  
	  
62	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “HUD	  Says	  City	  Misallocated	  Grant	  Monies,”	  July	  23,	  1977,	  1.	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New	  Orleans	  was	  not	  the	  only	  city	  in	  the	  United	  States	  to	  come	  under	  
scrutiny	  for	  misuse	  of	  block	  grant	  funding.	  In	  fact,	  there	  was	  evidence	  that	  cities	  
across	  the	  nation	  were	  misallocating	  block	  grant	  funding	  in	  far	  more	  egregious	  ways.	  
In	  1976,	  the	  Senate	  Committee	  on	  Banking,	  Housing,	  and	  Urban	  Affairs	  hosted	  a	  
series	  of	  legislative	  hearings	  on	  the	  improper	  uses	  of	  community	  development.	  
Speakers	  testified	  hour	  after	  hour	  about	  how	  the	  lack	  of	  meaningful	  community	  
participation	  and	  monitoring	  had	  affected	  the	  program.63	  Some	  funds	  were	  used	  for	  
political	  patronage,	  dispersed	  among	  city	  council	  members;	  others	  recounted	  funds	  
being	  mobilized	  in	  even	  more	  troubling	  ways.	  Peter	  J.	  Petkas,	  executive	  director	  of	  
the	  Southern	  Regional	  Council,	  outlined	  that	  some	  municipalities	  had	  approved	  
projects	  that	  not	  only	  did	  not	  benefit	  low-­‐income	  residents,	  but	  actually	  aided	  
higher-­‐income	  residents.	  Petkas’s	  organization	  found	  “flagrant	  misuses”:	  in	  
Chattanooga,	  Tennessee,	  a	  new	  tennis	  complex	  met	  an	  “urgent	  need”;	  in	  
Spartanburg,	  South	  Carolina,	  the	  city	  used	  funds	  to	  build	  a	  parking	  complex;	  and	  in	  
Montgomery,	  Alabama,	  the	  city	  directed	  the	  grant	  to	  a	  baseball	  park	  in	  a	  wealthy	  
neighborhood.64	  More	  often	  than	  not,	  local	  officials	  feared	  that	  to	  not	  use	  CDBGs	  as	  
leverage	  to	  attract	  private-­‐sector	  investment	  would	  make	  their	  cities	  vulnerable	  to	  
further	  business	  divestment.	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  offered	  private-­‐sector	  developers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Senate	  Committee	  on	  Banking,	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Affairs,	  On	  oversight	  on	  the	  
administration	  of	  the	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  Act	  of	  1974.	  94th	  Cong.,	  2nd	  sess.,	  
August	  22-­‐24,	  1976,	  24.	  
	  
64	  Senate	  Committee	  on	  Banking,	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Affairs,	  On	  oversight	  on	  the	  
administration	  of	  the	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  Act	  of	  1974.	  94th	  Cong.,	  2nd	  sess.,	  
August	  22-­‐24,	  1976,	  27.	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broad	  autonomy	  to	  shape	  the	  way	  federal	  programs	  were	  used,	  even	  when	  such	  use	  
undermined	  low-­‐income	  communities.	  	  
The	  congressional	  hearings	  spawned	  a	  proliferation	  of	  other	  research	  
demonstrating	  that	  the	  misuse	  stemmed	  from	  the	  general	  ideological	  application	  of	  
the	  funding.	  Similar	  to	  findings	  of	  the	  Southern	  Regional	  Council,	  a	  Brookings	  
Institute	  study	  found	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  funding	  was	  going	  not	  to	  low-­‐income	  
neighborhoods,	  but	  rather	  for	  use	  in	  moderate-­‐income	  areas	  to	  develop	  projects	  
much	  like	  the	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Improvement	  Project.	  Blight	  prevention	  was	  more	  
a	  priority	  than	  addressing	  neighborhoods	  already	  plagued	  by	  blight.65	  
While	  this	  use	  of	  the	  funding	  was	  troubling,	  it	  was	  nevertheless	  entirely	  
acceptable	  under	  the	  1974	  legislation,	  which	  did	  not	  differentiate	  between	  uses	  in	  
“low-­‐	  or	  moderate-­‐income	  areas.”	  Yet	  with	  every	  year,	  fewer	  and	  fewer	  dollars	  were	  
allocated	  to	  low-­‐income	  areas,	  despite	  CDBG	  replacing	  more-­‐targeted	  antipoverty	  
development	  programs.66	  More	  broadly,	  the	  studies	  found	  that	  without	  national	  
policy	  directives	  concerning	  antipoverty	  measures,	  the	  majority	  of	  cities	  had	  
interpreted	  the	  CDBG	  mission	  as	  a	  program	  of	  “neighborhood	  conservation	  and	  
growth	  strategy	  designed	  primarily	  to	  prevent	  urban	  blight.”67	  Cities	  once	  again	  
continued	  to	  construe	  the	  legislation	  in	  ways	  that	  could	  support	  gentrification,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Dennis	  Keating	  and	  Richard	  LeGates,	  "Who	  Should	  Benefit	  from	  the	  CDBG	  
Program?",	  Urban	  Lawyer	  10,	  no.	  4	  (1978),	  	  710.	  
	  
66	  Dennis	  Keating	  and	  Richard	  LeGates,	  "Who	  Should	  Benefit	  from	  the	  CDBG	  
Program?”,	  720.	  
	  
67Richard	  P.	  Nathan,	  Paul	  R.	  Dommel,	  Sarah	  F.	  Liebschutz,	  and	  Milton	  D.	  Morris,	  
"Monitoring	  the	  Block	  Grant	  Program	  for	  Community	  Development,"	  Political	  Science	  
Quarterly	  92,	  no.	  2	  (1977),	  	  228.	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target	  middle-­‐class	  consumption,	  and	  attract	  private-­‐sector	  development.	  Quite	  
simply,	  Community	  Development	  Block	  Grant	  legislation	  had	  fundamentally	  shifted	  
the	  focal	  point	  of	  urban	  aid	  away	  from	  a	  War	  on	  Poverty.	  
By	  the	  fall	  of	  1977,	  the	  abuses	  and	  subsequent	  protests	  from	  civil	  rights	  and	  
antipoverty	  groups	  forced	  Congress	  to	  seek	  revisions	  for	  Title	  1	  of	  the	  Housing	  and	  
Community	  Development	  Act.	  The	  Carter	  administration,	  anxious	  to	  appeal	  to	  its	  
outraged	  black	  and	  liberal	  constituencies,	  called	  for	  more	  stringent	  regulations	  on	  
aid	  utilization,	  a	  renewed	  emphasis	  on	  funding	  for	  low-­‐income	  areas,	  and	  a	  robust	  
focus	  on	  citizen	  participation.	  The	  most	  specific	  corrective	  redrew	  the	  language	  of	  
treatment	  by	  describing	  the	  act’s	  utility	  as	  to	  “improve	  conditions	  for	  low-­‐	  and	  
moderate	  income	  persons,”	  rather	  than	  the	  1974	  act’s	  stipulation	  of	  an	  either/or	  
type	  of	  income	  bracket.68	  	  Requiring	  that	  cities	  focus	  funding,	  particularly	  human	  
and	  health	  services,	  on	  fewer	  areas,	  the	  legislation	  called	  for	  targeting	  through	  the	  
development	  of	  Neighborhood	  Strategy	  Areas	  (NSAs).	  However,	  unlike	  Model	  Cities,	  
which	  targeted	  distinct	  poverty	  areas,	  NSAs	  represented	  areas	  where	  at	  least	  60	  
percent	  of	  residents	  were	  low-­‐	  and	  moderate-­‐income.	  While	  this	  change	  in	  some	  
ways	  sought	  to	  focus	  the	  efforts	  of	  community	  development,	  Congress	  balked	  at	  
drawing	  lines	  too	  distinctly.	  	  
Finally,	  the	  new	  act	  promised	  older	  big	  cities	  the	  opportunity	  for	  far	  more	  
financing.	  A	  new	  dual	  formula	  system—developed	  as	  a	  congressional	  compromise—
would	  allow	  cities	  to	  determine	  their	  outlay	  either	  by	  the	  old,	  poverty-­‐based	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  United	  States	  Government,	  Summary	  of	  the	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  
Act	  of	  1977,	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Dept.	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development,	  1977),	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formula,	  or	  through	  a	  formula	  that	  measured	  both	  the	  age	  of	  housing	  and	  growth	  
lags	  in	  the	  city.	  This	  formula,	  designed	  to	  target	  deindustrialized	  urban	  centers,	  
largely	  benefited	  cities	  in	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  North,	  but	  older	  Southern	  cities	  with	  
stagnating	  economies	  like	  New	  Orleans	  would	  benefit	  as	  well.69	  With	  increased	  
outlays	  of	  $3.5	  billion,	  $3.65	  billion,	  and	  $3.8	  billion	  for	  fiscal	  years	  1978,	  1979	  and	  
1980,	  respectively,	  older	  cities	  that	  had	  begged	  for	  more	  adequate	  funding	  seemed	  
to	  be	  getting	  a	  response	  from	  Congress.70	  The	  Carter	  administration	  advanced	  the	  
revisions	  as	  a	  testament	  to	  the	  nation’s	  commitment	  to	  low-­‐income	  communities.	  
The	  new	  legislation,	  however,	  hardly	  refocused	  the	  program	  around	  
antipoverty	  measures.	  In	  fact,	  in	  many	  ways	  its	  language	  further	  concentrated	  urban	  
aid	  policies	  around	  private-­‐sector	  investment	  and	  luxury	  consumption.	  Strategies	  
for	  attracting	  middle-­‐class	  residents	  back	  to	  cities	  had	  dominated	  much	  of	  the	  
hearings.	  Subsequently,	  the	  legislation	  reflected	  what	  Congress	  viewed	  as	  the	  
necessity	  to	  promote	  retention	  of	  a	  middle-­‐class	  tax	  base	  by	  including	  a	  provision	  
for	  “neighborhood	  development	  in	  order	  to	  induce	  higher	  income	  persons	  to	  remain	  
in,	  or	  return	  to,	  the	  community.”71	  Earlier	  debates	  about	  how	  this	  might	  displace	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  The	  new	  formula	  adopted	  by	  Congress	  measured	  the	  city’s	  lack	  of	  growth	  through	  
a	  different	  set	  of	  measures	  than	  the	  1974	  formula.	  The	  breakdown	  included	  pre-­‐1940	  
housing	  (50%),	  poverty	  (30%),	  and	  growth	  lag	  (20%).	  See	  United	  States	  Government,	  
Summary	  of	  the	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  Act	  of	  1977,	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Dept.	  
of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development,	  1977),	  5.	  
	  
70	  Yet,	  while	  the	  new	  formula	  provided	  more	  aid	  to	  certain	  large	  cities,	  it	  was	  not	  
nearly	  as	  much	  as	  it	  seemed	  given	  inflation	  and	  an	  expanding	  eligibility	  pool,	  which	  
extended	  aid	  to	  cities	  that	  would	  never	  have	  qualified	  for	  antipoverty	  programs.	  United	  
States	  Government,	  Summary	  of	  the	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  Act	  of	  1977,	  
(Washington,	  D.C.:	  Dept.	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development,	  1977).	  
	  
71	  United	  States	  Government,	  Summary	  of	  the	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  
Act	  of	  1977,	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Dept.	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development,	  1977),	  3.	  See	  also	  
	  
	   248	  
low-­‐income	  people	  were	  ignored,	  thus	  providing	  easier	  channels	  for	  gentrification.72	  
In	  many	  ways,	  new	  provisions	  undermined	  the	  stricter,	  more-­‐focused	  efforts	  to	  
direct	  funding	  to	  low-­‐income	  areas.	  	  
In	  fact,	  the	  reliance	  on	  a	  private-­‐sector	  urban	  aid	  approach	  was	  even	  more	  
explicit	  in	  the	  1977	  act.	  The	  new	  legislation	  gave	  new	  flexibility	  to	  private	  
companies	  and	  nonprofits	  seeking	  to	  organize	  activities	  around	  community	  
development	  efforts.	  	  Offering	  private	  corporations	  authority	  to	  acquire	  real	  
property,	  engage	  in	  construction	  and	  rehabilitation,	  and	  most	  importantly	  “carry	  
out	  neighborhood	  revitalization	  CDBG	  grant	  funds,”	  federal	  legislation	  continued	  to	  
decentralize	  responsibility	  for	  overseeing	  antipoverty	  activities.73	  Community	  
development	  could	  now	  take	  place	  through	  community	  development	  corporations	  
(CDCs)	  that	  were	  in	  no	  way	  held	  responsible	  for	  the	  interests	  of	  low-­‐income	  
residents,	  though	  they	  were	  funded	  through	  public	  aid.74	  More	  than	  anything,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Dennis	  Keating	  and	  Richard	  LeGates,	  "Who	  Should	  Benefit	  from	  the	  CDBG	  Program?,"	  Urban	  
Lawyer	  10,	  no.	  4	  (1978)	  and	  Sarah	  F.	  Liebschutz,	  "Neighborhood	  Conservation:	  Political	  
Choices	  under	  the	  Community	  Development	  Program,"	  Publius	  13,	  no.	  2	  (1983),	  23-­‐37.	  
	  
72	  Dennis	  Keating	  and	  Richard	  LeGates,	  "Who	  Should	  Benefit	  from	  the	  CDBG	  
Program?,"	  Urban	  Lawyer	  10,	  no.	  4	  (1978),	  725.	  
	  
73	  United	  States	  Government,	  Summary	  of	  the	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  
Act	  of	  1977,	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Dept.	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development,	  1977),	  5.	  
	  
74	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  community	  development	  corporations	  were	  not	  interested	  
in	  supporting	  low-­‐income	  interests.	  In	  fact,	  in	  many	  cases,	  CDCs	  were	  the	  most	  responsive	  
party	  operating	  within	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  the	  chapter.	  
It	  is	  nevertheless	  important	  to	  point	  to	  the	  complex	  political	  terrain	  that	  CDCs	  functioned	  in	  
that	  made	  them	  beholden	  to	  local	  government	  political	  interests	  for	  funding	  and	  support.	  As	  
Newman	  and	  Lake	  describe,	  this	  factor	  often	  created	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  the	  
imperative	  to	  maintain	  funding	  overshadowed	  a	  full	  commitment	  to	  pressing	  for	  low-­‐
income	  social	  and	  political	  inclusion.	  See	  Kathe	  Newman	  and	  Robert	  W.	  Lake,	  "Democracy,	  
Bureaucracy	  and	  Difference	  in	  U.S.	  Community	  Development	  Politics,"	  Progress	  in	  Human	  
Geography	  30,	  no.	  44	  (2006),	  48.	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delegation	  of	  community	  development	  activities	  to	  CDCs	  signaled	  the	  bifurcation	  of	  
neighborhood-­‐based	  improvement	  projects	  developed	  with	  the	  intent	  of	  aiding	  low-­‐
income	  communities	  and	  economic	  revitalization	  aimed	  at	  increasing	  gentrification.	  
There	  was	  no	  doubt	  that	  cities	  like	  New	  Orleans	  would	  need	  to	  cultivate	  a	  tax	  base	  
to	  provide	  residents	  with	  better	  services	  and	  infrastructural	  support,	  but	  the	  
reliance	  on	  a	  “trickle	  down"	  perspective	  ignored	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  policy	  was	  not	  
adequate	  to	  address	  the	  vast	  array	  of	  problems	  facing	  low-­‐income	  city	  dwellers.	  	  	  
	  
UDAG:	  Economic	  Development	  for	  Whom?	  
The	  centerpiece	  of	  the	  new	  community	  development	  legislation	  was	  the	  
Urban	  Development	  Action	  Grants	  (UDAG)	  program,	  a	  $400	  million	  fund	  to	  
encourage	  private-­‐sector	  economic	  development.	  The	  new	  legislation	  reflected	  the	  
language	  of	  the	  larger	  block	  grant	  initiative,	  stating	  that	  the	  funds	  would	  go	  to	  
“severely	  distressed	  cities	  and	  urban	  counties	  to	  help	  alleviate	  the	  physical	  and	  
economic	  deterioration	  through	  reclamation	  of	  neighborhoods	  having	  excessive	  
housing	  abandonment	  or	  deterioration	  and	  through	  community	  revitalization	  in	  
areas	  with	  population	  outmigration	  or	  a	  stagnating	  or	  declining	  tax	  base.”75	  The	  
funds	  were	  designed	  to	  provide	  gap	  financing	  for	  development	  projects	  that	  could	  
not	  move	  forward	  without	  the	  aid,	  and	  encourage	  community	  economic	  
development	  in	  low-­‐income	  areas.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  CDBG	  program,	  grant	  recipients	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Housing	  and	  Community	  Development	  Act	  of	  1977,	  quoted	  in	  Jerry	  A.	  Webman,	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were	  expected	  to	  pursue	  activities	  that	  worked	  to	  eliminate	  blight	  in	  low-­‐income	  
and	  moderate-­‐income	  areas.	  	  
In	  many	  ways,	  the	  new	  funding	  pool	  resolved	  the	  issues	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  
1977	  hearings	  on	  block	  grant	  financing	  surrounding	  use	  of	  federal	  urban	  funding	  for	  
corporate	  development.	  While	  congressional	  leadership	  emphasized	  alleviating	  
conditions	  for	  low-­‐income	  residents,	  UDAG	  legislation	  included	  loopholes	  allowing	  
work	  to	  proceed	  outside	  low-­‐	  and	  moderate-­‐income	  areas.	  In	  fact,	  the	  new	  fund	  
provided	  leeway	  to	  circumvent	  community	  development	  altogether,	  stating	  that	  
“activities	  which	  are	  ineligible	  for	  Community	  Development	  Block	  Grant	  funding	  
may	  be	  funded	  [through	  UDAG]	  if	  they	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  act.”76	  The	  “purpose	  
of	  the	  act,”	  however,	  remained	  broadly	  defined,	  allowing	  cities	  to	  use	  funds	  for	  
projects	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  further	  private	  investment,	  generate	  jobs	  for	  low-­‐income	  
people,	  or	  that	  served	  as	  a	  “stimulus	  to	  area	  revitalization.”77	  The	  expansion	  of	  
federal	  assistance	  to	  include	  aid	  for	  direct	  private	  intervention	  would,	  according	  to	  
President	  Carter,	  “set	  in	  motion	  a	  process	  of	  growth	  that	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century	  
can	  give	  us	  cities	  worthy	  of	  the	  greatest	  nation	  on	  earth.”78	  With	  this	  broad	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Report,	  "Fact	  about	  Action	  Grants"	  Prepared	  by	  the	  Urban	  Development	  Action	  
Grant	  Office	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development,	  1977,	  in	  the	  Tom	  




78	  President	  Jimmy	  Carter	  quoted	  in	  Michael	  A.	  Stegman,	  "National	  Urban	  Policy	  
Revisted:	  Policy	  Options	  for	  the	  Clinton	  Administration,"	  in	  Race,	  Poverty	  and	  American	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intentionally	  ambiguous	  language,	  almost	  every	  project	  with	  a	  developer	  and	  a	  
financier	  was	  open	  for	  federal	  business.79	  	  
Landrieu,	  who	  told	  the	  Times-­‐Picayune	  that	  the	  action	  aid	  was	  “by	  far”	  the	  
most	  important	  step	  toward	  revitalizing	  urban	  centers,	  immediately	  lauded	  the	  
plan.80	  It	  also	  reaffirmed	  the	  Core	  Area	  Development	  District's	  interest	  in	  retaining	  
CDBG	  funding	  and	  the	  city	  administration’s	  willingness	  to	  accommodate	  the	  
organization’s	  demands.	  Applying	  for	  fourth-­‐year	  funding,	  the	  city	  stressed	  that	  
community	  development	  aid	  would	  be	  guaranteed	  for	  projects	  in	  the	  CBD	  “which	  
have	  long	  term	  economic	  and	  related	  benefits	  for	  lower	  income	  residents.”81	  	  
By	  August	  1978,	  New	  Orleans	  looked	  to	  capitalize	  on	  the	  new	  funding	  amid	  a	  
transition	  in	  local	  government.	  Landrieu’s	  two	  terms	  as	  mayor	  had	  come	  to	  an	  end.	  
Just	  months	  after	  the	  end	  of	  his	  second	  term,	  Landrieu	  announced	  that	  he	  had	  
accepted	  a	  position	  as	  President	  of	  Canal	  Place	  Ventures,	  the	  umbrella	  organization	  
of	  Canizaro’s	  downtown	  project.82	  He	  was	  now	  positioned	  to	  lobby	  for	  private-­‐
sector	  interests.	  The	  new	  mayor,	  Ernest	  “Dutch”	  Morial,	  was	  the	  city’s	  first	  black	  
mayor	  and	  a	  former	  district	  judge.	  In	  a	  racially	  charged	  election,	  Morial	  shocked	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  Of	  course,	  it	  immediately	  excluded	  the	  majority	  of	  low-­‐income	  community	  
economic	  development	  projects	  that	  lacked	  investment.	  
	  
80	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Carter	  Urban	  Plan	  Lauded,”	  March	  29,	  1978,	  6.	  
	  
81	  Report,	  Summary	  of	  Proposed	  CD	  Policies	  for	  the	  4th-­‐year	  program,	  1978,	  Box	  2,	  
Folder	  CG-­‐POL-­‐REC,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  
Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
82	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Will	  $15	  Million	  Buy	  a	  Hall?”	  October	  27,	  1978,	  8.	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city’s	  media	  by	  winning	  with	  a	  near-­‐sweep	  of	  the	  black	  vote,	  despite	  not	  obtaining	  
endorsements	  from	  any	  of	  the	  major	  black	  political	  organizations.	  	  	  
Blunt	  and	  assertive,	  Morial	  promised	  he	  would	  implement	  a	  strategy	  to	  
diversify	  the	  city’s	  economy.	  It	  was	  high	  time	  the	  city	  started	  weighing	  the	  cost-­‐
benefit	  analysis	  of	  development,	  the	  new	  mayor	  announced,	  without	  blindly	  
submitting	  to	  strategies	  that	  would	  benefit	  only	  a	  few.	  He	  promised	  to	  court	  heavy	  
industry	  and	  manufacturing,	  declaring	  that	  New	  Orleans	  East	  was	  unchartered,	  
fertile	  territory	  for	  blue-­‐collar	  development	  projects.	  Growth	  for	  growth’s	  sake	  was	  
not	  necessarily	  positive	  for	  the	  city,	  the	  new	  mayor	  contended,	  and	  all	  “new	  things	  
are	  not	  always	  better,”	  if	  they	  did	  not	  provide	  “direct	  relief	  for	  all	  of	  New	  
Orleanians.”83	  
In	  spite	  of	  his	  ambitious	  plan	  to	  shift	  the	  city’s	  economic	  focus,	  by	  1977,	  only	  
11	  percent	  of	  the	  local	  workforce	  was	  employed	  in	  manufacturing,	  a	  figure	  that	  
placed	  New	  Orleans	  among	  the	  nation’s	  lowest	  industrial	  employment	  centers.84	  
The	  factors	  that	  deterred	  the	  Landrieu	  administration	  from	  seeking	  focused	  
industrial	  development	  had	  only	  grown	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  decade.	  Tourism	  
was	  in	  fact	  the	  only	  part	  of	  the	  economy	  that	  was	  actually	  expanding.	  The	  number	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Landrieu,	  Morial	  Urge	  Development	  of	  N.O.	  Resources,”	  May	  28,	  
1978,	  28.	  
	  
84	  Advocating	  the	  use	  of	  the	  same	  special	  taxing	  legislation	  employed	  by	  the	  
Downtown	  Development	  District,	  Morial	  oversaw	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Almonaster-­‐Michoud	  
Industrial	  District	  in	  1979,	  a	  sprawling	  7,000-­‐acre	  area	  across	  the	  industrial	  canal	  reserved	  
for	  industrial	  and	  manufacturing	  plants.	  Despite	  the	  promise	  of	  an	  organized	  board	  and	  
authority	  over	  the	  area,	  the	  city	  struggled	  to	  find	  industry	  willing	  to	  relocate	  to	  the	  city.	  See	  
Kevin	  Fox	  Gotham,	  "Tourism	  Gentrification:	  The	  case	  of	  New	  Orleans	  Vieux	  Carre,"	  Urban	  
Studies	  42,	  no.	  7	  (2005),	  1003.	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tourists	  visiting	  the	  Crescent	  City	  had	  grown	  exponentially	  in	  just	  a	  few	  years.	  In	  
1973-­‐1974,	  there	  were	  some	  4.4	  million;	  three	  years	  later,	  that	  number	  had	  grown	  
to	  5.8	  million,	  an	  increase	  of	  32	  percent.85	  	  Tourism	  had	  created	  jobs,	  too,	  albeit	  low-­‐
wage	  jobs.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s,	  the	  tourism	  industry	  employed	  49,000	  people.86	  
Such	  numbers	  offered	  CADD	  members	  a	  platform	  to	  strengthen	  their	  lobbying	  for	  
federal	  funding.	  Their	  position	  was	  bolstered	  by	  the	  Morial	  administration’s	  
inability	  to	  gain	  quick	  investment	  for	  industrial	  programming,	  forcing	  it	  to	  turn	  
attention	  back	  toward	  downtown	  revitalization.	  	  
Amid	  the	  race	  for	  UDAG	  approval,	  the	  city	  announced	  what	  it	  touted	  as	  the	  
"Megalink"	  plan,	  a	  $436	  million	  Central	  Business	  District	  revitalization	  scheme	  that	  
included	  a	  new	  $50	  million	  convention	  center.87	  Organized	  in	  part	  by	  the	  newly	  
christened	  Downtown	  Development	  District	  or	  DDD	  (which	  reorganized	  the	  CADD	  
with	  greater	  powers	  to	  buy	  and	  sell	  land),	  the	  Megalink	  represented	  a	  coalition	  
among	  developers	  overseeing	  projects,	  including	  Canizaro’s	  Canal	  Place,	  a	  
downtown	  Sheraton	  hotel,	  a	  Hilton	  hotel,	  a	  new	  parking	  garage	  development,	  and	  
the	  convention	  center.	  Mayor	  Morial	  announced	  the	  proposed	  project	  as	  “a	  
framework	  with	  which	  the	  Central	  Business	  District	  can	  be	  reborn,	  rebuilt,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Stephen	  W.	  Brener,	  "Review	  and	  Report	  on	  Grand	  Hotel	  ,"	  Helmsley-­‐Spear	  Inc.	  
(New	  York	  City,	  1977),	  2.	  
	  
86	  By	  1980,	  40	  percent	  of	  city	  employment	  was	  in	  services,	  food,	  and	  hotels.	  See	  
Arnold	  R.	  Hirsch,	  "New	  Orleans:	  Sunbelt	  in	  the	  Swamp,"	  in	  Sunbelt	  Cities:	  Politics	  and	  Growth	  
Since	  World	  War	  II	  (Austin:	  University	  of	  Texas	  Press,	  1983),	  114;	  	  Alma	  H.	  Young,	  "The	  
Local	  Matters:The	  Port	  of	  New	  Orleans	  Responds	  to	  Global	  Restructuring,"	  in	  Poverty	  or	  
Development:	  Global	  Restructuring	  and	  Regional	  Transformation	  in	  the	  US	  South	  and	  the	  
Mexican	  South,	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1999),	  202.	  
	  
87	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Megalink”	  CBD	  Plan	  Announced,”	  April	  7,	  1979,	  1.	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revitalized,”	  calling	  for	  almost	  $100	  million	  in	  federal	  funds	  and	  $150	  million	  in	  
state	  funds	  to	  ensure	  the	  development	  process.88	  Four	  of	  the	  projects	  sought	  to	  
apply	  Urban	  Development	  Action	  Grants	  to	  their	  development	  costs,	  totaling	  some	  
$31	  million;	  the	  exhibition	  center	  project	  alone	  sought	  more	  than	  $25	  million.89	  	  	  
While	  UDAG	  proposals	  came	  from	  community	  groups	  as	  well,	  local	  awards	  
reflected	  national	  trends	  by	  favoring	  downtown	  commercial	  projects.	  The	  first	  
award	  went	  to	  expand	  Hines	  Lane	  Wharf	  and	  the	  Todd	  Shipyards,	  but	  within	  a	  
month	  the	  City	  Planning	  Commission	  approved	  pursuing	  a	  UDAG	  for	  the	  Grand	  
Hotel	  in	  the	  Central	  Business	  District.	  The	  hotel’s	  ownership,	  seeking	  funding	  for	  
more	  than	  $1	  million	  in	  renovations,	  insisted	  that	  the	  project	  fulfilled	  the	  UDAG	  
requirements	  of	  area	  revitalization.	  Without	  improvements,	  the	  hotel	  would	  be	  
forced	  to	  close,	  which	  would	  “weaken	  significantly	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  CBD	  which	  is	  
beginning	  to	  exhibit	  signs	  of	  deterioration.”90	  Prepared	  by	  the	  Community	  
Improvement	  Agency,	  the	  application	  made	  use	  of	  the	  language	  of	  impending	  blight,	  
positioning	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  hotel	  as	  a	  mechanism	  through	  which	  to	  limit	  the	  
spread	  of	  deteriorated	  conditions	  from	  infecting	  healthy	  areas.	  	  
In	  attempts	  to	  garner	  more	  funding,	  the	  City	  Council	  also	  moved	  to	  clear	  the	  
way	  for	  Canizaro’s	  continued	  development	  of	  Canal	  Place.	  Morial	  joined	  Landrieu	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Megalink”	  CBD	  Plan	  Announced,”	  April	  7,	  1979,	  1.	  
	  	  
89	  Report,	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  “UDAG	  Briefing	  Sheet,	  1982,	  Box	  J14,	  Folder	  Urban	  
Development	  Action	  Grants,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Mayoral	  Files,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  
Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  	  
	  
90	  Report,	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency,	  "UDAG	  Grand	  Hotel	  Goals	  and	  
Objectives,"	  1977,	  Box	  J14,	  Folder	  Urban	  Development	  Action	  Grants,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Files,	  
New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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and	  Louisiana’s	  Lieutenant	  Governor	  Jimmy	  Fitzmorris	  in	  urging	  the	  luxury	  
department	  store	  chain	  Saks	  Fifth	  Avenue	  to	  locate	  within	  Canal	  Place.91	  With	  
encouragement	  from	  the	  Downtown	  Development	  District,	  the	  City	  Council	  dropped	  
its	  option	  on	  a	  section	  of	  road	  within	  the	  Canizaro	  property,	  accelerating	  the	  final	  
phase	  of	  the	  project	  bordering	  the	  French	  Quarter.92	  By	  1979,	  after	  numerous	  public	  
hearings	  during	  which	  residents	  criticized	  the	  project,	  Morial	  had	  identified	  Canal	  
Place	  as	  an	  eligible	  UDAG	  recipient.	  	  Despite	  his	  ongoing	  commitment	  to	  courting	  
industrial	  development,	  the	  mayor	  firmly	  stood	  behind	  subsidizing	  the	  downtown	  
growth	  coalition.	  
By	  the	  late	  1970s,	  support	  for	  a	  new	  convention	  center	  was	  growing	  steadily	  
as	  well.	  Cities	  such	  as	  Miami	  and	  Atlanta	  were	  experiencing	  great	  success	  billing	  
themselves	  as	  convention	  destinations.	  Amid	  an	  economy	  already	  reliant	  on	  tourism,	  
building	  a	  convention	  center	  that	  could	  outpace	  all	  others	  was	  a	  good	  bet.	  The	  
Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Tourism	  and	  Convention	  Commission	  utilized	  the	  expertise	  of	  
Anthony	  Downs's	  Real	  Estate	  Research	  Corporation	  (RERC)	  to	  press	  for	  funding.93	  
At	  a	  time	  where	  federal	  policy	  supported	  the	  unfettered	  growth	  of	  central	  business	  
districts,	  an	  RERC	  plan	  for	  rooting	  all	  downtown	  development	  in	  the	  convention	  
business	  had	  merit.	  The	  proposal	  encompassed	  warehouse	  land	  near	  the	  Central	  
Business	  District	  and	  recommended	  building	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  convention	  centers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Moon,	  Morial	  to	  Urge	  Saks	  to	  Locate	  in	  N.O.,”	  January	  18,	  1978,	  4.	  
	  
92	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “City	  Drops	  Riverfront	  Corridor,”	  March	  31,	  1978,	  1.	  
	  
93	  Downs	  had	  been	  involved	  ten	  years	  prior	  in	  the	  first	  attempt	  to	  devise	  a	  strategy	  
for	  downtown	  growth.	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Will	  $15	  Million	  Buy	  a	  Hall?”	  October	  27,	  1978,	  8.	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in	  the	  nation	  at	  a	  cost	  of	  $150	  million.	  The	  RERC	  identified	  Urban	  Development	  
Action	  Grants	  as	  the	  most	  essential	  source	  of	  funding	  investors	  should	  pursue.94	  	  
The	  new	  Exhibition	  Hall	  Authority	  director,	  Frank	  Keevers—the	  former	  
director	  of	  the	  improvement	  agency—took	  center	  stage	  in	  this	  pursuit.	  In	  a	  lobbying	  
trip	  to	  Washington,	  D.C,	  Keevers	  met	  with	  legislators	  about	  retaining	  a	  UDAG	  for	  the	  
convention	  center	  project.	  Speaking	  with	  the	  press,	  he	  contended	  that	  a	  bigger	  and	  
better	  convention	  center	  would	  be	  vital	  to	  the	  New	  Orleans	  economy,	  providing	  an	  
array	  of	  new	  industries	  and	  job	  opportunities	  for	  low-­‐income	  residents.	  It	  was	  
ironic	  that	  given	  his	  earlier	  misgivings	  about	  the	  expansion	  of	  urban	  renewal	  into	  
revitalization	  projects,	  Keevers’s	  new	  position	  placed	  him	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  
advocating	  for	  the	  private	  sector.95	  	  Like	  many	  former	  antipoverty	  warriors,	  Keevers	  
had	  now	  embraced	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  might	  be	  the	  only	  available	  
means	  to	  save	  urban	  cores.	  
Yet,	  the	  campaign	  for	  convention	  center	  financing	  was	  held	  in	  limbo	  by	  new	  
scandals.	  Nationally,	  within	  months	  of	  the	  new	  fund’s	  enactment,	  accusations	  flared	  
up	  from	  across	  the	  country.	  Despite	  the	  rhetoric	  that	  linked	  UDAG	  to	  more	  stringent	  
definitions	  of	  community	  development,	  it	  was	  unclear	  how	  the	  first	  wave	  of	  projects	  
represented	  those	  principles	  or	  how	  they	  corrected	  the	  abuses	  of	  CDBG.	  With	  one	  of	  
the	  first	  UDAGs	  awarded,	  Baltimore	  city	  officials	  announced	  that	  their	  grant	  would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Will	  $15	  Million	  Buy	  a	  Hall?”	  October	  27,	  1978,	  8.	  
	  
95	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “City	  Center	  Needed	  to	  Keep	  Conventions,”	  March	  20,	  1979,	  4.	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go	  to	  build	  a	  Hyatt	  Regency	  in	  Baltimore’s	  Inner	  Harbor.96	  The	  developers	  behind	  
the	  project	  disclosed	  that	  they	  were	  considering	  surrounding	  the	  hotel	  with	  middle-­‐
income	  and	  luxury	  housing	  to	  help	  revitalize	  the	  area	  for	  a	  wide	  spectrum	  of	  
interests.	  	  	  
The	  announcement	  immediately	  spurred	  conversations	  about	  how	  a	  luxury	  
harbor	  hotel	  would	  be	  “deigned	  to	  afford	  maximum	  benefits	  to	  low-­‐	  and	  moderate-­‐
income	  persons	  and	  minorities.”97	  Muck	  like	  Keevers’s	  defense	  of	  the	  convention	  
center,	  Baltimore	  city	  officials	  argued	  that	  the	  hotel	  would	  create	  direct	  benefits	  for	  
low-­‐income	  residents	  through	  job	  creation.	  Quickly	  following	  suit,	  other	  cities	  
moved	  to	  implement	  similar	  strategies.	  In	  Pittsburgh,	  corporate	  office	  buildings	  
were	  constructed	  along	  the	  blocks	  of	  downtown.98	  In	  Boston,	  the	  city	  granted	  a	  
$10.4	  million	  UDAG	  to	  developers	  to	  refurbish	  the	  Navy	  Yard	  and	  build	  luxury	  
housing	  at	  Lafayette	  Place,	  the	  commercial	  district	  of	  the	  city’s	  downtown.99	  Local	  
community	  activists	  across	  the	  nation	  were	  enraged.	  	  	  
Boston	  housing	  activist	  Rick	  Grey	  said	  to	  the	  press:	  	  
In	  granting	  UDAG	  funds	  to	  Boston’s	  non-­‐neighborhood	  projects,	  HUD	  
announced	  its	  preference	  for	  high-­‐income	  housing	  and	  downtown	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Baltimore	  Sun,	  “Hyatt	  Hotel	  Sparks	  Debate	  on	  Use	  of	  Public	  Funds,”	  December	  11,	  
1977,	  K7.	  
	  
97	  	  Ibid.	  	  
	  
98	  New	  Pittsburgh	  Courier,	  “UDAG	  Hearings	  Leave	  Area	  Citizens	  Incensed	  and	  
Disappointed	  with	  Plans,”	  May	  6,	  1978,	  1.	  
	  
99	  In	  the	  first	  year	  of	  the	  UDAG	  program,	  nearly	  66	  percent	  of	  award	  funds	  went	  to	  
commercial	  projects.	  See	  Report,	  “Urban	  Development	  Action	  Grant	  Program	  First	  Annual	  
Report,”	  1979,	  Box	  42,	  Folder	  459,	  Alma	  Young	  Collection,	  Earl	  K.	  Long	  Library,	  University	  
of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana;	  The	  Boston	  Globe,	  “Now	  It's	  Official:	  Hub	  gets	  
$10.4m,”April	  6,	  1978,	  30.	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developers.	  It	  has	  also	  announced	  to	  the	  working	  class,	  poor	  and	  third-­‐world	  
residents	  of	  Boston	  [that	  it	  is]	  unconcerned	  for	  our	  plight	  and	  is	  unwilling	  to	  
invest	  in	  programs	  that	  would	  contribute	  to	  the	  stability,	  growth	  and	  
development	  of	  our	  neighborhoods.”100	  	  	  
	  
While	  HUD	  officials	  continued	  to	  insist	  otherwise,	  there	  were	  other	  reasons	  to	  
believe	  Grey’s	  sentiment	  was	  correct	  and	  extended	  far	  beyond	  the	  Lafayette	  Place	  
project.	  	  Neighborhood	  revitalization	  projects	  had	  been	  virtually	  excluded	  from	  the	  
awards.	  In	  Pittsburgh,	  a	  project	  to	  renovate	  low-­‐income	  rental	  units	  as	  a	  rent-­‐to	  buy	  
cooperative	  was	  rejected	  outright.101	  In	  Boston,	  the	  revitalization	  of	  Blue	  Hill	  
Avenue,	  the	  major	  throughway	  of	  the	  low-­‐income,	  predominantly	  black	  
neighborhoods	  of	  Dorchester	  and	  Mattapan,	  was	  rebuffed.102	  In	  New	  Orleans,	  plans	  
to	  create	  a	  low-­‐income	  housing	  counseling	  center,	  proposed	  by	  former	  PIP	  director	  
Tom	  Taylor,	  were	  ignored	  by	  city	  officials.103	  Despite	  HUD’s	  claims	  to	  equitable	  
distribution,	  cities	  had	  not	  maintained	  a	  commitment	  to	  economic	  development	  that	  
could	  primarily	  benefit	  low-­‐income	  residents.	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  Carter	  administration	  and	  HUD	  Secretary	  Patricia	  Harris	  
defended	  their	  position.	  Harris	  claimed	  that	  luxury	  hotels	  and	  downtown	  office	  
corridors	  served	  as	  the	  “anchors”	  to	  city	  centers;	  what	  downtowns	  brought	  to	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  The	  Boston	  Globe,	  “Now	  It's	  Official:	  Hub	  gets	  $10.4m,”April	  6,	  1978,	  30.	  
	  
101	  New	  Pittsburgh	  Courier,	  “UDAG	  Hearings	  Leave	  Area	  Citizens	  Incensed	  and	  
Disappointed	  with	  Plans,”	  May	  6,	  1978,	  1.	  
	  
102	  The	  Boston	  Globe,	  “NAACP	  Suit	  Key	  to	  Housing,”	  June	  24,	  1978,	  1.	  
	  
103	  Memo,	  Tom	  Taylor	  to	  Alma	  Young,	  August	  17,	  1978,	  unprocessed	  Tom	  Taylor	  
Papers,	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  author.	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American	  cities	  was	  essential	  to	  all	  city	  residents.104	  Despite	  initially	  adopting	  
language	  regarding	  equalizing	  neighborhood	  and	  corporate-­‐driven	  economic	  
growth	  strategies,	  Harris	  now	  stressed	  that	  using	  grants	  for	  central	  business	  district	  
development	  was	  aligned	  with	  the	  funds’	  greater	  purpose	  of	  stimulating	  economic	  
development	  for	  cities	  verging	  on	  fiscal	  crisis.	  	  Certainly,	  she	  added,	  there	  should	  be	  
a	  balance	  between	  neighborhood	  projects	  and	  those	  designed	  to	  reinvigorate	  
downtowns,	  but	  the	  administration	  stood	  by	  the	  position	  that	  grants	  were	  being	  
used	  correctly.	  
Yet	  there	  was	  no	  balance.	  Research	  conducted	  by	  neighborhood	  watch	  
groups	  reported	  that	  in	  cities	  with	  more	  than	  50,000	  residents,	  fourteen	  of	  the	  first	  
fifty	  projects	  to	  receive	  funding	  went	  to	  build	  downtown	  luxury	  hotels;	  another	  
fifteen	  hotel	  projects	  received	  awards	  in	  the	  second	  round	  of	  funding.105	  Despite	  the	  
process	  promoted	  by	  HUD’s	  top	  officials,	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  funded	  projects	  did	  not	  
solicit	  citizen	  opinion	  in	  defining	  the	  goals	  and	  strategies	  for	  these	  projects.	  The	  
cases	  of	  neighborhood	  projects	  being	  rejected	  were	  not	  isolated	  incidences	  either,	  
even	  as	  HUD	  attempted	  to	  portray	  them	  as	  such.	  The	  Presidential	  Commission	  on	  
Neighborhoods	  confirmed	  that,	  despite	  HUD’s	  rhetoric,	  grant	  administrators	  
favored	  downtown	  development	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  low-­‐	  and	  moderate-­‐income	  
neighborhood	  projects.106	  The	  commission’s	  data	  questioned	  whether	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  Article,	  Patricia	  Harris	  quoted	  in	  an	  undated	  article	  torn	  from	  Meetings	  and	  
Conventions.	  Box	  C4,	  Folder	  Exhibition	  Hall	  1978-­‐1985.	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Mayoral	  Files,	  City	  
of	  New	  Orleans	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “UDAG	  Helps	  Distressed	  Cities,”	  April	  21,	  1979,	  14.	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  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “UDAG	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legislation	  was	  really	  designed	  to	  correct	  the	  flaws	  of	  community	  development	  or	  to	  
encourage	  gentrification.	  Activists	  believed	  the	  grant	  fulfilled	  the	  latter.	  They	  argued	  
that	  these	  new	  grants	  should	  promote	  industry	  that	  garnered	  mobility	  for	  low-­‐	  and	  
moderate-­‐income	  city	  residents.	  Hotel	  projects	  and	  downtown	  corporate	  
development	  created	  low-­‐paying	  jobs,	  such	  as	  maids,	  janitors,	  and	  bellhops—jobs	  
that	  “raise	  neither	  expectations	  nor	  living	  standards	  the	  way	  industrial	  employment	  
does.”107	  
All	  this	  was	  more	  troubling	  because	  while	  mayors	  were	  lauding	  UDAG	  grants,	  
other	  economic	  development	  programs	  were	  curtailed.	  An	  impending	  recession	  and	  
a	  Congress	  that	  had	  grown	  increasingly	  conservative	  during	  the	  1970s	  undid	  the	  
initial	  promise	  of	  Carter’s	  policy	  for	  urban	  aid	  expansion.	  Threats	  of	  urban	  aid	  cuts	  
of	  up	  to	  $15	  billion	  began	  surfacing	  in	  December	  1978.108	  Despite	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  
Carter	  administration,	  which	  cited	  the	  president’s	  urban	  policy	  document	  released	  
in	  1978	  as	  evidence	  of	  his	  commitment	  to	  the	  nation’s	  cities,	  the	  federal	  government	  
continued	  to	  slice	  funding	  for	  urban	  aid	  and	  social	  welfare	  programming.	  Block	  
grant	  funding	  under	  the	  Comprehensive	  Employment	  and	  Training	  Act	  (CETA)	  
experienced	  congressional	  cuts	  in	  both	  1978	  and	  1979,	  while	  the	  president’s	  $1	  
billion	  plan	  for	  a	  public	  works	  employment	  program	  was	  eliminated	  entirely	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107	  Presidential	  Commission	  on	  Neighborhoods,	  quoted	  in	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “UDAG	  
Helps	  Distressed	  Cities,”	  April	  21,	  1979,	  14.	  
	  
108	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  “Mayors	  Face	  Future	  of	  Less	  Federal	  Aid:	  National	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favor	  of	  balancing	  the	  budget.109	  Falling	  in	  line	  with	  the	  congressional	  agenda,	  the	  
U.S.	  Conference	  of	  Mayors	  supported	  cuts	  to	  urban	  aid	  and	  maintained	  that	  private	  
investment	  would	  win	  the	  fight	  to	  revitalize	  cities.	  At	  their	  1979	  national	  conference,	  
the	  mayors	  voted	  to	  support	  a	  resolution	  extending	  UDAG	  grants	  to	  cities	  with	  
“pockets	  of	  poverty”	  that	  were	  otherwise	  prosperous.110	  	  	  
Mimicking	  earlier	  CDBG	  grants	  that	  allowed	  cities	  such	  as	  wealthy	  Greenwich,	  
Connecticut,	  to	  participate	  under	  clauses	  for	  “areas	  of	  poverty,”	  the	  mayors	  now	  
supported	  diluting	  even	  further	  the	  focus	  on	  desperate	  central	  city	  areas.	  One	  
official	  in	  the	  Carter	  administration	  admitted	  that	  “there	  has	  been	  a	  real	  shift	  toward	  
private	  business”	  as	  the	  new	  avenue	  for	  promoting	  city	  redevelopment.111	  As	  it	  
became	  increasingly	  apparent	  that	  cities	  were	  going	  to	  be	  the	  big	  losers	  in	  
Congress’s	  fiscal	  austerity	  measures,	  city	  governments	  readied	  to	  throw	  their	  
support	  even	  more	  behind	  private-­‐sector	  investment	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  urban	  
renewal.	  	  
The	  strength	  of	  the	  downtown	  business	  coalition	  influenced	  the	  city	  
government	  to	  continue	  pushing	  a	  tourism	  strategy.	  By	  June	  1979,	  the	  Carter	  
administration,	  ignoring	  the	  protests,	  announced	  that	  the	  UDAG	  program	  had	  been	  
so	  successful	  that	  it	  would	  release	  a	  second	  round	  of	  funding	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  The	  Sun,	  “City's	  poor	  will	  feel	  cuts	  most,”	  January	  23,	  1979,	  1.	  
	  
110	  Report,	  "Facts	  about	  Action	  Grants,"	  Prepared	  by	  the	  Urban	  Development	  Action	  
Grant	  Office	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development,	  1978,	  Tom	  Taylor	  
Files.	  In	  possession	  of	  the	  author.	  	  
	  
111	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  “Mayors	  Face	  Future	  of	  Less	  Federal	  Aid:	  National	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The	  following	  month,	  President	  Carter	  nominated	  former	  New	  Orleans	  mayor	  Moon	  
Landrieu	  to	  be	  the	  new	  Secretary	  of	  HUD,	  despite	  whispered	  allegations	  of	  
impropriety	  arising	  from	  his	  relationship	  with	  Canizaro’s	  business	  ventures.112	  
Ironically,	  little	  was	  said	  about	  how	  his	  appointment	  would	  affect	  the	  pending	  
funding	  of	  the	  convention	  center,	  which	  New	  Orleans	  included	  in	  its	  second-­‐year	  
UDAG	  application.	  Morial	  had	  supported	  the	  downtown	  lobby,	  asking	  for	  $25	  
million	  for	  the	  convention	  center	  and	  an	  adjacent	  hotel	  to	  launch	  what	  would	  be	  the	  
most	  extensive	  public-­‐private	  partnership	  the	  city	  had	  ever	  seen.113	  If	  allocated,	  it	  
would	  be	  the	  largest	  UDAG	  awarded	  to	  date.	  	  
Landrieu	  sidestepped	  the	  allegations	  and	  in	  December	  1979,	  New	  Orleans	  
won	  	  $17.5	  million	  for	  the	  convention	  center	  and	  adjacent	  1,200-­‐room	  Sheraton	  
Hotel.	  Just	  two	  years	  later,	  the	  Canal	  Place	  project	  received	  a	  $6	  million	  UDAG	  award,	  
despite	  it	  being	  unclear	  that	  the	  project	  needed	  federal	  support	  to	  move	  forward.114	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  "Department	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development	  Nomination	  of	  
Moon	  Landrieu	  To	  Be	  Secretary,"	  July	  27,	  1979.	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  
Woolley,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project.	  
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32656.	  See	  also,	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Moon	  Denies	  
Impropriety,”	  August	  10,	  1979,	  1.	  
	  
113	  Memo,	  Ernest	  Morial	  to	  Terrance	  Duvernay,	  April	  30,	  1979,	  Box	  1,	  Folder	  
Revitalizing	  the	  Convention	  Industry	  1979,	  Chief	  Administrative	  Office,	  Federal	  Programs	  
Records	  1968-­‐1983,	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
114	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade,	  the	  final	  phase	  of	  the	  Canal	  Place	  project,	  which	  
included	  sidewalk	  construction,	  street	  lighting,	  and	  the	  relocation	  of	  power	  lines,	  
temporarily	  came	  to	  a	  halt.	  The	  city	  placed	  a	  moratorium	  on	  the	  development	  while	  
investigating	  claims	  that	  Canizaro	  was	  violating	  national	  historic	  landmark	  codes.	  
Simultaneously,	  French	  Quarter	  residents,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Advisory	  Council	  on	  
Historic	  Preservation,	  filed	  a	  lawsuit	  against	  Canizaro	  alleging	  the	  project	  would	  interfere	  
with	  the	  area’s	  historic	  preservation.	  The	  Vieux	  Carre	  Commission,	  representing	  French	  
Quarter	  residents,	  argued	  that	  the	  UDAG	  awarded	  to	  Canizaro’s	  project	  should	  be	  
invalidated	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  historic	  landmark	  codes.	  While	  the	  organization	  won	  initial	  
support	  from	  preservationists,	  both	  locally	  and	  nationally,	  a	  persistent	  lobbying	  effort	  by	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By	  1980,	  the	  Downtown	  Development	  District	  was	  collecting	  $1.825	  million	  a	  year	  
from	  special	  taxing	  millage.115	  While	  this	  new	  revenue	  was	  directed	  toward	  shuttle	  
buses,	  Canal	  Street	  improvements,	  additional	  police,	  and	  beautifying	  projects,	  
leaders	  within	  the	  DDD	  insisted	  that	  continued	  federal	  funding	  was	  necessary	  for	  
the	  area’s	  livelihood.	  Mayor	  Morial	  applauded	  the	  grants,	  explaining	  why	  support	  of	  
private	  corporate	  development	  was	  necessary.	  “We	  feel	  the	  UDAG	  program	  is	  a	  very	  
flexible,	  business-­‐oriented	  development	  tool	  that	  can	  be	  used	  successfully	  for	  many	  
additional	  projects	  in	  New	  Orleans,”	  he	  said.116	  By	  1980,	  the	  city	  had	  received	  
almost	  $70	  million	  in	  UDAG	  grants	  for	  nineteen	  different	  projects;	  a	  substantial	  
majority	  of	  the	  funds	  went	  to	  projects	  in	  and	  around	  the	  Central	  Business	  District.117	  
Much	  of	  the	  urban	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  experience	  of	  the	  1970s	  was	  the	  result	  of	  an	  
inability	  or	  unwillingness	  of	  local	  government	  to	  dictate	  the	  terms	  of	  engagement	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
city	  officials	  and	  Canizaro	  quickly	  crushed	  the	  protests	  of	  French	  Quarter	  residents.	  Within	  
a	  month	  of	  the	  initial	  suit,	  the	  City	  Planning	  Commission	  had	  reversed	  the	  moratorium.	  The	  
commission	  cited	  that	  upon	  “closer	  inspection	  of	  the	  historic	  building	  that	  had	  been	  on	  the	  
site,	  showed	  them	  not	  to	  be	  as	  significant	  as	  was	  originally	  believed.”	  Two	  years	  later,	  the	  
lawsuit	  was	  also	  thrown	  out.	  	  The	  judge	  ruled	  that	  there	  was	  insufficient	  evidence	  that	  the	  
project	  would	  interfere	  with	  preservation	  efforts.	  This	  was	  just	  one	  case	  that	  demonstrated	  
the	  power	  that	  downtown	  developers	  now	  held	  in	  city	  politics.	  See	  Robert	  B.	  DeBliuex,	  
“Finding	  of	  No	  Significant	  Effect,	  Canal	  Place,	  Phase	  II	  UDAG,	  October	  21,	  1981;	  Tom	  Taylor	  
personal	  collection.	  Currently	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  author.	  
	  
115	  Report,	  Downtown	  Development	  District	  of	  the	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  Box	  39,	  
Folder	  Downtown	  Development	  District	  of	  the	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  Alma	  Young	  Papers,	  
University	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  	  
116	  Memo,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  to	  Community	  Leaders,	  August	  18,	  1980,	  Box	  J14,	  Folder	  
Urban	  Development	  Action	  Grants,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  
Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
117	  Report,	  UDAG	  Briefing	  Sheet,	  New	  Orleans,	  Box	  J14,	  Folder	  Urban	  Development	  
Action	  Grants,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Papers,	  New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  
Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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with	  private-­‐sector	  interests	  amid	  the	  shifting	  terrains	  of	  both	  the	  national	  and	  local	  
economies.	  Yet,	  by	  implementing	  a	  strategy	  of	  community	  development	  that	  
promoted	  the	  private	  sector,	  city	  officials	  often	  lost	  the	  ability	  to	  manage	  economic	  
growth.	  This	  reliance	  on	  a	  service-­‐based	  private	  sector	  made	  it	  infinitely	  harder	  to	  
consider	  alternatives	  to	  the	  structure.	  That	  shift	  also	  represented	  a	  willful	  neglect	  of	  
poor	  people	  in	  favor	  of	  middle-­‐class	  gentrification.	  	  	  
Though	  there	  was	  no	  organized	  protest,	  city	  residents	  did	  express	  misgivings	  
about	  how	  UDAG	  funds	  were	  being	  used.	  In	  a	  hearing	  convened	  to	  discuss	  a	  $5	  
million	  grant	  for	  a	  hotel,	  speakers	  described	  the	  grant	  structure	  as	  a	  “smokescreen”	  
for	  local	  government	  to	  finance	  the	  private	  sector,	  questioning	  whether	  that	  project,	  
or	  any	  other	  downtown	  UDAG	  project,	  benefited	  city	  residents.118	  One	  citizen	  noted	  
that	  despite	  Mayor	  Morial’s	  rhetoric	  about	  industrial	  employment,	  the	  city	  had	  
promoted	  the	  downtown	  as	  the	  token	  of	  successful	  economic	  revitalization,	  
although	  the	  projects	  had	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  lives	  and	  livelihood	  of	  low-­‐income	  
residents.	  Tourism,	  the	  astute	  city	  resident	  said,	  “cannot	  be	  the	  number	  one	  or	  
number	  two	  money	  maker”	  when	  almost	  20	  percent	  of	  families	  lived	  below	  the	  
poverty	  line.119	  Without	  projects	  bolstering	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods,	  residents	  
wondered	  about	  the	  city’s	  commitment	  to	  their	  future.	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  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Urban	  Fund	  Hearing	  Gets	  Sparse	  Crowd,”	  April	  5,	  1979,	  1.	  
	  
119	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “New	  Convention	  Center	  Crucial,	  Director	  Claims,”	  April	  11,	  
1979,	  3.	  	  See	  also	  John	  Arena,	  Driven	  from	  New	  Orleans:	  How	  Nonprofits	  Betray	  Public	  
Housing	  and	  Promote	  Privatization	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2012).	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Heritage	  Square:	  The	  Failed	  Experiment	  in	  Community	  Economic	  Development	  
Despite	  the	  thrust	  of	  tourism-­‐driven	  economic	  development,	  the	  city	  did	  
provide	  opportunities	  for	  smaller	  neighborhood-­‐based	  projects	  aimed	  at	  aiding	  low-­‐
income	  people	  of	  color.	  These	  projects,	  however,	  never	  amassed	  the	  same	  support	  
or	  funding	  that	  downtown	  developers	  gained	  from	  local	  government.	  These	  smaller	  
projects	  attempted	  to	  provide	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  gross	  misuse	  of	  urban	  aid	  in	  
downtown	  development,	  but	  most	  failed	  to	  materialize	  beyond	  the	  idea	  stage.	  
Nevertheless,	  community	  economic	  development	  projects	  offered	  concrete	  
examples	  of	  how	  community	  leadership,	  with	  clear	  critiques	  of	  the	  city’s	  economic	  
strategy,	  attempted	  to	  address	  its	  unequal	  socioeconomic	  terrain.	  The	  Urban	  
League’s	  Heritage	  Square	  offers	  one	  example.	  
By	  the	  early	  1970s,	  Clarence	  Barney,	  the	  outspoken	  leader	  of	  the	  Greater	  
New	  Orleans	  Urban	  League,	  challenged	  the	  influence	  of	  private-­‐sector	  developers	  on	  
the	  city’s	  economic	  development	  strategy.	  He	  wrote	  that	  “in	  communities	  of	  the	  
United	  States,	  which	  today	  are	  poverty-­‐stricken,	  the	  private	  market	  not	  only	  does	  
not	  encourage	  development,	  but	  in	  fact,	  may	  work	  against	  it.”120	  Helping	  poor	  
people,	  Barney	  noted,	  was	  neither	  immediately	  economically	  efficient	  nor	  an	  
enterprise	  that	  would	  provide	  windfall	  profits.	  Instead,	  improving	  economic	  
mobility	  and	  equity	  in	  low-­‐income	  areas	  of	  New	  Orleans	  would	  be	  a	  long,	  tenuous	  
project	  requiring	  sustained	  resources	  and	  a	  willingness	  of	  local	  leadership	  to	  limit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  Paper,	  Clarence	  Barney,	  “Community	  Economic	  Development,"	  1975,	  Box	  B21,	  
Folder	  Economic	  Development	  1978,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Files,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  
New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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the	  private	  sector.	  In	  the	  long	  run,	  such	  a	  strategy	  would	  provide	  benefits	  to	  the	  
whole	  city	  by	  reducing	  the	  reliance	  of	  low-­‐income	  communities	  on	  public	  aid.	  
Barney	  argued	  that	  without	  granting	  economic	  power	  to	  low-­‐income	  communities,	  a	  
strategy	  that	  block	  grants	  had	  eschewed,	  the	  disparities	  between	  low-­‐income	  
residents	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  city	  residents	  would	  continue	  to	  grow.121	  	  	  
	   Despite	  Barney’s	  advocacy,	  local	  strategies	  for	  economic	  development	  were	  
increasingly	  divorced	  from	  low-­‐income	  area	  community	  development.	  In	  1974,	  in	  
an	  attempt	  to	  address	  this	  divide,	  Barney,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Greater	  New	  
Orleans	  Urban	  League,	  formulated	  a	  plan	  to	  provide	  all-­‐inclusive	  economic	  
development	  to	  the	  Central	  City	  neighborhood.	  In	  a	  bid	  to	  continue	  the	  Community	  
Improvement	  Agency’s	  work	  in	  the	  area,	  Barney’s	  team	  envisioned	  the	  project	  as	  a	  
means	  of	  “comprehensively	  dealing	  with	  the	  economic,	  environmental,	  and	  social	  
problems	  of	  the	  Central	  City	  area.”122	  With	  unemployment	  rates	  hovering	  at	  40	  
percent	  and	  a	  “severe”	  ranking	  on	  every	  index	  of	  blight	  the	  OPPA	  recorded,	  the	  
neighborhood	  was	  in	  dire	  need	  of	  such	  a	  project.123	  The	  Urban	  League	  team	  
conceived	  of	  the	  project’s	  objectives	  as	  diverse	  and	  multi-­‐varied.	  While	  the	  main	  
goal	  was	  to	  create	  sustainable	  jobs	  for	  area	  residents,	  the	  project	  also	  strove	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  Paper,	  Clarence	  Barney,	  “Community	  Economic	  Development,"	  1975,	  Box	  B21,	  
Folder	  Economic	  Development	  1978,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Files,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  
New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  	  
	  
122	  Report,	  Background	  on	  Heritage	  Square,	  Box	  101,	  Folder	  7,	  Urban	  League	  of	  
Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Archives,	  Amistad	  Research	  Center,	  Tulane	  University,	  New	  Orleans,	  
Louisiana.	  
	  	  
123	  See	  “Heritage	  Square	  Blight	  Statistics,”	  Box	  101,	  Folder	  10,	  Urban	  League	  of	  
Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Archives,	  Amistad	  Research	  Center,	  Tulane	  University,	  New	  Orleans,	  
Louisiana.	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develop	  resident	  job	  skills,	  enhance	  communication	  between	  leadership	  and	  
residents,	  and	  improve	  education	  opportunities.	  Barney	  believed	  that	  only	  
institutions	  that	  focused	  on	  the	  complex	  socio-­‐structural	  inequities	  in	  low-­‐income	  
areas	  would	  be	  successful	  in	  creating	  long-­‐term	  effects.	  Without	  a	  plethora	  of	  new	  
educational	  opportunities	  and	  meaningful	  job	  creation,	  any	  new	  development	  would	  
not	  create	  sustainable	  change.	  
	   The	  Urban	  League	  envisioned	  an	  eight-­‐block	  renovation	  of	  Dryades	  Street,	  a	  
black-­‐owned	  retail	  corridor,	  hoping	  to	  construct	  “mom	  and	  pop”	  businesses	  and	  
educate	  owners	  on	  how	  to	  run	  successful	  enterprises.	  Additional	  low-­‐income	  single-­‐
family	  housing	  would	  stave	  off	  the	  flight	  of	  working-­‐class	  black	  families	  while	  a	  new	  
community	  center	  would	  provide	  counseling	  and	  education	  programs.	  Urban	  
League	  officials	  hoped	  that	  the	  development	  of	  a	  mini-­‐industrial	  park	  would	  provide	  
jobs	  at	  sustainable	  wages.	  Though	  similar	  to	  the	  improvement	  agency’s	  proposal,	  
Urban	  League	  planners	  felt	  it	  imperative	  that	  the	  developments	  not	  displace	  
residents.	  Calling	  the	  project	  Heritage	  Square,	  the	  Urban	  League	  planned	  to	  
incorporate	  as	  a	  community	  development	  corporation	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  
CDBG	  funds.	  With	  a	  network	  of	  organizations	  already	  operating	  in	  the	  Central	  City	  
area,	  those	  behind	  the	  idea	  of	  Heritage	  Square	  hoped	  that,	  much	  as	  DDD	  had	  done	  
for	  the	  Central	  Business	  District,	  this	  project	  would	  provide	  the	  area	  with	  “the	  
institutional	  capacity	  to	  carry	  out	  an	  economic	  development	  program	  required	  to	  
affect	  long-­‐term	  change.”124	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  “Background	  on	  Heritage	  Square,”	  Box	  101,	  Folder	  7,	  Urban	  League	  of	  Greater	  
New	  Orleans	  Papers,	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  Research	  Center,	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  University,	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Despite	  favorable	  community	  response,	  the	  city	  took	  what	  Barney	  called	  a	  
“show	  me”	  approach,	  not	  displaying	  the	  same	  type	  of	  enthusiasm	  the	  mayor	  had	  
directed	  at	  downtown	  projects.125	  Nevertheless,	  with	  little	  city-­‐implemented	  
economic	  development	  in	  the	  former	  Model	  Cities	  areas,	  Landrieu	  pledged	  matching	  
funds	  to	  the	  Urban	  League’s	  $110,000	  planning	  fund	  as	  well	  as	  the	  technical	  
expertise	  of	  the	  city’s	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis.126	  By	  June	  1975,	  OPPA's	  
Moten	  secured	  a	  small	  grant	  from	  the	  Economic	  Development	  Administration	  (EDA)	  
to	  begin	  the	  planning	  process	  for	  Heritage	  Square.	  The	  city’s	  leadership,	  despite	  its	  
hesitations,	  promoted	  the	  project	  to	  funding	  officials.	  In	  the	  application	  to	  the	  EDA,	  
Moten	  stressed	  that	  Heritage	  Square	  was	  a	  way	  to	  garner	  minority	  participation	  in	  
economic	  development.127	  Barney	  rejoiced	  at	  the	  news	  of	  the	  EDA	  planning	  grant,	  
saying	  to	  reporters	  that	  he	  believed	  this	  “is	  the	  beginning	  of	  definite	  steps	  in	  the	  
revitalization	  of	  the	  inner	  city.”128	  
	   Yet,	  from	  the	  outset	  there	  were	  concerns	  about	  the	  feasibility	  of	  the	  project.	  
Lacking	  a	  clear	  vision	  for	  implementation,	  and	  without	  an	  internal	  planning	  staff,	  
members	  of	  the	  team	  quarreled	  about	  how	  implementation	  should	  occur.	  In	  an	  
attempt	  to	  garner	  local	  support	  for	  the	  project,	  the	  team	  fired	  their	  Cambridge,	  
Massachusetts-­‐based	  planning	  consultants,	  citing	  a	  desire	  to	  work	  with	  city	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




127	  Memo,	  Emmett	  Moten	  Jr.	  to	  Richard	  Kernion,	  June	  27,	  1975,	  Box	  8,	  Folder	  ED-­‐
EDA-­‐AR:	  Annual	  Report,	  Economic	  Development	  Unit	  (1975),	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  
Analysis	  Papers,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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  "150,000	  Grant	  to	  N.	  O.	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  Times-­‐Picayune,	  April	  11,	  1975,	  19.	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planners	  instead.	  With	  little	  full-­‐time	  manpower,	  Heritage	  Square	  staff	  decided	  in	  
1975	  that	  the	  comprehensive	  nature	  of	  the	  project	  was	  impeding	  interest	  and	  
slowing	  progress.	  Dividing	  the	  project	  into	  three	  components—industrial,	  
commercial,	  and	  residential—the	  staff	  requested	  development	  proposals	  from	  both	  
public	  and	  private	  local	  agencies.129	  The	  proposals	  the	  Heritage	  Square	  staff	  
received	  underscored	  Barney’s	  initial	  concern	  that	  community	  economic	  
development	  was	  not	  taken	  in	  earnest.	  	  	  
In	  the	  following	  weeks,	  the	  city	  planner	  assigned	  to	  work	  with	  Heritage	  
Square	  staff	  demanded	  to	  leave	  the	  project.	  Citing	  the	  lack	  of	  progress,	  the	  planner	  
told	  Moten	  that	  the	  project	  was	  guaranteed	  to	  fail.130	  There	  was	  not	  a	  way,	  the	  
planner	  relayed,	  for	  the	  project	  to	  be	  able	  to	  achieve	  its	  goals.	  While	  the	  project	  
called	  for	  $2.7	  million	  of	  capital	  investment,	  the	  Community	  Improvement	  Agency’s	  
review	  questioned	  where	  that	  funding	  would	  originate.131	  Keevers	  did	  not	  believe	  
the	  city	  would	  enlist	  millions	  of	  dollars	  into	  a	  project	  that	  seemed	  incapable	  of	  
succeeding,	  though	  the	  city	  was	  willing	  to	  allocate	  community	  development	  funds	  to	  
the	  Central	  Business	  District.	  Low-­‐income	  neighborhoods	  had	  little	  of	  the	  capital	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Memo,	  Emmett	  Moten	  Jr.	  to	  Richard	  Kernion,	  June	  27,	  1975,	  Box	  8,	  Folder	  ED-­‐
EDA-­‐AR:	  Annual	  Report,	  Economic	  Development	  Unit	  (1975),	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  
Analysis	  Collection,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans;	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
130Memo,	  Daniel	  E.	  Slater	  to	  Emmett	  Moten	  Jr.,	  May	  28,	  1976,	  Box	  8,	  Folder	  ED-­‐HSQ-­‐
GEN:	  General	  Information	  on	  Heritage	  Square,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  
Collection,	  City	  Archives	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  New	  Orleans,	  
Louisiana.	  
	  
131	  Memo,	  Frank	  Keevers	  to	  Clarence	  Barney,	  November	  25,	  1974,	  Box	  8,	  Folder	  ED-­‐
HSQ-­‐GEN:	  General	  Information	  on	  Heritage	  Square,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	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potential	  that	  made	  the	  downtown	  requests	  impossible	  to	  ignore.	  Heritage	  Square	  
would	  never	  be	  a	  	  “major	  multiplier.”	  
Projects	  like	  this	  had	  no	  precedent	  in	  New	  Orleans,	  but	  city	  planners	  seemed	  
ready	  to	  discount	  their	  feasibility	  from	  the	  outset,	  without	  acknowledging	  the	  
discrepancies	  in	  support	  between	  Heritage	  Square	  and	  downtown.	  Barney	  
questioned	  the	  city’s	  commitment,	  wondering	  why	  the	  mayor	  was	  reluctant	  to	  fund	  
neighborhood	  “planning	  and	  development.”132	  Without	  the	  “sustained”	  support	  that	  
Barney	  had	  cautioned	  was	  necessary	  for	  community-­‐level	  economic	  development	  to	  
be	  successful,	  the	  planner	  was	  indeed	  right,	  the	  project	  would	  fail.	  	  	  
Entering	  year	  two	  of	  planning	  incorporated	  as	  a	  nonprofit,	  Heritage	  Square	  
had	  still	  failed	  to	  attract	  private	  investment.133	  In	  fact,	  private-­‐sector	  interests	  had	  
made	  their	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  project	  quite	  clear.	  Anthony	  Urick,	  head	  of	  
Prudential’s	  insurance	  division,	  cautioned	  Barney	  that	  it	  would	  be	  “extremely	  easy	  
to	  move	  in	  a	  direction	  that	  gradually	  becomes	  unacceptable	  to	  the	  private	  sector.”	  
Urick	  suggested	  that	  if	  the	  Urban	  League	  wanted	  private	  support,	  then	  the	  project	  
needed	  to	  be	  aligned	  with	  interests	  of	  “local	  financial	  institutions	  on	  a	  continuing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	  Memo,	  Clarence	  Barney	  to	  Emmett	  Moten	  Jr.,	  May	  14,	  1976,	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  9,	  
Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Urban	  League	  Papers,	  Amistad	  Research	  Center,	  Tulane	  University.	  
New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  	  
133	  Memo,	  Leonard	  Wolfe	  to	  Robert	  J.	  Perks,	  August	  9,	  1976,	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  11,	  
Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Urban	  League	  Papers.	  Amistad	  Research	  Center,	  Tulane	  University,	  
New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  	  
133	  Memo,	  Ronald	  C.	  Davis	  to	  Clarence	  Barney,	  September	  22,	  1975,	  Box	  102,	  Folder	  
3,	  Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Urban	  League	  Papers,	  Amistad	  Research	  Center,	  Tulane	  University.	  
New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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basis	  and	  as	  early	  as	  possible.”134	  While	  the	  project	  would	  sacrifice	  community	  
participation,	  it	  would	  gain	  access	  to	  sustained	  funding,	  Urick	  argued.	  	  
The	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis	  shared	  this	  viewpoint.	  Moten,	  
analyzing	  the	  Heritage	  Square	  planning	  process	  for	  the	  mayor,	  wrote,	  “CDCs	  across	  
the	  country	  (had)	  a	  history	  of	  failure	  in	  terms	  of	  successfully	  [revitalizing]	  inner-­‐city	  
neighborhoods.”135	  This	  failure	  was	  the	  result	  of	  multiple	  factors,	  including	  a	  lack	  of	  
capable	  management,	  changes	  in	  federal	  policy,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  staff	  training.	  These	  
inadequacies	  were	  found	  within	  the	  Heritage	  Square	  project.	  However,	  the	  real	  
failure	  of	  CDCs	  lay	  in	  their	  inability	  to	  accumulate	  capital	  support.	  There	  was	  an	  
inherent	  contradiction	  in	  any	  project	  attempting	  to	  revitalize	  low-­‐income	  
neighborhoods:	  private	  interests	  sought	  projects	  that	  maximize	  capital	  while	  
neighborhood	  projects	  required	  a	  diffusion	  of	  capital.	  Unfortunately,	  Moten	  wrote,	  
“The	  interests	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  enterprise	  system	  and	  those	  of	  the	  community	  
may	  clash.”	  He	  concluded	  that,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  project,	  the	  only	  discernable	  
solution	  would	  be	  to	  exclude	  community	  participation	  altogether.136	  	  	  
Those	  closest	  to	  the	  project	  questioned	  the	  outcome	  of	  such	  action.	  Project	  
director	  Ronald	  Davis	  cautioned	  Barney	  about	  pursuing	  any	  strategy	  that	  excluded	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	  Memo,	  Anthony	  Urick	  to	  Clarence	  Barney,	  August	  31,	  1976,	  Box	  2,	  Folder	  1,	  
Urban	  League	  of	  Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Papers,	  Amistad	  Research	  Center,	  Tulane	  University,	  
New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  	  
	  
135	  Report,	  Emmett	  Moten	  Jr,.	  Heritage	  Square	  Final	  Report:	  A	  Critique,	  March	  10,	  
1977,	  Box	  103,	  Folder	  1,	  Urban	  League	  of	  Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Papers,	  Amistad	  Research	  
Center,	  Tulane	  University,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  	  
	  
136	  Report,	  Emmett	  Moten	  Jr.	  Heritage	  Square	  Final	  Report:	  A	  Critique,	  March	  10,	  
1977,	  Box	  103,	  Folder	  1,	  Urban	  League	  of	  Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Papers,	  Amistad	  Research	  
Center,	  Tulane	  University,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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area	  residents.	  Any	  project	  that	  eliminated	  the	  opportunity	  of	  residents	  to	  
participate	  fully	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  serve	  the	  community	  as	  originally	  intended,	  
Davis	  wrote.	  	  	  Ultimately,	  because	  of	  the	  desire	  to	  generate	  capital,	  a	  project	  
controlled	  by	  the	  private	  sector	  would	  produce	  another	  “downtown,”	  serving	  the	  
interests	  of	  gentrification	  rather	  than	  existing	  residents.137	  	  	  
Cecil	  W.	  Carter	  Jr.,	  former	  director	  of	  the	  Dryades	  Street	  YMCA,	  agreed.	  
Carter	  believed	  any	  failure	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Heritage	  Square	  was	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  
genuine	  city	  investment.	  OPPA	  insisted	  that	  the	  project	  could	  not	  move	  forward	  
without	  private-­‐sector	  involvement,	  but	  the	  office	  had	  done	  little	  to	  empower	  the	  
organization	  to	  seek	  investment	  through	  means	  that	  could	  maintain	  its	  community-­‐
driven	  revitalization	  focus.	  	  Carter	  told	  Barney	  that	  if	  local	  government	  truly	  
supported	  the	  project,	  city	  leaders	  would	  stipulate	  that	  to	  receive	  funds	  for	  
downtown	  projects,	  the	  private	  sector	  needed	  to	  invest	  in	  community	  economic	  
development.	  There	  had	  been	  no	  effort	  by	  public	  officials	  to	  link	  the	  fate	  of	  
downtown	  to	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods.	  Without	  “any	  infrastructure	  development,	  
nor	  any	  effort	  of	  significance	  to	  induce	  private	  investment	  in	  Central	  City	  
undertaken	  by	  the	  City	  government,”	  the	  city	  was	  ensuring	  that	  Heritage	  Square	  
would	  fail.138	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  Memo,	  Ronald	  C.	  Davis	  to	  Clarence	  Barney,	  September	  22,	  1975.	  Box	  102,	  Folder	  
3,	  Urban	  League	  of	  Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Papers,	  Amistad	  Research	  Center,	  Tulane	  
University,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
138	  	  Memo,	  Cecil	  W.	  Carter	  Jr.	  to	  Clarence	  Barney,	  July	  18,	  1977,	  Box	  102,	  Folder	  12,	  
Urban	  League	  of	  Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Papers,	  Amistad	  Research	  Center,	  Tulane	  University,	  
New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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  The	  financial	  support	  offered	  by	  the	  city	  paled	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  massive	  
influx	  of	  time,	  resources,	  and	  funding	  the	  city	  had	  devoted	  to	  tourism	  
development.139	  Carter	  was	  skeptical	  that	  the	  city	  government	  had	  any	  intention	  of	  	  
“empower[ing]”	  the	  project	  to	  marshal	  the	  authority	  necessary	  to	  produce	  
revitalization	  as	  it	  had	  done	  with	  the	  Growth	  Management	  Program.	  Though	  the	  
“city	  had	  certainly	  not	  fostered	  economic	  development	  in	  the	  black	  community	  
through	  systematic	  means	  until	  the	  advent	  of	  Heritage	  Square,”	  Carter	  said,	  it	  now	  
took	  a	  “negativist”	  approach	  to	  the	  project’s	  potential.140	  Though	  for	  a	  very	  different	  
reason,	  Carter	  acknowledged	  that	  under	  such	  circumstances,	  the	  project	  would	  
struggle	  to	  succeed.	  	  
Successful	  community	  economic	  development	  required	  jobs,	  improved	  
transportation,	  access	  to	  quality	  education,	  and	  sustainable	  low-­‐income	  housing.	  	  
However,	  by	  the	  late	  1970s,	  the	  city’s	  use	  of	  federal	  aid	  to	  leverage	  private-­‐sector	  
investment	  diminished	  the	  prospect	  of	  sustained	  funding	  for	  neighborhood-­‐based	  
economic	  development	  projects.	  Citizen-­‐led	  redevelopment	  was	  slow,	  inefficient,	  
and	  costly,	  and	  certainly	  Heritage	  Square	  had	  been	  all	  of	  those	  things.	  Barney,	  
fearing	  that	  the	  project	  would	  be	  lost	  altogether,	  began	  tempering	  his	  critique.	  He	  
actively	  supported	  downtown	  development	  despite	  his	  belief	  that	  it	  was	  unlikely	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  While	  the	  city	  supplied	  funding	  for	  the	  planning	  of	  Heritage	  Square,	  it	  offered	  just	  
20	  percent	  of	  the	  funds	  provided	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  downtown	  Growth	  Management	  
Plan.	  
	  
140	  Memo,	  Cecil	  W.	  Carter	  Jr.	  to	  Clarence	  Barney,	  July	  18,	  1977,	  Box	  102,	  Folder	  12,	  
Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Urban	  League	  Papers,	  Amistad	  Research	  Center,	  Tulane	  University,	  
New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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aid	  Central	  City	  residents.	  He	  hoped	  that	  his	  enthusiasm	  would	  garner	  symbiotic	  
support	  from	  the	  mayor.141	  
It	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  save	  the	  project.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Heritage	  Square	  
Development	  Corporation’s	  (HSDC)	  third	  year,	  progress	  remained	  minimal.	  The	  
group’s	  housing	  strategy	  had	  proven	  too	  costly	  to	  develop	  without	  private	  
investment,	  and	  it	  struggled	  to	  find	  alternatives.	  By	  1980,	  the	  development	  
corporation	  had	  failed	  to	  rehabilitate	  or	  construct	  any	  housing	  at	  all.142	  Its	  effort	  to	  
stimulate	  commercial	  and	  industrial	  development	  in	  the	  area	  was	  equally	  
unsuccessful.	  While	  the	  HSDC	  entered	  the	  project	  with	  high	  hopes,	  the	  cost	  of	  land	  
was	  far	  greater	  than	  any	  of	  the	  initial	  reports	  predicted.	  Without	  capital	  investment,	  
economic	  development	  in	  the	  area	  remained	  stymied.	  With	  the	  booming	  downtown	  




Though	  federal	  urban	  aid	  reached	  both	  community	  and	  downtown	  projects,	  
the	  promise	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  capital	  investment	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  interests	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141	  Memo,	  Clarence	  Barney	  to	  Moon	  Landrieu,	  September	  15,	  1976,	  Box	  102,	  Folder	  
12,	  Urban	  League	  of	  Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Papers,	  Amistad	  Research	  Center,	  Tulane	  
University,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	  
	  	  
142	  Later	  in	  the	  1980s,	  the	  HSDC	  was	  able	  to	  build	  some	  housing,	  but	  by	  that	  time,	  
the	  larger	  project	  had	  become	  defunct.	  
	  
143	  Report,	  Emmett	  Moten	  Jr.	  Heritage	  Square	  Final	  Report:	  A	  Critique,	  March	  10,	  
1977,	  Box	  103,	  Folder	  1	  Urban	  League	  of	  Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Papers,	  Amistad	  Research	  
Center,	  Tulane	  University,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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downtown	  developers	  that	  shaped	  the	  city’s	  strategy	  for	  economic	  development.	  
Thus,	  projects	  more	  suited	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  low-­‐income	  communities	  did	  not	  receive	  
the	  support	  they	  required	  to	  prosper.	  Nor	  did	  the	  city	  make	  much	  effort	  to	  establish	  
links	  between	  community	  and	  downtown	  development.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s,	  
local	  officials	  insisted	  that	  the	  city	  had	  weathered	  the	  economic	  crisis	  and	  was	  once	  
again	  becoming	  prosperous,	  but	  that	  upswing	  failed	  to	  extend	  to	  low-­‐income	  
communities.	  As	  summarized	  by	  planners	  at	  the	  Urban	  League:	  
[The	  city	  had	  developed]	  two	  economies	  that	  exist	  side	  by	  side	  ...	  one	  of	  
growth	  and	  prosperity,	  the	  other	  of	  disuse	  and	  stagnation.	  For	  reasons	  of	  
heritage,	  wealth	  and	  opportunity,	  the	  members	  of	  the	  first	  economy	  are	  
optimistic	  and	  hopeful	  about	  the	  future	  of	  their	  city.	  Without	  these	  
advantages	  and	  un-­‐insulated	  against	  the	  negative	  influences	  of	  their	  
surroundings,	  the	  second	  group	  is	  losing	  both	  hope	  and	  optimism.144	  	  
	  
Yet,	  mechanisms	  to	  bridge	  these	  disparities	  disappeared	  alongside	  the	  
federal	  aid	  designed	  to	  facilitate	  that	  process.	  Throughout	  the	  1970s,	  the	  language	  of	  
deficits,	  private	  investment,	  and	  revitalizing	  a	  tax	  base	  emphasized	  a	  “re-­‐imagining”	  
of	  the	  urban	  crisis	  as	  one,	  not	  of	  poverty,	  but	  of	  restoring	  the	  city’s	  fiscal	  health.145	  
This	  argument	  justified	  shifting	  the	  task	  of	  community	  economic	  development	  to	  
organizations	  like	  the	  Urban	  League.146	  Yet	  by	  isolating	  neighborhood-­‐based	  
economic	  development	  from	  citywide	  strategies,	  city	  growth	  advocates	  eliminated	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  Paper,	  Project	  Assist,	  1978,	  Box	  171,	  Folder	  7,	  Urban	  League	  of	  Greater	  New	  
Orleans	  Papers,	  Amistad	  Research	  Center,	  Tulane	  University,	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana,	  18.	  
	  
145Susan	  Fainstein,	  “Local	  Mobilization	  and	  Economic	  Discontent,”	  in	  The	  Capitalist	  
City:	  global	  restructuring	  and	  community	  politics	  ed.	  Michael	  Peter	  Smith	  et.	  al	  (Hoboken:	  
Blackwell	  Publishing,	  1987),	  329.	  
	  
146	  See	  John	  Mollenkopf,	  "Neighborhood	  Political	  Development	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  
Urban	  Growth:	  Boston	  and	  San	  Francisco	  1958-­‐1978,"	  International	  Journal	  of	  Urban	  and	  
Regional	  Studies	  5,	  no.	  1	  (1981),	  15-­‐39.	  
	  
	  
	   276	  
spaces	  for	  critical	  discourse	  on	  how	  their	  projects	  excluded	  low-­‐income	  
communities	  of	  color.	  Those	  leaders	  who	  could	  offer	  a	  more	  pointed	  critique	  often	  
found	  themselves	  bound	  by	  reliance	  on	  locally	  controlled	  federal	  funding,	  and	  were	  
silent.147	  	  
As	  the	  decade	  came	  to	  a	  close,	  local	  administrators	  had	  sacrificed	  the	  vision	  
of	  an	  equitable	  city	  for	  one	  capable	  of	  generating	  profit—affluent	  and	  white.	  It	  was	  
clear	  that	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty	  in	  New	  Orleans	  was	  officially	  over.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  Kathe	  Newman	  and	  Robert	  W.	  Lake,	  "Democracy,	  Bureaucracy	  and	  Difference	  in	  
U.S.	  Community	  Development	  Politics,"	  Progress	  in	  Human	  Geography	  30,	  no.	  44	  (2006),	  59.	  
And	  also,	  Randy	  Stoecker,	  "The	  CDC	  Model	  of	  Urban	  Redevelopment:	  A	  Critique	  and	  an	  
Alternative,"	  Journal	  of	  Urban	  Affairs	  19,	  no.	  1	  (1991),	  1-­‐22.	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CONCLUSION	  
	  
Maximum	  Feasible	  Privatization:	  
New	  Orleans,	  from	  Reaganomics	  to	  Katrina	  
	  
"A	  nagging	  doubt	  arises.	  Does	  the	  publicly	  subsidized	  splendor	  of	  downtown	  
and	  institutional	  parts	  of	  our	  cities	  really	  have	  much	  to	  do	  with	  a	  city's	  recovery?	  The	  
answer	  must	  be	  no.	  The	  recovery	  of	  cities	  is	  more	  than	  a	  brick	  and	  mortar	  project.	  The	  
city	  is	  people,	  and	  unless	  most	  of	  them	  are	  employed,	  self	  respecting	  and	  respected,	  the	  
new	  towers	  downtown	  are	  a	  mockery	  and	  a	  delusion.”	  	  Norman	  Krumholz1	  
	  
I.	  
By	  1979,	  President	  Carter	  began	  scaling	  back	  funding	  for	  several	  major	  
urban	  aid	  programs	  as	  a	  budget-­‐balancing	  measure	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  recession.2	  	  
Alongside	  those	  cuts,	  Carter	  abandoned	  his	  earlier	  promise	  of	  renewed	  urban	  
antipoverty	  efforts.	  Later	  that	  year,	  the	  president	  used	  an	  executive	  order	  to	  
assemble	  a	  commission	  to	  set	  policy	  goals	  for	  the	  coming	  decade.	  Writing	  on	  the	  
future	  of	  cities,	  the	  fifty-­‐member	  commission,	  led	  by	  Columbia	  University	  president	  
William	  McGill,	  determined	  that	  “contrary	  to	  popular	  opinion,	  cities	  are	  not	  
permanent.”3	  To	  develop	  policy	  around	  particular	  cities,	  the	  commission	  concluded,	  
was	  a	  gross	  misuse	  of	  national	  resources	  that	  only	  diverted	  attention	  from	  a	  larger,	  
more	  intractable	  problem	  of	  a	  shifting	  economy.	  Rather	  than	  criticize	  policies	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Norman	  Krumholz	  quoted	  in	  Gregory	  D.	  Squires,	  "Public-­‐Private	  Partnerships:	  
Who	  Gets	  What	  and	  Why?,"	  in	  Unequal	  Partnerships:	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Urban	  
Redevelopment	  in	  Postwar	  America,	  ed.	  Gregory	  D.	  Squires,	  (New	  Brunswick,	  NJ:	  Rutgers	  
University	  Press,	  1989),	  3.	  
	  
2	  Cal	  Clark	  and	  Oliver	  Walter,	  "Cuts,	  Cultures,	  and	  City	  Limits	  in	  Reagan's	  New	  
Federalism,"	  in	  Urban	  Innovation:	  Creative	  Strategies	  for	  Turbulent	  Times,	  	  (New	  York:	  Sage	  
Publications,	  1994),	  174.	  
	  
3	  President's	  Commission	  for	  a	  National	  Agenda	  for	  the	  Eighties,	  A	  National	  Agenda	  
for	  the	  Eighties:	  Report	  of	  the	  President's	  Commission	  for	  a	  National	  Agenda	  for	  the	  Eighties,	  
(Washington,	  D.	  C.:	  United	  States,	  1980),	  65.	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had	  facilitated	  the	  disintegration	  of	  urban	  industrialized	  economies	  and	  rising	  
poverty,	  the	  commission	  blamed	  the	  stagnation	  on	  cities	  themselves.	  It	  implied	  that	  
it	  was	  cities,	  not	  the	  physical	  containers	  themselves,	  but	  their	  populations—
increasingly	  poor	  and	  increasingly	  black—that	  created	  the	  urban	  crisis.	  Further,	  the	  
report	  echoed	  the	  Real	  Estate	  Research	  Corporation	  (RERC)	  literature,	  which	  
portrayed	  the	  dilapidation	  of	  American	  cities	  as	  natural,	  even	  positive.	  There	  was,	  
the	  commission	  wrote,	  a	  “fundamental	  problem	  in	  attempting	  to	  halt	  the	  shrinkage	  
of	  a	  metropolitan	  area	  or	  revitalize	  obsolete	  industries.”	  Instead,	  the	  commission	  
recommended	  the	  reorientation	  of	  urban	  policy	  to	  move	  people	  to	  jobs	  rather	  than	  
jobs	  to	  people.4	  	  The	  commission	  wrote:	  
[The	  nation	  should]	  respond	  to	  urban	  change	  promoting	  strategies	  of	  
adjustment,	  rather	  than	  attempt	  to	  reverse	  the	  changes	  experienced	  by	  
communities	  across	  the	  land.	  In	  large	  measure,	  these	  changes	  are	  often	  
beneficial	  to	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole,	  even	  though	  they	  may	  have	  undesirable	  
short-­‐	  term	  effects	  on	  specific	  communities.5	  	  	  
	  
The	  report’s	  authors	  believed	  the	  way	  to	  pursue	  “strategies	  of	  adjustment”	  
was	  to	  limit	  urban	  aid	  to	  state-­‐centered	  block	  grants,	  whereby	  federalism	  could	  best	  
constitute	  urban	  strategies	  and	  utilize	  the	  public	  sector	  to	  ensure	  “private	  sector	  
vitality.”6	  Funding,	  once	  intended	  as	  an	  antipoverty	  measure,	  could	  now	  be	  available	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  This	  recommendation,	  of	  course,	  ignored	  the	  reality	  that,	  for	  low-­‐income	  people	  of	  
color,	  mobility—both	  residential	  and	  economic—was	  always	  structurally	  limited	  by	  racism	  
and	  lack	  of	  access.	  
	  
5	  President's	  Commission	  for	  a	  National	  Agenda	  for	  the	  Eighties,	  A	  National	  Agenda	  
for	  the	  Eighties:	  Report	  of	  the	  President's	  Commission	  for	  a	  National	  Agenda	  for	  the	  Eighties,	  
(Washington,	  D.C.:	  United	  States,	  1980),	  64.	  
	  
6	  President's	  Commission	  for	  a	  National	  Agenda	  for	  the	  Eighties,	  A	  National	  Agenda	  
for	  the	  Eighties,	  70.	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to	  communities	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  was	  filtered	  through	  private-­‐development	  
interests.	  
While	  the	  report	  met	  outrage	  from	  mayors	  and	  community	  leadership	  across	  
the	  nation,	  the	  commission’s	  rhetoric	  was	  not	  at	  all	  novel	  by	  1980.	  In	  fact,	  it	  was	  a	  
reflection	  of	  the	  teleological	  construction	  of	  federal	  urban	  policy	  and	  programs	  over	  
the	  course	  of	  the	  1970s	  that	  deliberately	  abandoned	  confronting	  the	  structural	  
issues	  of	  urban	  poverty.	  Reiterating	  language	  of	  early	  urban	  life-­‐cycle	  theorists,	  the	  
commission’s	  report	  recommended	  restructuring	  Community	  Development	  Block	  
Grants	  (CDBGs)	  to	  focus	  urban	  aid	  on	  neighborhoods	  capable	  of	  gentrification	  
rather	  than	  those	  in	  poverty,	  a	  strategy	  already	  in	  place	  in	  cities	  throughout	  the	  
1970s.	  Thus,	  the	  CDBG	  program	  would	  be	  the	  link	  between	  revitalizing	  
neighborhoods	  and	  the	  strategies	  pursued	  in	  downtown	  development.	  Now	  being	  
reformulated	  as	  a	  means	  to	  encourage	  a	  middle	  class	  in	  cities,	  the	  block	  grants	  
effectively	  were	  an	  asset	  for	  economic	  growth.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  Ronald	  Reagan’s	  
inauguration	  in	  1981,	  federal	  support	  for	  antipoverty	  aid	  had	  already	  been	  
dismantled.	  	  	  
Reagan	  immediately	  took	  up	  the	  Carter	  administration’s	  mantra	  of	  
“unsalvageable”	  cities	  and	  stated	  that	  his	  new	  urban	  policy	  would	  work	  to	  correct	  
the	  deep	  inefficiencies	  that	  left	  cities	  in	  crisis.	  The	  crisis	  he	  described	  was	  not	  
growing	  wealth	  disparities,	  startling	  rates	  of	  poverty,	  or	  the	  diminishing	  tax	  base	  
that	  constricted	  the	  means	  to	  enact	  redistributive	  measures.	  The	  crisis,	  according	  to	  
Reagan,	  had	  been	  expedited	  by	  federal	  intervention	  and	  aid.	  “Too	  often	  in	  the	  past,”	  
the	  president	  declared,	  “the	  federal	  government	  has	  responded	  to	  temporary	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symptoms	  of	  national	  economic	  change	  with	  policies	  and	  programs	  intended	  to	  halt	  
or	  slow,	  rather	  than	  accommodate	  the	  process	  of	  adjustment.”	  Federal	  policies	  and	  
programs,	  Reagan	  felt,	  had	  “distorted	  local	  priorities,	  lessened	  administrative	  
accountability,	  suffocated	  the	  growth	  of	  institutions	  which	  are	  closer	  to	  the	  citizenry	  
than	  is	  Washington.”7	  The	  aid	  had	  left	  cities	  dependent	  and	  unable	  to	  create	  
competitive	  economic	  programs	  to	  attract	  jobs	  and	  skilled	  labor.	  Removing	  the	  
‘burden'	  of	  federal	  funding	  would	  jolt	  inert	  cities	  into	  self-­‐sufficiency.8	  	  	  
Reagan	  laid	  out	  a	  plan	  that	  would	  cede	  control	  of	  urban	  aid	  to	  state	  
governments	  while	  deregulating	  market	  controls	  to	  promote	  economic	  
development.	  If	  private	  enterprise	  were	  allowed	  to	  flourish	  without	  regulation,	  then	  
the	  economy,	  and	  therefore	  cities	  that	  found	  ways	  to	  compete	  in	  it,	  would	  recover.	  	  
Under	  this	  theory,	  local	  governments	  were	  responsible	  for	  providing	  the	  
infrastructure	  and	  competitive	  resources	  to	  lure	  new	  economic	  development.9	  	  
While	  Nixon	  and	  Carter	  had	  actively	  sought	  to	  use	  federal	  funds	  in	  ways	  that	  would	  
promote	  private-­‐sector	  leadership,	  Reagan	  sought	  to	  utilize	  private-­‐sector	  
investment	  to	  withdraw	  federal	  aid	  altogether.10	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Neil	  M.	  Cohen,	  "The	  Reagan	  Administration's	  Urban	  Policy,"	  Town	  Planning	  Review	  
54,	  no.	  3	  (1983),	  305.	  
	  
8	  Susan	  S.	  Fainstein	  and	  Norman	  Fainstein,	  "The	  Ambivalent	  State:	  Economic	  
Development	  Policy	  In	  the	  US	  Federal	  System	  under	  the	  Reagan	  Administration,"	  Urban	  
Affairs	  Review	  25,	  no.	  1	  (1989),	  42.	  
	  
9	  Timothy	  L.	  Barnekov,	  Daniel	  Rich	  and	  Robert	  Warren,	  "The	  New	  Privatism,	  
Federalism	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  Urban	  Governance:	  National	  Urban	  Policy	  in	  the	  1980s,"	  
Journal	  of	  Urban	  Affairs	  3,	  no.	  4	  (1981),	  13.	  
	  
10	  Neil	  M.	  Cohen,	  "The	  Reagan	  Administration's	  Urban	  Policy,"	  Town	  Planning	  Review	  
54,	  no.	  3	  (1983),	  311.	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The	  administration	  proposed	  a	  series	  of	  urban	  programs	  that	  would	  aid	  
revitalizing	  cities.	  One	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  Enterprise	  Zones—districts	  in	  low-­‐
income	  areas	  that	  would	  provide	  “the	  impetus	  for	  local	  and	  state	  governments	  to	  
remove	  obstacles	  to	  private	  initiative	  created	  by	  excessive	  taxes	  and	  regulations.”11	  	  
Enterprise	  Zones	  would	  allow	  for	  private-­‐sector	  competition	  in	  previously	  untapped	  
low-­‐income	  areas.	  	  While	  Enterprise	  Zones	  were	  never	  enacted	  at	  a	  federal	  level,	  the	  
idea	  of	  private-­‐sector-­‐led	  interventions	  in	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods	  drove	  all	  
urban	  legislation	  put	  forth	  during	  the	  Reagan	  administration.12	  Suggesting	  few	  other	  
new	  programs,	  Reagan’s	  1982	  budget	  called	  for	  the	  end	  of	  nearly	  all	  federally	  
funded	  projects,	  including	  the	  termination	  of	  UDAG,	  the	  Economic	  Development	  
Administration,	  CETA	  job	  training	  and	  youth	  programs,	  public	  employment	  jobs,	  
mass	  transit	  subsidies,	  and	  drastic	  cuts	  to	  AFDC	  and	  food	  stamps.13	  
Congress	  resisted	  the	  complete	  decimation	  of	  urban	  aid	  programs.	  
Nonetheless,	  the	  Omnibus	  Reconciliation	  Act	  authorized	  massive	  reductions	  for	  
many	  of	  the	  programs,	  while	  terminating	  all	  proposed	  new	  subsidized	  housing	  
construction	  and	  public	  service	  jobs.14	  While	  the	  nation’s	  mayors	  warned	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  David	  E.	  Franasiak	  and	  William	  D.	  Kelleher,	  “Statement	  on	  The	  Enterprise	  Zone	  
Tax	  Act	  of	  1982,”	  May	  5,	  1982,	  Box	  OA8619,	  Folder	  Enterprise	  Zones	  (2),	  MB	  Oglesby	  Files,	  
Office	  of	  Legislative	  Affairs,	  Ronald	  Reagan	  Presidential	  Archives,	  Ronald	  Reagan	  Library,	  
Simi	  Valley,	  California.	  	  
	  
12	  The	  idea	  of	  Enterprise	  Zones	  flourished	  at	  the	  state	  level,	  however,	  with	  states	  
across	  the	  country	  enacting	  “enterprise	  measures”	  throughout	  the	  1980s.	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  
New	  Orleans	  had	  29	  “Enterprise	  Zones.”	  
	  
13	  Clancy	  DuBos,	  “Reagan	  Cuts	  would	  be	  Disaster,	  Morial	  says,”	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  
March,	  27,	  1981,	  21.	  
	  
14	  Demetrios	  Caraley	  and	  Yvette	  R.	  Schlussel,	  "Congress	  and	  Reagan's	  New	  
Federalism,"	  Publius	  16,	  no.	  1	  (1986),	  51.	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dangers	  of	  state-­‐controlled	  urban	  aid,	  citing	  the	  growing	  influence	  of	  suburban	  
constituencies	  on	  state	  Legislatures,	  Congress	  followed	  Reagan’s	  directions	  and	  
consolidated	  seventy-­‐seven	  different	  urban	  aid	  programs	  into	  nine	  broad-­‐reaching,	  
state-­‐controlled	  block	  grants.	  The	  same	  act	  eliminated	  another	  sixty	  urban	  
programs	  altogether.15	  	  
The	  sweeping	  cuts	  to	  federal	  urban	  aid	  affected	  almost	  every	  aspect	  of	  city	  
revitalization.	  Urban	  aid	  programs	  did	  not	  simply	  face	  budget	  reductions;	  they	  were	  
also	  subject	  to	  vast	  reorganization	  that	  decoupled	  development	  from	  low-­‐income	  
neighborhoods	  and	  abandoned	  federal	  oversight	  in	  its	  entirety.	  The	  Community	  
Development	  Block	  Grant	  program	  was	  among	  those	  restructured	  to	  further	  
promote	  the	  "market-­‐first	  ideology"	  of	  the	  administration.	  By	  1981,	  Reagan	  had	  
eliminated	  HUD’s	  control	  of	  the	  seventy-­‐five-­‐day	  review	  and	  veto	  period	  on	  grant	  
applications.	  The	  reorganization	  also	  ended	  compliance	  oversight	  and	  broadened	  
the	  use	  of	  social	  service	  provisions	  beyond	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods.16	  	  
Announcing	  the	  shifts,	  HUD	  declared	  that	  it	  would	  “no	  longer	  conduct	  any	  review	  of	  
the	  grantee’s	  overall	  program	  with	  respect	  to	  how	  it	  benefited	  low-­‐	  and	  moderate-­‐
income	  persons.”17	  Cutting	  local	  and	  regional	  community	  development	  by	  nearly	  
two-­‐thirds	  and	  job	  training,	  social	  services,	  and	  education	  programs	  by	  45	  percent,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Timothy	  J.	  Conlan,	  "The	  Politics	  of	  Federal	  Block	  Grants:	  From	  Nixon	  to	  Reagan,"	  
Political	  Science	  Quarterly	  99,	  no.	  2	  (1984),	  247.	  
	  
16	  Paul	  R.	  Dommel,	  Decentralizing	  Urban	  Policy:	  Case	  Studies	  in	  Community	  
Development.	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Brookings	  Institute,	  1982),	  260.	  
	  
17	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Changes	  in	  the	  rules	  threaten	  urban	  grant	  program,”	  September	  
26,	  1982,	  12.	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Reagan	  reshaped	  both	  the	  federal	  and	  local	  revenue	  landscape.18	  Outlays	  for	  
community	  development,	  which	  peaked	  in	  1980	  with	  funds	  nearing	  $6.5	  billion,	  
decreased	  to	  $4.1	  billion	  by	  1984.19	  The	  message	  was	  clear:	  Cities	  were	  on	  their	  own.	  
	  
II.	  
Urban	  divestment	  had	  substantial	  repercussions	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  In	  1981,	  
speaking	  before	  the	  City	  Council,	  Mayor	  Morial	  warned	  that	  the	  “potential	  impact	  to	  
our	  city	  is	  staggering.”	  Calculating	  that	  more	  than	  $130	  million	  in	  federal	  aid	  funds	  
would	  be	  endangered	  by	  cuts	  in	  the	  following	  three	  years,	  the	  mayor	  warned	  that	  it	  
would	  have	  a	  “far	  more	  devastating	  impact	  on	  city	  finances	  and	  city	  services	  than	  
any	  natural	  economic	  force	  that	  we	  have	  ever	  encountered.”	  It	  would	  be	  “absurd,”	  
he	  concluded,	  to	  believe	  that	  cities	  like	  New	  Orleans	  would	  be	  able	  to	  make	  up	  the	  
loss	  of	  federal	  funds	  through	  tax	  measures	  and	  fiscal	  management	  as	  the	  Reagan	  
administration	  had	  suggested.20	  	  The	  mayor’s	  assertions	  were	  supported	  by	  a	  Joint	  
Economic	  Committee	  Congressional	  report,	  which	  found	  that	  cities	  experiencing	  the	  
most	  devastation	  from	  middle-­‐class	  flight	  and	  unemployment	  were	  the	  same	  cities	  
that	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  largest	  federal	  aid	  cuts.21	  Yet,	  the	  need	  to	  appease	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Duane	  A.	  Martin,	  "The	  President	  and	  the	  Cities,"	  Urban	  Lawyer	  26	  (1994),	  112.	  
	  
19	  Susan	  S.	  Fainstein	  and	  Norman	  Fainstein,	  "The	  Ambivalent	  State:	  Economic	  
Development	  Policy	  In	  the	  U.S.	  Federal	  System	  under	  the	  Reagan	  Administration,"	  Urban	  
Affairs	  Review	  25,	  no.	  1	  (1989),	  41.	  
	  
20	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Reagan	  Cuts	  would	  be	  a	  disaster,	  says	  Morial,”	  March	  27,	  1981,	  
21.	  
	  
21	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Reagan’s	  Cruel	  City	  Policies,”	  February	  1,	  1982,	  11.	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mayors,	  which	  was	  required	  of	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  to	  ensure	  the	  success	  of	  its	  
policies,	  was	  not	  a	  concern	  of	  the	  Reagan	  administration,	  which	  relied	  on	  growing	  
suburban-­‐	  and	  state-­‐based	  constituencies	  to	  support	  anti-­‐urban	  policies.	  Federal	  
programs	  that	  had	  encouraged	  deindustrialization	  and	  white	  flight,	  thus	  crippling	  
cities,	  had	  created	  new	  and	  powerful	  constituencies	  who	  supported	  the	  rhetoric	  that	  
city	  residents	  were	  lazy	  and	  dependent.	  	  
Contrary	  to	  this	  rhetoric,	  federal	  aid	  was	  essential	  to	  cities	  like	  New	  Orleans	  
facing	  extraordinary	  poverty.	  By	  1980,	  almost	  85	  percent	  of	  the	  city’s	  capital	  budget	  
and	  nearly	  65	  percent	  of	  the	  operating	  budget	  came	  from	  intergovernmental	  funds,	  
the	  majority	  from	  federal	  aid.22	  In	  comparison	  to	  its	  Sun	  Belt	  neighbors,	  New	  
Orleans	  received	  nearly	  four	  times	  more	  federal	  aid	  per	  capita	  than	  Houston	  and	  
approximately	  a	  fifth	  more	  funding	  per	  capita	  than	  Atlanta.23	  Reliance	  on	  federal	  
monies	  was	  a	  given—so	  much	  so	  that	  the	  1979	  Economic	  Development	  Strategy	  
Report	  noted	  that	  the	  only	  funding	  source	  allocated	  for	  city-­‐led	  development	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Statistics	  derived	  from	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  "The	  Dynamics	  of	  Growth:	  1980	  
Annual	  Report,"	  (New	  Orleans,	  1980);	  Table	  of	  federal	  funding	  contribution	  to	  capital	  
outlays	  found	  in	  Marlene	  Keller	  and	  Michael	  Peter	  Smith,	  "'Managed	  Growth'	  and	  the	  
Politics	  of	  Uneven	  Development	  in	  New	  Orleans,"	  in	  Restructuring	  the	  City:	  The	  Political	  
Economy	  of	  Urban	  Redevelopment,	  ed.	  Susan	  Fainstein	  and	  Norman	  Fainstein,	  126-­‐166	  (New	  
York:	  Longman,	  1986),	  153.	  See	  also	  Robert	  K.	  Whelan,	  Alma	  H.	  Young,	  and	  Mickey	  Lauria,	  
"Urban	  Regimes	  and	  Racial	  Politics	  in	  New	  Orleans,"	  Journal	  of	  Urban	  Affairs	  16,	  no.	  1	  
(1994),	  7.	  	  
	  
23	  US	  Bureau	  of	  the	  Census,	  City	  Finances,	  adapted	  from	  data	  in	  John	  P.	  Ross's	  “The	  
Impacts	  of	  Urban	  Aid,”	  in	  Donald	  Rosenthal,	  ed.,	  Urban	  Revitalization,	  (Sage:	  Beverly	  Hills,	  
1980),	  129;	  Cited	  in	  Marlene	  Keller	  and	  Michael	  Peter	  Smith,	  "	  'Managed	  Growth'	  and	  the	  
Politics	  of	  Uneven	  Development	  in	  New	  Orleans,"	  in	  Restructuring	  the	  City:	  The	  Political	  
Economy	  of	  Urban	  Redevelopment,	  ed.	  Susan	  Fainstein	  and	  Norman	  Fainstein,	  126-­‐166	  (New	  
York:	  Longman,	  1986).	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Central	  Business	  District	  came	  from	  federal	  grants.24	  Nevertheless,	  while	  the	  media	  
claimed	  that	  Reagan’s	  cuts	  would	  “effectively	  [reverse]	  half	  a	  century	  of	  growth	  in	  
social	  programs,”	  the	  city	  was	  already	  facing	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  deficits	  in	  New	  
Orleans	  history.25	  	  
In	  1981,	  the	  mayor	  announced	  the	  elimination	  of	  1,500	  municipal	  jobs,	  
reducing	  the	  public	  work	  force	  by	  14	  percent.26	  That	  same	  year,	  attempting	  to	  
correct	  a	  grossly	  unbalanced	  budget,	  Mayor	  Morial	  reluctantly	  cut	  CETA	  job	  
programs	  by	  60	  percent	  and	  terminated	  job-­‐training	  programs	  in	  their	  entirety.27	  In	  
a	  period	  of	  national	  recession,	  unemployment	  only	  continued	  to	  rise.	  While	  the	  
Crescent	  City	  suffered	  higher	  rates	  of	  unemployment	  than	  most	  major	  American	  
cities	  for	  much	  of	  the	  prior	  twenty	  years,	  unemployment	  rates	  rose	  even	  further	  in	  
the	  first	  year	  of	  Reaganomics.	  Joblessness	  affected	  10.9	  percent	  of	  the	  city’s	  work	  
force.	  Unemployment	  was	  exponentially	  higher	  in	  the	  black	  community.	  Where	  
employers	  had	  located	  in	  the	  Sun	  Belt	  South	  (in	  which	  growth	  was	  being	  touted	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  In	  1966,	  prior	  to	  the	  New	  Orleans	  War	  on	  Poverty,	  only	  1.5	  percent	  of	  the	  city’s	  
operating	  budget	  came	  from	  federal	  funding.	  See	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  "The	  Dynamics	  of	  
Growth:	  1980	  Annual	  Report,"	  (New	  Orleans,	  1980).	  	  
	  
25	  Martin	  Tolchin,	  “97th	  Congress;	  The	  Major	  Figure	  was	  the	  Congress,”	  Times-­‐
Picayune,	  December	  20,	  1981,	  15	  
	  
26	  Report,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial,	  “Report	  to	  the	  City	  Council	  on	  Federal	  Budget	  Reduction	  
Proposals,	  March	  26,	  1981,”	  Box	  L5,	  Folder	  Federal	  Budget	  Cuts,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Collection,	  
New	  Orleans	  City	  Archives,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	  
	  
27	  Marlene	  Keller	  and	  Michael	  Peter	  Smith,	  "	  'Managed	  Growth'	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  
Uneven	  Development	  in	  New	  Orleans,"	  in	  Restructuring	  the	  City:	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  




	   286	  
proof	  of	  the	  “people	  to	  jobs”	  phenomena),	  those	  prospects	  were	  limited	  by	  the	  city’s	  
failure	  to	  invest	  in	  education.	  	  
By	  1980,	  New	  Orleans	  public	  schools	  were	  85	  percent	  black	  and	  Louisiana	  
schools	  performed	  second	  to	  last	  nationwide,	  behind	  only	  Mississippi,	  in	  test	  scores	  
and	  high	  school	  graduation	  rates.28	  Failure	  to	  pass	  new	  funding	  measures	  for	  the	  
school	  board	  discouraged	  manufacturers	  employing	  high-­‐skilled	  laborers	  from	  
considering	  New	  Orleans.	  By	  1982,	  Daniel	  C.	  Thompson,	  a	  Dillard	  University	  
sociologist,	  concluded	  that	  the	  explosion	  of	  downtown	  growth	  in	  New	  Orleans	  had	  
done	  little	  to	  reach	  those	  in	  poverty.	  “The	  economic	  boom,”	  the	  disheartened	  scholar	  
wrote,	  “has	  not	  provided	  them	  [black	  New	  Orleanians]	  with	  jobs,	  or	  training,	  or	  
hope	  of	  either.”29	  
In	  1981,	  Mayor	  Morial	  issued	  a	  press	  statement	  charging	  that,	  “This	  program	  
[of	  federal	  cuts],	  which	  was	  supposed	  to	  promote	  economic	  growth	  and	  increase	  
employment,	  has	  instead	  plunged	  our	  nation	  into	  the	  worst	  economic	  crisis	  since	  
the	  Great	  Depression.”30	  The	  mayor	  adroitly	  noted	  that	  the	  severe	  reductions	  in	  
federal	  urban	  aid	  were	  concurrent	  with	  massive	  cutbacks	  in	  corporate	  and	  
individual	  income	  taxes.	  Outlining	  how	  the	  Reagan	  budget	  would	  necessitate	  cuts	  in	  
almost	  every	  city	  department,	  Morial	  stated,	  “It	  is	  clear	  that	  Reaganomics	  is	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Monte	  Piliawsky,	  "The	  Impact	  of	  Black	  Mayors	  on	  the	  Black	  Community:	  The	  Case	  
of	  New	  Orleans'	  Ernest	  Morial,"	  The	  Review	  of	  Black	  Political	  Economy	  13,	  no.	  4	  (1985),	  7.	  
	  
29	  Quoted	  in	  Allen	  Katz,	  "N.O.	  Black	  Underclass,"	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  February	  7,	  1982,	  
33.	  
	  
30	  Speech,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial,	  “Address	  to	  the	  City	  Council,”	  1981,	  Box	  J1,	  Folder	  
Federal	  Programs	  1982,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Mayoral	  Papers,	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans	  Archives,	  
Collection,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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morally	  bankrupt	  policy	  that	  has	  had	  a	  devastating	  impact	  on	  middle-­‐income	  and	  
lower-­‐income	  families	  in	  order	  to	  grant	  large	  tax	  cuts	  to	  the	  wealthy.”31	  
It	  was	  impossible	  for	  the	  city	  government	  to	  make	  up	  the	  loss	  in	  federal	  
funds.	  The	  ability	  to	  generate	  new	  local	  revenue	  was	  crippled	  by	  shifting	  urban	  
demographics,	  the	  anti-­‐taxation	  culture	  of	  Louisiana,	  and	  the	  state’s	  failure	  to	  
support	  redistributive	  tax	  measures	  to	  equalize	  revenue	  throughout	  the	  state.	  In	  
1978	  alone,	  Morial	  and	  his	  administrative	  staff	  proposed	  five	  different	  revenue	  
packages,	  including	  a	  municipal	  earnings	  tax	  similar	  to	  that	  proposed	  by	  Mayor	  
Landrieu.	  The	  mayor	  told	  City	  Council	  members	  that	  the	  imperative	  for	  new	  
revenue	  sources	  was	  not	  the	  measure	  of	  a	  “progressive	  budget,”	  as	  some	  had	  
charged,	  but	  the	  reality	  of	  a	  “survival	  budget.”32	  Outlining	  the	  “three-­‐sided	  vise”	  
facing	  American	  cities,	  the	  mayor	  noted	  that	  federal	  aid	  reductions,	  inflation,	  and	  
the	  expansive	  inability	  of	  local	  governments	  to	  generate	  progressive	  revenue	  reform	  
would	  drive	  the	  city	  into	  a	  deficit	  crisis.	  Tax	  reform	  was	  critical.33	  	  
The	  City	  Council,	  attempting	  to	  find	  innovative	  ways	  to	  sidestep	  strict	  limits	  
on	  taxes,	  moved	  to	  impose	  a	  $50	  service	  charge	  on	  all	  cars	  registered	  within	  city	  
limits,	  and	  a	  similar	  $100	  charge	  on	  all	  property	  irrespective	  of	  size	  or	  value.	  While	  
the	  nature	  of	  service	  charges	  avoided	  the	  need	  for	  public	  vote,	  these	  new	  levies	  
garnered	  disdain	  from	  elite	  and	  grassroots	  communities	  alike.	  Within	  months,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Speech,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial,	  “Address	  to	  the	  City	  Council,”	  1981,	  Box	  J1,	  Folder	  
Federal	  Programs	  1982,	  Ernest	  N.	  Morial	  Mayoral	  Papers,	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans	  Archives,	  
Collection,	  New	  Orleans	  Public	  Library,	  Louisiana.	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ACORN	  and	  other	  groups	  protested	  that	  passing	  any	  service	  charge	  only	  reinforced	  
the	  regressive	  nature	  of	  the	  city’s	  tax	  structure	  by	  disproportionately	  straining	  the	  
finances	  of	  the	  poor.	  The	  mayor’s	  office	  defended	  the	  service	  charges	  as	  the	  only	  
equitable	  means	  to	  generate	  revenue	  for	  social	  services	  and	  infrastructure	  
provisions.	  	  
However,	  ACORN	  activists	  saw	  no	  equity	  in	  a	  charge	  that	  erased	  the	  
distinctions	  between	  a	  Lower	  Ninth	  Ward	  homeowner	  living	  just	  above	  the	  poverty	  
line	  and	  a	  Garden	  District	  millionaire.	  They	  vowed	  to	  resist	  such	  measures.34	  Other	  
homeowners	  thought	  any	  charge	  on	  property	  was	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  homestead	  
exemption	  and	  thus	  unconstitutional.	  It	  was	  the	  latter	  argument,	  put	  forth	  by	  middle	  
class	  residents	  that	  forced	  the	  council	  to	  reconsider.	  The	  council	  found	  itself	  in	  a	  
bind,	  with	  dwindling	  revenue	  and	  a	  growing	  deficit	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  
potential	  alienation	  of	  a	  shrinking	  middle	  class	  on	  the	  other.	  Yet,	  the	  outrage	  was	  so	  
unanimous	  that	  the	  service	  charge	  was	  repealed	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  hike	  in	  the	  sales	  tax.	  
Despite	  being	  equally	  regressive,	  the	  sales	  tax	  preserved	  the	  right	  to	  untaxed	  
property	  that	  concerned	  white,	  middle-­‐class	  property	  owners	  and	  transferred	  the	  
burden	  of	  revenue	  generation	  to	  low-­‐income	  families.	  By	  1984,	  New	  Orleans	  would	  
have	  the	  highest	  sales	  tax	  in	  the	  country	  at	  9	  percent,	  making	  the	  city	  evermore	  
dependent	  on	  tourism.35	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  Peter	  Scott	  Julian,	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  New	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  Fiscal	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  Ceilings	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The	  Morial	  administration’s	  revenue	  crisis	  was	  exacerbated	  by	  new	  state	  
legislation.	  In	  the	  same	  year	  that	  the	  federal	  Omnibus	  Reconciliation	  Act	  went	  into	  
effect,	  the	  Louisiana	  Legislature	  raised	  the	  homestead	  exemption	  to	  $75,000.	  
Because	  New	  Orleans	  is	  both	  a	  city	  and	  a	  parish,	  the	  increase	  meant	  that	  any	  
property	  there	  valued	  under	  $75,000	  was	  not	  subject	  to	  levies—either	  state	  or	  local.	  
The	  rise	  in	  the	  exemption	  had	  catastrophic	  affects	  on	  the	  city’s	  ability	  to	  fund	  itself,	  
despite	  federal	  administrators	  instructing	  cities	  that	  revenue	  was	  now	  solely	  their	  
responsibility.	  In	  1981,	  only	  16	  percent	  of	  homeowners	  paid	  any	  tax	  on	  their	  
property	  at	  all,	  making	  up	  less	  than	  5	  percent	  of	  all	  city	  revenues;	  fifteen	  years	  
earlier,	  nearly	  a	  quarter	  of	  city	  revenue	  came	  from	  ad	  valorem	  property	  taxation.36	  
The	  city	  estimated	  that	  discarding	  the	  outmoded	  homestead	  exemption	  altogether	  
could	  generate	  an	  additional	  $6	  million	  annually	  in	  property	  taxes.37	  However,	  
despite	  attempts	  to	  exempt	  New	  Orleans	  from	  the	  new	  measure,	  the	  state	  not	  only	  
enforced	  compliance,	  but	  also	  required	  the	  City	  Council	  to	  roll	  back	  millage	  rates	  in	  
order	  to	  account	  for	  the	  inflation	  of	  home	  values.38	  	  	  
Amid	  these	  constraints,	  any	  tax	  hike	  would	  have	  had	  detrimental	  effects.	  	  
Without	  state-­‐sponsored	  tax	  equalization	  between	  the	  city	  and	  its	  suburbs,	  raising	  
new	  levies	  would	  certainly	  lead	  to	  an	  uptick	  in	  white,	  middle-­‐class	  flight.	  Yet,	  with	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no	  means	  to	  generate	  additional	  revenue	  in	  the	  face	  of	  massive	  cuts	  to	  federal	  aid,	  
local	  officials	  confronted	  their	  own	  disintegrating	  ability	  to	  provide	  public	  services.	  
As	  the	  city	  government	  continued	  to	  struggle	  to	  generate	  revenue	  and	  the	  
needs	  of	  an	  increasing	  low-­‐income	  populace	  grew,	  white	  middle-­‐class	  flight	  
continued.	  Between	  1970	  and	  1980,	  70,000	  white	  residents	  left	  the	  city,	  though	  
many	  continued	  to	  work	  in	  the	  city’s	  burgeoning	  downtown.	  Those	  who	  stayed	  
continued	  to	  disapprove	  adamantly	  of	  any	  taxation	  measures	  designed	  to	  address	  
the	  social	  service	  and	  employment	  needs	  of	  low-­‐income	  city	  residents.	  Fear	  of	  
encouraging	  further	  flight	  discouraged	  city	  administrators	  from	  demanding	  tax	  
reform,	  though	  they	  did	  suggest	  them.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  throughout	  the	  early	  1980s,	  Morial	  pushed	  to	  diversify	  the	  
city’s	  economy,	  asserting	  that	  it	  would	  generate	  new	  revenue	  and	  hope	  for	  the	  
devastated	  city.	  Enlisting	  the	  city’s	  Industrial	  Development	  Board	  (IDB),	  a	  public-­‐
private	  partnership	  chaired	  by	  mayor-­‐appointed	  leaders	  of	  the	  business	  community,	  
the	  city	  sought	  special	  tax	  district	  status	  for	  an	  undeveloped	  area	  of	  New	  Orleans	  
East.	  In	  January	  1982,	  the	  board	  released	  a	  master	  plan	  for	  the	  7,000-­‐acre	  privately	  
held	  swampland,	  ignoring	  the	  warning	  from	  the	  Army	  Corps	  of	  Engineers	  that	  
construction	  in	  the	  area	  might	  make	  the	  city	  vulnerable	  to	  hurricanes.39	  The	  plan	  
called	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  public-­‐private	  partnership	  led	  by	  landowners	  and	  
facilitated	  by	  local	  government	  to	  develop	  an	  industrial	  park	  capable	  of	  providing	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the	  city	  with	  more	  than	  50,000	  jobs	  by	  the	  year	  2000.40	  The	  IDB	  envisioned	  a	  
burgeoning	  industrial	  cooperative	  with	  worker	  training	  programs,	  vocational	  
classes,	  and	  manufacturing	  plants	  that	  could	  enhance	  the	  business	  at	  the	  New	  
Orleans	  Port.	  
The	  proposed	  Almonaster-­‐Michoud	  Industrial	  District	  offered	  the	  mayor	  a	  
chance	  to	  provide	  low-­‐income	  residents	  with	  new	  opportunities	  while	  creating	  the	  
most	  diverse	  economic	  base	  the	  city	  had	  ever	  had.	  As	  a	  city	  councilor	  described	  the	  
project,	  the	  proposed	  development	  of	  Almonaster-­‐Michoud	  was	  the	  first	  time	  those	  
in	  leadership	  recognized	  that	  “the	  future	  of	  New	  Orleans	  really	  lies	  in	  jobs—good	  
jobs,	  jobs	  in	  industry.”41	  Unlike	  the	  1970s	  strategy,	  where	  city-­‐sponsored	  downtown	  
economic	  development	  was	  divorced	  from	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods,	  building	  an	  
industrial	  base	  could	  link	  the	  success	  of	  the	  city	  with	  the	  upward	  mobility	  of	  poverty	  
neighborhoods.	  	  	  
	  The	  mayor	  deployed	  Community	  Development	  Block	  Grant	  funds	  
aggressively	  to	  create	  the	  infrastructure	  for	  the	  new	  industrial	  park,	  utilizing	  federal	  
monies	  to	  drain	  the	  area	  and	  create	  a	  pump	  system	  to	  protect	  it	  from	  flooding.	  	  
Among	  the	  reasons	  that	  large-­‐scale	  industrial	  development	  had	  been	  slow	  to	  
materialize	  in	  New	  Orleans	  before	  was	  due	  to	  the	  enormous	  cost	  of	  readying	  land	  
for	  development.	  Drainage	  was	  just	  the	  first	  step	  to	  ensure	  stability;	  buildings	  
needed	  double-­‐deep	  foundations	  and	  enforced	  pilings	  to	  withstand	  the	  ever-­‐present	  
threat	  of	  hurricanes.	  Along	  with	  shouldering	  the	  cost	  of	  land	  preparation,	  city	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officials	  pledged	  that	  interested	  companies	  would	  be	  provided	  with	  a	  myriad	  of	  
public	  incentives.	  Touting	  the	  project	  as	  key	  to	  the	  city’s	  revitalization,	  Morial	  and	  a	  
contingent	  of	  business	  leaders	  forming	  the	  Economic	  Development	  Council	  wooed	  
businesses	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  the	  nearby	  Sun	  Belt	  cities	  of	  Houston,	  Phoenix,	  and	  
Atlanta.	  Under	  new	  Louisiana	  legislation,	  the	  city	  offered	  tax	  incentives	  including	  
abatements	  and	  UDAGs,	  while	  the	  city-­‐operated	  New	  Orleans	  Citywide	  Development	  
Corporation	  funded	  loans	  for	  companies	  to	  build	  in	  the	  area.	  By	  1985,	  with	  twelve	  
new	  firms	  operating	  in	  the	  district,	  the	  mayor	  claimed	  the	  area	  was	  a	  growing	  
success.42	  	  
Yet	  there	  were	  stumbling	  blocks	  to	  fulfilling	  the	  area’s	  promise.	  Developing	  
an	  infrastructure	  that	  could	  support	  what	  was	  essentially	  unused	  swampland	  was	  
costly	  and	  time-­‐consuming.	  The	  need	  for	  drainage	  was	  massive	  as	  was	  the	  need	  to	  
link	  sewer	  system	  lines	  and	  public	  services	  to	  surrounding	  neighborhoods	  and	  other	  
commercial	  zones.	  By	  1984,	  nearly	  $3.8	  million	  had	  gone	  into	  draining	  the	  area,	  
which	  was	  still	  considered	  unstable.43	  The	  mayor’s	  office	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  
drastic	  cuts	  in	  federal	  funding	  only	  detracted	  from	  the	  Industrial	  Development	  
Board’s	  efforts	  to	  attract	  businesses	  capable	  of	  supplying	  meaningful	  job	  creation.	  	  
With	  fewer	  resources,	  cities	  were	  now	  competing	  with	  each	  other	  for	  dwindling	  
opportunities	  to	  entice	  industrial	  development,	  observers	  noted.44	  In	  this	  new	  era,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Monte	  Piliawsky,	  "The	  Impact	  of	  Black	  Mayors	  on	  the	  Black	  Community:	  The	  Case	  
of	  New	  Orleans'	  Ernest	  Morial,"	  The	  Review	  of	  Black	  Political	  Economy	  13,	  no.	  4	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43	  Report,	  City	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  "Grantee	  Performance	  Report	  1984"	  (New	  Orleans,	  
Decemeber	  31,	  1984).	  In	  possession	  of	  the	  author.	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  “Economic	  Outlook",	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  1984,	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businesses	  with	  uncertain	  job	  production	  capabilities	  were	  offered	  broad	  
abatements,	  incentives,	  and	  corporate	  tax	  reductions	  to	  locate	  in	  urban	  areas.	  	  
Despite	  the	  strains	  on	  city	  revenue,	  administrators	  in	  New	  Orleans	  felt	  there	  were	  
few	  choices	  but	  to	  do	  the	  same	  and	  hope	  that,	  alongside	  comprehensive	  training	  
programs	  for	  low-­‐income	  workers,	  development	  could	  transform	  the	  city’s	  
economic	  landscape.	  	  	  
As	  early	  as	  1982,	  the	  dream	  of	  industrial	  area	  economic	  revitalization	  
seemed	  less	  and	  less	  viable.	  The	  1982	  oil	  crisis	  led	  to	  an	  outmigration	  of	  companies	  
that	  consolidated	  their	  firms	  in	  Houston	  headquarters	  and	  with	  them	  went	  large	  
sectors	  of	  any	  “returning	  middle	  class.”45	  While	  city	  officials	  originally	  believed	  that	  
job	  training	  for	  the	  high-­‐tech	  work	  required	  at	  new	  industrial	  firms	  would	  come	  
through	  CETA,	  this	  possibility	  disappeared	  with	  the	  elimination	  of	  training	  
programs	  from	  the	  federal	  budget.46	  Further,	  the	  lack	  of	  commitment	  to	  schooling	  
continued	  to	  be	  an	  impediment	  to	  attracting	  new	  industry.	  The	  situation	  was	  
exacerbated	  by	  an	  unsuccessful	  city	  vote	  in	  1986	  to	  increase	  the	  school	  board	  levy.47	  	  
Observers	  noted	  that	  without	  investment	  in	  public	  education,	  new	  high-­‐tech	  
industrial	  jobs	  would	  go	  to	  non-­‐residents	  with	  better	  training	  and	  far	  more	  
resources	  than	  Lower	  Ninth	  residents.	  The	  move	  toward	  an	  education-­‐based	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Kevin	  Fox	  Gotham,	  "Tourism	  Gentrification:	  The	  case	  of	  New	  Orleans	  Vieux	  
Caree,"	  Urban	  Studies	  42,	  no.	  7	  (June	  2005),	  1104.	  	  
	  
46	  Booklet,	  Ernest	  Morial,	  “New	  Orleans	  2001,”	  1980,	  Box	  41,	  Folder	  450,	  Alma	  
Young	  Collection,	  Earl	  K.	  Long	  Library,	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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  Alma	  H.	  Young	  and	  Jane	  S.	  Brooks,	  "Revitalising	  the	  Central	  Business	  District	  in	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economy	  in	  a	  city	  that	  did	  not	  support	  its	  public	  schools	  doomed	  the	  prospect	  of	  
reaping	  broad	  benefits	  from	  new	  industry.48	  Thus,	  while	  the	  private	  sector	  benefited	  
from	  tax	  breaks	  and	  incentives,	  low-­‐income	  city	  residents	  continued	  to	  be	  neglected.	  	  
This	  last	  concern	  was	  one	  that	  Mayor	  Morial	  desperately	  attempted	  to	  
address.	  The	  successful	  acquisition	  of	  SFE	  Technologies,	  a	  California-­‐based	  plant	  
specializing	  in	  ceramic	  capacitors,	  offered	  an	  example	  of	  how	  low-­‐income	  cities	  
could	  utilize	  abatements	  to	  ensure	  responsible	  development.	  Recruited	  by	  the	  
Economic	  Development	  Council	  and	  its	  chair,	  developer	  Joseph	  Canizaro,	  the	  firm	  
would	  locate	  in	  New	  Orleans	  and,	  in	  exchange	  for	  long-­‐term	  tax	  abatements,	  would	  
hire	  one-­‐third	  of	  its	  employees	  from	  the	  adjacent	  and	  struggling	  Lower	  Ninth	  
Ward.49	  	  
While	  the	  deal	  seemed	  a	  coup	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  severe	  federal	  funding	  cuts,	  
within	  just	  two	  years	  the	  company	  announced	  that	  it	  was	  closing	  its	  offices	  in	  New	  
Orleans	  due	  to	  its	  financial	  losses	  across	  the	  country	  and	  would	  sell	  operations	  to	  
the	  Erie,	  Pennsylvania-­‐based	  Spectrum	  Control.	  The	  loss	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  demand	  
similar	  employment	  stipulations	  from	  other	  companies.	  That	  year,	  a	  Southern	  
Industrial	  Development	  Council	  report	  further	  dampened	  the	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  
Almonaster-­‐Michoud	  Industrial	  District.	  Evaluating	  fifteen	  major	  cities	  across	  the	  
South,	  the	  report	  revealed	  that	  while	  Louisiana	  was	  second	  only	  to	  North	  Carolina	  in	  
investing	  the	  most	  funds	  to	  attract	  industrial	  development	  to	  the	  area,	  those	  efforts	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Allen	  Katz,	  "N.O.	  Black	  Underclass,"	  Times-­‐Picayune,	  February	  7,	  1982,	  33.	  
	  
49	  Monte	  Piliawsky,	  "The	  Impact	  of	  Black	  Mayors	  on	  the	  Black	  Community:	  The	  Case	  
of	  New	  Orleans'	  Ernest	  Morial,"	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  Review	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led	  to	  the	  least	  stable	  job	  production	  across	  the	  South.50	  Irrespective	  of	  the	  efforts	  of	  
Morial	  and	  the	  Industrial	  Development	  Board,	  the	  city	  lost	  14,000	  more	  
manufacturing	  jobs	  between	  1981	  and	  1984,	  and	  a	  total	  of	  22,000	  jobs	  in	  private	  
industry	  by	  1986.51	  
The	  suggestion	  that	  manufacturing	  was	  no	  longer	  viable	  worked	  to	  
counteract	  Morial’s	  efforts.	  For	  that,	  Morial	  lay	  the	  blame	  squarely	  with	  the	  
Landrieu	  administration,	  accusing	  it	  of	  leaving	  him	  with	  fewer	  options.	  The	  city	  had	  
lost	  crucial	  ground	  throughout	  the	  1970s	  and	  the	  focus	  on	  tourism	  only	  further	  
eroded	  the	  prospects	  of	  institutionalizing	  industrial	  development,	  the	  mayor	  
challenged.	  Now,	  with	  federal	  funding	  for	  any	  industrial	  infrastructure	  dwindling	  
and	  intercity	  competition	  climbing	  to	  new	  heights,	  Morial	  had	  missed	  his	  
opportunity.52	  Ultimately,	  amid	  nationwide	  shifts	  in	  economic	  production,	  the	  
disintegration	  of	  unions,	  and	  the	  vast	  corporate	  tax	  breaks,	  the	  mayor’s	  efforts	  to	  
produce	  stable,	  upwardly	  mobile	  jobs	  may	  not	  have	  succeeded	  anyway.	  	  
Thus,	  alongside	  Morial’s	  efforts	  to	  develop	  the	  Almonaster-­‐Michoud	  district,	  
the	  mayor	  committed	  his	  administration	  to	  supporting	  the	  tourism	  industry,	  doling	  
out	  abatements,	  zoning	  variances	  (New	  Orleans	  had	  the	  second	  incentive-­‐based	  city	  
zoning	  ordinance,	  after	  New	  York),	  floating	  bonds,	  and	  tax	  incentives.	  Reluctantly,	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  Times-­‐Picayune,	  “Liabilities	  shadow	  state’s	  business	  image,”	  June	  30th,	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  Robert	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  Whelan,	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  Partnerships	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Development,"	  in	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  1989).	  Franklin	  J.	  James,	  "Federal	  Economic	  Development	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the	  mayor	  accepted	  that	  investing	  in	  service-­‐sector	  development	  came	  with	  low-­‐
wage,	  low-­‐skill	  labor.53	  In	  reality,	  these	  kinds	  of	  abatements,	  incentivized	  zoning,	  
and	  bonds	  offered	  little	  to	  the	  city’s	  low-­‐income	  residents	  while	  it	  drained	  city	  
coffers	  and	  depleted	  city	  revenue.	  (Ironically,	  the	  rhetoric	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  
investment	  would	  provide	  more	  available	  funds	  had	  driven	  the	  way	  cities	  promoted	  
using	  abatements).	  Nevertheless,	  while	  well-­‐publicized	  studies	  demonstrated	  that	  
abatements	  and	  other	  financial	  motivations	  played	  little	  part	  in	  how	  companies	  
made	  choices	  about	  where	  to	  locate	  their	  business,	  New	  Orleans	  administrators	  felt	  
compelled	  to	  continue	  the	  practice.54	  Within	  this	  broad	  set	  of	  revenue	  constraints,	  
local	  officials	  articulated	  that	  the	  abatements	  were	  necessary	  because	  private-­‐sector	  
investment—in	  entertainment,	  luxury	  houses,	  and	  new	  elite	  sites	  of	  consumption-­‐-­‐	  
was	  the	  only	  means	  through	  which	  to	  lure	  a	  middle	  class	  back.55	  
As	  private-­‐sector	  investors	  sought	  to	  gentrify	  what	  was	  an	  increasingly	  poor,	  
black	  city,	  local	  government	  officials	  continued	  to	  claim	  that	  they	  supported	  all	  
forms	  of	  city	  development—community,	  industrial,	  and	  tourism.	  However,	  it	  was	  
increasingly	  difficult	  to	  reconcile	  these	  contending	  development	  visions.	  The	  
tension	  between	  competing	  agendas	  boiled	  over	  during	  the	  preparation	  for	  the	  
1984	  Louisiana	  World’s	  Fair.	  Backers	  hoped	  that	  the	  fair	  would	  bring	  some	  12	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million	  tourists	  to	  the	  area	  and	  provide	  a	  platform	  to	  encourage	  new	  business	  
ventures	  in	  the	  city.	  Despite	  the	  proliferation	  of	  state	  and	  local	  funds	  that	  went	  into	  
making	  the	  fair	  possible,	  it	  was	  clear	  early	  in	  the	  planning	  process	  that	  decision-­‐
making	  was	  firmly	  rooted	  in	  the	  fair’s	  private-­‐sector-­‐dominated	  commission.	  While	  
Mayor	  Morial	  castigated	  the	  commission	  for	  being	  secretive	  and	  dictatorial	  with	  
planning,	  he	  continued	  to	  publicly	  support	  the	  fair,	  even	  as	  the	  group	  did	  little	  to	  
respond	  to	  claims	  of	  closed-­‐door	  policies,	  racism,	  and	  exclusiveness.	  	  
As	  the	  decade	  went	  on,	  New	  Orleans	  residents	  and	  their	  elected	  
representatives	  had	  less	  and	  less	  control	  of	  economic	  development	  decisions	  made	  
largely	  outside	  of	  City	  Hall.	  Utilizing	  the	  World’s	  Fair	  as	  the	  impetus,	  members	  of	  the	  
Downtown	  Development	  District	  suggested	  creating	  a	  “Superboard”	  of	  like-­‐minded	  
business	  organizations	  that	  could	  advocate	  for	  the	  removal	  of	  skid	  row,	  beggars,	  and	  
“ethnic”	  vendors	  in	  the	  area	  while	  hoping	  to	  re-­‐create	  much	  of	  the	  downtown	  as	  a	  
playground	  for	  luxury	  consumption,	  replete	  with	  night	  life	  and	  high-­‐income	  
condominiums.56	  	  	  
While	  the	  fair	  itself	  was	  a	  disaster,	  drawing	  only	  just	  over	  half	  the	  expected	  
visitors	  and	  running	  the	  corporation	  into	  bankruptcy,	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  fair	  was	  to	  
expand	  the	  reach	  of	  downtown	  development	  beyond	  its	  original	  borders.	  
Convention	  space,	  nearly	  eighty-­‐two	  acres	  of	  waterfront,	  was	  converted	  into	  tourist	  
attractions	  with	  the	  use	  of	  a	  new	  round	  of	  UDAG	  grants.	  By	  1986,	  developer	  James	  
Rouse,	  founder	  of	  the	  Rouse	  Company—the	  corporation	  responsible	  for	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Memo,	  Warren	  Moses	  to	  Alma	  Young,	  “CBD	  Problems	  of	  the	  Future,	  including	  the	  
World’s	  Fair,”	  November	  18,	  1981,	  Box	  38,	  Folder	  408	  Correspondence,	  October-­‐November	  
1981,	  Alma	  Young	  Collection,	  Earl	  K.	  Long	  Library,	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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explosion	  of	  festival	  marketplaces,	  including	  Faneuil	  Hall	  in	  Boston,	  the	  South	  Street	  
Seaport	  in	  New	  York,	  and	  Harbor	  Place	  in	  Baltimore—converted	  industrial	  
warehouses	  into	  an	  attraction	  called	  Riverwalk.	  	  
With	  federal	  aid	  dwindling,	  the	  Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Convention	  and	  
Tourism	  Commission	  and	  the	  Downtown	  Development	  District	  used	  the	  city’s	  
economic	  weakness	  to	  demand	  rule	  over	  the	  city’s	  economic	  strategy.	  Private	  
authority	  replaced	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  as	  the	  mode	  for	  generating	  city	  
economic	  development.	  By	  1987,	  the	  new	  mayor,	  Sidney	  Barthelemy	  supported	  this	  
change.	  Barthelemy	  believed	  that	  economic	  planning	  was	  best	  conceived	  in	  relation	  
to	  the	  needs	  of	  private-­‐sector	  investors	  and	  outside	  of	  City	  Hall.57	  Thus,	  city	  
administrators	  should	  double	  their	  effort	  to	  use	  public	  aid	  and	  lobbying	  strength	  to	  
support	  downtown	  leadership.	  	  
Decisions	  made	  by	  the	  DDD	  and	  the	  Industrial	  Review	  Board	  were	  more	  
often	  than	  not	  made	  without	  consulting	  residents.	  As	  early	  as	  1980,	  Downtown	  
Development	  District	  staff	  members	  were	  regularly	  flying	  to	  Washington	  to	  get	  
approval	  and	  feedback	  on	  projects	  directly	  from	  HUD	  officials	  before	  public	  
hearings.	  Though	  funds	  were	  awarded	  through	  City	  Hall,	  developers	  knew	  that	  with	  
HUD	  approval,	  the	  city	  would	  fall	  in	  line	  with	  proposed	  projects.58	  By	  1986,	  the	  DDD	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Barthelemy	  was	  also	  one	  of	  the	  founding	  members	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  organization	  
Community	  Organization	  for	  Urban	  Politics	  (COUP),	  which	  represented	  the	  more	  affluent	  
and	  Creole	  Seventh	  Ward.	  	  COUP	  was	  considered	  less	  radical	  than	  other	  homegrown	  black	  
political	  organizations,	  like	  SOUL.	  	  
	  
58	  Minutes,	  “Downtown	  Development	  District,	  Special	  Meeting	  Minutes”	  September	  
24,	  1980,	  Box	  37,	  Folder	  371,	  Alma	  Young	  Collection,	  Earl	  K.	  Long	  Library,	  University	  of	  
New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana.	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was	  collecting	  $3.6	  million	  annually	  in	  special	  levies	  to	  support	  hiring	  extra	  police	  
and	  sanitation,	  undeterred	  by	  the	  dire	  need	  for	  services	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  city.59	  	  
With	  a	  dwindling	  city	  budget,	  city	  services,	  including	  sanitation,	  were	  turned	  
over	  to	  private	  contractors.	  60	  The	  increasing	  reliance	  on	  the	  private	  sector	  did	  not	  
improve	  the	  efficiency	  of	  resource	  delivery	  outside	  of	  development	  zones.	  While	  
business	  leaders	  sought	  praise	  for	  their	  initiatives,	  community	  groups	  questioned	  if	  
new	  services	  benefited	  development	  at	  the	  exclusion	  of	  low-­‐income	  areas.	  By	  1990,	  
unemployment	  had	  reached	  an	  all-­‐time	  high	  in	  the	  city	  at	  12.4	  percent,	  and	  nearly	  
18	  percent	  among	  black	  residents,	  while	  the	  median	  family	  income	  was	  lower	  than	  
it	  had	  been	  ten	  years	  earlier.61	  Real	  wages	  had	  deteriorated	  so	  much	  that	  one-­‐
quarter	  of	  working	  families	  in	  the	  Crescent	  City	  lived	  in	  poverty.62	  	  While	  federal	  
administrators	  continued	  to	  express	  the	  belief	  that	  state	  governments	  would	  direct	  
new	  revenue	  toward	  municipalities	  suffering	  from	  the	  loss	  of	  federal	  aid,	  state	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Alma	  H.	  Young	  and	  Jane	  S.	  Brooks,	  "Revitalising	  the	  Central	  Business	  District	  in	  
the	  face	  of	  decline:	  The	  case	  of	  New	  Orleans	  1973-­‐1993,"	  Town	  Planning	  Review	  64,	  no.	  3	  
(1993),	  256.	  
	  
60	  Marc	  H.	  Morial	  and	  Robert	  K.	  Whelan,	  "Privatizing	  Government	  Services	  in	  New	  
Orleans,"	  in	  Making	  Government	  Work:	  Lessons	  from	  America's	  Governors	  and	  Mayors	  
(Landham:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  Publishers,	  2000),	  215	  	  .	  
	  
61	  Kelly	  Frailing	  and	  Dee	  Wood	  Harper,	  "Crimes	  and	  Hurricanes	  in	  New	  Orleans,"	  in	  
The	  Sociology	  of	  Katrina:	  Perspectives	  on	  a	  Modern	  Catastrophe,	  ed.	  David	  L.	  Brunsma,	  David	  
Overfelt,	  Steven	  J.	  Picou	  and	  Carl	  L.	  Bankston	  III	  (New	  York	  City:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  
Publishers,	  2010),	  88.	  
	  
62	  Kevin	  Fox	  Gotham,	  "Tourism	  Gentrification:	  The	  case	  of	  New	  Orleans	  Vieux	  
Carre,"	  Urban	  Studies	  42,	  no.	  7	  (2005),	  1105.	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outlays	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  local	  revenues	  actually	  declined	  nationwide	  over	  the	  
course	  of	  two	  decades.63	  	  	  
	  
III.	  
In	  New	  Orleans,	  increased	  privatization	  prevented	  the	  municipal	  deficit	  
looming	  throughout	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  but	  it	  did	  so	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  alternative	  
goals	  of	  resource	  equity,	  redistribution,	  and	  social	  justice.	  Throughout	  the	  1970s,	  
the	  projects	  completed	  with	  community	  development	  funds	  in	  cities	  like	  New	  
Orleans	  allowed	  for	  small,	  incremental	  change	  in	  some	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods.	  
In	  the	  Crescent	  City,	  the	  funding	  paid	  for	  the	  paving	  of	  select	  roads	  in	  the	  Lower	  
Ninth	  Ward	  and	  Central	  City.	  In	  addition,	  the	  aid	  supported	  the	  renovation	  or	  
construction	  of	  nearly	  forty	  new	  playgrounds	  throughout	  the	  city	  and	  the	  CDBG	  
program	  allowed	  the	  continuation	  of	  Model	  Cities	  health	  care	  clinics	  and	  day	  care	  
centers.	  The	  forty-­‐odd	  neighborhoods	  included	  in	  Community	  Development	  by	  1980	  
surely	  benefited	  from	  the	  needed,	  albeit	  largely	  superficial,	  improvements	  to	  their	  
areas	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  1970s.	  However,	  though	  Community	  Development	  
Block	  Grants	  continued	  to	  fund	  important	  programs,	  the	  promise	  of	  economic	  and	  
political	  inclusion	  never	  materialized.	  At	  the	  most	  fundamental	  level,	  alleviating	  
poverty	  was	  no	  longer	  the	  goal.	  
	  	  The	  bifurcation	  of	  low-­‐income	  community	  development	  and	  the	  city’s	  
downtown	  economic	  development	  obscured	  the	  reality	  that	  new	  economic	  
strategies	  ignored	  and	  often	  displaced	  poverty	  populations.	  When	  leaders	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Peter	  Eisenger,	  "City	  Politics	  in	  an	  Era	  of	  Federal	  Devolution,"	  Urban	  Affairs	  
Review	  33	  (1998),	  310.	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attempted	  to	  utilize	  funds	  for	  more	  comprehensive	  projects	  like	  Heritage	  Square	  or	  
Almonaster-­‐Michoud,	  opposition	  from	  private	  investors	  who	  pointed	  to	  the	  
changing	  national	  economy	  compelled	  leadership	  to	  abandon	  redistributive	  efforts	  
in	  order	  to	  maintain	  private-­‐sector	  involvement.	  This	  situation	  undercut	  the	  
capacity	  of	  local	  leaders	  to	  enact	  substantive	  changes	  for	  their	  populaces.	  Instead,	  
more	  and	  more	  cities	  became	  sites	  of	  gross	  wealth	  disparities	  and	  rising	  inequities	  
in	  access	  to	  resources.	  	  
This	  process	  of	  urban	  decline	  was	  largely	  ignored	  in	  the	  mainstream	  
discourse	  on	  New	  Orleans	  until	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  On	  August	  28,	  2005,	  a	  Category	  5	  
storm	  crashed	  into	  the	  Gulf	  city.	  The	  storm	  surge	  breached	  the	  levies	  one	  by	  one;	  by	  
the	  next	  morning,	  close	  to	  80	  percent	  of	  the	  city	  was	  underwater.64	  Nearly	  1,000	  
people	  died;	  many	  more	  crowded	  into	  the	  once-­‐glittering	  Superdome	  waiting	  for	  aid	  
that	  was	  too	  late	  while	  still	  others	  evacuated.	  Journalists	  and	  pundits	  spoke	  in	  
horror	  of	  the	  dire	  poverty	  that	  exacerbated	  the	  storm’s	  devastation.	  But,	  in	  the	  
weeks	  and	  months	  after,	  little	  was	  done	  to	  repair	  the	  city’s	  infrastructure	  or	  to	  have	  
conversations	  about	  alleviating	  some	  of	  these	  conditions.	  Residents	  returned	  to	  
their	  homes	  to	  find	  them	  condemned	  or	  demolished;	  others	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  
return	  at	  all.	  There	  were	  some	  people,	  however,	  who	  saw	  the	  storm	  as	  offering	  a	  
tabula	  rasa.	  	  	  
In	  the	  wake	  of	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  New	  Orleans	  has	  become	  a	  workshop	  for	  
the	  most	  extreme	  forms	  of	  privatization.	  Quickly,	  planners	  scrambled	  to	  design	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  Daniel	  Swenson,	  Flash	  Flood:	  Hurricane	  Katrina's	  Innundation	  of	  New	  Orleans,	  
August	  29,	  2005,	  May	  14,	  2005,	  http://www.nola.com/katrina/graphics/flashflood.swf	  
(accessed	  January	  30,	  2014).	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new,	  market-­‐centered	  strategy	  for	  revitalizing	  the	  city.	  “Private	  entrepreneurial	  
activity	  and	  vision,	  not	  government,	  must	  be	  the	  engine	  for	  rebuilding,”	  analysts	  at	  
the	  conservative	  Heritage	  Foundation	  proclaimed.65	  Tracing	  the	  New	  Orleans	  
problem	  back	  to	  War	  on	  Poverty	  “handouts,”	  policy	  analysts	  believed	  that	  more	  
federal	  funds	  would	  only	  further	  damage	  the	  city’s	  ability	  to	  remake	  itself	  and	  its	  tax	  
base.66	  Instead,	  the	  redevelopment	  plans	  proposed	  in	  the	  subsequent	  months	  
suggested	  everything	  from	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  city’s	  footprint,	  excluding	  some	  of	  
the	  most	  devastated	  and	  poor	  neighborhoods,	  to	  new,	  more	  restrictive	  zoning	  
practices.67	  Canizaro	  informed	  reporters	  that,	  with	  the	  storm,	  “we	  have	  a	  clean	  sheet	  
to	  start	  again.	  And	  with	  that	  clean	  sheet,	  we	  have	  some	  very	  big	  opportunities.”68	  
For	  the	  real	  estate	  and	  bank	  mogul,	  who	  had	  spent	  the	  last	  thirty	  years	  advocating	  
for	  a	  middle	  class	  and	  tourist-­‐friendly	  New	  Orleans,	  the	  storm	  seemed	  to	  have	  
finally	  cleared	  out	  the	  city’s	  poorest	  neighborhoods.	  	  
	  That	  “clean	  sheet”	  appealed	  to	  others	  as	  well.	  Within	  months	  after	  the	  storm,	  
private	  planning	  firms	  and	  think	  tanks	  vied	  to	  direct	  the	  rebranding	  of	  Crescent	  City.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65Quoted	  in	  Jamie	  Peck,	  "Liberating	  the	  City:	  Between	  New	  York	  and	  New	  Orleans,"	  
Urban	  Geography	  27,	  no.	  8	  (2006),	  696.	  
	  
66	  Jamie	  Peck,	  "Liberating	  the	  City:	  Between	  New	  York	  and	  New	  Orleans,"	  702.	  	  
	  
67	  Marla	  Nelson,	  Ehrenfeucht	  and	  Shirley	  Laska,	  "Planning,	  Plans,	  and	  People:	  
Professional	  Expertise,	  Local	  Knwledge	  and	  Governmental	  Action	  in	  Post-­‐Katrina	  New	  
Orleans,"	  www.huduser.org,	  2007,	  
http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/cityscpe/vol9num3/ch2.html	  (accessed	  January	  30,	  
2014).	  	  
	  
68	  Prior	  to	  Katrina,	  the	  number	  of	  New	  Orleans	  neighborhoods	  with	  concentrated	  
poverty	  grew	  by	  almost	  70	  percent.	  See	  Elizabeth	  Fussell,	  Narayan	  Sastry	  and	  Mark	  
VanLandingham,	  "Race,	  Socioeconomic	  Status,	  and	  Return	  Migration	  to	  New	  Orleans	  after	  
Hurricane	  Katrina,"	  Population	  and	  Environment	  31,	  no.	  1-­‐3	  (2010),	  20-­‐42.	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In	  the	  minds	  of	  these	  outside	  interests,	  the	  city	  could	  be	  revitalized	  without	  the	  
pathologies	  that	  had	  been	  associated	  with	  the	  city’s	  past.69	  Key	  to	  any	  revitalization	  
effort	  was	  a	  renewed	  emphasis	  on	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  New	  Orleans	  culture	  that	  had	  
been	  central	  to	  the	  city’s	  tourism	  industry	  for	  the	  past	  forty	  years.	  It	  is	  a	  rhetoric	  
that	  has	  attracted	  young	  artists,	  teachers,	  and	  entrepreneurs	  to	  New	  Orleans	  over	  
the	  last	  few	  years.70	  New	  Orleans	  is	  now	  touted	  as	  an	  “untapped	  bohemia”	  where	  
residents	  measure	  their	  journey	  into	  the	  wild	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  “there	  is	  no	  kale.”71	  	  
Taking	  over	  abandoned	  "shotgun"	  houses	  in	  droves,	  gentrifiers—becoming	  what	  
geographer	  Richard	  Campanella	  calls	  "super-­‐natives"—lapped	  up	  the	  New	  Orleans	  
mystique,	  thus	  offering	  a	  twisted	  proof	  of	  the	  industry's	  "success."72	  	  	  
Gentrification,	  which	  in	  many	  cities	  often	  occurs	  amid	  tension	  and	  conflict,	  
has	  transformed	  neighborhoods	  in	  New	  Orleans	  virtually	  overnight.	  As	  gentrifiers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Young	  Teach	  for	  America	  fellows	  have	  become	  an	  unwitting	  force	  in	  this	  
privatization	  effort	  as	  the	  city	  turns	  its	  public	  school	  system	  into	  an	  all-­‐charter	  school	  
system.	  	  See	  Naomi	  Klein,	  The	  Shock	  Doctrine:	  The	  Rise	  of	  Disaster	  Capitalism	  (London:	  
Picador,	  2008).	  
	  
70	  Lizzy	  Goodman,	  "The	  City	  Through	  Newcomers'	  Eyes	  and	  Ears,"	  New	  York	  Times,	  
March	  9,	  2014,	  TR10.	  
	  
71	  Richard	  Campanella,	  “Gentrification	  and	  its	  discontents:	  Notes	  from	  New	  Orleans,”	  
New	  Geography,	  March	  1,	  2013,	  http://www.newgeography.com/content/003526-­‐
gentrification-­‐and-­‐its-­‐discontents-­‐notes-­‐new-­‐orleans	  (accessed	  February	  2,	  2014).	  For	  an	  
interesting	  discussion	  following	  Professor	  Campanella’s	  assertions	  in	  this	  piece,	  see	  C.	  W.	  
Cannon’s	  "Gentrification	  flap	  rooted	  in	  an	  older	  debate	  over	  New	  Orleans	  ‘exceptionalism’,"	  
The	  Lens	  ,	  April	  9,	  2013,	  http://thelensnola.org/2013/04/09/gentrification-­‐flap-­‐rooted-­‐in-­‐
an-­‐older-­‐debate-­‐over-­‐new-­‐orleans-­‐exceptionalism/	  (accessed	  February	  2,	  2014).	  See	  also	  
Tara	  Elders	  quoted	  in	  Lizzy	  Goodman,	  "The	  City	  Through	  Newcomers'	  Eyes	  and	  Ears,"	  New	  
York	  Times,	  March	  9,	  2014,	  TR10.	  
	  
72	  Richard	  Campanella,	  “Gentrification	  and	  its	  discontents:	  Notes	  from	  New	  Orleans,”	  
New	  Geography,	  March	  1,	  2013,	  http://www.newgeography.com/content/003526-­‐
gentrification-­‐and-­‐its-­‐discontents-­‐notes-­‐new-­‐orleans	  (accessed	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revel	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  “the	  cool	  places	  here	  are	  really	  rundown,”	  they	  ignore	  that	  
these	  were	  places	  in	  which	  people	  used	  to	  live.	  Thus,	  for	  new	  migrants,	  the	  “strange	  
feeling	  of	  homecoming”	  is	  only	  possible	  because	  there	  are	  those	  who	  could	  not	  come	  
“home.”73	  As	  a	  result	  of	  foreclosures	  and	  forced	  removal,	  gentrifiers	  now	  occupy	  
historically	  low-­‐income	  black	  neighborhoods	  without	  having	  to	  confront	  the	  
contradictions	  of	  their	  own	  liberalism.	  What	  has	  emerged	  in	  these	  areas—high-­‐	  
priced	  restaurants,	  speculative	  real	  estate	  prices,	  juice	  bars,	  and	  yoga	  studios—	  
continues	  to	  exclude	  and	  encroach	  on	  those	  residents	  who	  remain.	  	  	  	  
	  
IV.	  
Community	  Development	  Block	  Grants,	  though	  hardly	  the	  sole	  culprit	  in	  the	  
reorganization	  of	  the	  nation’s	  urban	  landscapes,	  distanced	  the	  federal	  government	  
from	  its	  responsibility	  to	  cities	  at	  a	  time	  when	  global	  economic	  restructuring	  
jeopardized	  the	  newly	  fought-­‐for	  mobility	  and	  rights	  of	  low-­‐income	  people	  of	  color.	  	  
Imagined	  through	  the	  project	  of	  physical	  development,	  and	  focused	  on	  blight,	  the	  
program	  minimized	  candid	  conversations	  about	  the	  structural	  poverty	  
(conversations	  admittedly	  that	  officials	  governing	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty	  may	  not	  have	  
wanted	  to	  encourage,	  but	  were	  happening	  nonetheless).	  As	  those	  conversations	  
were	  increasingly	  replaced	  with	  rhetoric	  concerned	  with	  fiscal	  revitalization,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73Michael	  Huisman	  quoted	  in	  Lizzy	  Goodman,	  "The	  City	  Through	  Newcomers'	  Eyes	  
and	  Ears,"	  New	  York	  Times,	  March	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  2014,	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community	  development,	  and	  its	  attendant	  philosophy,	  the	  stage	  was	  set	  for	  the	  
demise	  of	  the	  nation’s	  social	  welfare	  commitment.74	  	  
Unlike	  other	  cities,	  which	  used	  CDBG	  funds	  to	  build	  golf	  courses	  and	  tennis	  
courts,	  a	  majority	  of	  funding	  in	  New	  Orleans	  was	  used	  in	  moderate-­‐	  and	  low-­‐income	  
areas.	  Yet,	  that	  was	  not	  without	  cost.	  The	  program	  became	  a	  stopgap,	  diverting	  
attention	  away	  from	  structural	  economic	  changes	  that	  would	  inevitably	  worsen	  the	  
situation	  of	  low-­‐income	  residents.	  Though	  liberal	  city	  planners	  consistently	  
reaffirmed	  the	  inherent	  relationship	  between	  poverty,	  education,	  housing,	  and	  
access,	  the	  programs	  developed	  through	  the	  Community	  Development	  Block	  Grant	  
program	  almost	  never	  reflected	  a	  complex	  socioeconomic	  and	  structural	  analysis	  of	  
how	  to	  reverse	  inequality.	  Community	  development	  as	  physical	  development	  would	  
not	  alter	  wealth,	  resource,	  and	  education	  disparities,	  but	  officials	  often	  pretended	  it	  
would.	  
By	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  much	  of	  the	  community	  development—both	  physical	  and	  
through	  social	  services—in	  low-­‐income	  communities	  across	  the	  nation	  was	  
overseen	  by	  a	  range	  of	  nonprofits	  and	  community	  development	  corporations.	  	  
Where	  community	  development	  corporations	  are	  increasingly	  becoming	  the	  
service-­‐delivery	  arm	  of	  local	  governments,	  their	  work	  is	  challenged	  by	  their	  
susceptibility	  to	  shifts	  in	  local	  economies	  stimulated	  by	  middle-­‐class	  flight,	  federal	  
corporate	  and	  individual	  tax	  cuts,	  and	  the	  reduction	  of	  urban	  aid	  relief.75	  Low-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Kathe	  Newman	  and	  Robert	  W.	  Lake,	  "Democracy,	  Bureaucracy	  and	  Difference	  in	  
U.S.	  Community	  Development	  Politics,"	  Progress	  in	  Human	  Geography	  30,	  no.	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  (2006),	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75	  Kathe	  Newman	  and	  Robert	  W.	  Lake,	  "Democracy,	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  Difference	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  Community	  Development	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  48.	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income	  communities,	  unable	  to	  stave	  off	  economic	  disinvestment	  in	  their	  own	  
neighborhoods,	  have	  only	  become	  more	  reliant	  on	  city,	  state,	  and	  federal	  
governments	  for	  this	  relief.	  Thus,	  the	  organizations	  that	  represent	  those	  
neighborhoods	  are	  reluctant	  to	  be	  critical	  of	  state	  economic	  policies	  so	  as	  to	  not	  
jeopardize	  funding.76	  	  In	  those	  moments,	  without	  concerted	  pressure	  on	  city	  
governments,	  the	  basic	  demands	  of	  community	  organizations	  are	  simply	  dismissed	  
when	  they	  threaten	  the	  goals	  of	  private-­‐sector	  economic	  development.	  	  
	  	  While	  community	  organizations	  are	  ever	  more	  responsible	  for	  service	  
delivery,	  mechanisms	  for	  doing	  this	  work	  have	  been	  constrained.	  By	  the	  early	  1990s,	  
the	  infatuation	  with	  block	  grant	  aid	  and	  a	  market-­‐first	  approach	  to	  city	  
revitalization	  transcended	  both	  partisan	  and	  racial	  lines.77	  In	  fact,	  every	  
administration	  since	  President	  Nixon’s	  has	  heralded	  block	  grants	  as	  a	  means	  to	  
promote	  “development”	  and	  “efficiency,”	  phrases	  that	  have	  virtually	  replaced	  any	  
mention	  of	  poverty	  in	  discussions	  of	  urban	  issues.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  Clinton	  
administration,	  the	  president	  proposed	  consolidating	  another	  fifty-­‐five	  categorical	  
programs	  ranging	  from	  housing	  to	  education	  into	  state-­‐run	  block	  grants.78	  Claims	  
that	  block	  grants	  boost	  efficacy	  and	  transfer	  responsibility	  closer	  to	  the	  people	  make	  
it	  even	  more	  difficult	  to	  propose	  redistributive	  national	  urban	  policy	  or	  directives.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Randy	  Stoecker,	  "The	  CDC	  Model	  of	  Urban	  Redevelopment:	  A	  Critique	  and	  an	  
Alternative,"	  Journal	  of	  Urban	  Affairs	  19,	  no.	  1	  (1991),	  7.	  	  
	  
77	  Peter	  Eisenger,	  "City	  Politics	  in	  an	  Era	  of	  Federal	  Devolution,"	  Urban	  Affairs	  
Review	  33	  (1998),	  317.	  
	  
78	  Duane	  A.	  Martin,	  "The	  President	  and	  the	  Cities,"	  Urban	  Lawyer	  26	  (1994),	  139.	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In	  New	  Orleans,	  perhaps	  more	  than	  in	  other	  struggling	  American	  cities,	  the	  
efforts	  of	  city	  administrators	  to	  provide	  comprehensive	  low-­‐income	  community	  
development	  have	  been	  circumscribed	  not	  only	  by	  federal	  legislation,	  but	  by	  state	  
government	  as	  well.	  	  In	  general,	  state	  governments,	  subject	  to	  powerful	  suburban	  
constituencies,	  exercise	  profound	  discretion	  over	  the	  way	  funding	  is	  utilized	  and	  
where	  it	  goes.	  Often	  this	  means	  that	  cities	  like	  New	  Orleans,	  where	  inequality	  
appears	  most	  starkly,	  receive	  disproportionately	  lower	  aid	  in	  relation	  to	  wealthier,	  
less	  needy	  parishes	  and	  counties.	  In	  New	  Orleans,	  the	  rejection	  of	  tax	  equalization	  
and	  municipal	  income	  levies	  along	  with	  the	  1982	  approval	  of	  the	  ludicrous	  
homestead	  exemption	  increase	  have	  only	  further	  handicapped	  city	  efforts	  to	  pursue	  
diverse	  economic	  and	  community	  development	  strategies.	  Other	  cities	  like	  New	  
York	  and	  Boston,	  which	  have	  more	  progressive	  tax	  measures,	  have	  also	  had	  more	  
resources	  by	  which	  to	  provide	  redistributive	  resources	  to	  low-­‐income	  communities.	  
However,	  as	  federal	  oversight	  lessens,	  we	  see	  that	  the	  peculiar	  relationship	  between	  
cities	  and	  states	  constrains	  this	  ability	  just	  as	  much	  as	  federal	  policy.79	  As	  a	  result,	  
cities,	  responding	  to	  the	  contraction	  of	  urban	  aid,	  are	  forced	  to	  do	  more	  with	  less.	  
Without	  federal	  funding,	  the	  fiscal	  crises	  facing	  cities	  have	  facilitated	  a	  shift,	  at	  both	  
the	  local	  and	  state	  government	  levels,	  away	  from	  supporting	  comprehensive	  
community-­‐level	  economic	  development.	  	  
Although	  community-­‐level	  redevelopment	  projects	  garnered	  far	  less	  support	  
than	  those	  bringing	  millions	  of	  dollars	  into	  downtown	  development,	  there	  is	  no	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  A	  recent	  illustration	  of	  this	  relationship	  is	  found	  in	  New	  York	  City	  Mayor	  de	  
Blasio’s	  proposal	  to	  tax	  wealthy	  residents	  to	  provide	  the	  means	  for	  universal	  pre-­‐
kindergarten.	  Yet	  without	  the	  approval	  of	  Governor	  Cuomo,	  who	  has	  vowed	  to	  not	  allow	  
this	  to	  happen,	  de	  Blasio	  has	  no	  authority	  to	  enact	  this	  change.	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assurance	  that	  the	  situation	  would	  have	  been	  different	  had	  mayors	  in	  New	  Orleans	  
invested	  more	  into	  those	  channels.	  The	  changing	  demographics	  of	  the	  American	  
landscape,	  the	  shifts	  in	  the	  global	  economy,	  the	  anti-­‐tax	  attitude	  of	  the	  city’s	  wealthy,	  
and	  structurally	  compounded	  racism	  made	  substantive	  change	  in	  low-­‐income	  areas	  
of	  New	  Orleans	  difficult.	  The	  dramatic	  shift	  in	  federal	  policy	  and	  rhetoric,	  where	  
redistribution	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  goal,	  challenged	  the	  ability	  of	  city	  administrators	  and	  
community	  organizations	  to	  revitalize	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods.	  	  These	  efforts	  
were	  also	  challenged	  by	  the	  failure	  of	  city	  departments	  to	  provide	  the	  same	  level	  of	  
commitment	  to	  low-­‐income	  neighborhoods	  as	  they	  did	  to	  middle	  class	  areas.	  
However,	  local	  officials	  increasingly	  pursued	  policies	  focused	  on	  luring	  a	  middle	  
class	  back	  into	  cities,	  providing	  channels	  to	  promote	  gentrification	  and	  broad	  
reliance	  on	  the	  private	  sector.	  Such	  investments	  rarely	  expand	  opportunity	  in	  low-­‐
income	  neighborhoods.	  	  	  
Though	  strategies	  of	  this	  nature	  were	  pursued	  in	  most	  US	  cities,	  some	  city	  
governments	  have	  utilized	  simultaneously	  limited	  resources	  to	  safeguard	  the	  
bargaining	  power	  of	  low-­‐income	  community	  organizations	  against	  the	  rising	  tide	  of	  
neo-­‐liberalism.	  With	  grassroots	  support,	  the	  city	  of	  Oakland,	  California,	  demanded	  
community	  stipulations	  from	  real	  estate	  developers.	  Thus,	  while	  building	  a	  Hyatt	  
Hotel	  as	  part	  of	  a	  downtown	  strategy,	  government	  officials	  ensured	  that	  the	  return	  
on	  the	  UDAG	  loan	  would	  go	  to	  a	  revolving	  fund	  to	  be	  used	  solely	  on	  neighborhood-­‐
centered	  projects.80	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Norman	  Krumholz,	  "Equitable	  Approaches	  to	  Economic	  Development,"	  Policy	  
Studies	  Journal	  27,	  no.	  1	  (1999),	  88.	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Yet	  progressive	  mayors	  alone	  do	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  uphold	  
redistributive	  policies,	  particularly	  if	  those	  actions	  are	  not	  supported	  by	  federal	  
urban	  policy	  and	  certainly	  not	  in	  moments	  of	  economic	  upheaval.	  While	  community	  
groups	  across	  the	  nation	  were	  largely	  left	  out	  of	  CDBG	  decision-­‐making,	  collectives	  
in	  some	  cities	  have	  won	  a	  voice,	  however	  unequal,	  in	  how	  funding	  is	  distributed.81	  	  
Boston’s	  Dudley	  Street	  Neighborhood	  Initiative	  (DSNI)	  is	  one	  such	  
community-­‐based	  project	  that	  was	  able	  to	  make	  demands	  on	  the	  city,	  influencing	  
the	  mechanics	  of	  community	  economic	  development	  and	  even	  controlling	  funding.	  	  
Responding	  to	  the	  encroachment	  of	  city-­‐sponsored	  gentrification,	  residents	  of	  the	  
low-­‐income	  Roxbury	  area	  of	  Boston	  demanded	  a	  voice	  in	  the	  planning	  effort.	  While	  
city	  interests	  wanted	  to	  utilize	  Dudley	  Street	  as	  a	  corridor	  for	  new	  development,	  
neighborhood	  groups	  insisted	  that	  the	  city	  respond	  to	  the	  dilapidation	  of	  services	  
and	  resources	  for	  existing	  residents.	  The	  DSNI	  hired	  planners	  to	  devise	  a	  
community-­‐envisioned,	  community–led	  redevelopment	  effort	  and	  successfully	  won	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  The	  shift	  from	  community-­‐run	  action	  programs	  to	  mayor-­‐controlled	  block	  grants	  
diminished	  the	  capacity	  of	  low-­‐income	  residents	  to	  affect	  change	  in	  comprehensive	  ways.	  
The	  use	  of	  neighborhood-­‐based	  funding	  distribution	  undercut	  broad-­‐based	  coalitions	  from	  
developing	  around	  structural	  socioeconomic	  divides	  in	  the	  city.	  There	  are	  many	  theories	  as	  
to	  why	  New	  Orleans	  community	  groups	  were	  unable	  to	  achieve	  a	  larger	  voice	  in	  community	  
development	  planning	  during	  the	  1970s:	  A	  lack	  of	  previous	  participation	  in	  federal	  
programs	  meant	  there	  was	  not	  the	  widespread	  insurgence	  of	  community	  groups	  fighting	  
against	  urban	  renewal	  and	  other	  programs;	  the	  geography	  of	  the	  city	  itself	  gave	  natural	  rise	  
to	  neighborhood-­‐based	  collectives	  with	  distinct	  identities;	  the	  public	  housing	  population,	  
which	  made	  up	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  poverty	  population,	  was	  not	  allowed	  to	  have	  
tenant	  organizations	  until	  1974;	  and	  the	  city’s	  civil	  rights	  and	  black	  political	  organizations	  
competed	  for	  access	  to	  political	  power	  and	  financial	  backing.	  While	  intra-­‐city	  dynamics	  
shaped	  the	  terrain	  on	  which	  community	  development	  programs	  were	  deployed,	  the	  nature	  
of	  the	  program	  itself	  discouraged	  community	  engagement,	  thus	  making	  collective	  influence	  
harder	  to	  achieve.	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control	  of	  the	  area.82	  While	  grassroots	  power	  remained	  unequal	  to	  that	  of	  private-­‐	  
sector	  development	  forces,	  the	  presence	  of	  determined	  coalitions	  forced	  the	  city	  of	  
Boston	  to	  redevelop	  in	  ways	  that	  conformed	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  residents.	  	  	  
It	  has	  only	  been	  with	  the	  pressure	  (and	  support)	  of	  strong	  grassroots	  civic	  
and	  collective	  action	  that	  low-­‐income	  communities	  have	  gained	  access	  to	  tangible	  
benefits.	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Dudley	  Street	  Initiative	  or	  work	  done	  by	  tenant	  
organizations	  in	  New	  York	  City	  public	  housing,	  where	  community	  organizations	  
have	  become	  powerfully	  vested	  interest	  groups,	  low-­‐income	  residents	  have	  been	  
able	  to	  push	  back	  against	  the	  wholesale	  destruction	  of	  social	  welfare	  policy	  in	  
American	  cities.83	  While	  the	  nation’s	  political	  economy	  continues	  to	  limit	  available	  
choices,	  these	  movements—although	  often	  unable	  to	  provide	  structural	  change—
continue	  to	  force	  local	  governing	  agents	  to	  reckon	  with	  the	  way	  they	  interact	  with	  
low-­‐income	  communities.	  Where	  low-­‐income	  communities	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  
form	  alliances	  with	  progressive	  local	  officials	  or	  develop	  coalitions	  across	  grassroots	  
organizations,	  local	  concessions	  are	  more	  often	  given	  in	  the	  form	  of	  political	  
patronage.	  In	  this	  way,	  low-­‐income	  constituencies	  continue	  to	  be	  excluded	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  In	  this	  way,	  organizations	  like	  the	  Dudley	  Street	  Initiative	  have	  forced	  the	  city’s	  
hand.	  	  They	  are	  now	  operators	  of	  the	  only	  permanent	  low-­‐income	  housing	  in	  the	  city.	  	  
Subsequently,	  Boston	  has	  given	  the	  organization	  power	  of	  eminent	  domain	  to	  build	  more	  
low-­‐income	  housing	  on	  abandoned	  lots.	  See	  Jonathan	  Greeley,	  The	  Roxbury	  strategic	  master	  
plan	  oversight	  committee:	  A	  case	  study	  of	  empowered	  participatory	  governance.,	  MA	  Thesis,	  
Tufts	  University	  (Medford:	  Proquest	  Dissertations	  and	  Theses,	  2007).	  
	  
83	  For	  an	  in-­‐depth	  discussion	  of	  this	  question	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  black	  mayors	  in	  
particular,	  see	  J.	  Philip	  Thompson,	  Double	  Trouble:	  Black	  Mayors,	  Black	  Communities,	  and	  the	  
Call	  for	  a	  Deep	  Democracy	  (New	  York	  City,	  NY:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005).	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gaining	  a	  substantive	  and	  sustained	  commitment	  to	  a	  seat	  at	  the	  table.	  This	  has	  
indeed	  been	  true	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  
Everywhere,	  cities	  are	  more	  and	  more	  beholden	  to	  private	  interests	  while	  
progressive	  governments	  and	  their	  low-­‐income	  constituencies	  have	  fewer	  tools	  
with	  which	  to	  push	  back.	  Within	  the	  confines	  of	  block	  grant	  legislation,	  these	  efforts	  
can	  only	  go	  so	  far	  to	  buffer	  low-­‐income	  communities	  against	  the	  onslaught	  of	  rapid	  
private	  development	  and	  constricted	  opportunities	  for	  decent	  jobs	  and	  education.	  
Without	  strong	  federal	  policy	  in	  place	  that	  allows	  local	  governments	  to	  advocate	  for	  
redistributive	  measures,	  as	  John	  Pecoul	  argued	  for	  in	  1975,	  the	  likelihood	  that	  such	  
measures	  will	  be	  achieved	  in	  cities,	  particularly	  those	  like	  New	  Orleans,	  is	  
implausible.	  Yet,	  throughout	  our	  history,	  progressive	  federal	  policy	  has	  been	  the	  
result	  of	  sustained	  collective	  action.	  It	  is	  the	  people’s	  action	  that	  moves	  government	  
to	  enforce	  issues	  of	  equity,	  not	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  A	  reinvestment	  in	  issues	  of	  
urban	  equality	  will	  necessitate	  that	  mobilization.	  	  	  
This	  year,	  we	  enter	  the	  fiftieth	  year	  since	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty.	  
Eight	  years	  after	  Katrina,	  with	  only	  76	  percent	  of	  the	  city’s	  population	  returned,	  the	  
poverty	  rate	  in	  New	  Orleans	  hovers	  around	  29	  percent,	  slightly	  higher	  than	  it	  was	  
fifty	  years	  earlier.84	  In	  marking	  this	  anniversary,	  an	  editorial	  released	  by	  the	  
Heartland	  Institute	  echoed	  the	  language	  repeated	  by	  Nixon,	  and	  then	  again	  by	  
Reagan;	  the	  author	  asserted	  that	  it	  was	  actually	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty	  that	  provided	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  Marc	  Waller,	  "Hurricane	  Katrina	  eight	  years	  later,	  a	  statistical	  snapshot	  of	  the	  
New	  Orleans	  area,"	  www.nola.	  com,	  August	  28,	  2013,	  
http://www.nola.com/katrina/index.ssf/2013/08/hurricane_katrina_eight_years.html	  
(accessed	  January	  30,	  2014).	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the	  “core	  of	  America’s	  poverty	  crisis.”85	  Rather,	  what	  seems	  true	  is	  that	  the	  war	  on	  
the	  War	  on	  Poverty	  has	  succeeded	  through	  a	  slow,	  deliberate	  shift	  in	  policy	  and	  
rhetoric	  that	  has	  privileged	  the	  market	  over	  people.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Nancy	  Thorner,	  Somewhat	  Reasonable,	  The	  Heartland	  Institute,	  January	  16,	  2014,	  
http://blog.heartland.org/2014/01/lbjs-­‐great-­‐society-­‐programs-­‐at-­‐the-­‐core-­‐of-­‐nations-­‐
poverty/	  (accessed	  January	  17,	  2014).	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Young,	  Alma	  H.,	  and	  Jane	  S.	  Brooks.	  "Revitalising	  the	  Central	  Business	  District	  in	  the	  
Face	  of	  Decline:	  The	  case	  of	  New	  Orleans	  1973-­‐1993."	  Town	  Planning	  Review	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Appendix	  1:	  Blight	  Index	  for	  Second	  Year	  Community	  Development	  Program,	  New	  
Orleans	  (1976)	  
	  
Neighborhood	  Name	  	   Blight	  Index	  Rating	   Income	  Index	  Rating	  	  
Florida	  Project	   Severe	   Severe	  
Holy	  Cross	   Severe	   Endangered	  (-­‐)	  
Calliope	  Project	   Severe	   Severe	  
Tulane/Gravier	   Severe	   Severe	  
Desire	  Project	   Severe	   Severe	  
Iberville	  Project	   Severe	   Critical	  
St.	  Bernard	  Area	   Severe	   Severe	  
St.	  Thomas	  Project	   Severe	   Severe	  
Fischer	  Project	   Severe	   Severe	  
Lower	  Ninth	  Ward	   Severe	   Severe	  
St.	  Claude	   Severe	   Severe	  
Central	  City/Magnolia	   Severe	   Severe	  
McDonough	   Severe	   Severe	  
Gertown/Zion	  City	   Severe	   Severe	  
	   	   	  
Sixth	  Ward	   Endangered	   Severe	  
Freret	   Endangered	   Endangered	  (-­‐)	  
Seventh	  Ward	   Endangered	   Severe	  
Florida	  Area	   Endangered	   Endangered	  (-­‐)	  
Algiers-­‐Whitney	   Endangered	   Severe	  
	   	   	  
St.	  Roch	   Endangered	   Severe	  
Fairgrounds/Broad	   Endangered	   Endangered	  (-­‐)	  
Leonidas/West	  Carrollton	   Endangered	   Endangered	  (-­‐)	  
East	  Riverside	   Endangered	   Severe	  
Black	  Pearl	   Endangered	   Endangered	  (-­‐)	  
Milan	   Endangered	   Endangered	  (-­‐)	  
St.	  Thomas	   Endangered	   Endangered	  (-­‐)	  
Mid	  City	  (Census	  Tract	  71)	   Endangered	   Severe	  
Plum	  Orchard	   Endangered	   Endangered	  (-­‐)	  
Algiers	  Point	   Endangered	   Severe	  
Hollygrove	   Endangered	   Endangered	  (-­‐)	  
Irish	  Channel	   Endangered	   Severe	  
Broadmoor	  PIP	   Endangered	   Endangered	  (-­‐)	  
Desire	   Endangered	   Severe	  
Bywater	  	   Endangered	   Severe	  
	   	   	  
Dixon	   Endangered	   Severe	  
	  
Source:	  Adapted	  from	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Analysis,	  New	  Orleans.	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Appendix	  2:	  Federal	  Aid	  Contribution	  to	  the	  New	  Orleans	  Capital	  Budget,	  1970-­‐1980	  
	  
	  
YEAR	   TOTAL	  CAPITAL	  
BUDGET	  
PERCENT	  DERIVED	  
FROM	  FEDERAL	  FUNDS	  
1970	   $1,245,674	   7.09	  
1971	   $5,471,658	   15.02	  
1972	   $7,927,010	   19.35	  
1973	   $6,867,180	   12.76	  
1974	   $21,627,891	   58.56	  
1975	   $15,915,283	   36.77	  
1976	   $14,376,993	   43.11	  
1977	   $19,469,442	   22.68	  
1978	   $27,038,941	   56.94	  
1979	   $27,567,803	   58.12	  
1980	   $61,329,493	   84.54	  
Adapted	  from	  New	  Orleans,	  “The	  Dynamics	  of	  Growth,	  1980.”	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Appendix	  3:	  Unemployment	  Rate,	  New	  Orleans	  1960-­‐1990	  
	  
	  
	   1960	   1970	   1980	   1990	  
Unemployment	  
Rate	  
5.5	   5.7	   7.0	   12.4	  
Unemployment	  
Rate,	  White	  
3.9	   4.1	   4.0	   3.0	  
Unemployment	  
Rate,	  Black	  
8.7	   8.3	   10.1	   17.8	  
	  
Adapted	  from	  US	  Bureau	  of	  Census,	  1960-­‐1990	  
